Managing a Flight Diversion with an Emergency Response at Small, Non-Hub, or General Aviation Airports (2023)

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1   This synthesis explores how smaller airports manage various levels of unexpected aircraft diversions from routine to emergency. It investigates which types of diversions these airports can manage with their own capabilities. It also indicates who these airports call on for addi- tional assistance. It discusses the resiliency of smaller airports, or rather, their ability to recover quickly from flight diversions to maintain regularly scheduled flight schedules and operations. Capabilities are different for each airport because of a myriad of factors explored in this synthesis. Factors associated with “capability” include an airport’s • Size (e.g., annual enplanements), • Structure (e.g., governance and contracting structures), • Physical infrastructure (e.g., runway type and length, terminal size, ramp space and number of gates, and impacts to it like construction), • Number of personnel and expertise (e.g., training and qualifications), • Resources (e.g., supplies like fuel, equipment like airstairs, and technology for communi- cating critical information), • Preparedness (e.g., plans, training, and collaborative networks), • Notification factors (e.g., tracking, timing, and airport accessibility), • Communication factors (e.g., common nomenclature and established protocols), and • Hours of operation. The objectives of this synthesis are to describe current practices that small hub (SH), non- hub (NH), and general aviation (GA) airports use to manage the following types of aircraft diversions: (1) routine gas and go technical stops; (2) diversions involving an incident, espe- cially those that exceed an airport’s capability to manage a situation; and (3) diversions requir- ing an emergency response. The information for this synthesis initially came from an extensive literature review and a survey that was sent to approximately 300 SH, NH, and GA airports in the United States (71 survey responses). Interviews were also conducted with leaders at eight SH, eight NH, and nine GA airports (including those GA airports categorized as nonprimary commercial service [CS] and reliever [R] airports); pilots at one airline and representatives from the industry group Airlines for America (A4A); a fixed-base operator (FBO); four technology partners; three regional irregular operations (IROPS) networks; a reliever airport group; and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Flight diversions are typically caused by factors outside the aircraft (e.g., weather), with the physical aircraft (e.g., low fuel levels, minor mechanical issues, and structural damage), S U M M A R Y Managing a Flight Diversion with an Emergency Response at Small, Non-Hub, or General Aviation Airports

2 Managing a Flight Diversion with an Emergency Response at Small, Non-Hub, or General Aviation Airports and inside the aircraft (e.g., disruptive passengers and medical issues). Research demonstrates that most diverted flights to smaller airports are “gas and go” technical stops in which no passenger deplaning occurs. These types of diversions are considered routine operations for most smaller airports and are easy for them to manage. Smaller airports look forward to these diversions as they make money from them by collecting landing fees and FBO services. On rare occasions, smaller airports receive flight diversions with incident-level issues like minor aircraft mechanical issues or disruptive passengers on board. Sometimes they receive a diverted flight with an emergency-level issue like engine failure or a medical emergency. But, when one of these types of diverted flights lands at an airport, the authority under which first responders operate is the primary factor that determines whether smaller airports can manage the situation without exceeding their capabilities. For many SH and NH airports, first responders such as aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF), law enforcement, and medical responders are considered under an airport’s authority, either as in-house staff or third-party contracted staff. For many GA airports, first responders are considered mutual aid and are contracted through interlocal or joint-use agreements or are managed through another department under municipal control. But these generaliza- tions do not always hold true. It is difficult to make broad statements about SH, NH, and GA airports because of their various governance and management structures, contractual service arrangements, and operating characteristics–all of which are unique for each airport across various sizes. Research does show that SH and NH airports can effectively manage most incident- and emergency-level flight diversions. This is especially true for joint-use civil-military airports that often have a higher ARFF index level. SH and NH airports are challenged most when they receive non-station international flight diversions or multiple flight diversions at once, particularly if they have limited gate or parking space for aircraft or terminal space for deplaned passengers. GA airports tend to exceed their capabilities more quickly than SH and NH airports because of their limited hours of operation, very small staff size, limited or no federal agency presence, and fewer, if any, in-house emergency response resources. This does not hold true for GA airports that are considered nonprimary commercial service (CS) airports as they service larger aircraft and have ARFF presence. However, since GA airports tend to have fewer incoming and outgoing daily flights, emergencies can often be mitigated without impacting normal flight operations. But passengers may experience extended delays if there are fewer alternative flights available to take them to their final destinations. Unless they are part of a regional diversion network, smaller airports do not receive early notification of flight diversions; they hear from air traffic control (ATC) or an airline pilot about a diversion just before or just as they witness it landing on their runway. For smaller airports located in remote locations, incident- or emergency-related diversions can be challenging to manage without adequate warning when they rely on first responders from mutual aid located miles away. However, with newer flight-tracking technology websites, smaller airport staff can stay abreast of changing conditions whether they are on or off the airport. Once a smaller airport is notified of a diversion, operations staff typically notify and com- municate diversion status information via a combination of means like phone, email, texts, and radio communication as well as via web-based platforms with smartphone app capabili- ties that can push mass notifications to internal airport staff, on-airport partners, mutual aid,

Summary 3   and network partners when needed. Smaller airports do not typically have the personnel to use social media as a communications tool to manage emergencies. To manage routine diversions, smaller airports typically collaborate with a network of external network partners, including on-airport (e.g., FBO, airline ground handlers, Trans- portation Security Administration [TSA]) and off-airport (e.g., FAA) departments, organi- zations, and agencies—all considered within their capabilities. The list of a small airport’s partners expands to first responders as a diversion situation escalates. Depending on the authority structure, first responders (e.g., ARFF, law enforcement, and medical responders) can sometimes be obtained within an airport’s capabilities. When this is not the case, mutual aid, including local emergency management (e.g., city police, fire, and paramedics), regional (e.g., county emergency management and healthcare systems), and network partners such as community resources (e.g., other airports and busing companies) or federal agencies (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Customs and Border Protection [CBP]) may be called upon as diversion situations escalate from irregular operations to incident-level response to emergency situations. Mutual aid has traditionally been defined as organizations defined by regulation to lend resources or personnel to mitigate emergency situations. These organizations include fire departments, paramedics, and law enforcement. Beyond this, industry research and real-world diversion experience have revealed that smaller airports look to other network partners to care for passengers in the first few hours after a diversion event. These network partners beyond airlines include concessionaires, ground transportation (buses), local stores, restaurants, and hotels—all of which can provide passenger care assistance during flight diversions. For ease of simplicity, all external airport partners in this synthesis are either considered network partners or mutual aid, and contracting with them is indicated as mandatory or voluntary. While many different types of mutual aid and network partners exist, there are similari- ties in the way diverted flights are managed as smaller airports typically follow the Incident Command System (ICS), a major component of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), to provide a flexible and scalable system for multiple agencies and disciplines to manage emergencies as well as other unplanned events—even when they are not man- dated. In addition, smaller airports use a variety of plans to manage diversions—from standard operating procedures for gas and go technical stops to IROPS plans for incident-related diversions to airport emergency plans (AEPs) for emergency-level diversions. Many non- Part 139 airports report developing AEPs or similar plans even though they are not regu- lated to do so to be prepared for emergencies such as certain flight diversions. Most smaller airports refer to a combination of plans to manage diversions, while some have developed stand-alone diversion plans, international diversion plans, or diversion checklists. Smaller airports that have developed diversion checklists include these essential items in them: monitoring procedures for flight, weather, and national airspace conditions; notifica- tion triggers and procedures; communication procedures to maintain common situational awareness among mutual aid and network partners during an event; escalation triggers; coordination procedures to access resources, staff and equipment from mutual aid and network partners; and special conditions procedures like after-hours staffing procedures. Diversion checklists are effective according to smaller airports interviewed and surveyed when they are formatted in one or more of the following ways: • A separate, stand-alone streamlined document one to two pages in length, easy to find and access;

4 Managing a Flight Diversion with an Emergency Response at Small, Non-Hub, or General Aviation Airports • Specific, clear, and precise instructions in an actionable bullet and dot point format, which divides complicated tasks into simple ones grouped by role and responsibility and task; or • Tasks ordered sequentially or by escalating factors, available in a digital format or on a smartphone app, and which are verified to be current and up-to-date. Most small airports have not developed stand-alone plans to manage passenger care needs. Since most diversions to smaller airports are gas and go stops that do not involve deplaning passengers, passenger care (e.g., food or lodging) is not typically necessary. Even for one of the most common diversion causal factors—medical emergencies—these generally result in deplaning one person requiring medical attention. In addition, research demonstrates that many airport personnel believe that most passenger care-related provisions are the responsi- bility of the air carriers. Nevertheless, some smaller airports do plan for some passenger care needs in their IROPS plans or in airport emergency plans (AEPs). In these, some airports des- ignate secure space for CBP clearance or make provisions for passengers so they can recharge phones, receive information updates, find food and water, or obtain ground transportation and hotel options. Most SH and NH airports regularly train for aviation emergencies with emergency responders from their mutual aid organizations to fulfill their Part 139 requirements, but only just a few surveyed and interviewed said that they regularly conduct diversion-specific training. Generally, GA airports report that they do not train with mutual aid or network partners for emergencies or diversions, as they are not required by regulations to do so. Some challenges associated with diversions mainly pertain to how quickly they can esca- late into more demanding situations. Some escalating factors include diversions that arrive after normal airport business hours at airports that do not staff around the clock, when non-station international diversions arrive at airports without CBP presence, or when multiple diversions arrive all at once. Construction at smaller airports can also drastically reduce parking and gate capacity, making it difficult to manage unexpected diversions. Interviews with smaller airports revealed that beyond effective planning efforts, having relationships in place with on-airport (e.g., FBOs, fuelers, or deicers) and off-airport (e.g., FAA or FBI) partners as well as mutual aid (e.g., local first responders) and network partners (e.g., airlines or concessionaires) are critical to the success of managing and mitigating the multitude of effects of flight diversions. Small airports that collaborate with external partners by communicating regularly, sharing diversion-related and other irregular and emergency plans, training together, and conducting after-action reports (AARs) are the most successful at mitigating a variety of situations including diversions. While trends indicate that the overall number of diversions should continue to rise in tandem with the increasing number of flights post-2020 COVID-19 pandemic recovery, there are indicators that smaller airports may experience a decline in diversions. For instance, emerging robust flight-tracking technologies are just beginning to allow air traffic controllers and pilots to see real-time airport capacities and capabilities. This is assisting them to make wiser decisions that often result in diverting aircraft to larger airports with more capabilities. Also, more regional airport planning groups have formed around major hubs, enabling airports, airlines, and government agencies to work together regularly to ensure that diverted flights are only routed to airports that can manage them at that moment. In addition, the ramifications of the global pandemic and its associated workforce reduc- tion combined with worldwide political uncertainties causing supply chain disruptions and steeply rising fuel costs have challenged airlines to operate as efficiently as possible. Airlines have minimal economical margins for error. As a result, airlines are reducing the number of overall flight routes, increasing pre-flight planning efforts to avoid holding patterns, and

Summary 5   only diverting to airports with available or certain capacity to handle them—all to save fuel. One major airline’s objective is to avoid diverting to either smaller airports with limited resources or remote airports away from major hubs. All these factors point to potentially fewer diversions to the smallest of airports. More research would be helpful to determine how to create a nationwide airport capacity and capability database, how to make diversion-related plans adaptable so they can be easily updated after real-world experiences, and how to keep contact lists current. In addi- tion, more research is needed on how smaller airports recover from diversions, especially emergency-related ones.