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The Significance of the Job Training Partnership Act for Federal-State-Local Relationships Gail Garfield Schwartz and Kenneth E. Poole INTRODUCTION The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) changed federal-local relationships created by federal assis- tance for manpower training under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) to federal-state and state-local relationships. Whereas under CETA, local prime sponsors were funded directly by the federal government, under JTPA, funds go to the states, which are responsible for allocating them, setting up and overseeing the administrative structure, and setting the performance goals that fund recipients must meet. This switch created a sudden opportunity and, also, a sudden danger. The opportunity was to achieve a new means of control, to coordinate manpower training with related activities, and to channel manpower training efforts where they were most needed or where they might have the highest payoff. The danger was that, given inexperience, the states could not meet their responsi- bilities. This danger was compounded by the prospect that federal funding would diminish over time and that failure to meet goals would be a state failure, not a local or federal one. This paper speculates on how JTPA might change state-local relationships and how the new program is likely to influence outcomes that would have positive or negative repercussions in the states. It is based on information from disparate sources, including public interest groups, individuals in charge of JTPA at the state and local levels, and interviews with researchers who are beginning to assess JTPA systematically--and conjecture. 184
185 Many aspects of the JTPA program itself are interest- ing. The program sets up a new relationship between manpower training providers and private business and industry. It requires the linking of training with education and employment services and with economic development. It sets aside certain funds for dislocated workers--those who have had steady jobs in the past-- while targeting the bulk of the appropriation to disad- vantaged workers, who might never have had a steady job. This allocation in itself raises some interesting questions: Will more effort be spent on dislocated workers than is intended, given that they are generally more politically vocal? Or, will communities that do not have many genuine dislocated workers find ways to use those set-aside funds for disadvantaged workers? The scope of this paper does not allow in-depth explo- ration of these interesting and important issues. Rather, the focus is on the likely intergovernmental impact of JTPA. Information about clients is presented only as it is relevant to questions about shifts in con- trol, power, and responsibility. The paper begins with a brief, bare-bones summary of what JTPA is and how it is supposed to work, according to the legislation. Next, the way states and localities are implementing the law, as of early April 1984, is discussed. Finally, some likely scenarios are devel- oped. These are related not only to what states are doing but also to what other organizations, such as the public interest groups that serve the states, are doing and planning. WHAT IS JTPA? Title IIA of the JTPA provides funds to train the disadvantaged, and Title III is a grant for training dislocated workers that generally must be matched by the states (U.S. Congress, 1982). The allocation to each state from the U.S. Department of Labor (hereinafter DOL) has been made for the transition period October 1983 to June 1984, as was the allocation for the program year 1984 (July 1984 to June 1985). Funds for disadvan- taged workers (Title II) are distributed by a formula that weights equally unemployment, excess unemployment (over 4.5 percent), and poverty. A state's proportion of individuals in each category determines its allot-
186 meet. Hold harmless. provisions ensure that no state receives less than 90 percent of its final CETA allot- ment, in fiscal year 1984, or the previous JTPA program year, in subsequent years. Title III funds for dislocated workers are based on equally weighted unemployment, excess unemployment, and duration of unemployment. Only 7S percent of Title III funds go to the states; the balance is reserved to the DOL. A state match is generally required for Title III funds, dollar for dollar, with the exception that for- giveness of match is allowed: 10 percent for every per- centage point the state's unemployment rate is above the national average. (Some states receive greater allot- ments of Title IIA and Title III money per unemployed person than do others, but there does not seem to be a significant difference among the states.) Unlike its predecessor, CETA, JTPA does not provide for job creation. It expects job creation to occur in the private sector. The strengthening of Private Indus- try Councils (PICs) is intended to improve the job- generation capabilities of communities. Who does what in regard to JTPA is explained graph) cally in Figure 7-1. The State Job Training Coordinating Council (SJTCC) advises the governor on job training plans, and state liaisons generally work out of the state executive branch. The PICs are appointed by the chief local elected official (LEO). ~ ~~~ 'l'ne PIUS and LEGS agree on the grant recipients, program administrators, and the plan- ning organization. These agencies can be the PIC, a local government agency, or a third party. The grant recipient receives the federal JTPA funds and is liable for the proper use of the funds. The program adminis- trator selects the contractors and sets performance criteria for the programs. Virtually no restrictions are placed on how the states exercise their responsibilities and powers. The DOL has taken a hands-off approach; whereas DOL played an active role in CETA, it stepped back and allowed other players to implement JTPA. The DOL finances program-evaluation studies and sets minimum national guidelines, which are not mandatory. In fact, many states have modified them by adding additional restric- tions. As a result, there are no uniform national standards, such as wage at placement, cost per person trained and subsequently employed, or entered employment rate (National Governors' Association, 1983a).
187 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR . r I STATE JOB TRAINING COORDI NATI NG COUNC PRIVATE INDUSTRY COUNCI L/SERVICE DELIVERY AREA | 1 GOVERNOR/STATE EXECUTIVE GIL OFFICE IN CHARGE OF JTPA 1 _ LOCA L ELECTED OF F I C IA L GRANT RECIPIENT L | PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION | FIGURE 7-1 Organizational structure of Job Training Partnership Act. WHAT THE STATES ARE DOING With few exceptions, ~states. means the executive branch. Few legislatures have taken an active part in getting JTPA up and running, and their role has been generally limited to exercising-constitutional authority to spend federal monies and other mechanical involve- ments (Riffel, 1984). Most governors (32) consulted with legislative leaders about becoming SJ~CC members, and a few legislatures are represented on the SJTCCs. However, in Kentucky, the legislature established a rival JTPA task force in protest against its lack of representation on the SJTCC. The intention of the National Conference of State Legislatures to help legis- latures get more involved is probably too little, too late. State Job Training Coordinating Councils Governors, not the executive branch, appoint the mem-
188 hers of the State Job Training Coordinating councils (S]TCCs), which are responsible for monitoring the plans and programs of the Service Delivery Areas (SDAs). Mem- bers are drawn from business and industry, organized labor, PICs, LEOs, state agencies and organizations' community-based organizations, educational institutions, special-client groups, the public, SDA administrators, and representatives of apprenticeship programs. How SJTCCs can effectively discharge their responsi- bilities is unclear, since only 24 have full-time staff, and only 6 have staff independent of state government. The average SJTCC has 30 members, but the range is from 9 to 55. The larger councils clearly have more trouble operating efficiently. The SJTCCs tend to view their function more as reviewing plans or setting goals than monitoring results or evaluating programs. In a Na- tional Alliance of Business (1984) survey, however, 30 SJTCCs said that overseeing JTPA was their primary func- tion and 12 said it was their secondary function. There is no national requirement for representation, method of appointment, tenure, staffing, or performance, so the quality of SJTCCs is undoubtedly far from uniform. Service Delivery Areas Governors designate SDAs, with the advice of the JTCCs. There are 596 SDAs, of which 401 are multiju - risdictional, 155 are single-county, and 40 are single- city SDAs. Designating SDAs was a highly political process, since it reorganized the existing CETA prime sponsors as local service delivery entities. The intent of the legislation was to reduce the number of delivery agencies, but the number actually increased by 26 per- cent. (States are actually grant recipients or program administrators in 48 SDAs, although technically the law limits this role to single-state SDAS. According to the National Alliance of Business [1984], these are predomi- nantly rural states.) More than 50 percent of all SDAs are exactly the same as the previous CETA prime sponsor (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1983; Grinker, 1984; Pines, 1984; Wills, 1984). The prime sponsors, especially in large metro- politan areas that had received large funding and had a good organization, were uniquely qualified to direct the states in designating SDAs. In Baltimore, for instance, the local prime sponsor also led the successful effort
189 to create a new state agency to administer JTPA (Pines, 1984). Local areas resisted strongly when previously independent, small prime sponsors were proposed by states to be combined with contiguous jurisdictions or consortiums of counties. The SDAs are the geographic units in which planning and delivery of services tai- lored to local economic, demographic, and labor market needs are carried out by the PICs. These PICs choose the program administrators and the grant recipients. Private Industry Councils Every SDA has a Private Industry Council (PIC), the members of which are selected by LEOs with the advice of local businessmen and with the oversight of the gover- nor's office. The chair of the PIC was elected by the PICs in 401 cases and was selected by the LEO in the other 195 cases (National Alliance of Business, 1984). Members of the PICs are chosen primarily from busi- ness and industry in the SDA area, but they also include representatives of labor, government, education, voca- tional rehabilitation, and the community. The average PIC has 25 members, of which 14 represent business, 2 represent labor, and 3 represent education. The PICs are the link between the demand for labor and the supply of trained workers instructed under JTPA training programs. They are supposed to help define and quantify demand for specific skills and occupations. Since the federal government is not funding job crea- tion, PICs have a larger role in JTPA than they did in CETA because they are depended on to aid in finding many of the jobs. According to the National Alliance of Business (1984), business persons are suspicious of job training programs because of their negative memories of the CETA program, but PIC members are changing this negative per- ception. Other perceptions are that PICs, at least so far, have been relatively uninvolved and have not had a major influence on the set-up of JTPA systems. Three-fourths of all PIC members are new; only one- fourth had been involved with CETA. Many PIC members have never worked with job training programs before. Even the PIC chairs are often new to job training. This inexperience often results in their deferring to the more experienced local governments. The PICs role is severely limited by lack of fund-
190 ing. Volunteer participation almost inevitably means low-level and sporadic involvement. Only 27 percent of all PICs have staffs, and these are concentrated in the PICs that have program responsibilities. Over 400 PICs do not plan to hire staff. As of late 1983, many PICs had met once or twice, but indications are that they plan to meet about monthly. Most PICs have limited their activities to general policy direction. The prognosis varies on whether PICs are planning to assume a stronger role in the future and whether they can. The National Alliance of Business (1984) reports that they will and that, therefore, their staffs will probably become larger and stronger in order to carry out the new programs. Some practitioners, how- ever, believe that there will not be enough JTPA funding for PICs to play a vital role. (PICs as grant recipi- ents are discussed below.) Other Executive Branch Authority Governors have discretionary control of 6 percent of the JTPA funds allocated to the states. They also can provide incentive bonuses. In addition, governors can determine the disposition of the 8 percent education set-aside of the state allotment, the 3 percent set- aside for older workers, and the 5 percent set-aside for state administrative funds. In some states, these per- centages constitute a substantial amount of money, while in others they do not constitute enough additional bud- get support to warrant an all-out effort to set up the apparatus necessary to control the funds tightly. One way governors can divide discretionary funds is by the same formula used to allocate Title II funds to the states; another way is to divide it equally among all SDAs. And there are other choices, too. The lengths to which governors will go in setting up allocation crite- ria obviously vary with the amount of money involved in the discretionary fund, and that depends in turn on the original allocation formula. The possibilities are sug- gested by these figures: discretionary fund to be divided among three SDAs, while Utah has a $1.5 million discretionary fund to be divided among nine SDAs. The executive branch, in rare instances with the assistance of the legislature, determines the perfor- mance standards for both Title II and Title III training Alabama has a $7.4 million
191 efforts. Training is classified in three categories-- reemployment, basic skills, and occupational skills-- but can be directed toward specific target groups, such as youth, welfare recipients, ax-offenders, and so forth. So far there does not appear to be much dramatic activity in standard setting. Connecticut, Florida, and Mississippi added standards not in the federal guide- lines, and 29 states altered the federal recommendations on at least one measure. Guidelines for performance standards are generally being formulated by local gov- ernments and reviewed by states (National Governors' Association, 1984b). The Department of Employment Services, which played a coordinating and informational role under CETA, remains important under JTPA. No major changes under JTPA have occurred, with the exception that employment services are better coordinated with the private sector through cooperation with PICs. The major policy issue raised by some employment services activities concerns the use of unemployment insurance as stipends for trainees. Absent national guidelines, business organizations have opposed this practice and organized labor has generally favored it (National Alliance of Business, 1984). The stipend problem is a key issue, since the lack of a stipend limits the type of trainee who will apply for training. In some states the coordinating function has been placed in the Department of Economic and Community De- vetopment or the Human Resources Department. In Mary- land, a new Department for Job Training was formed. In general, however, such agencies do not have any experi- ence in overseeing or coordinating job training ser- vices, and this makes them more likely to take recommen- dations of local grantees. The Job Training Partnership Act is intended to encourage coordination between education and training and, thus, to involve educational institutions in joint planning and cooperative implementation of training programs. There is little evidence that this has yet occurred on a broad front, however, although lip service is paid to the objective. So far, results are idiosyncratic. Educational institutions-, generally community colleges, receive funds for programs in 31 SDAs, 22 of which are small SDAs with fewer than 300,000 population (National Alliance of Business, 1984). In many places, educa- tional institutions so far have taken passive roles-- they provide the facilities and the equipment, but they
192 are not involved in determining the skill requirements, planning the curriculum, selecting trainees, doing the training, or following up on the trainees. Exceptions, such as the Baltimore County, Maryland, community col- leges, generally had a close link with the training administration under CETA and were poised to play a leadership role when JTPA was passed (Pines, 1984; Schwartz, 1982a, 1982b). Congress also intended JTPA to be coordinated with economic development, but this is not yet occurring in any meaningful way in many places. One reason is that the apparatus at the local level that provides training has traditionally been divorced from the organizations engaging in economic development. Professionals in the two groups seldom speak the same language, and they have very different ways of measuring their achievements, especially when economic development efforts are fi- nanced locally, not with federal funds. One result that is becoming evident is the use of JTPA funds for customized job training to induce com- panies to locate or expand in a community. The result often is the substitution of federal dollars for expen- ditures the employers would have made anyway, as when JTPA finances training for new hotel employees. There are no data measuring the extent to which this occurs, but many informants verify that it does (Pines, 1984). At present, state priorities coincide with those of the majority of local elected officials and local gran- tees. They target disadvantaged individuals, especially youth, and concentrate on coordinating state agencies, rather than on state-local coordination. If state pri- orities change, there is no telling what the outcome of turf battles might be, since some local grantees possess the power of networks, professional experience, and the ability to shut down the system--to the detriment of the state's reputation. Although coordination among many diverse state-level agencies is the primary responsi- bility of the states, there are no penalties for failing to achieve a tight system. Local Grantees Federal statute does not limit grants to specified types of grantees. Local governments, community-based organizations, local nonprofit training organizations, community colleges, school districts, labor unions, and
193 PICs are all eligible to receive grants. As would have been expected, the majority of grantees to date have been prime sponsors under CETA, which is to say, local government. Local government or quasi- governmental corporations constitute 75 percent of all grantees and administrative agencies. The prime spon- sors that have been eliminated from the system, accord- ing to our interviewees, are those that were not per- forming effectively under CETA. They tend to be community-based organizations and small prime sponsors. The large urban prime sponsors, by and large, seem to have retained a substantial amount of influence in determining who service providers will be and in direct- ing the efforts of the SDAS and the SJTCCs. Organized labor has greater opportunities under JTPA than it had under CETA to obtain training funds. Twenty- three states (of 44 respondents) allow labor groups to be grantees (National Governors' Association, 1984b), but there is no information on how many labor groups actually are grantees. Since the sum of PICs, community- based organizations, labor groups, and states who are grantees comes to one-quarter of all grant recipients and administrative agencies, the number is not very large (National Alliance of Business, 1984). Many state laws limit the ability of PICs to receive funds, treat- ing them as private organizations rather than public sector organizations. Program Results The JTPA programs are too new to have been systemat- ically evaluated. Moreover, a discussion of program results in the light of the changes in the training delivery system would require a large-scale, comparative study of client-group experiences under both CETA and JTPA--a research effort that, as far as we have been able to determine at this time, has not been under- taken. The following discussion is therefore specula- tive. One consequence of the changes from CETA to JTPA is the shift of training activities to those that can be completed quickly. Federal limits on expenditures and the relegation of responsibility regarding income sup- port to the states together favor short-term training. Although JTPA does permit federal funds for Needs-based payments and supportive services. for trainees, there is
194 a limit on how much can be spent for such stipends. For Title IIA, 70 percent of all funds received must be spent for actual training. This means that program operators tend to limit the duration of training, so that clients can afford to take the time to be trained. It also means that beneficiaries of Aid to Families with Dependent Children are likely to be sought as trainees, because they have other means of support while being trained. Since the federal legislation did not dictate to the states the terms under which unemployed individ- uals could receive unemployment compensation while being trained, states differ in the way they treat eligibility for dislocated worker training. Some states allow trainees to receive unemployment compensation, but most do not. Only in 13 states are recipients of unemploy- ment insurance exempted from job-search and job-avail- ability requirements in order to enroll in training programs (National Governors' Association, 1984b). The same tendency to favor short-term training exists for dislocated workers, who must first exhaust unemployment benefits before entering training. Thus, for both Title IIA and Title III, making income maintenance partially a state responsibility has the effect of biasing training away from the long-term programs that impart the highest level of skills. One would expect that for disadvan- taged workers, it would also tend to keep clients in the two lower levels of training, preemployment training and basic skills training, since it could take a long time before an individual who needs these levels of training could advance to occupational skill training. The perennial policy choice regarding stipends will never be resolved satisfactorily unless there is enough money behind a training program to train everyone and enough income support to allow everyone to be trained. The choice is whether to cast a net with large holes so that only the biggest fish are caught in it, or to cast a net with smaller holes to capture all.the fish in the area. In this case, the large fish are those who can afford training without stipends. The small fish are the other potential trainees, who need the skills, but will not try to get them if they are not supported. The issue of training is complicated by the fact that some people who would benefit quickly from skills train- ing are likely to be missed if the big-hole net is cast, and some people who do not benefit very much from train- ing are likely to be included if the small-hole net is spread. The JTPA has two expressly stated ob jectives,
195 which can often be mutually exclusive: to serve those most in need and to serve those that would best benefit from the training. States individually determine who falls into which group. Reality dictates that SDAS try to train workers most likely to satisfy employers' needs and thus there is a tendency to accept ~cream. appli- cants. This is not a function of the Revolution of responsibility to states, however, and there is most likely no uniform mix of clients, since each state can determine its own priorities for eligibility. Speculating on whether cities will be hurt or helped by the current tilt toward limited stipends, short-term training, and ~creaming,. it is likely that in labor markets where there is a shortage of skills that can be learned in a short time, the net benefits of short-term training will be greater than in areas where there Is a surplus of such skills. More communities probably fall into the latter category than the former. Nevertheless, it must be said that in large urban areas, especially where the disadvantaged--and especially minority group members--have not had access to private sector jobs, JTPA could give a leg-up into the work world for a rela- tively large number of individuals, especially women. States may provide state stipends, but we have no evidence of states' supplementing federal funds for direct training. Some states, such as New York, use unemployment benefits in conjunction with JTPA train- ing. Only states with comfortable surpluses in their insurance accounts have the luxury of doing this, which excludes some 12 of the key industrial states. Some observers speculate that SDAs will try to sup- plement their budgets with local funds. The degree to which such efforts will develop will depend on condi- tions in the local labor market. It must be remembered, however, that where there are labor shortages or short- ages in specific skills, the private sector traditional- ly accelerates its own training efforts or recruits out- side the local labor market. Where there are labor sur- pluses, the private sector tends to be disinterested in supporting training of any kind. Those who expect the private sector voluntarily to subsidize local training activities in a large way for a general market are probably going to be disappointed. Client mix is affected by limitations on stipends. The limitation on expenditures established by the fed- eral statute, on the other hand, impinges on states autonomy and has induced various responses. Since
196 administrative costs cannot exceed 15 percent, service deliverers search for ways to allocate management costs to the training category. Customized training is one way to do this. More commonly, SDAS favor youth pro- grams because they are exempt from the 15 percent limi tation. WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN? When one contemplates the bureaucratic inertia that must be overcome to fulfill the hopes for JTPA merely in coordinating training with higher education, general education, vocational education, employment services, welfare services, social services, weatherization and conservation programs, and economic development, In relation to a very diverse and sometimes amorphous cli- ent group, one cannot realistically expect much. Yet this coordination goal is one of the most valuable ele- ments of JTPA. If the program's funding were sufficient, and assured for a long enough period to justify the effort that has to be made to institute this coordination, a major change might be made that is greatly needed at the state and local levels. As it is, it is probably optimistic to expect much real and effective chance. A second objective of JTPA, to achieve job growth through private sector employment of JTPA-trained indi- viduals, will succeed or fail only with the success or failure of the local economy. The PICs cannot make jobs where employers do not need workers. In areas with a labor surplus, the role of the PIC can be, at best, to replace traditional hires with JTPA trainees. In areas with a labor shortage, SDAs with effective PICs may be able to train marginal workers fast enough and well enough to prevent employers from recruiting outside the community. But this requires successful solutions to the historically intractable problems of the disadvan- taged: first, overcoming their reluctance to risk rejection so that they enter training, and second, being able to keep them in training long enough to acquire the entire range of job-ready skills. Without income main- tenance, it does not seem likely that either of these solutions can be implemented on a large scale. Dangers lurk in the larger role given to PICs, too. Firms will have greater opportunity to abuse the program by using JTPA funds to pay for on-the-job or classroom
197 training that they would formerly have paid for them- selves. There is no evidence that this is the case, but then again, no one has asked. These and other abuses can be prevented or at least controlled by state performance standards, which have not yet been widely established. There are good argu- ments on both sides of the issue as to whether uniform standards are desirable, given the varying economic con- ditions and wage levels in different parts of the coun- try, and indeed, in different regions within states. The National Governors' Association and other public interest groups are developing their own guidelines for performance standards. One shortcoming of the legislation that the states do not seem to be dealing with at all is the lack of a re- quirement for long-term follow-up. In order to deter- mine whether the elaborate mechanisms and complicated organizational structure called for in the legislation are worthwhile, it would be necessary to know the eco- nomic outcome for trainees. These outcomes should not be limited to six months, but should be traced for sev- eral years so that duration of employment, wages, and upward mobility could be measured. At this writing, neither the DOL, the organizations representing the states, nor other independent organizations have evi- denced any interest in this kind of monitoring of the JTPA program. Although it is certainly common for government to put a low priority on program evaluation, in the case of JTPA it is particularly unfortunate. Regardless of whether there are local or national shortages or sur- pluses of labor, there certainly will be periodic, and probably frequent, shortages of specific skills in spe- cific places. Whether this complex JTPA enterprise effectively assists to prevent shortages, and whether it does so efficiently, could mean a great deal to commu- nities' growth potential--especially communities under- going transition to a different industrial or service base. Such places are by no means confined to urban areas, of course, but many large and medium-size cities are among them. CONCLUS ION JTPA is a good deal more than a partnership: It calls for a sort of public holding company within each
198 state, coordinating many different enterprises that have some missions related to JTPA goals but also have other unrelated missions. There are no federal sanctions if this holding company goes bankrupt. sut the governors do face a potential problem. If the elaborate system is developed, and federal funds are reduced, there will be no way to continue the efforts. If hopes have been raised, states could face the same syndrome that cities faced in 1969 and 1970 when the nourishment of model cities money was cut off but the appetite remained. The SDAs and PICs can avoid taking the blame: they just spend the money. Governors may be able to demonstrate that the federal government is re- sponsible for program cutbacks, but they may also feel pressed to continue programs with state funds, which would cause fiscal problems. Governors face another potential problem. It is simply that training does not equal employment. The more elaborate the efforts to carry out the integration of state and local agencies in the pursuit of training objectives, the greater the danger that failure to train ~ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ 1 _ ~ _ _ ~ ~ ~ and employ a sizable number or wormers Will DECKS the governor's office. The most important linkage, therefore, with JTPA is the linkage with economic devel- opment. But the requirement to develop all the other linkages, if heeded, will mean that too little attention can be paid to job creation. It seems inevitable that some states will find JTPA to be less than a blessing. Cities, on the other hand, will be able to conduct business as usual within the constraints discussed above. Their main problems will arise if there are not enough jobs in their communities for the trainees. If clients become discouraged and drop out or remain unemployed after completing the pro- gram, it is local government that will bear the brunt. The JTPA directors with experience are extremely sensi- tive to this possibility, and many are already worried about the fact that only low-wage, dead-end jobs are available for clients. Over time, especially in large urban areas with large numbers of disadvantaged individ- uals, there is likely to be pressure for revision of JTPA legislation or new legislation to provide for job creation. This would not occur only if the country entered a period of rapid job growth, so that excess labor was absorbed in virtually all urban labor mar- kets. That event is not likely to occur; indeed, there is likely to be a large and growing labor surplus in
199 many labor markets. The surplus will be greatest at the lower levels of skill, and JTPA may merely succeed in adding to the numbers of low-skilled and semi-skilled workers competing for entry level and dead-end jobs. From the perspective of cities and their control over their own training funds, it is likely that JTPA is more helpful to them than other options might have been. Given that Congress was determined to abolish CETA, the formula it came up with did protect the cities and the large prime sponsors from losing all they had built up. Had Congress left it up to state legislators to allocate funds, training funds might well have been distributed disproportionally to suburban and rural areas. The metropolitan prime sponsors did remain intact after JTPA and that is favorable to urban economic development and job development. REFERENCE LIST AND BIBLIOGRAPHY Beaumont, Enid 1984 Interview. Director, Academy for State and Local Government. Washington, D.C. March 27. Cochran, Gary 1984 Telephone interview. Project Coordinator, U.S. General Accounting Office study of JTPA imple- mentation. Washington, D.C. March 5. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1983 Development and Recommendations for a Statewide Service Delivery System. Office of the Gover- nor. Harrisburg: Commonwealth of Pennsyl- vania. Grinker, William 1984 Interview. Grinker, Walker and Associates. New York City. March 13. National Alliance of Business 1984 An Overview of the New Job Training System. . . Survey Report I. Washington, D.C.: National Alliance of Business. 1983b National Governors' Association 1983a Managing the Six Percent Set-Aside. Washing- ton, D.C.: National Commission for Employment Policy. Managing the Ten Percent Set-As~de. Washing- ton, D.C.: National Commission for Employment Policy. 1983c The State Employment/Economic Development
200 Link: Coordinating opment Block Grant Program with the Job Train- ing Partnership Act. HA-11194. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1984a Analysis of Coordination Criteria in the Governor's Coordination and Special Services Plan. Draft. Washington, D.C.: National Governors' Association. 1984b Survey of the States: A Report on the Status of State-Level Administration of the Job Train- ing Partnership Act. Draft. Washington, D.C.: National Governors' Association. Pines, Marion 1984 Interview. Director, Baltimore City (Md.) Office of Manpower Resources. March 12. Riffel, Rod 1984 Interview. Program Manager, Job Training Program, National Conference of State Legisla- tures. Washington, D.C. April 4. Schwartz, Gail Garfield 1982a Education and Training for Baltimore County. Washington, D.C.: Baltimore County Economic Development Commission (in association with Morton Hoffman and Company, Inc.). 1982b Strategies for Closing the Jobs-Skills Gap in Baltimore County. Washington, D.C.: Baltimore County Economic Development Commission (in association with Morton Hoffman and Company, Inc.). Schwartz, Gail Garfield, and Neikirk, William 1984 The Work Revolution. New York: Rawson Associates. Trego, Nancy ReMine 1984 Program Design Options for Non-stipended Pro- grams. Academy for State and Local Govern- ment. Washington, D.C.: National Commission for Employment Policy. Job Training Partnership Act. P.L. 97-300. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Congress, House 1983 Implementation of the Job Training Partnership Act: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. 98th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. State Communi ~ Devel- U.S. Congress 1982
201 Walker, Gary, Grinker, William, Seessel, Thomas, Smith, R.C., and Cama, Vince 1984 An Independent Sector Assessment of the Job Training Partnership Act: Phase I: The Initial Transition. Participating organiza- tions: MDC, Inc., Grinker, Walker & Associ- ates, and Syracuse Research Corporation. Wallace, John W. 1983 A Proposal for the Development of A Coherent Delivery System for Federal Employment and Training Programs. Washington, D.C.: National . Commission for Employment Policy. Widner, Ralph R., Schwartz, Gail Garfield, Rainey, Kenneth D., and Choate, Pat 1980 Economic Development and Employment: A Survey of Economic Development, Employment and Train- . ing Programs Since 1960. Washington, D.C.: Manpower Commission on Employment. Wills, Joan 1984 Interview. Director, Center for Policy Research, National Governors' Association. Washington, D.C. March 30.
