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Risks Posed by Confucius Institutes to DOD-Funded Research
The Department of Defense (DOD) research and engineering funding landscape is diverse, in terms of grants and contracts; unclassified, controlled unclassified, and classified programs; and basic, applied, and advanced technology efforts, as well as health, social science, and language programs. This varied and complex landscape requires myriad risk mitigation approaches. While Confucius Institutes (CIs) fundamentally are language and culture institutes, it is imperative to understand the risks that having a CI on, adjacent to, or near campus poses to research, and to DOD-funded research in particular. This chapter seeks to discern whether a CI bestows risks beyond those associated with other foreign individuals, programs, and partnerships already present on campus.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH
The committee acknowledges that CIs are one aspect of a suite of activities China pursues to engage and influence U.S. academic institutions, which are the bedrock of American education, national security talent, and research. In a June 9, 2022, hearing on U.S.-China competition in global supply chains held by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, former U.S. government analyst, linguist, and technology protection expert Jeffrey Stoff testified to the Chinese government’s methods of tapping into U.S. innovation engendered by U.S. academic institutions, including “official and unofficial proxies; investment structures such as venture capital funds, incubators and innovation centers; start-up contests; talent programs and supporting recruitment networks; and partnerships with diaspora organizations” (Stoff, 2022).
Maintaining an open environment with a strong commitment to U.S. values, including independence of thought and freedom of speech, is critical. Though the work of this committee is limited by the fact that this study is being conducted at the unclassified level and by its inability to engage with the security community, which was invited but declined to contribute, the committee has not found evidence of espionage or research data theft resulting from the presence of a CI on campus. Therefore, the committee believes that rigorous adherence to appropriate research security measures can mitigate the majority of risk to DOD-funded research posed by a CI on campus and allow DOD to confirm that a CI is not unknowingly integrated into a DOD-funded research program on campus (Rogin, 2018).
RISKS POSED BY CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES TO DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH
The committee believes it is important to be mindful of China’s multi-pronged approach to furthering its national competitiveness and global influence, as China’s “hybrid innovation system” blends “forms of academic collaboration, industry partnerships, cyber espionage, direct investment, and influence operations” to further China’s power and influence (Fedasiuk et al., 2021; Puglisi, 2020). Specifically, some Chinese “science and technology diplomats” leverage a network of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–sponsored organizations called the “United Front” to gain intimate details regarding leading-edge science, along with the entities and individuals capable of accelerating China’s development (Fedasiuk, 2020; Fedasiuk et al., 2021; Joske, 2020). CIs receive substantial oversight from the United Front Work Department, which reports directly to the CCP Central Committee (Joske, 2020; Xinhua News Agency, 2018).
The CCP can covertly cultivate relationships, build trust, and gain access to strategic information and assets through these nongovernmental but government-organized organizations (Fedasiuk et al., 2021; Lee and Sullivan, 2019). While Chinese Embassy officials responsible for science and technology tend to minimize the role of their overseas influence activities, evidence exists showing that such individuals make payments to overseas scholars and pass funding through Chinese universities (Fedasiuk et al., 2021; Puglisi, 2021). As for the broader role of overseas Chinese professional organizations, more research is needed to illuminate connections between specific groups and China’s science and technology ecosystem, particularly regarding military-civil fusion efforts and research parks (Fedasiuk and Weinstein, 2020).
The committee believes it is fair to note that CIs have the potential to be “nontraditional collectors” of foreign technology given their ties to campuses where scientific research is conducted. In fact, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Christopher Wray and others in the intelligence and security communities perceive CIs in this manner (Redden, 2018; Rogin, 2018; Wray, 2018).
There is evidence that academic solicitation, or “the use of students, professors, scientists or researchers as collectors” of information has increased, tripling from 8 percent of all foreign efforts to obtain classified or sensitive information in fiscal year (FY) 2010 to 24 percent in FY 2014 according to the Defense Security Service (Golden, 2015).
The committee is not aware of any publicly known instances of attempted academic espionage or intellectual property theft stemming from or associated with a CI. However, the committee recognizes that a determined adversary could seek to use any avenue to exploit existing connections and access to research results. While the committee is not aware of any evidence of CIs posing these kinds of risk in the past or at present, the same cannot be said of the future given the evolving political landscape in China. This underscores the need for a rigorous waiver process that contains provisions for increased and sustained oversight of CIs and adequate separation and firewalls between the CI and campus.
The colocation of CIs on campuses hosting classified DOD-funded research is an identified risk. Indeed, CI faculty and staff at a U.S. academic institution might have easier access to campus life and to labs conducting and discussing DOD-funded research. Campuses hosting classified research must adhere to strict requirements issued by the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) and, in particular, those detailed in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).1 If a campus engages in classified work, the university must have a government sponsor, apply for and receive a facility security clearance, and abide by the rules and regulations required to maintain such clearance. CI-hosting institutions should protect this work or research not only from a CI, but also from any unauthorized access at the university. The committee believes there is no additional risk posed by the conduct of classified research on a campus hosting a CI, as long as the campus complies with NISP and NISPOM requirements.
Another risk could entail having Chinese government representatives tell their own versions of China’s culture and traditions, which may conflict with domestic research values including openness and reciprocity. This differs from student organizations that the Chinese government does not authorize or install at a particular university. If the Chinese government directly selects CI faculty, this might be a risk that a CI-hosting institution will need to mitigate because of potential limited transparency regarding the full objectives of the faculty in the U.S. academic institution.
The federal government is currently establishing rules to improve the overall research security posture on campuses through National Security Presidential Memorandum—33 (NSPM-33) (Trump, 2021). These practices appear to cover the risks to DOD-funded research effectively. NSPM-33 addresses and mitigates a broad range of risks by bolstering transparency and reporting requirements. The
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1National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, 32 CFR part 2004. Available at https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/isd/nisp/.
new requirements include full disclosure of outside appointments and activities, including those occurring outside the United States and those conducted outside of the home academic institution’s purview. Recent enhancements to other federal agencies’ disclosure requirements include listing all foreign appointments, paid and unpaid, as well as all outside resources that support the individual investigator’s research program, not only those that support the specific proposed research. As an example, an institution would have to disclose a trainee that a foreign government funds, such as a Chinese scholar funded by the China Scholarship Council, as it would for research materials being shared by a Chinese university. Full knowledge of any investigators’ entire research portfolio will permit DOD to make risk-based decisions about whether a particular investigator should participate in a DOD-funded activity.
The committee notes that the majority of institutions that continue to host CIs and to perform DOD-funded research fall below the $50 million threshold of federally funded research that triggers compliance with NSPM-33. Therefore, these campuses must fully comply with all applicable requirements under the federal funding they receive and take it upon themselves to implement strong and effective research security practices in areas including cybersecurity, foreign travel security, insider threat awareness and identification, and export control training. These institutions may find science and security resources developed by the Association of American Universities and Association of Public and Land-grant Universities to be useful (AAU, 2022).
