3

Benefits and Risks Posed by Confucius Institutes to Academic Institutions

This chapter addresses the benefits of hosting Confucius Institutes (CIs) at U.S. institutions of higher education and the risks that CIs pose to U.S. academic institutions as well as to national security. The task was not to look at all dimensions of CIs, and the following analysis is subject to an important qualification: as the previous chapter notes, the structure, management, and programming of CIs vary widely across institutions. Because of this variation, the committee could not construct a uniform risk profile for all CIs. The chapter has two goals: to provide a comprehensive outline of the benefits and risks a CI might present and to summarize the evidence in the record regarding the experience of institutions that have hosted CIs.

BENEFITS TO U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION HOSTING A CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE

Given that U.S. institutions of higher education are under no obligation to host a CI, there must be compelling reasons to establish a CI on a college or university campus. A primary benefit is that a CI provides a source of funds for teaching resources that build current and future capacity in Chinese language and culture at host institutions (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2018; Kaleem et al., 2022). This is particularly true at a time of tight funding for language and area studies at U.S. institutions of higher education and given “a clear need for cultivating Mandarin speakers and China expertise across multiple disciplines” (Horsley, 2021).

For institutions with existing Chinese language programs, these resources can enable them to offer introductory-level courses to more students, provide advanced-level courses that would otherwise be unavailable, and create noncredit

Chinese language courses for members of the local business community (Kaleem et al., 2022). CI instructors can also assist with teacher training and developing teaching materials.¹ In addition, the added resources that come with a CI might enable the host institution to augment cocurricular programming, such as convening conversation groups for students studying Chinese or to meet visiting scholars from China. At some institutions, CI instructors add capacity in teaching courses on Chinese culture and literature as well as language. Collaborations between the host institution and its Chinese partner university have supported research into Chinese language pedagogy.

For institutions that lack their own Chinese language and culture programs, hosting a CI provides opportunities and resources for language instruction on their campuses. CI instructors can also show administrators there is sufficient student interest in learning Chinese and studying Chinese culture to warrant establishing such a program and hiring faculty needed to teach such courses.

Other benefits of hosting a CI include the following:

• Creating opportunities for students to study abroad in China (Tufts University, 2019). This is especially valuable at institutions enrolling many students from lower socioeconomic groups. The COVID-19 pandemic and China’s “zero-COVID” policy has limited this opportunity in recent years.
• Providing cultural enrichment experiences on campus and in surrounding communities (Fowler, 2018). CIs have resources to bring in speakers and organize cultural events that provide instructional benefit to students at the U.S. institution and members of the surrounding community.
• Serving as conveners to bring together faculty members whose research relates to China.
• Supporting global engagement and connections. For some universities, it is through the CI that they create a partnership with a Chinese university, which can support other goals such as research collaborations or study abroad (Fowler, 2018). For those institutions whose CI involves an existing partner, the additional activities associated with the CI can strengthen and expand that partnership.
• Offering benefits to the community by providing Chinese language instruction in K–12 schools.
• Serving as a venue for Chinese language proficiency testing services, such as the Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì (HSK) exam.
• Supporting the internationalization and economic missions of U.S. institutions and their integration into local, state, national, and international businesses. Chinese language instruction and knowledge has become

___________________

¹ Although host universities do not use Hanban-supplied materials in for-credit classes, these materials can serve as supplementary resources (GAO, 2019).

• crucial for deeper understanding of a near-peer competitor and for trade and business between Chinese-speaking countries and the United States.

RISKS TO U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION HOSTING A CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE

Academic Freedom and Freedom of Expression

One of the major risks associated with CIs is that they might impair academic freedom on U.S. campuses. This perceived threat relates both to the CI’s own activities and to the campus environment more generally.

Academic freedom and freedom of expression and dissent are the foundations of the research, teaching, and learning environment at U.S. colleges and universities. Together, they guarantee that students and faculty members can express their views in free and open intellectual debate and without censorship or sanction. They also guarantee students and faculty the right to pursue academic inquiry on whatever topic they choose and without fear that others will impose their views—including political views—on them.

Interference with the Freedom to Discuss Sensitive Topics

The Chinese government actively censors the flow of information within China on a range of topics, including the status of Taiwan, Uighur rights, and certain historical events such as the Tiananmen Square uprising. One concern regarding CIs is that their presence on U.S. campuses will impair the free and open exchange of information on these topics at the host institution. This concern relates in part to the activities and programs of the CIs themselves. According to the terms of some agreements between CIs and their host institutions, Hanban retains the right to approve proposed expenditures of funds for CI activities and programs. Some observers have expressed doubt that a CI would receive approval for any events involving speakers critical of China’s stance on sensitive topics, leading to self-censorship. Others have suggested that CI instructors would avoid such issues within their own classrooms or would stifle any contrary views that emerged during discussion (Diamond and Schell, 2019).

There is also a concern that a CI at an institution of higher education might threaten academic freedom more broadly, with particular impacts on Chinese nationals on campus. Some reports allege that CI staff or board members have attempted either to interfere with university events on politically sensitive topics—by taking down promotional materials, for example—or to pressure universities to avoid such topics altogether (ChinaFile, 2013; Ford, 2022). Other reports identify a more indirect form of interference, suggesting that the mere presence of a CI on campus has a chilling effect on academic discourse by those who fear offending a Chinese partner or the Chinese government (GAO, 2019;

Wallace, 2016). Sixty-eight percent of respondents to the 2018 China Scholar Research Experience Survey “identified self-censorship as a concern for the field” (Chestnut Greitens and Truex, 2018). This concern regarding self-censorship by faculty members or administrators is sometimes ascribed to a fear of losing the funding provided through the CI or other Chinese sources. Finally, students also are affected by self-censorship, as they may choose not to discuss issues sensitive to China or to limit their associations on U.S. campuses out of fear of monitoring by the Chinese Communist Party (FIRE, 2022).

Dissemination of Propaganda

A related concern is that the Chinese government will use CIs to actively disseminate Chinese propaganda, including through the teaching materials that Hanban supplies for use at CIs. This concern is acute at universities with no separate program in Chinese language and culture, which may rely more, or solely, on Hanban-provided materials (Peterson et al., 2022).

Effective Academic Governance

Under the principle of shared governance, it is the joint responsibility of faculty, administrators, and governing bodies to govern U.S. universities (AAUP, 1966). Within this governance model, faculty members play a critical role in overseeing academic matters and participating in decision-making in areas such as faculty appointments and curriculum. However, depending on their particular structure, CIs may sit outside the governance system of the host university, thereby compromising the system of shared governance. The American Association of University Professors has been vocal in raising this concern, stating that “[a]llowing any third-party control of academic matters is inconsistent with principles of … shared governance” (AAUP, 2014).

Concerns regarding academic oversight of CIs and their operations relate to several matters that the legal agreements among Hanban, the Chinese partner, and the host institution typically address. For example, host universities do not participate in the process by which Hanban screens and selects the teaching staff it recommends for appointment, though U.S. institutions typically have final decision authority as to whether to accept or reject the candidates that Hanban and the Chinese partner university identify. In addition, once recommended, CI instructors might be appointed without going through normal hiring channels subject to faculty involvement and oversight, and once appointed, instructors might not be subject to the control of the relevant academic department or unit (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019a). CI administrators might also be exempt from normal employee policies including ongoing performance

reviews, and senior administrators might not report up through academic leadership or otherwise be subject to sufficient oversight.

The intersection between these concerns with concerns about a lack of transparency regarding the operations of CIs merits further exploration. For faculty to adequately discharge their shared governance responsibilities, such as executing decision authority over potential CI instructors and determining the nature of course offerings and materials, there should be sufficient transparency in university operations. If confidentiality provisions or other measures make it difficult to obtain information, meaningful shared governance may become impossible. As a result, observers have raised concerns about the privacy surrounding CI legal arrangements (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019a).

Finally, the contracts between some U.S. institutions and Hanban contained provisions requiring adherence to both U.S. and Chinese law at CIs on U.S. campuses (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019a; Peterson, 2017). This has significant legal and human rights implications and poses an additional concern regarding adequate control over CIs’ programs and practices (Gladstone et al., 2021). Many universities hosting CIs subsequently updated their contracts and Memorandums of Understanding to assert the primacy of U.S. law at CIs on U.S. campuses.

University Research

A third set of concerns, in addition to academic freedom and freedom of expression and effective academic governance, relates to university research. This is particularly with respect to the possible effect of CIs on the research environment at host institutions. These concerns overlap with the question of how CIs may affect Department of Defense-funded research, which the following chapter addresses.

Talent Recruitment

China has engaged in an expansive strategy to recruit U.S. researchers. Some observers have noted that CIs provide the Chinese government with a point of access to faculty and students at host institutions (Ren, 2012). This suggests that CI staff may actively engage in recruiting U.S. graduate students and faculty members to contribute to the Chinese research enterprise (Wray, 2018). Possible adverse effects for host universities include losing highly productive researchers and creating conflicts of interest and commitment for faculty members.

Intellectual Property Theft

The majority of CIs do not engage in research,² and therefore their programs and activities do not directly intersect with the research environment on U.S. campuses. However, CI staff and faculty interact with members of the university at large and have the potential to serve as operatives of varying capacity for the Chinese government, which actively seeks access to U.S. research data and technology. In addition, some U.S. faculty have obtained permission from Hanban to use CI funding to bring Chinese scholars and artists to their campuses to further their own research as well as joint collaborations. It is possible that some of these visitors to U.S. campuses might also serve as Chinese government operatives.

The committee notes that using CIs as a conduit for intellectual property theft is at best inefficient given the intellectual, and often physical, distance between language and culture studies on campus and departments focusing on scientific research. The public record does not establish that CIs present a special risk in this regard.

Assessment

National Security Risk

Like other forms of activity involving academic interaction with foreign governments of concern, CIs create the potential for threats to research security on campus. However, several committee briefings explicitly addressed this question, and the speakers at these briefings did not view CIs as a primary source of research security threats. Arun Seraphin, deputy director at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Emerging Technology Institute, noted on July 20, 2022, that “the 2019 Bipartisan Report led by Senators Portman and Carper found no evidence that CIs are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity.”³ Kevin Gamache, associate vice chancellor and chief research security officer for the Texas A&M University System, told the committee on July 20, 2022, that CIs “are not a major concern because we no longer have a Confucius Institute within the A&M System. We remain extremely concerned and focus a great deal of effort on understanding and mitigating other state-sponsored programs such as the China Scholarship Council.”

As a Brookings Institution report stated, “Multiple investigations into U.S.-based CIs, including by the Senate, have produced no evidence that they facilitate espionage, technology theft or any other illegal activity …” (Horsley, 2021). This echoes the findings by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

___________________

² Stanford University’s CI was a research unit housed within the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures and conducted academic research on sinology.

³ The full report is available at www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20China’s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf.

report mentioned earlier, which states that “… there is no evidence that these [Confucius] institutes are a center for Chinese espionage or any other illegal activity …” and by Tufts University, which states that while “concerns about Chinese political interference and influence should not be dismissed … there is not specific evidence regarding CIs” (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019b; Tufts, 2019).

Academic Freedom

Based on the public record, it is difficult to determine the extent of the threat CIs present to academic freedom, though Hanban’s oversight over programming and budgeting creates this possibility. There are reports of individual instances of problems (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2019a). For example, in a presentation to the committee on June 22, 2022, Denis Simon, senior adviser to the president for China affairs at Duke University, said, “I would say that everyone involved, unless you were somewhere in outer space during this period, recognized that Chinese money coming from the [People’s Republic of China] could not be used to support political programming dealing with Taiwan independence, Tibet independence, human rights, all of the sensitive issues” involving programming at U.S. host institutions. University of Chicago professor Marshall Sahlins, an outspoken critic of CIs, also held this view (Sahlins, 2014). However, the record does not indicate that CIs have had a meaningful impact on free and open discourse on U.S. campuses regarding issues related to China (Abamu, 2019). In fact, several case studies and reports (Diamond and Schell, 2019; GAO, 2019) concluded that the concerns about academic freedom are overstated, and even Simon, in his comments to the committee, acknowledged that “many of the examples of some of this heavy handedness coming from the Chinese side did occur in overseas venues where there were CIs, but I think the conditions that prevailed at U.S. universities, in most cases because they had experience, senior administrators did not allow these things to take place on U.S. campuses.”

A 2022 working paper explored the CI teacher selection process and to what extent China’s government exerts control over CI teachers (Fan et al., 2022). The authors of this paper found that CI teachers are not screened or selected for their political beliefs or asked to adopt particular political behaviors. CI teachers also receive little training on political topics and encounter minimal monitoring while teaching abroad. However, additional training or political education is unnecessary given the amount of ideological and political education to which Chinese students and scholars are currently exposed. This is consistent with the surveys conducted by Fan, Pan, and Zhang, which revealed that CI teachers frequently espouse and disseminate positions held by the Chinese Communist Party and self-censor when encountering sensitive political topics abroad, as well as Ruth and Xiao, who state that CI teachers “are exceedingly likely to continue to

self-censor, regardless of contractual reform, because they know that they will eventually return to China” (Fan et al., 2022; Ruth and Xiao, 2019).

University Governance

The background literature contains more evidence of issues relating to university governance. These include challenges to transparency and, at least prior to universities amending their agreements, gaps in academic oversight and control. One report concluded that universities can and should actively regulate their CIs (Diamond and Schell, 2019).