Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

TCRP LRD 58 25 the act of grabbing it and pulling it behind her back (her version of events), then a reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is warranted: the force that seized her is the force that injured her, and it would be for Daniella to demonstrate that a reasonable officer would not have used that degree of force.322 However, if Daniella were “injured when Officer Cantella accidentally fell on her as she struggled to avoid arrest (his ver- sion), no Fourth Amendment rights have been trampled, be- cause the officer did not intend to bring her under his control by falling on her; falling on her was not the means that Officer Cantella used to seize her.”323 The jury found that Officer Cantella was negligent, but it was not known “precisely what aspect of Officer Cantella’s conduct [the jury] found to be negligent.”324 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts remanded the case for a new trial on Daniella’s claim that Officer Cantella’s use of excessive force violated her civil rights under § 1983. The trial court “could not properly direct a verdict on the excessive force claim based on the jury’s verdict on the negligence claim.”325 C. Use of Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity Section III of the digest discusses when officers are not liable for their actions on the ground of qualified immunity. In some cases, police officers may have qualified immunity in a § 1983 case in which a plaintiff alleges that he or she was subjected to a use of force that was excessive under the circumstances. For ex- ample, in Cutchin v. District of Columbia,326 supra, in which the officers allegedly used excessive force, the court found that, after his arrest, “Cutchin, through his own volition, moved approxi- mately the length of a bus after he had been handcuffed….”327 Within seconds, what began as the arrest of a cooperative suspect for a minor offense turned into much more: a fleeing suspect who disobeyed the officers’ commands, continued to struggle even after being taken to the ground, and who was trying to move his hands to a part of his body where a handgun was observed by [Officer] Muñoz. Based on these events, the officers were entitled to respond in the manner … they did.328 The court held that the officers had qualified immunity for their necessary use of force “to effectuate” Cutchin’s arrest.329 In Figueroa v. Miami-Dade County,330 supra, Officer Huerta was entitled to qualified immunity, because there was no evi- dence “that Huerta used more than de minimis force to arrest” Figueroa. 322 Id., 437 Mass. at 402, 772 N.E.2d at 559. 323 Id. 324 Id. 325 Id. 326 369 F. Supp.3d 108 (D.C. D.C. 2019). 327 Id. at 125 (citations omitted). 328 Id. at 126 (citations omitted). 329 Id. at 127 (citation omitted). 330 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78809, at * 14. See also, Moroughan, 514 F. Supp.3d at 527 (stating that a court “must inquire about the totality of the circumstances….”). For example, without prior warning or threat of arrest, the offi- cers grabbed Fuller by the wrist, lifted him off the ground from behind, and tased him “all in a matter of 23 seconds as he was calmly standing still.”312 Third, Fuller, who was not resisting arrest, was “noncombative and non-violent.”313 The court held that, under those circumstances, “a reason- able jury could find that Plaintiff Fuller posed no immediate threat to the safety of the officers….”314 In the Eleventh Circuit “‘non-violent suspects, accused of minor crimes, who have not resisted arrest … are victims of constitutional abuse when police used extreme force to subdue them.’”315 In addition, a reason- able jury could find that the defendants “acted with actual mal- ice or intent to injure because they used extreme physical force against Plaintiff….”316 In another case alleging the use of excessive force, Gutierrez v. Mass. Transp. Auth.,317 the plaintiffs, two sisters (Daniella and Dominque Gutierrez), brought an action against the defen- dants Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), four MBTA officers in their individual capacity, and two other individuals for civil rights violations and personal injuries that resulted from the plaintiffs’ arrests for trespassing. Daniella alleged that Officer Cantella violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force during her arrest.318 The court stated that [t]he Fourth Amendment provides the appropriate constitutional standard when the claim arises out of excessive force used during an arrest. ... That amendment guarantees the right to be “‘secure … against unreasonable … seizures’ of the person.” … Fourth Amend- ment liability is possible only when a “seizure” has occurred.319 First, “[t]o prove a violation of § 1983, Daniella had to “dem- onstrate that the defendant deprived her of a Federal constitu- tional or statutory right while acting under color of State law.”320 Second, Daniella’s claim had to be “‘judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right rather than to some generalized excessive force standard.’”321 While arresting Daniella, Officer Cantella took Daniella into his control through a “means in- tentionally applied” -- he grabbed her arm. If he broke her arm by 312 Id. at *13-14. 313 Id. at *14. 314 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 315 Id. at *21 (citation omitted). 316 Id. at *24. See Fuller v. MARTA, 810 Fed. Appx. 781, at *1 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendants’ (the transit authority and two officers) appeal of the denial of their motion for summary judgment based on grounds of qualified and official immunity). See also, Kirk, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *30, 32 (stating that Officer Rocket’s “aggressive actions inspired a rea- sonable apprehension of offensive contact” that resulted in a battery and that there was no need for the officers, when confronting an unarmed suspect in a small office, “to undertake extraordinary measures in order to preserve evidence or ensure the officers’ safety”) (citation omitted). 317 437 Mass. 396, 772 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 2002). 318 Id., 437 Mass. at 400, 772 N.E.2d at 558. 319 Id., 437 Mass. at 401, 772 N.E.2d at 559 (citation omitted). 320 Id., 437 Mass. at 401, 772 N.E.2d at 558 (citations omitted). 321 Id. (citation omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted).