Appendix E

Information-Gathering Sessions with U.S. Colleges and Universities That Are Current or Former Hosts of Confucius Institutes

A Report to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Committee on Confucius Institutes at U.S. Institutions of Higher Education

Korantema Kaleem, Jasmine Howard, and Kellie Macdonald

American Institutes for Research

OVERVIEW

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) Confucius Institutes Study Committee was tasked with conducting a consensus study to (a) identify best practices and principles regarding appropriate operations for U.S. academic institutions and (b) share information that the Department of Defense (DOD) could use regarding the potential issuance of waivers for the prohibition of research support at institutions that host Confucius Institutes (CIs).

As part of this consensus study of institutions hosting CIs, the National Academies contracted with the American Institutes for Research (AIR) to conduct information-gathering sessions with U.S. colleges and universities (institutions) that are currently hosting, or have hosted, CIs and that participated in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) waiver process. In summer 2022, the National Academies staff compiled a list of target institutions for the information-gathering study sample, including contact information for potential respondents from each institution. The AIR research team collaborated with the National Academies in the outreach and recruitment of the target institutions.

These recruitment efforts resulted in a final sample of seven institutions. Across the seven institutions, AIR completed virtual information-gathering sessions with 10 individuals identified as having knowledge of and familiarity with their institution’s CI.¹ The focus of the conversations was on institutions’ experiences and perspectives related to CI operations and the 2019 DOD waiver process.

In July 2022, AIR presented preliminary findings from the information-gathering sessions to the committee. This report provides a more detailed account of the final set of findings and is intended to inform the broader National Academies consensus study. The results will be synthesized in two reports authored by the committee. Findings from these two consensus study reports, including the findings discussed in this report, may be used to inform federal processes regarding waiver criteria and the conditions under which a waiver may be considered and granted to allow an institution to host a CI and receive federal agency funding.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

This report presents the key findings from AIR’s information-gathering sessions with seven institutions to answer the following research questions (RQs):

• RQ1. How are institutions with CIs operated and funded?
• RQ2. What are the characteristics of CIs and their partnerships with Hanban?²
• RQ3. What are or were the most important factors that led to the closure of CIs?
• RQ4. What measures do or did institutions have in place to preserve academic freedom, openness, and/or national security in 2019?
• RQ5. What were the experiences of institutions’ staff who applied for DOD waivers in 2019?

To address these research questions, AIR conducted 60-minute, virtual, information-gathering sessions with 10 senior-level CI administrators across a sample of seven institutions representing both private and public colleges and universities. The information-gathering sessions were conducted over a 3-week period between June 2022 and July 2022 through a semistructured interview protocol.³

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¹ One respondent was a senior-level administrator at a CI at a K–12 public school.

² “Hanban” is the colloquial term for the Chinese International Education Foundation, or CIEF, now known as the Ministry of Education Center for Language Education and Cooperation, or CLEC. This is the Chinese government agency affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education that promoted, managed, and funded CIs on foreign campuses.

³ A semistructured interview protocol allows for flexibility when obtaining qualitative data. It provides structure with a list of open-ended questions all respondents are asked and permits individual follow-up questions, or probes, to mine for deeper or more detailed information from a respondent.

Protocol questions addressed respondent experiences with hosting a CI related to operations, partnerships, CI closure decisions and processes, risk-mitigating measures, and the 2019 DOD waiver process. AIR developed and finalized the protocol with direct input, consultation, and collaboration with National Academies staff. The full information-gathering protocol is provided at the end of this report.

Institution and Respondent Characteristics of Study Sample

The seven institutions that participated in the information-gathering sessions are in different locations in the United States. Of the seven institutions, four are public and three are private. Five of the seven institutions represented in the sample were open for more than a decade. Four of the seven CIs had a specific linguistic and cultural focus, and the other three CIs focused on promoting a general appreciation of Chinese language and culture. Three institutions are open, and four have closed; all are 4-year institutions (see Table E-1).

TABLE E-1 Institution and Respondent Characteristics

NOTES: CI is Confucius Institute. DOD is Department of Defense.

* Indicates that an institution applied for a DOD waiver, but the respondent was not involved in the waiver application because it was handled by a separate department.

** Indicates that two administrators from the same institution were interviewed.

SOURCE: U.S. News & World Report, 2022.

DATA ANALYSIS

The virtual information-gathering sessions were audio-recorded and transcribed using the Zoom meeting platform. The transcripts were uploaded into the NVivo qualitative software data analysis program and systematically coded by two AIR researchers using a codebook that aligned with the key research questions (RQ1–RQ5, above) and more specific focal areas of interest identified by National Academies staff. The full set of information-gathering questions is provided at the end of this report.

To ensure intercoder reliability, each analyst coded two transcripts separately at the outset of the coding process to gauge consistency in code application and coding agreement. The code definitions were adjusted in the codebook as needed. After the team reached the intercoder agreement threshold of 95 percent, the codebook was finalized and data analysis ensued. The AIR team engaged in regular communication to monitor and ensure consistency throughout the coding process.

Limitations of the Data

The data and findings presented in this report should be interpreted with two key considerations: (a) The study timeline necessitated a short window of time to recruit, schedule, and conduct information-gathering sessions with institutions that hosted a CI. The timeline affected the ability of some institutions to participate due to the conflicting schedules of respondents or, in some cases, competing demands on their time (including other projects related to CIs with timelines overlapping this study timeline); and (b) staff turnover affected some institutions’ ability to participate when administrators with experience and familiarity with an institution’s CI were no longer employed at the institution. These challenges to recruitment and participation resulted in a smaller sample of institutions than initially targeted and reflect the experiences of a relatively small number of institutions—7 out of more than 100 institutions that have had or currently still host CIs in the United States (Horsley, 2021; NAS, 2022).

FINDINGS

The findings discussed in this section are based on the virtual information sessions. Respondents from the seven participating institutions had their own unique insights about their experiences hosting a CI, and a few provided insights about their experiences with the DOD waiver process.

The sections below highlight key findings relative to the five research questions, which represent areas of interest to the committee.

CI Operations and Funding

All respondents were asked to elaborate about their institution’s CI operations and funding structure. The following section highlights findings related to CI leadership and staffing, CI affiliations with academic departments, CI funding and budget structure, and CI programming.

CI Leadership and Staffing

Leadership Structure.

Institutions included in this study maintained a leadership structure consisting of at least one director from the U.S. institutions and a leadership board of some kind (e.g., board of directors, board of advisors). A few CIs were led by co-directors; typically, the co-director was an administrator from the Chinese partner institution.

All respondents indicated that their CI was guided by an advisory board or a board of directors. These boards typically were composed of senior-level administrators from both the U.S. and Chinese partner institutions. Respondents reported that board members held a variety of positions at their host institution, including president of the institution, provost, dean, and faculty. Board involvement and influence in CI operations varied across institutions. One respondent said the board of their CI had minimal involvement in CI operations, and that over a 4-year period the board met once a year to receive an overview of operations and events at the CI. In this case, the CI director was solely responsible for approval of programming and expenditures. Other boards were described as being more involved in CI operations. One respondent explained that they had to receive approval from their board before submitting budget proposals to Hanban, although most programming and operations decisions were made by CI directors. The instructor staffing process included the following components: applicant recruitment, applicant screening, and application selection.

Staffing.

Respondents from all seven institutions described the processes used to select CI instructors, including screening and recruitment.

The process began with the Chinese partner institutions issuing a public call for applications to work at a specific U.S.-based CI. To narrow down the pool of applicants, Hanban and the Chinese partner institutions conducted their own screening process, including personal interviews and language and culture tests, to ensure applicants were well qualified to work at a U.S. institution.

Some institutions understood that their location could serve as either an incentive or a disincentive for attracting, hiring, and retaining instructors. In other words, applicants were drawn to an institution’s location for a variety of reasons, including the climate and the geographic location of the institution. For some institutions, location poses a challenge to recruiting and retaining applicants. In particular, one respondent said their location in a rural setting serves as a deterrent, and they sometimes find it difficult to attract instructors.

Once the Chinese partner institutions narrowed down the pool of applicants, the U.S. institution assumed control of the hiring process, which included a review of applicant résumés/curricula vitae and then a series of in-person or virtual interviews using their own set of criteria for hiring CI instructors. One respondent explained that their CI followed the same criteria for hiring instructors as the academic department in which the CI was housed. The full information-gathering protocol is provided at the end of this report.

Respondents across the seven institutions also described the instructor evaluation process as well as issues they experienced with staffing their respective CIs.

Evaluating Instructors.

Student evaluations served as the main source for evaluating the performance of CI instructors across the institutions, with most respondents indicating that this was generally consistent with their institution’s practice for evaluating faculty and instructors. However, according to one respondent, the CI director and the head of the department in which the CI was housed at the institution reviewed and assessed CI instructors and staffing needs each term.

Issues with Staffing.

Some respondents described having very few issues related to CI instructors, while others reported that their CI did not have any issues. Those who reported issues described them as minor and related mainly to logistics (e.g., housing, finances) or to the Chinese instructors experiencing challenges with adjusting to the life and culture of their host institution. While some of these issues were resolved through instructional coaching and mentoring, in a few cases, CI instructors’ contracts were terminated prematurely. Decisions to end a contract early were described as the responsibility of the CI director.

CI Affiliation with Academic Departments

All respondents were asked to describe how their CI was affiliated with academic departments and the physical location of the CI at their institution. Some CIs included in the study were affiliated with academic departments; however, the structure of these affiliations varied by institution, and CI directors typically held other positions or roles beyond their position as the CI director (i.e., not a designated full-time position). For example, the CI directors often held faculty appointments or additional leadership roles within their academic departments.

Department Affiliation.

Most respondents indicated that their CI fell under the Department of East Asian Studies, foreign language department, or comparable academic unit. Others, however, were housed across departments affiliated with international studies or languages but not directly affiliated with a specific department. In one case, the CI was housed under the president’s special projects.

Regardless of where the CI was officially housed, respondents across the seven institutions noted that collective academic events such as teacher immersion trainings, seminars, and other events included the CI and affiliated departments.

At six of the seven institutions, major degree-granting programs did not fall under the CI directly but, rather, across various related departments. The degree offerings ranged from undergraduate to advanced professional degrees, with CI-specific courses counting toward degree credit. However, not all CI courses across the seven institutions were credit bearing.

Physical Location.

All respondents reported that the CI at their institution had a physical location on their campus. Some CIs had a small, designated space, whereas CIs at other institutions were located in an area accessible by the campus community (students, faculty, staff, and visitors). Some CIs shared space with other academic departments.

CI Funding and Budget Structure

CI funding structures fell into one of three types: (a) institutions received funding from Hanban or a Chinese third-party agency and its host institution, (b) funding from Hanban or a Chinese third-party agency and its host institution typically matched the funds, and (c) Hanban or a Chinese third-party agency provided funds, whereas U.S. host institutions provided in-kind support (i.e., office, event space, furnishings, or classrooms). Some institutions received funding up front, while others received an initial gift and annual funding. Others received annual funding from Hanban or a Chinese third-party agency. Overall, across the seven institutions, respondents reported that the funding and in-kind support allocated to CIs enabled institutions to continue daily operations. Most respondents also discussed their budget structure and how funds were allocated.

Funding and In-Kind Support.

Several respondents described the funding split as “50/50” between Chinese and American sources. Most of the funding from Chinese sources supported cultural programming offered by the CIs, with the remainder used to fund operating expenses, Chinese staff salaries, and trainings for staff. Alternatively, funding from U.S. sources was described as “in kind” because it was allocated to supporting the physical space occupied by the CI and the salaries of staff employed by the U.S. institution that supported the CI. One respondent explained that additional funds were available from Hanban and did not come out of the annual budget. These additional funds included up to $3,000 for additional materials as well as travel expenses for attending conferences or convenings in China. A few CIs received funding from other sources, including the local community, fundraising efforts, and online learning programs.

To secure funding from Hanban, several respondents explained that CI directors submitted annual budget proposals to Hanban outlining planned activities for the year as well as estimated costs of these activities. Within the annual budget proposals, CIs requested specific dollar amounts to fund their proposed activities for the year. Respondents reported budget proposals ranging from $40,000

to $400,000. For some CIs, funding requests were consistent from year to year, whereas for others, funding requests varied (i.e., typically increased) over time. Though several respondents indicated that they rarely were denied funding for the activities outlined in their budget proposals, respondents noted that Hanban made the final decision as to whether proposed activities would receive funding. Most respondents were unaware of whether their CI received any one-time gifts, except for one respondent who reported that their CI received startup funds in addition to their yearly installment.

Budget Structure.

Most CIs allocated the majority of their budget for cultural programming (e.g., music performances, calligraphy workshops). One respondent explained that greater than 80 percent of their budget was spent on cultural programming (e.g., cultural events, talks by visiting scholars, musical performances). Other CIs allocated more of their budget toward organization and delivery of courses, including salaries for instructors, trainings, and professional development. In one instance, a CI budgeted for Ph.D. student fellowships. One respondent explained that funds were also allocated for miscellaneous expenses (e.g., supplies, technology, faculty reimbursements).

One respondent indicated that the CI budget is entirely separate from the institution’s budget, and that funding from Hanban never became part of the institution’s operational fund. When asked about the use of Hanban funds, all respondents reported that their CI never used funding from Hanban to support scientific research. Rather, all funding was used to support language instruction and cultural programming.

CI Programming

CI programming varied by institution. Some CIs offered cultural programming only (e.g., Chinese New Year celebrations), whereas others offered Chinese language classes only. While some language classes were offered for credit, other CIs only offered not-for-credit classes.

Regardless of whether a CI offered for-credit or not-for-credit classes, cultural programming activities and classes at each CI across the seven institutions were open to students at the institution and members of the surrounding community. Respondents described their CI programming in detail. The programming included curriculum development for CIs that delivered Chinese language classes and activities beyond instruction. One participant explained that it would be impossible to foster learning and appreciation related to the Chinese culture without involving Chinese entities.

Curriculum Development.

For the CIs that delivered Chinese language classes, the responsibility for developing the curriculum varied by CI; however, several

respondents stated unequivocally that Hanban did not have any say in the curriculum delivered by the CI. For example, one respondent explained that they never received any directive from Hanban on what they had to teach at the CI, and another explained that the curriculum development process was driven entirely by the U.S. host institution. A few CIs included text in their agreements with Hanban stating that the U.S. institution ultimately approved the CI curriculum.

A few respondents reported that the curriculum was developed by the faculty teaching the courses. One respondent explained that their CI had an understanding with Hanban that oversight related to curriculum delivery was required to ensure that all instructors adhered to the same standards. At other CIs, the curriculum was established by the academic department under which the courses were housed. In those instances in which the curriculum was set by the academic department, the CI provided an instructor to deliver the predetermined curriculum. One respondent stated, however, that at their CI, the instructors from China were responsible for developing the CI curriculum.

Three institutions reported that all CI curricula underwent their institution’s rigorous review process, just like any other course being taught at the institution. One respondent noted that at their CI, a third party reviewed all CI curricula to ensure that they met the institution’s standards. In terms of materials, just one respondent reported that their institution uses textbooks recommended by Hanban; however, these books still go through the institution’s textbook-vetting process.

Activities Beyond Instruction.

All CIs across the seven institutions offered activities other than class instruction. These activities included procuring items for local museum exhibits related to China, planning summer trips to China for local high school students, organizing and facilitating calligraphy workshops, hosting conferences, and providing cultural programming at local K–12 schools. In addition, several CIs were approached by their local community or by local performers to co-sponsor events such as festivals, music performances, poetry readings, and dance recitals. The responsibilities tied to co-sponsorship of these activities varied by CI, with CIs providing a combination of funding, space, staffing, or programming to support the activities in their local community. Few respondents were able to speak to the approval process for these community-focused events; those who did reported no issues with gaining approval for activities outside of instruction.

Relationships with Hanban and Chinese Partner Institutions

For the purposes of this report, a formal relationship is defined as a legal contract with two or more entities, and an informal relationship is without a legal contract. Across the seven institutions participating in this data collection, the relationships between the U.S. host institution and the Chinese partner varied in formality but were typically initiated by the U.S. institutions. Several

respondents reported that the relationship with their Chinese partner was initiated by a member of the faculty and/or an administrator based on an existing relationship; however, in at least one case, the relationship with the Chinese partner began primarily with the establishment of the CI. The AIR research team noted that two institutions participating in information-gathering sessions have the same Chinese partner institution.

Pre-Existing Relationships with Chinese Partners

Several respondents described having informal relationships with their Chinese partner institution, outside of or in addition to their official CI agreement. One participant stated that the relationship with their Chinese partner was established due to an alumnus of the university visiting the partner institution. Through this individual a connection was formed, and the relationship between the U.S. institution and the Chinese partner was established. Another respondent stated that their faculty established relationships within their CI’s Chinese partner institution by conducting research in China.

Formal Agreements to Host a CI

Institutions with formal partnerships described their institution’s CI arrangement as a contracted partnership between their institution, Hanban, and a Chinese partner university. In some cases, there was one agreement with the partner institution and Hanban; however, at least one institution negotiated separate formal contracts with the Chinese partner institution and Hanban. Although the details of these institutions’ formal agreements varied, they generally shared a common purpose and goal: to cultivate appreciation for Chinese culture within the institution as well as in the local community.

Supplemental MOUs.

Most respondents reported that their institution did not sign a supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with their Chinese partner institution; however, a few respondents said their institution signed a supplemental MOU with their Chinese partner. Supplemental agreements signed with a Chinese partner institution outlined how the governing board would form and the frequency with which they would meet. A respondent indicated that the terms of the supplemental agreement restricted the authority of the governing board, which serves in an advisory role.

CI CLOSURE

The announcement by DOD in 2019 to deny funding to institutions of higher education that host a CI, unless those institutions applied for a 2019 NDAA waiver, caused institutions to make abrupt decisions regarding the future of their

CI (CRS, 2022; GAO, 2019). The announcement in 2019 by the government served as the deciding factor for some institutions to close their CI. One respondent explained that the decision to close their CI came directly from the university president; another respondent said the decision came from their university leadership.

Of the four institutions in the sample whose CIs closed after the announcement, three institutions’ programs were integrated into other departments (e.g., Chinese language courses), and other programming was taken up by local organizations to ensure continuation. One participant explained that when their CI closed, the language instruction reverted to its “pre-Confucius Institute state,” during which it was housed under an academic department. Few respondents said they still have an informal relationship with their partner Chinese institution after the closure of the CI, with some describing enduring friendships with Chinese staff post-CI closure.

Participation in the 2019 NDAA Waiver Process

Institutions that applied for the DOD waiver were asked about their experiences with the 2019 NDAA waiver process. Some respondents who went through the process provided information about their institution’s decision to apply for a waiver or close their CI and about their experiences with the application process.

Decision to Apply for a Waiver or Close CI

Four institutions included in this study decided to move forward with the 2019 NDAA waiver process; however, of the respondents included in the information-gathering sessions, three institutions had direct experience with the process. One respondent of a CI that is currently open reported that the waiver application was handled in another department; therefore, they could not provide any information or perspectives on the details of the application process. Three institutions, now closed, indicated that the decision to apply for a waiver was contingent on the ways in which the CI brought value to their institution and the surrounding community. In one case, a CI brought value to their institution by helping to create a pipeline for Chinese language instruction, whereby the CI offered introductory language courses and a separate department offered intermediate and advanced courses. Another institution decided to apply for a waiver because they had a strong partnership with the local K–12 school district to provide Chinese language instruction, which would have been dissolved with the closure of the CI at the university. One institution decided to close their CI instead of applying for a waiver because they wanted to ensure that their federal funding was not jeopardized.

Application Process

Two institutions that hosted CIs that are now closed had experience with the process. They stated that they applied because they felt confident that they would

be granted a waiver because their CI had separate leadership and the academic departments received DOD funding. Of these two institutions, one explained that their university leadership considered their CI to be a good candidate for receiving a waiver because the CI funding was separate from DOD funding. As part of the waiver process, these institutions provided the DOD with documents from different departments within the institution. Required documents included institutions’ signed agreements with Hanban and annual reports as well as other documents from all of the academic departments within the institution. One respondent explained that their institution gathered every agreement that each academic department had with China to submit along with their application materials.

Three respondents whose institutions applied for a waiver and are now closed expressed disappointment and frustration with the process, citing a lack of communication from the DOD upon submission of the application as well as informal hints along the way that waivers would not be granted. As a result of these types of experiences during the process, one institution decided to formally withdraw their application. Ultimately, these three institutions that applied for a waiver were denied. None of the applicants received an explanation for the denial.

Campus Precautions and Risk-Mitigating Measures

The following sections highlight findings on the respondents’ perceptions of risk; the steps that institutions took to mitigate risk and preserve academic freedom, openness, and national security; and the steps that institutions took in evaluating partnerships involving funding in other countries. Of the seven institutions represented in the study, three institutions reported that their university conducted classified research. These institutions clarified that classified research was conducted in other departments at the institution and their CIs did not conduct classified research. In addition, more than half of the respondents stated that their institution works with classified or controlled unclassified information, and the remaining respondents said their institution does not work with this information or could not answer the question.

Perceptions of Risk, 2019 to the Present

Several respondents said they were aware that local and national politicians scrutinized the CIs. Some respondents explained that the scrutiny had increased because politicians questioned the motives of the Chinese government and their involvement in CIs and in U.S. institutions of higher education, and politicians expressed concern about the potential threat that CIs posed to U.S. national security. Some respondents shared that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) contacted them for clarification of the role of the Chinese government in their

CI. One respondent, who was the director of a CI at a public research institution, shared that before their CI closed, the FBI contacted them to inquire about Chinese involvement in their CI.

All respondents said they believed that their CI did not pose a national security risk. Respondents cited the focus of their CI (on cultural awareness), the lack of scientific research taking place, and the long-standing relationships with Chinese staff as reasons that their CI did not constitute a national security risk. Additionally, when asked about preserving academic freedom, openness, and national security, some respondents explained that these issues were not of high concern to them because they had maintained friendships with the Chinese staff, which fostered a sense of openness at the CI. A few respondents commented on academic freedom specifically, with one respondent explaining that Hanban did not restrict “normal operations” of the institution, particularly regarding academic freedom and research. Another respondent explained that the CI preserved academic freedom by using materials (e.g., textbooks) from trusted curriculum providers rather than materials provided by Hanban.

Risk Mitigation Measures

Despite respondent sentiments that CIs do not pose a risk to academic freedom, openness, and national security, respondents mentioned that their institutions followed specific processes—that is, processes not specific to CIs—to ensure that staff, faculty, and administrators were aware of possible threats. Most of the mitigation measures described were internal to the institution; however, some CI leaders and staff participated in annual seminars hosted by the FBI, which provided training to increase awareness of potential threats when working with foreign entities.

Most respondents discussed the involvement of various offices within the institution in mitigating risks associated with a foreign entity such as Hanban. These offices typically offered governance of legal agreements and robust security processes for visa procurement (e.g., instructors were prescreened and vetted and the office verified documents).

One respondent reported that their institution’s office of international affairs was involved in the visa procurement process for foreign instructors. This institution systematically conducted an institution-wide audit process of each office every 6 or 7 years across various departments. This audit process served as an additional layer of protection to assess individuals working with minors.

Another respondent described the roles of their institution’s office of data governance and legal department, which vetted their agreements with Hanban before the agreements were signed. Two respondents mentioned working with an export control officer. The officer conducts background checks on visiting scholars and ensures that any scholars associated with the university who enter or exit the country are in compliance with U.S. and foreign laws.

As another example, one institution worked with their national security and research review committee, which was described as being in charge of understanding federal regulations related to working with a foreign entity. Similarly, another institution worked with its office of research administration, which is responsible for reviewing research or activities funded by a foreign entity. In addition, this institution’s CI had a group of top leaders from the institution who were involved in a committee to monitor agreements and use of funding from foreign sources such as Hanban.

Evaluating Partnerships Involving Foreign Funding

For most of the seven institutions in this study, management of foreign gifts occurs at the university level. Respondents explained that their institutions’ respective research offices were responsible for evaluating foreign gifts and that these offices often worked with offices of international affairs as well as offices of financial aid.

The ways in which CIs treated one-time gifts varied by institution. Although some respondents were not clear on their institution’s policy regarding one-time gifts, one participant explained that their institution does not have a formal policy. Two respondents said their institution does not treat one-time gifts differently than annual installments, and one of the respondents explained that their institution’s process remains the same regardless of the gift amount.

CONCLUSION

Through the virtual information-gathering sessions, the respondents from the seven institutions included in this data collection effort shared their experiences and perspectives on their CI operations, funding structures, activities, and programming; the benefits and challenges related to their CI; and the DOD waiver application process. The primary aim of the data collection and analysis is to assist the Confucius Institutes study committee in understanding the direct experiences of hosting a CI and the DOD waiver process from institutions that applied in 2019.

Overall, respondents cited many benefits of the CI and found the relationship and CI activities beneficial and rewarding to the institution, the students, and the local community. Issues with the Chinese partners, Hanban, and/or Chinese instructors were infrequent and generally described as minor. Commonly shared experiences and perceptions across the seven institutions were as follows: (a) respondents’ CIs were described as successfully fostering appreciation of the Chinese culture across their institution and local communities; (b) CIs were described as bringing awareness of Chinese language and culture to U.S. institutions; and (c) although respondents were aware of criticisms and concerns from local and

national politicians related to CIs and the role of the Chinese government in higher education, they believed these concerns to be unfounded and unwarranted. Respondents pointed to their agreements with Hanban as well as several other internal measures at their institutions to mitigate risk associated with inappropriate Chinese government involvement.

Given the overall positive experiences with CIs, respondents shared a common disappointment with the concerns raised about U.S. institution-based CIs and expressed frustration with the 2019 DOD waiver application process and the limited communications they received about why waiver applications were denied. Some institutions were able to work with the local community and internally within their academic departments to continue activities and classes they perceived as particularly beneficial after the official closure of their CI.

REFERENCES

CRS (Congressional Research Service). 2022. Confucius Institutes in the United States: Selected Issues. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11180.

GAO (Government Accountability Office). 2019. Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary (GAO-19-278). Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-278.pdf.

Horsley, J. P. 2021. It’s time for a new policy on Confucius Institutes. Brookings Institution, April 1, 2021. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/its-time-for-a-new-policyon-confucius-institutes/.

NAS (National Association of Scholars). 2022. How many Confucius Institutes are in the United States? NAS blog, April 5, 2022. Retrieved from https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states.

U.S. News & World Report. 2022. Education (web page). U.S. News Best Colleges. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges.

INFORMATION-GATHERING QUESTIONS

Background Questions

• What is/was your title and institutional affiliation?
• How long have you been/were you in this role?
• What is your connection to your institution’s Confucius Institute?

Campus Confucius Institute Information

1. Now, we would like to begin by learning more about your Confucius Institute.
   • What year did your Confucius Institute open/begin? What year did it close/end, if applicable?

1. • Does/Did your Confucius Institute have a specific language and culture focus area? If so, what is/was it?
   • Who is/was your Chinese partner institution?
2. Did your institution have a formal (contract and/or MOU) or informal relationship with your Chinese partner institution prior to establishing your Confucius Institute?
3. [Only CIs that have closed] Following the closure of your Confucius Institute, has your institution maintained a formal (contract and/or MOU) or informal relationship with your Chinese partner institution? If yes, please describe.

Campus Confucius Institute Operations

4. We would like to learn about the agreement that your institution signed with Hanban to host a Confucius Institute.
   • Did your institution negotiate any parts or clauses contained in this agreement?
   • Did your institution sign any sort of supplementalMOU with your Chinese partner institution?
   • Is your agreement with Hanban publicly available? If so, can you point us to a link?
5. Where, both physically and organizationally, if applicable, was your Confucius Institute located relative to the rest of your academic institution?
   • Probe: Was the Confucius Institute physically located on campus or off campus? Please explain.
   • Probe: Was the Confucius Institute affiliated in some way with an academic department or division? Please explain.
6. What was the relationship between your Confucius Institute and the Department of East Asian Studies, Department of Languages, or comparable academic unit at your institution?
   • Does your institution have a major or degree-granting program related to China?
7. What was the leadership structure of your institution’s Confucius Institute?
   • What is/was the breakdown (percentage-wise) of U.S. and Chinese staff at your institution’s Confucius Institute?
   • Whom does/did your institution’s Confucius Institute director report to?
   • Does/Did your institution have a board of directors to oversee the Confucius Institute?

8. Did any of the leaders or staff of your institution’s Confucius Institute hold other university affiliations, such as a faculty appointment?
9. How and by whom was your Confucius Institute funded?
   • Did your Confucius Institute receive a large initial gift?
   • Did your Confucius Institute receive annual funding installments from Hanban, regardless of whether you received a large initial gift?
   • Did contracted amounts of funding from Hanban match amounts received by your institution?
   • Did your institution ever use funding from Hanban to support scientific research?
10. Can you share more about your Confucius Institute’s yearly budget outlay? Approximately what was the overall yearly budget for your institution’s Confucius Institute, and what were the major categories of expenses?
11. How and by whom was the curriculum at your Confucius Institute developed?
    • Did for-credit students at your institution utilize the Confucius Institute’s curriculum?
    • Did your institution utilize texts and course materials provided by Hanban?
    • What types of issues, if any, did your institution encounter related to your Confucius Institute’s curriculum?
12. How and by whom were the instructors at your Confucius Institute selected and evaluated?
    • What types of issues, if any, did your institution encounter related to your Confucius Institute’s instructors?
    • Were any instructors asked to leave? If so, who made the decision to ask the instructor to leave, and how was this done?
13. What other activities, beyond instruction, did your Confucius Institute offer?
14. How and by whom were events sponsored by or at your Confucius Institute approved?
    • Was an external organization such as a local consulate ever involved?
    • What types of issues, if any, did your institution encounter related to your Confucius Institute’s events?

Campus Precautions and Risk-Mitigating Measures

15. What general precautions and risk-mitigating measures, if any, did your institution have in place to preserve academic freedom, openness, and/or national security in 2019?
    • Have these changed at all since 2019?
16. What general precautions and risk-mitigating measures, if any, did your institution have in place to evaluate partnerships involving foreign funding and gifts in 2019?
    • Have these changed at all since 2019?
17. Does your institution treat one-time gifts differently from continuous funding streams?
18. Does your institution conduct classified research?
19. Does your institution work with controlled unclassified information (CUI)?

Campus Participation in the 2019 NDAA Waiver Process

[ASK QUESTIONS 20–23 ONLY IF RESPONDENT PARTICIPATED IN 2019 NDAA WAIVER PROCESS]

20. What is/are the reason(s) that your institution decided to apply for a waiver to host both a DOD Chinese Language Flagship and a Confucius Institute, if applicable? Could you describe this decision?
21. What bottom-line argument did your institution make to the Department of Defense to justify hosting a Confucius Institute and receiving DOD Chinese Language Flagship funding, if applicable?
22. What types of Confucius Institute-related documents and information did your institution provide to the Department of Defense in support of receiving a waiver in 2019?
    • Probe: Did the documents you provided in support of receiving a waiver include agreements, financial records, course syllabi, CI-sponsored speaker series, flyers for cultural events, vision statements, strategic plans, or statements concerning academic freedom?
23. What information and characteristics, if any, does your institution feel demonstrate a justifiable reason for your academic institution to receive a waiver?

Campus Confucius Institute Closure

[ASK QUESTIONS 24–25 ONLY IF CI IS CLOSED]

24. Was your institution’s Confucius Institute transferred to another school or organization? Could you describe this decision, if applicable?

25. Following the closure of your Confucius Institute, did your institution create any new organizations, programs, or offerings to continue programs previously conducted or organized by your Confucius Institute or to fill any language and culture programming gaps?
    • If yes, how were these organizations or offerings funded and/or structured?

Concluding Question

26. Is there anything else you would like to share to inform the Confucius Institutes consensus study?

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