Policing and Public Transportation (2022)

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TCRP LRD 58 31 lation where the need for training was patently obvious.”417 The court held that the plaintiff had provided “sufficient evidence” on which a reasonable jury could find that Jackson Township, not only was “deliberately indifferent in investigating claims of excessive force against its police department,” but also “had a custom of failing to properly investigate internal affairs com- plaints preceding this incident.”418 On the other hand, with respect to Meza’s claim that the Township failed to train its officers, the court stated that “[a] plaintiff ’s claim ‘is at its most tenuous’ when it ‘turns on a fail- ure to train.’”419 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence of the Township’s failure “‘to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with [the plain- tiff ’s] injury….’”420 In Villegas, supra, the plaintiff brought a Monell claim against the City of El Paso for failure to intervene.421 Allegedly, the El Paso Police Department’s policy or practices included coercing and falsifying witness statements and suppressing evidence, as well as failing to train or supervise its officers adequately on the proper conduct of investigations.422 The court denied the city’s motion for a summary judgment, because “[t]he sheer number of abuses alleged and the degree of coordinated involvement of multiple members of the El Paso police department show a plausible accepted standard of practice within the department rising to the level of unwritten custom.”423 Moreover, because of the “extensive coordination” of members of the police depart- ment, it was reasonable to infer “that a policymaker had at least constructive knowledge of the misconduct alleged.”424 The court held that the plaintiff had stated “a claim for municipal liability under an implied policy theory.”425 However, the court did not agree that the plaintiff had stated a claim for municipal liability for failure to intervene: “[C]ities are held accountable via Monell for officers’ constitutional viola- tions only where city policy is the moving force behind officer misconduct.”426 Although the City of El Paso allegedly had “an informal policy encouraging officers to turn a blind eye to con- stitutional violations and become bystanders,”427 the plaintiff ’s theory was based on “an informal policy of acquiescence….”428 Such an informal policy would result in the city being held “liable for inaction even if the factfinder determines [that] the City is not responsible for the underlying constitutional 417 Id. at *36-37 (citation omitted). 418 Id. at *40 (citation omitted). 419 Id. at *42 (citation omitted). 420 Id. (citation omitted). 421 Villegas, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34907, at *22-23. 422 Id. at *39 (footnotes omitted). 423 Id. at *43 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied). 424 Id. at *42 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied). 425 Id. at *44 (emphasis supplied). 426 Id. at *47 (footnote omitted). 427 Id. at *48 (footnote omitted). 428 Id. plicated the plaintiff and a false confession by the plaintiff, who recanted the next day. After the plaintiff ’s conviction at a second trial and the court’s imposition of a sentence of imprison ment for life, a later state court habeas corpus proceeding determined that the incriminating statements against Villegas that the indi- vidual officers took were obtained by “‘illegal and coercive methods.’”409 The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a fair trial prohibits the use of excessive force, the knowing fabrication of evidence, and the obtaining of a “conviction with testimony that government agents know is false.”410 However, Villegas also alleged that the defendant officers were liable for failing to intervene to prevent their fellow offi- cers’ violations of Villegas’s constitutional rights.411 The court held that an officer is liable under § 1983 under a theory of “by- stander liability” when the officer knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; the officer has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and the officer chooses not to act.412 The court found that all of the officers were present at vari- ous points during the interrogation, that they participated in the use of coercive interrogation tactics, and that they knew that the plaintiff ’s “confession was false but used it anyway.”413 Consequently, the plaintiff ’s complaint was sufficient to state a claim for the officers’ failure to intervene.414 Moreover, the court found that another officer, although not physically present to witness his other officers’ constitutional violations, was aware of the officers’ misconduct and participated in his fellow officers’ suppression of evidence.415 B. Liability of a Transportation Authority for Failure to Train a Police Officer In Meza, supra, the case involving a violent encounter, recorded by a home surveillance camera, between homeowners and police officers who were responding to a noise complaint, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against Jackson Township for failure to train and supervise the police. The court held that, if a municipal “policy or custom does not facially violate federal law, causation may only be established by ‘demonstrat[ing] that the municipal action was taken with delib- erate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences.’”416 A plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference “either by showing a pattern of violations which puts the municipal employee on notice that a new program is necessary or a single incident vio- 409 Villegas, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34907, at *9 (footnote omitted). 410 Id. at *15 (footnotes omitted). 411 Id. at *22. 412 Id. at *14 (footnote omitted). 413 Id. at *17 (footnote omitted). 414 Id. at *23. 415 Id. at *31, 36. 416 Id. at *36 (citation omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).