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Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning (1976)

Chapter: Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Page 12
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Page 17
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Page 18
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Page 19
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Page 20
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 21
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 22
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 23
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 24
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 25
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 26
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 27
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 28
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 29
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 30
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 31
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
×
Page 32
Suggested Citation:"Historical Development of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice." National Research Council. 1976. Interim report: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice : objectives and planning. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26975.
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Page 33

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10 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE P o l i t i c a l Setting I t i s clear from the h i s t o r i c a l record that LEAA was born i n a time of national fear and trauma. Because LEAA i s predominately a state block grant program, the eventual consequences of that emotional beginning depended, for the most part, on the p o l i t i c a l characteristics of the various states. With the exception of detailed regulations from the central offices i n Washington (and l a t e r from the "de-centralized" regional o f f i c e s ) , most LEAA funds have been spent i n response to the demands of loc a l and state criminal j u s t i c e con- stituencies. Of the discretionary funds available to LEAA i t s e l f , a s i g n i f i - cant proportion was allocated each year to NILECJ—making t h i s organization one of the few f o c i for a national perspective on crime (see Table 1 i n Appen- dix D) . Pressures on the I n s t i t u t e have ranged from outraged Congressional i n q u i r - ies to SPA demands for immediate solutions to long-range problems. In general, the impact of p o l i t i c a l pressures can be summed up i n David Stanley's observa- t i o n after interviewing many I n s t i t u t e s t a f f : "A l e t t e r to be answered (espe- c i a l l y one from Capitol H i l l ) gets i n the way of research and development ('The urgent drives out the important.')" (1972, p. 8). (For a discussion of Congres- sional attitudes toward the I n s t i t u t e , see Appendix A.)

11 While none of these pressures became d i r e c t t h r e a t s t o the I n s t i t u t e ' s ex- ist e n c e , I n s t i t u t e personnel o f t e n i n d i c a t e d i n inte r v i e w s t h a t such c r i t i c i s m s and demands shaped t h e i r t h i n k i n g . Their expectations about what LEAA would fund and what Congress would f i n d a c c e p t a b l e — o r unacceptable—became c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n the planning process. Perhaps the most important continuing con- s t r a i n t on I n s t i t u t e s t a f f i s t h e i r f r e q u e n t l y mentioned perception t h a t LEAA I t s e l f i s h o s t i l e t o research; whether the perception i s accurate or not. I n - s t i t u t e s t a f f f e e l there i s a lack of sympathy f o r and understanding of research. The h i s t o r y of the I n s t i t u t e i t s e l f must, t h e r e f o r e , be cast i n p o l i t i c a l terms. A c c o u n t a b i l i t y i n government funding i s a many-sided issue. I t i s c e r t a i n l y proper t o hold the I n s t i t u t e accountable f o r i t s performance, but a research program i s bound t o s u f f e r i f I t i s c o n t i n u a l l y measured against immediate pro- blem-solving demands. Such a perspective i s c r i t i c a l l y important t o an evalua- t i o n of the I n s t i t u t e ' s h i s t o r y and current operations and t o understanding why no long-term research agenda has survived more than a year or two. The environ- ment i n which the I n s t i t u t e has operated from i t s i n c e p t i o n has made i t d i f f i - c u l t f o r t h i s agency—the major r e p o s i t o r y of f e d e r a l funds f o r research on c r i m e — t o have any s u b s t a n t i a l impact on the problem of crime i n America. I n i t i a l Assumptions There were two sources from which the I n s t i t u t e could draw guidance i n i t s formative stages. The President's Crime Commission r e p o r t s provided voluminous commentary on the s t a t e of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e i n America, along w i t h recommenda- t i o n s and exhortations f o r reform. From the perspective of a research and de- velopment task, those r e p o r t s put f o r t h only a general view of e x i s t i n g problems.

12 They covered a wide range of issues, i n c l u d i n g such f a c t o r s as the importance of f a m i l y and school t o c o n t r o l l i n g crime, but they d i d not provide an i n t e - grated programmatic focus or formula f o r research (ACIR 1976, Ch. I I , pp. 5-6). A p a r t i c u l a r R&D approach was provided by a 1968 I n s t i t u t e f o r Defense Analyses (IDA) study, which had been requested by the Department of J u s t i c e as a program plan f o r NILECJ ( I n s t i t u t e f o r Defense Analyses 1968; h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as IDA 1968).* At the time the I n s t i t u t e was created, the President's Crime Commission's r e p o r t s and the IDA study's proposed research program were the only bases f o r designing a c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e research program. The President's Crime Commission had urged t h a t "America can c o n t r o l crime i f i t w i l l " (1967, p. 291). With crime c o n t r o l as a g o a l , the IDA study ob- served t h a t the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system was "fragmented and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e " (IDA 1968, p. 7) and proceeded t o plan f o r the improvement of the instruments of c o n t r o l . The problem of crime became a s o c i a l engineering prob- lem i n very r e a l t e r m s — a matter of developing the technologies t o improve the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system by manipulating i t s parts and by b e t t e r i d e n t i f y i n g the behavioral mechanics of i t s t a r g e t population. Charles Rogovin, f i r s t adminis- t r a t o r of LEAA, rep o r t s a discussion between himself and Associate Administra- t o r Richard Velde t h a t provides a contemporary c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the IDA r e - p o r t . The discussion had t o do w i t h the choice of an i n d i v i d u a l t o be d i r e c t o r of the I n s t i t u t e . Rogovin says (1973, pp. 17-18): *The choice of IDA f o r t h i s r o l e was undoubtedly the r e s u l t of the f a c t t h a t IDA had done the task force r e p o r t on science and technology f o r the President's Crime Commission.

13 I argued f o r someone w i t h c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e experience and c r e d i b i l i t y , coupled w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o en- gage the a t t e n t i o n of the researchers whom we would hope to a t t r a c t t o work on the problems of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e . My colleague opted f o r someone s k i l l e d i n the e s o t e r l c a of systems analysis and operations research. Since we had already agreed t h a t a research program design which had been developed f o r the I n s t i t u t e by one of the lead- ing ' t h i n k tanks' was too h e a v i l y weighted toward those very d i s c i p l i n e s and we would thus not pursue i t s o u t l i n e , I would not agree w i t h h i s choice. More fundamental issues, such as "what the c r i m i n a l sanction i s good f o r " (Packer 1967, p. 17) or what the s o c i a l roots of deviant behavior are, were not r a i s e d . This was t o be a war on crime on the model of the war on poverty. Analogous t o the optimism surrounding the war on poverty, the war on crime was based pn the assumption t h a t crime could be c o n t r o l l e d , and t h i s basic assump- t i o n continued unchallenged f o r several years. I n s t i t u t e D i r e c t o r <;erald Cap- Ian r e c e n t l y described (1975a) the a t t i t u d e of t h a t time: The p u b l i c pronouncements on crime of ten years ago, i n r e t r o s p e c t , have an ot h e r - w o r l d l y f l a v o r t o them. Lyndon Johnson's c a l l i n 1965 t o "not only reduce but banish crime" was not then greeted w i t h skepticism, l e t alone c a t c a l l s . Nor was the more somber but equally grandiose forecast of the N a t i o n a l Crime Commission t h a t "America can c o n t r o l crime i f i t w i l l " seen as a Utopian ambition. At a time when we were about to land a man on the moon, perhaps i t d i d not seem so d i f f i c u l t t o purge the Nation of i t s muggers, r a p i s t s , t h e i v e s , corrupt o f f i c i a l s , and w h i t e - c o l l a r c r i m i n a l s . I n 1965, crime had been l i t t l e s t u d i e d . The f i r s t of s e v e r a l p r e s i d e n t i a l commissions on the subject was j u s t g e t t i n g underway; the investment i n experimental programs was n e g l i g i b l e ; and there was a general f e e l i n g i n the a i r t h a t , i f only some b r i g h t people would work very had a t i t , a harvest of plummeting crime r a t e s would ensue. (For a discussion of these issues, cast i n broader terms, see Nelson 1974.) That crime can be c o n t r o l l e d i s an assumption c u r r e n t l y being challenged. As Gerald Caplan r e c e n t l y s t a t e d : "The a l t e r n a t i v e t o our high crime r a t e i s not necessarily a low crime r a t e . Crime r e d u c t i o n pursued too

14 desperately on too insecure a knowledge base, could w e l l f r a c t u r e t h a t f r a g i l e union of order and l i b e r t y t h a t i s the democratic experience." (1975, p. 16) The IDA plan proposed t o a l l o c a t e NILECJ's resources i n such a way as t o avoid a p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l p i t f a l l . The r e p o r t assumed t h a t e x i s t i n g c o n s t i - tuencies i n c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e would simply demand "a f a i r share" unless the r e - search and development problem could be defined i n a way t h a t would recombine or create new co n s t i t u e n c i e s . Arguing t h a t " i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o develop p r i o r i - t i e s r a t i o n a l l y " (IDA 1968, p. 19) by a l l o c a t i n g funds i n terms of the t r a d i - t i o n a l agencies of the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system ( p o l i c e , c o u r t s , and c o r r e c t i o n s ) , the r e p o r t i d e n t i f i e d f o u r mission areas t h a t cut across sub-system l i n e s (see Figure 1 ) . I n a d d i t i o n t o the b e n e f i t of bypassing s r a i g h t - l i n e p o l i t i c a l de- mands, new constituencies could be expected t o approach problems i n new ways and thereby t o i n f u s e the system w i t h new ideas. Such a perspective f i t the analogy of "going t o the moon," and "America can c o n t r o l crime" w e l l . Further, given the b e l i e f t h a t crime can be c o n t r o l l e d , i t was easier t o d e f i n e the prob- lem i n management r a t h e r than i n f u n c t i o n a l terms. The fo u r mission areas, under the general conceptual umbrella of reducing the s o c i a l costs of crime, served t h a t purpose. I n a d d i t i o n , an important methodological approach was introduced. Research and development were t o feed i n t o a broad-scale, test-and-evaluation e f f o r t , which would provide a basis f o r funding decisions i n LEAA's a c t i o n program. Hence, NILECJ's service r o l e w i t h i n a mission agency was e x p l i c i t from the beginning.

15 Reduction of Soci a l Costs Associated w i t h Crime and I t s C o n t r o l Mission Area IV Pro v i s i o n f o r Program Support Reduction of Costs Associated w i t h Crime 1 : Mission Area I Mission Area I I Reduction of Need and Desire t o Commit Crime (Crime Prevention and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n ) Increase i n Risks and D i f f i c u l t y of Committing Crime (Crime Control) Mission Area I I I Reductions of Costs Associated w i t h Criminal i s t i c e System Operations (System Management) Figure 1. Structure of the Mission Areas i n the IDA Report The IDA r e p o r t was a c a r e f u l l y developed and elaborate plan f o r a research program. NILECJ never used i t as such, although i t s basic concepts are c l e a r l y apparent i n subsequent plans produced by NILECJ throughout i t s h i s t o r y . The President's Crime Commission p r e m i s e — t h a t "America can c o n t r o l crime i f i t w i l l " — p e r v a d e d a l l of LEAA i n the e a r l y years. NILECJ's f i r s t d i r e c t o r s un- doubtedly paid some a t t e n t i o n t o the IDA r e p o r t , but t h e i r plans r e f l e c t e d the p a r t i c u l a r pressures of gearing up a new and major e f f o r t as w e l l as t h e i r own views. The pressures of a new pro g r a m — f o r example, having t o h i r e s t a f f , de- velop a program, and then spend $3 m i l l i o n i n one year—had at l e a s t the e f f e c t of s c a l i n g down the very ambitious i n i t i a l plan proposed i n the IDA re p o r t .

16 I n sum, conceptual ground of a c e r t a i n k i n d , s t r e s s i n g a social-engineering conception of crime c o n t r o l and a test-and-evaluation methodology f o r develop- i n g p r a c t i c a l knowledge, had been prepared by the time NILECJ was o f f i c i a l l y i n existence i n October 1968. The nagging h i n d s i g h t question—Could the IDA p l a n , or any other r a t i o n a l i z e d program, have been implemented?—is not e a s i l y an- swered. Probably i t cannot even be addressed except on the basis of a close reading of subsequent h i s t o r y . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e H i s t o r y . 1969-Present The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i s t o r y of NILECJ can be d i v i d e d i n t o three phases. The f i r s t phase, which covers the d i r e c t o r s h i p s of several i n d i v i d u a l s , can be characterized as a s i n g l e phase because i t was c l e a r l y a period of gearing up.* The second and t h i r d phases are each i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a s i n g l e d i r e c t o r who had s u f f i c i e n t time t o make an evaluable record. This section focuses on i d e n t i f y - i n g the goals and ob j e c t i v e s of the three phases and on an examination of the planning process used i n each. Phase I : Gearing Up, 1969-1971 The f i r s t d i r e c t o r of NILECJ, Henry Ruth, organized the I n s t i t u t e ' s work around f i v e centers. The Center f o r Crime Prevention and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n focused on conditions underlying c r i m i n a l behavior and new methods f o r prevention and *The f i r s t phase began i n October 1968 when some OLEA personnel f i r s t s t a r t e d t o plan a research s t r u c t u r e t h a t would f i t the requirements w r i t t e n i n t o the 1968 Act. Ralph Siu, then at the Department of Defense, was nominated t o be the f i r s t d i r e c t o r , but he was never confirmed by the Senate because of the change of administrations a f t e r the 1968 e l e c t i o n . Henry Ruth became the f i r s t d i r e c t o r and served f o r approximately one year. He was succeeded i n 1970 by h i s deputy, I r v i n g S l o t t , who served as a c t i n g d i r e c t o r u n t i l e a r l y 1971.

17 r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . The Center f o r Criminal J u s t i c e Operations and Management was concerned w i t h operations research toward improving law enforcement agencies. The Center f o r Law and J u s t i c e d e a l t w i t h the appropriateness and f a i r n e s s of c r i m i n a l laws; the 1971 program plan added mention of community treatment, o f - fender r e i n t e g r a t i o n , and concern f o r the conditions from which an offender en- t e r s the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system. The Center f o r Special Projects administered a f e l l o w s h i p program. The Center f o r Demonstration and Professional Services had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t r a n s l a t i n g knowledge i n t o a c t i o n by means of dissemina- t i o n and t e c h n i c a l assistance programs. (The l a s t f u n c t i o n i s c u r r e n t l y c a r r i e d out by the O f f i c e of Technology Transfer.) The goals and o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s e a r l y period are not e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e . The p u b l i c r e c o r d — i . e . , annual program p l a n s — i n d i c a t e s l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n from the premises and program o b j e c t i v e s discussed by the President's Crime Commis- sion and the IDA r e p o r t . While the f i v e centers established by D i r e c t o r Ruth d i d not m i r r o r the mission areas proposed i n the IDA r e p o r t , the e a r l y program plans r e f l e c t very s i m i l a r o b j e c t i v e s . The major theme i s c o n t r o l l i n g crime; the s t r a t e g i e s proposed are engineering and managerial. The I n s t i t u t e funded almost nothing t h a t could l e g i t i m a t e l y be termed basic research. While the annual program plans r e f l e c t a cle a r and consistent viewpoint, i n t e r n a l documents suggest more divergence of opinion. I t i s apparent t h a t much i n t e r n a l debate was occurring among the e a r l y I n s t i t u t e s t a f f — o v e r p r i o r i - t i e s , over mission, over the appropriate r e l a t i o n s h i p t o LEAA, and over general p h i l o s o p h i c a l perspectives. The i n t e r n a l debate i s evidenced now by memoranda r e f l e c t i n g exchanges over such matters as: the extent t o which c i t i z e n i n v o l v e - ment was important f o r I n s t i t u t e planning; the extent t o which the I n s t i t u t e should become involved i n controversy by tak i n g unpopular stands on c i v i l r i g h t s

18 issues and the f a i r n e s s of c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e p r a c t i c e s ; the extent t o which the I n s t i t u t e should monitor and attempt t o co r r e c t the a c t i v i t i e s of other govern- ment agencies when those a c t i v i t i e s appear to f o s t e r or f a i l t o a l l e v i a t e crime- generating conditions i n American s o c i e t y ; the extent t o which the I n s t i t u t e should focus on environmental problems t h a t tend to produce crime; and the ex- t e n t t o which the I n s t i t u t e should work f o r the improvement of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . The debate suggests the concern and seriousness of purpose t h a t characterized those who were involved i n the d i f f i c u l t stage of beginning a major research and development e f f o r t . However, the process of gearing u p — h i r i n g competent s t a f f , b u i l d i n g a capacity t o plan, spending money p r o d u c t i v e l y without a f u l l y developed p l a n , and coping w i t h the p o l i t i c a l pressures—consumed most of the time and energy i n t h i s e a r l y period. D i r e c t o r Ruth f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t the mood of Congress was a n t i - r e s e a r c h . Representative Rooney (see Appendix A) was e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l of research e f - f o r t s during t h i s e a r l y p e r i o d . * Much of Ruth's time was spent j u s t i f y i n g the research r o l e t o oversight groups, i n c l u d i n g h i s own a d m i n i s t r a t i v e hierarchy. The LEAA t r o i k a r e f l e c t e d p r a c t i t i o n e r / p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s t h a t were never con- ducive to developing a research r o l e i n LEAA. Charles Rogovin, f i r s t LEAA Ad- m i n i s t r a t o r , summarized Ruth's experiences (1973, p. 18): I had represented t o him t h a t he could design h i s own r e - search program and enjoy r e a l freedom and f l e x i b i l i t y i n implementing i t . I have r a r e l y been more i n e r r o r . Time and again Ruth's i n i t i a t i v e s were f r u s t r a t e d by the d i s - agreements among Velde, Coster and myself [ t h e t r o i k a ] . Despite a wealth of experience i n assessing the q u a l i t y *Mr. Ruth's comments, during an i n t e r v i e w i n the f a l l of 1975, were supported by several sources: other i n d i v i d u a l s who were on the s t a f f of the I n s t i t u t e during t h a t time have made s i m i l a r comments i n i n t e r v i e w s ; Charles Rogovin, f i r s t Administrator of LEAA, has made such comments i n p r i n t (1973, p. 19).

19 of research i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n d i v i d u a l s during h i s ser- v i c e as Deputy D i r e c t o r of the Crime Commission and i n academic l i f e , he was second-guessed on every judgment. Whether i t was r e p o r t i n g t o a h o s t i l e Congress or t o an ac t i o n - o r i e n t e d admin- i s t r a t o r , the j o b of the e a r l y d i r e c t o r s was a p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r than a research task. This c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the r o l e of I n s t i t u t e d i r e c t o r s v a r i e s only i n degree of pressure, and never i n k i n d , throughout the h i s t o r y of the I n s t i t u t e . Phase I I : The Danziger Period, 1971-1973 Phase I ended w i t h President Nixon's appointment of J e r r i s Leonard as LEAA Administrator and Leonard's appointment of M a r t i n Danziger as D i r e c t o r of NILECJ i n the spr i n g of 1971. The previous year had seen strong c r i t i c i s m of LEAA i n Congress (see Appendix A) because, among other t h i n g s , the large sums already expended on various programs had not produced a dec l i n e i n the crime r a t e . Since Congress had established LEAA w i t h the expectation t h a t crime would be reduced and LEAA had not taken issue w i t h the assumption t h a t crime could be reduced by programs t o "strengthen law enforcement," there was no p u b l i c basis f o r advocat- ing a d i f f e r e n t measure of performance. The use of crime r a t e s as a measure of performance i s problematic f o r two reasons: f i r s t , i t i s based on u n r e a l i s t i c expectations about the kin d and ex- te n t of immediate impact t h a t i s possible from anti - c r i m e programs; second, crime rates themselves are a f f e c t e d by higher c i t i z e n or v i c t i m r e p o r t i n g and p o l i c e r e p o r t i n g procedures. I t i s q u i t e possible f o r a program i n c i t i z e n awareness, f o r example, t o have the intended Impact of higher r e p o r t i n g of crimes, t h e r e f o r e producing a higher crime r a t e (see f o o t n o t e , p. 28). Nonetheless, increases or decreases i n crime rates remain the focus of LEAA performance measures.

20 One consequence of the c r i t i c i s m of LEAA was LEAA's embarrassing discovery t h a t i t had almost no in f o r m a t i o n about the impact of i t s programs. Therefore, a new e f f o r t was begun throughout LEAA to focus on crime reduction ( r a t h e r than "system improvement") and on ev a l u a t i o n of impact. This new e f f o r t a f f e c t e d the I n s t i t u t e i n major ways: i t hardened and i n t e n s i f i e d the commitment to the goal of c o n t r o l l i n g crime; i t involved I n s t i t u t e s t a f f i n a lengthy and complex planning process using s p e c i f i c reductions i n crime rates as performance mea- sures; and i t produced a sharp change i n R&D s t r a t e g y . The term " c r i m e - s p e c i f i c planning" came i n t o use throughout LEAA i n 1971, i n d i r e c t response t o Congressional questions about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between government anti - c r i m e funding and the increasing crime r a t e . (See discussion of the Monagan hearings i n Appendix A; also see Chelinsky 1976, pp. 3-16.) The term meant t h a t programming had t o be t i e d t o a s p e c i f i c crime and designed t o b r i n g about a s p e c i f i e d l e v e l of reduction (or decreasing r a t e of increase) i n the r a t e of occurrence f o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r crime. The t o t a l l ack of re a l i s m i n these expectations underlying c r i m e - s p e c i f i c planning became c l e a r very q u i c k l y , but the concept had a much longer o r g a n i z a t i o n a l Impact. I n the case of the I n s t i t u t e , two years were devoted t o making both the o r g a n i z a t i o n , through i t s planning process, and i t s programs d i r e c t l y responsive t o the goal of reduc- I ing crime. "Crime-specific" was relaxed t o "crime-oriented" during t h i s p e r i o d , but the b e l i e f remained strong t h a t crime could be reduced i f only the r i g h t combination of planning and funding s t r a t e g y was used. The concept of working w i t h centers was abandoned. Planning was d i r e c t e d by a separate planning u n i t w i t h support from a Research Operations D i v i s i o n , one of the f i v e p a r t s of Danziger's s t r u c t u r e of the I n s t i t u t e . The s t r u c t u r e included a planning and evaluation s t a f f and four d i v i s i o n s : Research Adminls-

21 t r a t i o n . Research Operations, S t a t i s t i c s , and Technology Transfer. The planning took the form required by the performance measurement system (PMS) then being implemented by LEAA. Under PMS, performance measures t i e d c l o s e l y t o goals were a c r i t i c a l focus. The crime r e d u c t i o n focus was described by a Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n r e p o r t (Stanley 1972, p. 4 ) : LEAA has adopted the Performance Measurement System (PMS) sponsored by the O f f i c e of Management and Budget as a basis f o r program planning and ev a l u a t i o n g e n e r a l l y , i n - clu d i n g t h a t done by the I n s t i t u t e . This system subsumes a l l goals and program a c t i v i t i e s under one comprehensive o b j e c t i v e , "Reduce Crime i n the United States." Indeed, the system forced such a high degree of goal-oriented planning and grant s e l e c t i o n t h a t the "program areas" r e a l l y became s t r a t e g i e s : t o a l l e v i a t e crime- producing c o n d i t i o n s , intervene i n c r i m i n a l careers and reduce o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r and increase the r i s k of c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . The 1973 Program Plan, i n which t h i s system was most f u l l y elaborated, ad- mits t h a t " t h i s approach i s b a s i c a l l y the s t r u c t u r e f o r an o p e r a t i o n a l , a c t i o n - oriented program," but goes on t o assert t h a t "a research plan also can c l o s e l y f o l l o w the design." This statement i l l u s t r a t e s the extent t o which the I n s t i - t u t e during t h i s period was engaged i n an i n t e n s i v e d r i v e t o produce s o c i a l change. D i r e c t o r Danziger saw crime-oriented planning as a d i s t i n c t s h i f t from the approach used by h i s predecessors. The 1973 Program Plan described e a r l i e r e f f o r t s as "system t i n k e r i n g , " because the focus was not on the problem needing change but on the "mechanism f o r change," the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system; the t h r u s t had been system improvement. I n c o n t r a s t , crime-oriented planning emphasized the problem of crime; i n the words of the 1973 Program Plan, i t "forces the pl a n - ner t o i n t e r r e l a t e common elements of the problem and t o s t r u c t u r e p r i o r i t i e s from the needs inherent i n the problem..."

22 The r e s u l t of t h i s p r o c e s s — t h e funding program i t s e l f — ^ w a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from previous years. F i r s t , NILECJ chose t o l i m i t i t s funding t o a few large-scale grants and contracts on the grounds t h a t t h i s s t r a t e g y f o r spending the money would have the l a r g e s t possible payoff (see Figures 3 and 6, Appendix D). Large d o l l a r amounts were committed t o p r o j e c t s , f o r example, the Equipment Systems Improvement Program, several of which continue today. The PMS planning process may simply have been a n e u t r a l v e h i c l e i n t h i s change, but whatever i t s a c t u a l i n f l u e n c e , i t absorbed enormous amounts of I n s t i t u t e s t a f f time and was severly c r i t i c i z e d as l a r g e l y a waste of time by the Brook- ings I n s t i t u t i o n r e p o r t on NILECJ. "We repeat t h a t 'crime r e d u c t i o n ' or 'crime- s p e c i f i c ' g u i d e l i n e s , although obviously e s s e n t i a l , cannot be allowed t o over- power a l l other work p r i o r i t i e s " (Stanley 1972, p. 11). The s h i f t i n R&D str a t e g y was r e a l enough. The major example was the I n - s t i t u t e ' s involvement i n LEAA's Impact C i t i e s Program. The I n s t i t u t e ' s 1973 Program Plan describes the Impact C i t i e s Program i n the f o l l o w i n g way: This program channels a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of LEAA's d i s c r e t i o n a r y and research funds t o selected Impact C i t i e s f o r the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crime and b u r g l a r y . The o b j e c t i v e i s t o h a l t the increase i n the t a r g e t crimes and t o achieve a 5% reduc t i o n i n two years and a 20% decrease i n f i v e years. The I n s t i t u t e committed a large p o r t i o n of i t s budget (see Table 2 and Figures 5 and 7, Appendix D) t o funding a crime analysis team i n each of the c i t i e s as w e l l as a major eval u a t i o n of the Impact Program. The crime analysis teams were t o coordinate the a c t i v i t i e s of the various c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e agencies i n each Impact C i t y , i n c l u d i n g the c o l l e c t i o n of data f o r evaluation. The o v e r a l l e valuation e f f o r t , c a l l e d the National Impact Program Evaluation, was under con- t r a c t w i t h the M i t r e Corporation. According t o the 1973 Program Plan, i t s ob- j e c t i v e s were:

23 i d e n t i f y i n g s i g n i f i c a n t successful programs f o r dissemination to other l o c a l i t i e s , r e l a t i n g p r o j e c t success t o Impact Pro- gram goals, comparing s i m i l a r programs i n the various Impact C i t i e s , i d e n t i f y i n g f a c t o r s which a s s i s t or impede the pro- cess of change i n the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system, and determin- i n g the o v e r a l l achievements of the Impact Program. Thus, apparently convinced t h a t s o l u t i o n s could be found by concentrating large amounts of money at selected s i t e s and b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h i s would r e s u l t i n a more e f f i c i e n t use of R&D money than a fragmented grants program, Leonard and Danziger made the Impact C i t i e s program a major focus of LEAA funds. I t was a bold s t r a t e g y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the expected payoff f o r gaining new know- ledge about reducing crime d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e . The f u l l s t o r y of Impact C i t i e s has yet t o be t o l d , * but some p o i n t s are c l e a r . F i r s t , the obviously p o l i t i c a l nature of the o v e r a l l program d i c t a t e d many aspects of i t s design and operation. For example, the c i t i e s themselves were chosen f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons and the New Federalism requirements precluded mandating comparable programs or comparable data c o l l e c t i o n and eva l u a t i o n designs (see Appendix B). While the I n s t i t u t e was not responsible f o r these p o l i t i c a l l y motivated requirements, the s i t u a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s the h i g h l y p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s w i t h i n which the I n s t i t u t e operates, c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t do not lend themselves t o good research e f f o r t s . However, the I n s t i t u t e can be held responsible f o r committing i t s resources t o programs t h a t cannot be reconciled w i t h research o b j e c t i v e s . Second, both i n f o r m a l accounts and the M i t r e e v a l u a t i o n agree t h a t the performance of the crime analyses teams has been v a r i a b l e . T h i r d , there i s no outstanding example of accomplishment, e i t h e r as a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o any one c i t y ' s c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system or as an answer t o the general questions being *The f i n a l e valuation r e p o r t by the M i t r e Corporation i s about t o be released; see Appendix B f o r excerpts from t h a t r e p o r t .

24 asked by means of the Impact C i t i e s Program, t h a t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the f e d e r a l program. Fourth, the emphasis on e v a l u a t i o n w i t h i n each Impact C i t y has produced masses of data t h a t have seldom been used f o r meaningful evalua- t i o n s or other analyses. F i n a l l y , the evaluation of impact on crime r e d u c t i o n — t h e c e n t r a l purpose of the program—was to have been based on the crime v i c t i m i z a t i o n surveys then being s t a r t e d by the s t a t i s t i c s d i v i s i o n under contract w i t h the Census Bureau. The survey was designed w i t h c i t y panels i n a d d i t i o n t o the n a t i o n a l panel be- cause of the Impact C i t i e s program; the c i t i e s chosen were the impact c i t i e s . * To date, no e v a l u a t i o n of impact on crime reduction using the c i t y panel data has been reported. Further, since no c o n t r o l c i t i e s were used and no basis was l a i d f o r making the independent v a r i a b l e s comparable or f o r separating treatment e f f e c t s , * * i t i s hard t o see how such an e v a l u a t i o n could be done. I n s h o r t , the huge Impact C i t i e s Program, l i k e c r i m e - s p e c i f i c planning, had l i t t l e e f f e c t on crime r e d u c t i o n (LEAA's a c t i o n goal) and produced no knowledge about d e a l i n g w i t h crime. One f i n a l p o i n t should be made about t h i s p e r iod. At t h a t time, the I n - s t i t u t e was s t r u c t u r e d so t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t amounts of s t a f f time could be de- voted t o in-house research. Whether or not the I n s t i t u t e should have an i n - house research c a p a b i l i t y had been a matter of debate from the beginning, but the s t r u c t u r e under Danziger s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r researchers ra t h e r than research managers. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r managing the grants and contracts was located i n the Research A d m i n i s t r a t i o n D i v i s i o n , thereby f r e e i n g ( i n theory) *The p o l i t i c a l nature of the design of the crime v i c t i m i z a t i o n surveys w i l l be examined by t h i s Committee i n i t s f i n a l r e p o r t . **For a d e t a i l e d statement of the reasons f o r t h i s f a i l i n g , see Appendix B.

25 the Research Operations D i v i s i o n s t a f f t o conduct i n t r a m u r a l research p r o j e c t s along w i t h some substantive support a c t i v i t y . This arrangement proved t o be unworkable. The major problem c i t e d by those who worked i n the Research Opera- t i o n s D i v i s i o n was the constant pressure from bureaucratic r o u t i n e and paper- pushing tasks.* I n sum, the Danziger period produced an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the I n s t i t u t e commitment t o reducing crime. Goals, o b j e c t i v e s and planning were a l l t i e d t o a b e l i e f t h a t crime was a problem t h a t could be solved: a war on crime on the model of the war on poverty. This e f f o r t has g e n e r a l l y been considered not only a f a i l u r e but wrong-headed as w e l l . (Almost everyone interviewed who knew any- t h i n g about Impact C i t i e s expressed skepticism about i t s value.) This judgment does not f a u l t the good i n t e n t i o n s of those who were p a r t of the I n s t i t u t e ' s e f f o r t during t h i s p e r i o d . I n f a c t , given the p o l i t i c a l climate and bureau- c r a t i c complexities. I t i s not even cl e a r t h a t t h i s period provided a good t e s t of the v a l i d i t y of crime-reduction p o l i c i e s . What i s c l e a r i s the absence of any encouraging impact on the crime problem or even of s u b s t a n t i a l knowledge about how t o achieve such an impact. Phase I I I : The Caplan Period, 1973-Present The present s t r u c t u r e of the I n s t i t u t e has three major d i v i s i o n s : the Of- f i c e of Research Programs (ORP), the O f f i c e of Evaluation (OE), and the O f f i c e of Technology Transfer (OTT). This s e c t i o n describes these d i v i s i o n s as they r e f l e c t goals and as they r e l a t e t o the planning process. *Whether research can be done by I n s t i t u t e s t a f f , p r o p e r l y i n s u l a t e d from ad- m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i s a question t h a t w i l l receive c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n from t h i s Committee.

26 The I n s t i t u t e ' s current organization and s t a f f i n g are shown i n Figure 2. The s t a f f i n g does not represent f u l l authorized s t a f f l e v e l s . Gerald Caplan was appointed D i r e c t o r of the I n s t i t u t e i n f a l l 1973 by the new LEAA Ad m i n i s t r a t o r , Donald S a n t a r e l l i . Caplan immediately requested a management a n a l y s i s — c o n t r a c t e d w i t h Aerospace C o r p o r a t i o n — t o give him some basis f o r planning the I n s t i t u t e ' s program. The product of t h i s analysis was l a r g e l y a conglomeration of goals and o b j e c t i v e s from the past: from the P r e s i - dent's Crime Commission (1967), the IDA study (1968), a M i t r e e v a l u a t i o n of grants ( M i t r e Corporation 1968-1973), and other documents. The Aerospace Cor- p o r a t i o n analysis assigned p r i o r i t i e s by means of a weighting system based on the number of times those goals and o b j e c t i v e s had been mentioned by Congress and other commentators. The conclusions of the analysis d i d not p o i n t t o a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n or i d e n t i f y compelling goals t h a t would have i n d i c a t e d important or f r u i t f u l d i r e c t i o n s i n which the I n s t i t u t e would move. Furthermore, there were s i g n i - f i c a n t c o n s t r a i n t s on new d i r e c t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n t o the f a c t t h a t a l l p r o j e c t s r e q u i r e the LEAA Administrator's approval—and i t i s c l e a r from i n t e r v i e w s w i t h numerous I n s t i t u t e s t a f f t h a t they keep the Administrator's t h i n k i n g c a r e f u l l y i n mind when making planning and funding d e c i s i o n s — a large p r o p o r t i o n of the I n s t i t u t e ' s budget was committed t o continuing c o n t r a c t s . * Despite these con- s t r a i n t s , however, the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r new leadership was there. *For exaanple: the Vera I n s t i t u t e ' s "Evaluation of the E f f e c t s of Methadone Treatment on Crime and Criminal Narcotics Addicts," which began i n 1969 and terminated i n 1975; the N a t i o n a l Bureau of Standards' "Law Enforcement Stand- ards Laboratory and Support Services," which s t a r t e d i n 1970 and i s s t i l l con- t i n u i n g ; and the Aerospace Corporation's "Law Enforcement Development Group," which has been operating since 1972.

27 O F F I C E OF T H E DIRECTOR Office of Research Programs (2) Police Division Planning Special Assistant Special Assistant Staff Assistant Office of Evaluation (11) Office of Technology Transfer (3) Community Crime Prevention Division (3) Model Program Development Division (4) Courts and Corrections Division Courts Branch (3) Training and Demonstration Division (5) Corrections Branch (2) Advanced Technology Division (5) Reference and Dissemination Division (6) Special Programs <4) Note Numbers in parentheses represent currently filled professional positions, not necessarily full, authorized staff levels FIGURE 2 N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e of Law Enforcement and Criminal J u s t i c e : Organization and S t a f f i n g

28 The Caplan period received i t s e a r l i e s t d e f i n i t i o n i n the decision to de- emphasize crime-reduction as a goal. The experience w i t h c r i m e - s p e c i f i c and then crime-oriented planning was clear throughout LEAA; i t simply was not pos- s i b l e t o demonstrate t h a t the various LEAA programs, l e t alone NILECJ grants, had c o n t r i b u t e d t o s p e c i f i c decreases i n s p e c i f i c crime r a t e s . A set of notes f o r a planning meeting a t t h i s stage contains the f o l l o w i n g comments: The goals don't work f o r the I n s t i t u t e — c r i m e r e d u c t i o n can't l i n k a l l a c t i v i t i e s t o goals. I t h i n k i t stems from the s i n g l e [crime-reduction] goal. I am not sold on the concept of a s i n g l e goal. And not t h a t one. (1) I t i s not what we are doing. (2) I t i s not what we are l e g i s l a t e d t o do. (3) I t i s not what we are going t o do. (4) I t t i e s us i n t o the absurd p o s i t i o n of hav- in g our success measured by things we have no c o n t r o l over. Since crime rates had not decreased s i g n i f i c a n t l y anywhere—indeed had i n - creased more o f t e n than decreased—the claims f o r impact were probably unfounded from the s t a r t . * Caplan responded t o t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s by e x p l i c i t l y d i s - claiming the r e a l i t y of such expectations. (See Appendix C f o r excerpts of Caplan's comments at t h i s time.) The I n s t i t u t e would no longer plan f o r d i r e c t and immediate impact on crime rates but instead would develop longer-range ob- j e c t i v e s t h a t could be expected t o c o n t r i b u t e i n a more r e a l i s t i c way t o an o v e r a l l r e d u c t i o n i n crime. Even the t r a d i t i o n a l focus on improving the system was recast so t h a t e f f i c i e n c y and f a i r n e s s became ob j e c t i v e s i n t h e i r own r i g h t r a t h e r than t o o l s f o r reducing crime rates (see Caplan 1975). The I n s t i t u t e and a l l of LEAA entered a new period of sc a l i n g down expectations. * I n f a c t , some experimental programs had the e f f e c t of increasing the crime r a t e — a s measured by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports—because they achieved t h e i r intended e f f e c t of increasing the numbers of crimes a c t u a l l y reported t o the p o l i c e .

29 The s t r a t e g y of change had two s t r u c t u r a l components. F i r s t , the I n s t i t u t e dropped i t s elaborate planning process. Instead of a separate planning u n i t supported by time from the Research Operations D i v i s i o n , a s i n g l e p o s i t i o n of planning d i r e c t o r was set up w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r producing the annual pro- gram plan. Second, Caplan abolished the d i s t i n c t i o n between research adminis- t r a t i o n and research operations (and w i t h i t even the pretense of in-house r e - search) , r e p l a c i n g those d i v i s i o n s w i t h the O f f i c e of Research Programs (ORP). ORF was s t r u c t u r e d around t r a d i t i o n a l program areas: p o l i c e , c o u r t s , correc- t i o n s , community crime p r e v e n t i o n , and technology. As a r e s u l t of t h i s r e s t r u c - t u r i n g , the planning process was decentralized and became an i n d u c t i v e e f f o r t based l a r g e l y i n the program areas. Substantive changes were s i m i l a r i n nature. I n terms of the 1974 Program Plan, the focus s h i f t e d from b u r g l a r y and stranger-to-stranger s t r e e t crime r a t e s t o such matters as h a b i t u a l offenders and a l t e r n a t i v e s t o i n c a r c e r a t i o n . (Although both types of grants have been made throughout NILECJ's h i s t o r y , the emphasis has changed at various times.) Special emphasis was placed on improv- i n g the e f f i c i e n c y of the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system and the f a i r n e s s w i t h which i t operates. (Again, these have always been state d o b j e c t i v e s ; i t i s a matter of emphasis.) There was no attempt t o do in-house research, but the V i s i t i n g Fellows Program was viewed as a s u b s t i t u t e means of c a r r y i n g on what i s r e f e r r e d t o as " r e a l research" i n the I n s t i t u t e . F i n a l l y , D i r e c t o r Caplan began t o make a major e f f o r t t o develop and en- courage a research community i n t e r e s t e d i n more basic research questions. He moved away from the Danziger s t r a t e g y of supporting a few large-scale e f f o r t s toward a p o l i c y of awarding a l a r g e r number of smaller grants, e s p e c i a l l y look- ing t o the academic research conmtunity (see Figures 3 and 6 i n Appendix D).

30 Caplan has developed closer connections w i t h a wider research community, not only t r a d i t i o n a l c r i m i n o l o g i s t s . He i s attempting t o draw i n researchers, and research ideas, from among those who have never done work on c r i m i n a l j u s - t i c e but who are i n t e r e s t e d i n behaviors and s o c i a l patterns t h a t are c l e a r l y important f o r understanding crime phenomena. Caplan has mounted a new s t r a t e g y : he i s d i r e c t i n g the I n s t i t u t e e f f o r t s not t o reducing crime r a t e s but t o under- standing the s o c i a l and behavioral phenomena t h a t u n d e r l i e crime r a t e s . The planning process under Caplan i s best described as d i f f u s e d . Three f a c t o r s stand out. F i r s t , the process i s c o n t r o l l e d by a management by objec- t i v e s (MBO) system operating out of the O f f i c e of the Planning D i r e c t o r . MBO i s e s s e n t i a l l y a management t o o l t h a t attempts t o f o r c e program s t a f f t o orga- nize t h e i r work s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and e x p l i c i t l y , and t o meet c e r t a i n time r e q u i r e - ments. MBO i s used throughout LEM (having replaced PMS) and t h e r e f o r e the goals i n question are presumably agency-wide. I n f a c t , there i s l i t t l e i n the way of substantive c o n t r o l over I n s t i t u t e o b j e c t i v e s through MBO: of LEAA's general goals, the two t h a t apply t o the I n - s t i t u t e concern research and development and demonstration and dissemination.* C l e a r l y , a wide range of programs can be f i t under those broad categories. The MBO process i s l i t e r a l l y one of f i l l i n g i n the blanks under the categories w i t h proposed p r o j e c t s . I t requires a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the type of p r o j e c t (which o b j e c t i v e does i t f i t ) , and of milestones f o r completing the tasks r e q u i r e d . These milestones specify times f o r completing phases of p r o j e c t s , but do not specify percentage reductions i n s p e c i f i c crime rates as d i d the PMS version *The two are: (1) develop, t e s t , and evaluate p r o j e c t s , equipment, and tech- niques f o r improved crime reduction and c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e ; and (2) demonstrate and market t o s t a t e and l o c a l governments e f f e c t i v e p r o j e c t s and techniques f o r improved crime r e d u c t i o n and c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e .

31 of c r i m e - s p e c i f i c planning. Usually, the tasks t o be completed are not crime r e d u c t i o n , b u t , f o r example, the development of management c a p a b i l i t i e s , i n f o r - mation systems, or data bases. The planning d i r e c t o r i s responsible f o r co- o r d i n a t i n g the I n s t i t u t e ' s p a r t of LEAA's MBO work p l a n , but only c o n t r o l s the substance of I n s t i t u t e programs by v i r t u e of a working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the D i r e c t o r . Therefore, the o v e r a l l planning f u n c t i o n appears t o be e n t i r e l y managerial r a t h e r than substantive. While the MBO process i s c e n t r a l i z e d , the substantive planning under D i - r e c t o r Caplan i s l a r g e l y d e c e n t r a l i z e d . The d i f f e r e n c e between PMS ( e s p e c i a l l y as i t was cotmected w i t h c r i m e - s p e c i f i c planning) and MBO i s t h a t PMS forced substantive a c c o u n t a b i l i t y w h i l e MBO can operate without compelling substantive c r i t e r i a . When Caplan decentralized the planning process, presumably t o escape some of those compelling c r i m e - s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a , he cast the p r e r o g a t i v e of de- f i n i n g programs t o the t r a d i t i o n a l program areas. As noted (see IDA 1968 and pp. 14-13 above), a warning against such a procedure had been sounded by the IDA r e p o r t i n 1968. However, f i n d i n g no payoff i n other schemes. D i r e c t o r Cap- l a n has r e v e r t e d t o the t r a d i t i o n a l program areas—and t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l con- s t i t u e n c i e s — a s a basis f o r program planning. Each program desk i n ORP submits i t s requests f o r funds on the basis of various means of canvassing program needs. Devices f o r canvassing have Included s o l i c i t i n g concept papers, forming expert panels, having conferences w i t h r e - g i o n a l o f f i c e s p e c i a l i s t s , searching the l i t e r a t u r e , and reviewing past p r o j e c t s . OTT and OE f o l l o w s i m i l a r procedures, deciding what programs should be evaluated, which exemplary p r o j e c t s , p r e s c r i p t i v e packages, t r a i n i n g programs, e t c . , should be funded.

32 Strategies f o r shaping program requests have included developing a "needs assessment," looking t o s p e c i f i c c l i e n t s who s p e c i f y t h e i r needs, and funding both sides of c o n t r o v e r s i a l questions. D i r e c t o r Caplan meets w i t h each of the program and d i v i s i o n heads to help shape t h e i r requests. I n a d d i t i o n , there are regular meetings among s t a f f from d i f f e r e n t program areas and d i v i s i o n s . The requests are standardized by means of the MBO format and proceed upward as "candidate o b j e c t i v e s " and proposed p r o j e c t s t o meet c r i t e r i a f o r p r i o r i t y fund- ing applied by the D i r e c t o r , LEAA's O f f i c e of Planning and Management, and the A d m i n i s t r a t o r . The general goals are so broad t h a t they provide l i t t l e guidance f o r s e l e c t i n g p r i o r i t i e s . Therefore, budget c o n s t r a i n t s , c o n t i n u a t i o n funding, p o l i t i c a l demands, and general LEAA p r i o r i t i e s combine t o determine I n s t i t u t e p r i o r i t i e s . The I n s t i t u t e under Caplan's leadership has engaged i n one major planning cycle t h a t produced the f i s c a l 1975 program plan and provided most of the ma- t e r i a l f o r the f i s c a l 1976 program plan. Review panels were set up f o r each program area; i n a d d i t i o n , some ad hoc planning has occurred i n p a r t i c u l a r pro- gram areas throughout the period. I n these instances D i r e c t o r Caplan meets again w i t h h i s program s t a f f t o define more s p e c i f i c a l l y a general program objec- t i v e . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t the same procedure w i l l be used t h i s s p r i n g during the f i s c a l 1977 planning cycle. The o v e r a l l impression of the I n s t i t u t e ' s goals and o b j e c t i v e s under Cap- l a n 's leadership i s one of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and e c l e c t i c i s m . No s i n g l e , i n t e - grated set of ideas e x i s t s as a general guide t o planning and funding. The s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f — t r a d i t i o n a l program areas plus major e f f o r t s i n e v a l u a t i o n and technology transfer—seems t o generate the program plans. This may simply r e f l e c t the maturing of an o rga n i z a t i o n t h a t , i n i t s c o l l e c t i v e sense of i t s e l f .

33 now r e a l i z e s t h a t a step-by-step, piece-by-piece approach i s the best route t o accomplishing i t s mission. Or i t may r e f l e c t the f r u s t r a t i o n of f a i l u r e and the absence of any sense of mission. I t i s impossible t o say which of these c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s i s c o r r e c t without completing the examination of a c t u a l fund- ing (which i s now under way).

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