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TCRP LRD 58 33 or expel an individual,445 the rules did not include a procedure whereby a rider could contest a suspension or ban.446 In a prior appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the MTTAâs rules âconstrained its discretion to deny services,â because the rules created a âlegitimate claim of entitlement to access MTTA transportation as long as a patron complies with the rules.â447 The appeals court remanded the case to the district court to consider the issue of whether Brown received sufficient process. In the proceedings on the remand to the district court, the âMTTA argue[d] that plaintiff had notice of MTTAâs complaint procedures and [that] he could have contested his ban[] but that he failed to take advantage of the procedures available to him.â448 However, the appeals court had held already that, under the Due Process Clause, Brown âhad a property interest in riding the busâ¦.â449 Thus, Brown had to be afforded ââan opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.ââ450 Brown had not received a pre-deprivation hearing before he was banned.451 As there was âno formal post-depri- vation procedure,â Brown could not âhave waived his right to post-deprivation process to challenge the ban.â452 The district court entered a permanent injunction that re- quired the MTTA to provide Brown a hearing to determine whether the ban should remain in place. At the hearing, Brown had to be permitted âto make arguments and present evidence in support of his request to rescind the ban.â453 C. Section 1983 Actions Challenging Laws for Being Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad An aggrieved plaintiff may challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance on the basis that the statute or ordinance is void for vagueness or is overbroad. In Benson v. City of Chicago,454 the plaintiff alleged that while she was sleeping in a chair near a baggage area at OâHare Air- port, two police officers issued her a citation for trespassing in violation of Section 8-4-050 of the City of Chicago Municipal Code. The citation directed Benson to appear for an administra- tive hearing on a certain date, but it was unclear whether the arrest ing officers appeared for the hearing. The court terminated the proceeding in Bensonâs favor. Benson sued only the city for declaratory relief that the trespass ordinance was unconstitu- tionally vague.455 445 Id. at *5 (citation omitted). 446 Id. at *6 (citation omitted). 447 Id. at *6-7 (citation omitted). 448 Id. at *8-9 (citation omitted). 449 Id. at *10 (citation omitted). 450 Id. at *11 (citation omitted). 451 Id. at *12. 452 Id. at *18. 453 Id. at *21 (footnote omitted). Although Brown made no showing of damages that he sustained because of the ban, Brown was entitled to nominal damages. Id. at *19. 454 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77390, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 455 Id. at *2, 3. A state statute (or city ordinance) is âunconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend- mentâ when it fails to âdefine the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.â456 In spite of any questions regarding the ordinance and Bensonâs citation, the court held that there is ânothing vague about an ordinance that prohibits remaining on property after receiving notice from the owner to depart.â457 In Chad v. City of Fort Lauderdale,458 supra, the plaintiffs challenged the Cityâs rules and regulations that were intended to prevent ânuisance activityâ on the beach, including Rule 7.5(c) prohibiting soliciting, begging, and panhandling. After the court denied the plaintiffsâ motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffsâ moved for a summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that the rules violated the Fourteenth Amendment for being vague or overbroad, or both, as well as violated the First Amendment for being an unconstitutional limitation on free speech.459 The court held that the cityâs Rule 7.5(c) was not void for vagueness: The void-for-vagueness doctrine is linked to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, the doctrine is rooted in notions of providing âfair notice and warningâ to citizens of what any particular legislation prohibits or allows. The doctrine requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact to prevent âarbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.â460 The court held that â[t]he absence of more limiting language than the terms themselves, âbegging, panhandling, solicitation,â is the very thing that saves the rule from vagueness. Had the City attempted to tailor the rule to only âaggressiveâ types of solicita tion, the rule might very well have failedâ¦.â461 As for the plaintiffsâ argument that Rule 7.5(c) was over- broad, â[t]he threshold issue ⦠[was] whether begging, pan- handling and solicitation are types of expression entitled to First Amendment protection.â462 Although Rule 7.5(c) applied to conduct protected by the First Amendment, the court held that the rule, nevertheless, âstill qualifie[d] as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction on protected speech.â463 The rule was content-neutral, because it ââapplie[d] even-handedly to persons aspiring to solicit, beg or panhandle along the beach and adjacent sidewalk regardless of their agenda.ââ464 What the rule prohibited was begging and soliciting âregardless of what the purpose or message behind the begging or solicitation may be. This form is simply a way of communicating[] and does 456 Id. at *3 (citation omitted). 457 Id. at *6. 458 66 F. Supp.2d 1242, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 459 Id. at 1244. 460 Id. (citation omitted). 461 Id. at 1245. 462 Id. at 1245-1246. 463 Id. at 1246 (footnote omitted). 464 Id. (citation omitted).