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26 TCRP LRD 58 A claim for malicious abuse of process exists against ââa defen- dant who (1) employs regularly issued legal process to compel performance or forbearance of some act (2) with intent to do harm without excuse or justification, and (3) in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process.ââ337 In Marshall, supra, the plaintiff did not present âany evidence that the officers had an âimproper motive or pursued a collateral purpose outside the legitimate ends of process;ââ thus, the court granted the defendantsâ motion for a summary judg- ment on Marshallâs claim for malicious abuse of process.338 However, in contrast to a malicious prosecution claim, for which an element of proof is that there was an absence of proba- ble cause, a claim for malicious abuse of process does not require proof that probable cause was lacking.339 Thus, in Gutierrez v. Mass. Transp. Auth.,340 supra, the court held that a finding that there was probable cause was not relevant to an abuse of process claim.341 [T]here was enough evidence for the jury to conclude that the defen- dant officers sought to initiate proceedings against the plaintiffs for an improper purpose. ⦠The jury could infer that the officersâ reports intentionally exaggerated the gravity of the situation so that the pros- ecutor would be more likely to press charges. Probable cause at the time of the arrest does not equate necessarily with subjective good faith in filling out an arrest report at a later time. By the time the arrest reports were being prepared, the officers were aware of the extent of Daniellaâs injuries, and the desire to see the plaintiffs prosecuted could be interpreted as a preemptive maneuver in anticipation of tort and civil rights claims.342 The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the plaintiff âs claim for abuse of process.343 In another case, Pottinger v. Miami,344 a class action alleg- ing, inter alia, that the City of Miami had routinely seized and destroyed the plaintiffsâ personal property, one of the plaintiffsâ claims was for malicious abuse of process. The plaintiffs alleged âthat the City, through its police department, has used its legiti- mate arrest process for the unlawful purpose of harassing and intimidating homeless individuals to purge them from streets and parks.â345 A malicious abuse of process claim is tenable when a âprosecution is initiated legitimately but is thereafter used for a purpose other than that intended by the law.â346 Nevertheless, in Pottinger, the court held that, even if the city used the arrest process to harass and disperse the home- less, the cityâs âulterior purpose alone is an insufficient basis for an abuse of process claimâ¦.â347 Rather, â[s]ome definite act or 337 Marshall, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172567, at *21-22 (citation omitted). 338 Id. at *22 (citation omitted). 339 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1566 (citations omitted). 340 437 Mass. 396, 772 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 2002). 341 Id., 437 Mass. at 407-408, 772 N.E.2d at 563. 342 Id., 437 Mass. at 408, 772 N.E.2d at 563 (emphasis supplied). 343 Id., 437 Mass. at 409, 772 N.E.2d at 564. 344 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 345 Id. at 1565 (footnote omitted). 346 Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 347 Id. at 1568. VIII. LIABILITY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN § 1983 ACTIONS FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION OR ABUSE OF PROCESS A. Elements of a § 1983 Action for Malicious Prosecution A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution requires a plain- tiff to prove that the defendant initiated or continued a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff for which there was no prob- able cause; that actual malice motivated the defendantâs actions; and that the criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff âs favor.331 In Kirk, supra, the court stated that a § 1983 action also requires proof of another elementââthe existence of a post- arraignment deprivation of liberty rising to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation.â332 A § 1983 case for malicious prosecution may be viable when evidence emerges later that probable cause was lacking, yet the police and/or the prosecutor continued to pursue the criminal case. In Moroughan, the court stated that [i]n cases where the police had probable cause to arrest, in order to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that âauthorities became aware of exculpatory evidence between the time of the arrest and the subsequent prosecution that would undermine the probable cause which supported the arrest.â333 In Figueroa v. Miami-Dade County,334 supra, the court ruled that Officer Huerta was entitled to a summary judgment on the plaintiff âs § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. A claim for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to âprove the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution and a viola- tion of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreason- able seizures.â335 There was no evidence that Officer Huerta was involved in the State Attorneyâs officeâs decision to prosecute Huerta.336 B. Elements of a § 1983 Action for Malicious Abuse of Process In a § 1983 action for malicious abuse of process, a plain- tiff must prove that legal process was used for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose that resulted in an injury to the plaintiff. 331 Moroughan, 514 F. Supp.3d at 522. See also, Marshall, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172567, at *1, 15, 16 (citations omitted) (stating that for Marshallâs claim for malicious prosecution against Officers Mathews and Gallaher under § 1983 and New York law, Marshall had âto demon- strate: â(i) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding against [him]; (ii) the termination of the proceeding in [his] favor; (iii) that there was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (iv) that the proceeding was instituted with malice,ââ as well as âdemonstrate a post- arraignment deprivation of liberty sufficient to implicate his Fourth Amendment rightsâ) (citations omitted). 332 Kirk, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *43 (citations omitted). 333 Moroughan, 514 F. Supp.3d at 524 (citations omitted). 334 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78809, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 335 Id. at *14-15 (citation omitted). 336 Id. at *15. See also, Laster, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at *11.
TCRP LRD 58 25 the act of grabbing it and pulling it behind her back (her version of events), then a reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is warranted: the force that seized her is the force that injured her, and it would be for Daniella to demonstrate that a reasonable officer would not have used that degree of force.322 However, if Daniella were âinjured when Officer Cantella accidentally fell on her as she struggled to avoid arrest (his ver- sion), no Fourth Amendment rights have been trampled, be- cause the officer did not intend to bring her under his control by falling on her; falling on her was not the means that Officer Cantella used to seize her.â323 The jury found that Officer Cantella was negligent, but it was not known âprecisely what aspect of Officer Cantellaâs conduct [the jury] found to be negligent.â324 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts remanded the case for a new trial on Daniellaâs claim that Officer Cantellaâs use of excessive force violated her civil rights under § 1983. The trial court âcould not properly direct a verdict on the excessive force claim based on the juryâs verdict on the negligence claim.â325 C. Use of Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity Section III of the digest discusses when officers are not liable for their actions on the ground of qualified immunity. In some cases, police officers may have qualified immunity in a § 1983 case in which a plaintiff alleges that he or she was subjected to a use of force that was excessive under the circumstances. For ex- ample, in Cutchin v. District of Columbia,326 supra, in which the officers allegedly used excessive force, the court found that, after his arrest, âCutchin, through his own volition, moved approxi- mately the length of a bus after he had been handcuffedâ¦.â327 Within seconds, what began as the arrest of a cooperative suspect for a minor offense turned into much more: a fleeing suspect who disobeyed the officersâ commands, continued to struggle even after being taken to the ground, and who was trying to move his hands to a part of his body where a handgun was observed by [Officer] Muñoz. Based on these events, the officers were entitled to respond in the manner ⦠they did.328 The court held that the officers had qualified immunity for their necessary use of force âto effectuateâ Cutchinâs arrest.329 In Figueroa v. Miami-Dade County,330 supra, Officer Huerta was entitled to qualified immunity, because there was no evi- dence âthat Huerta used more than de minimis force to arrestâ Figueroa. 322 Id., 437 Mass. at 402, 772 N.E.2d at 559. 323 Id. 324 Id. 325 Id. 326 369 F. Supp.3d 108 (D.C. D.C. 2019). 327 Id. at 125 (citations omitted). 328 Id. at 126 (citations omitted). 329 Id. at 127 (citation omitted). 330 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78809, at * 14. See also, Moroughan, 514 F. Supp.3d at 527 (stating that a court âmust inquire about the totality of the circumstancesâ¦.â). For example, without prior warning or threat of arrest, the offi- cers grabbed Fuller by the wrist, lifted him off the ground from behind, and tased him âall in a matter of 23 seconds as he was calmly standing still.â312 Third, Fuller, who was not resisting arrest, was ânoncombative and non-violent.â313 The court held that, under those circumstances, âa reason- able jury could find that Plaintiff Fuller posed no immediate threat to the safety of the officersâ¦.â314 In the Eleventh Circuit âânon-violent suspects, accused of minor crimes, who have not resisted arrest ⦠are victims of constitutional abuse when police used extreme force to subdue them.ââ315 In addition, a reason- able jury could find that the defendants âacted with actual mal- ice or intent to injure because they used extreme physical force against Plaintiffâ¦.â316 In another case alleging the use of excessive force, Gutierrez v. Mass. Transp. Auth.,317 the plaintiffs, two sisters (Daniella and Dominque Gutierrez), brought an action against the defen- dants Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), four MBTA officers in their individual capacity, and two other individuals for civil rights violations and personal injuries that resulted from the plaintiffsâ arrests for trespassing. Daniella alleged that Officer Cantella violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force during her arrest.318 The court stated that [t]he Fourth Amendment provides the appropriate constitutional standard when the claim arises out of excessive force used during an arrest. ... That amendment guarantees the right to be ââsecure ⦠against unreasonable ⦠seizuresâ of the person.â ⦠Fourth Amend- ment liability is possible only when a âseizureâ has occurred.319 First, â[t]o prove a violation of § 1983, Daniella had to âdem- onstrate that the defendant deprived her of a Federal constitu- tional or statutory right while acting under color of State law.â320 Second, Daniellaâs claim had to be ââjudged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right rather than to some generalized excessive force standard.ââ321 While arresting Daniella, Officer Cantella took Daniella into his control through a âmeans in- tentionally appliedâ -- he grabbed her arm. If he broke her arm by 312 Id. at *13-14. 313 Id. at *14. 314 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 315 Id. at *21 (citation omitted). 316 Id. at *24. See Fuller v. MARTA, 810 Fed. Appx. 781, at *1 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendantsâ (the transit authority and two officers) appeal of the denial of their motion for summary judgment based on grounds of qualified and official immunity). See also, Kirk, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *30, 32 (stating that Officer Rocketâs âaggressive actions inspired a rea- sonable apprehension of offensive contactâ that resulted in a battery and that there was no need for the officers, when confronting an unarmed suspect in a small office, âto undertake extraordinary measures in order to preserve evidence or ensure the officersâ safetyâ) (citation omitted). 317 437 Mass. 396, 772 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 2002). 318 Id., 437 Mass. at 400, 772 N.E.2d at 558. 319 Id., 437 Mass. at 401, 772 N.E.2d at 559 (citation omitted). 320 Id., 437 Mass. at 401, 772 N.E.2d at 558 (citations omitted). 321 Id. (citation omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted).