Making Policies for Children: A Study of the Federal Process (1982)

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The Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements John R. Nelson,Jr: INTRODUCTION This case study reconstructs the decision-making processes dealing with the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR), past and present. The first section develops the three traditions of nonparental child care in America: the reformer tradition oriented toward the moral and physical well-being of the children of the poor; the employment tradition directed toward child care that allows the mother to work; and the developmental tradi- tion, concerned with the comprehensive psychological development of the child. All three interacted continu- ously throughout the history of nonparental child care and are significant in shaping the requirements. The following section details the creation of the FIDCR and the continual subsequent efforts to revise them. The next section examines the crisis of enforcement in 1975-1976 that followed the passage of the Title XX amend- ment to the Social Security Act. The final two sections of this chapter explore the current debate over the requirements and the most far-reaching scientific examination of their impact, the National Day Care Study carried out by Abt Associates, Inc. Throughout the paper the issue of child-staff ratios is stressed over the other requirements. This emphasis is due to the care giver's overriding importance both to the cost of child care and to its benefits to the child. In particular, the child-staff ratios for preschool children aged three to five were crucial, since this age group constitutes most of the children receiving non- parental care. Child-staff ratios, although not by any means the only significant aspect of child care touched by the FIDCR, are nonetheless the crux of the politics 151

152 and economics surrounding them. In addition to being an aspect of care easily subject to regulation, the ratios have been considered by decision makers to be of the greatest importance. AMERICAN DAY CARE BEFORE THE FIDCR Day care and its regulation have no unified past. Depend- ing on the history sought as a prologue, the care of other people's children finds antecedents in America in one of three traditions: one directed toward the moral reforma- tion of the child, another toward the employment of the mother or care giver, and a third toward comprehensive development. The earliest day care began in the infant school of early l9th-century Boston. There, social refor- mers sought to remove, if only for the day, poor children from an environment of "want and vice" into a salubrious milieu of cleanliness and its next-of-kin, godliness. Similar efforts to care for preschool children followed the international precedents of Fredrich Froebel's kinder- gartens and Maria Montessori's work with impoverished Italian children. In part, these efforts by social reformers reflected a sincere concern for the well-being of the children of the poor. In part, too, they were deliberate attempts at imposing a particular ethos on poor immigrants who vehemently resented and resisted their paternalism. The initial peak of the reformer movement came in the Progressive era of the 20th century with the professionalization of social work. To uplift the children of the "deserving poor," social workers opened settlement houses that provided education, dental and medical care, and counseling. Day care became part of a broad social welfare philosophy. After World War I, rapid turnover of personnel and clientele brought about a steady decline in these houses.) A countertrend to day care was the long-standing notion of keeping women at home to care for their own children. Labeled the Widows' Pension Movement, this group lobbied successfully for state financial aid to fatherless families--fatherless by death, that is. Now paid to care for their own children, a few "deserving poor" were channeled away from day care centers and full-time work. However, the paucity of the pensions often compelled mothers to continue working, and working women needed some kind of day care for their children. Despite their resentment of the social worker and reformer, these women

153 found day care preferable to giving up their children to orphanages and other institutions. By the 1930s the vestiges of these day care centers surrendered to the depression. Women were thrown out of work and into their homes. Eleemosynary institutions went bankrupt, and the social workers became government bureaucrats. Child care outside the home revived, however, with the Work Projects Administration's nursery schools. Designed to provide jobs for unemployed teachers and food and care for poor children, these schools did not survive the Work Projects Administration .2 The second tradition of child care, more central to federal programmatic efforts and in that sense more policy-relevant, is employment-oriented day care. Its history begins in New York City in 1854. Wealthy women created nurseries for indigent and pregnant women. In return for the care afforded them during childbirth, the healthiest of these mothers came to work as wet nurses and maids in the homes of their patrons. The system helped the poor and eased the shortage of domestic servants. The federal role in day care followed more in the employment tradition than that of the reformer, although the employment of mothers was consistently combined with moral and physical care. The nurseries of the Work Projects Administration already mentioned sought to employ teachers, if not mothers. And the Farm Security Administration sponsored a small day care program for the children of migrant workers during the depression to allow both parents to work in the fields. By far the most massive federal program prior to the 1960s began during World War II, when the massive entry of women into factories placed day care on the national agenda. Reports of children being locked in cars in factory parking lots reached the Children's Bureau, the Office of Education, and Eleanor Roosevelt. Ironically, the children in the locked cars were at least physically safe, unlike others alone at home or on the streets. At the President's behest, in August 1942 the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare began to fund a few local day care centers. In that same month the Federal Works Agency obtained a more liberal interpretation of the Lanham Act for defense housing and public works to allow funding of day care facilities. Under this program the government spent $52 million over three years to care for 109,000 children across the country. Most of the centers were operated by local schools. Others, under the purview of the Children's Bureau, were encouraged to locate away i

154 from factories in order not to make working too convenient for mothers. All federal aid for day care ended with the armistice. A handful of states continued funding for a few years to enable families to avoid welfare dependency; most of these, however, faltered in the early 1950s.3 Although neglected in most day care chronologies, federal participation in some form revived in the 1950s. Congress passed an authorization for day care grants during the Korean War: the Defense Housing and Community Services Act. Though enacted in September 1951, the day care provision was never funded and the authorization lapsed with the armistice. The most significant federal action to subsidize nonparental child care came in the 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Act. In it a child care deduction was allowed for low-income working mothers. Working parents with an adjusted gross income under $4,500 could deduct up to $600 in expenses for the care of their children. Widowed, divorced, and separated mothers had no income limit on their eligibility; they merely had to have work-related child care costs. In practice, the measure allowed working parents to deduct over $100 million in child care expenses annually--no mean initia- tive, considering that the entire budget of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was only $1,997 million in 1954. Thus, contrary to general belief, the steady influx of women into the labor force was not unassisted in terms of federal subsidies for child care. The employment tradition of federal aid to day care continued through this deduction, which was justified as a necessary work expense .4 The third tradition, that of comprehensive psychologi- cal development, originated in the nursery schools of the 1920s--a unique nonparental care effort. Unlike all the other child care efforts, these nurseries catered to middle- and upper-class mothers. They did not keep children while their mothers worked; rather, they cared for children whose mothers were home. These nurseries were products of new psychological theories that pro- claimed the dangers to a child of a "smothering" and overprotective mother. The nursery endeavored to enhance the psychological development of the child. Insofar as the child was the object of the nursery, there was a kinship with the goals of the infant schools and other devices of the reformer tradition to uplift children. Nonetheless, there were radical differences in social class, technique, and compulsion between the two. The nursery schools of the 1920s began a tradition that can

155 be traced through the cooperative nurseries of the 1950s and ultimately into the Head Start program, in which centers for comprehensive development finally reached the children of the poor. In sum, out-of-home child care entered the 1960s with three historical purposes: to encourage employment of the poor, to promote the moral and physical well-being of their children, and to enhance the psychological develop- ment of middle-class children. The latter two traditions possessed greater appeal to social workers and child development specialists, while the former held greater sway over policy makers. Both, however, were ambiguous regarding the child. Day care for the sake of employment accorded priority to the cost of services, not their effects on children. Long-term benefits might accrue to a child if a family's cycle of welfare dependency were broken; meanwhile the child might suffer. The reform tradition was not without its flaws. It was afflicted with the ambivalence of all public charity: at once generous and self-serving, caring and condescending, selfless and arrogant. The developmental tradition had been narrowly focused in terms of class and psychological theory. Its theories of development lacked strong empiri- cal bases and had a voguish hue wedded to a popularized notion of Freudian theory. The legacy of these traditions to the child care programs of the 1960s was, in a word, problematic. Another lineage of out-of-home child care in the 1960s was government regulation. The first attempt at regulat- ing out-of-home child care dealt mainly with orphanages and other 24-hour institutions. Their central purpose was to stem the high infant and child mortality rates in these institutions. At issue were basic health measures, sanitation, nutrition, and disease prevention. As national child advocacy organizations and state licensing agencies became forces at the turn of the century, their overriding concern was the prevention of disease and its transmission among institutionalized children. Similarly, their licensing codes sought to protect children from epidemics, fire, severe neglect, and starvation. At the federal level the Children's Bureau suggested provisions for state codes and offered goals for better child care. Licensing laws were by no means comprehensive. Linked to general fire safety and health codes of cities and counties, they allowed little room for the variations in day care. States were loath to enforce their laws against church-sponsored institutions. Funds were always limited

156 and often lowest in times of greatest demand for facili- ties. It was difficult to suspend licenses because the alternative to poor facilities was frequently no facili- ties. Finally, the enforcers were drawn from the ranks of social workers. They lacked experience in administra- tion and found themselves regulating their colleagues. In sum, over the first half of the 20th-century effective regulation suffered from poor administration and the general inadequacy of the regulations themselves. During World War II the Children's Bureau and the Office of Education were empowered to approve local and state day care plans for federal funding. The Office of Education had jurisdiction over school district plans, the Children's Bureau over nonschool plans. Since 95 percent of the facilities were school related, the Office of Education predominated. For the first time the govern- ment issued a set of standards for day care. Under the aegis of the Children's Bureau, the Conference on Day Care of Children of Working Mothers met in July 1941 to confront the problem that war mobilization posed for women and children. A February 1942 report proposed a set of day care standards based on the experience and expertise of the conference participants. These standards preceded approval powers granted in August 1942 and did not have the force of law. Like all the standards of the Chil- dren's Bureau, they were merely recommendations to state and local authorities. The standards assumed that school-age children received adequate education in school and required only supervision and a safe play area until the end of the work day. They recommended that children under age three stay with their mothers and that those women be discouraged from working. Children aged two to five received the most attention. The standards suggested a maximum group size of 30 chil- dren with a minimum ratio of 10 children to 1 adult. They discussed the child's need for "warmth and affection" and opportunities "for music, conversation, poetry, stories, work with materials, group play, etc." The needs of the family were also to be considered. Staff directors were to be trained in a broad range of children's needs, including education, psychology, family relations, health, nutrition, and child development. Ideally, a facility would provide proper nutrition and health training and would conform to safety codes. Intended only as goals, these standards were never enforced as a precondition of federal funding. Federal regulatory authority extended only to state and local plans, not their operation. As

157 goals, however, they no doubt exerted some pressure for better day care facilities than otherwise would have developed.5 The expiration of direct federal aid to day care did ~ e __ ~:~ ;~ ~ A; ~ =~= not Salt cnllaren-s DUE Beau ~ ~ v ~ ~ ~ In 1953 the bureau, in conjunction with the Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor, held a National Confer- ence on Planning Services for Children of Employed Mothers. The conference stressed the growing number of women with children entering the labor force: They noted that 2 million working women had children under 6, and over 5 million had children under 18. In an effort to promote more state and local aid to day care the con- f mr"=c ma; need t~ industry's need for labor and the ='~~~ rim working woman's need for supplemental family income. Forty percent of those working women were the sole supporters of their families. To touch all bases the conferees explained the growth of kindergartens and nursery schools because parents were "eager to profit from the new scientific knowledge of child develop- ment. . . ." Their central plea, however, remained the expansion of day care to abet the entry of women into the work force. No federal programs were enacted, but the year following the conference Congress passed the child care deduction ·6 The issue of day care and its regulation persisted throughout the 1950s. The Children's Bureau conducted a major study of day care in 1958. In October 1960 the Child Welfare League published Standards for Day Care Service. "these standards," Director Joseph H. Reid stressed, "are intended to be goals for continuous improvement of services to children." In many respects the standards recapitulated those issued earlier by the Children's Bureau: health supervision, family counseling, educational experiences, and physical and emotional security. They suggested group sizes according to age: for children age 3, 12-15 per group; for children ages 4-6, 15-20 per group; and for children over 6, 20-25 per group. Each group "should have a full-time teacher and assistant." As Children's Bureau standards emphasized earlier, children under 3 were not recommended for day care. The staff ratios recommended were roughly the same, but the recommended group size was one third smaller in the Child Welfare League standards.7 Soon after the publication of these standards the Children's Bureau and Women's Bureau sponsored a day care conference, which noted among other things the continued

1S8 influx of women into the labor force and their purported demand for day care services. Again the conferees raised the issue of child care in terms of dependency. Day care was touted as a means to escape welfare. President-elect John F. Kennedy wrote approvingly of the conference's recommendations. Once inaugurated, he set his new secretary of HEW, Abraham Ribicoff, to work drafting a welfare reform package for Congress--a package that included a $10-million day care program for welfare clients. In several respects the legislation was similar to a 1958 day care bill Senator Jacob Javits had proposed to Congress. His bill had gone nowhere, but now packaged with the first of a long line of welfare reforms it became law in 1962. The rationale for the reform measures would become a familiar litany throughout the next two decades. Welfare costs were rising; the present system was an administrative nightmare and a failure; only by breaking the cycle of dependency could the welfare burden be lessened; employment and training were necessary means of breaking that cycle and day care was a requisite support service. The tradition of employment oriented day care reached an apotheosis. Enacted as P.L. 87-543, the bill authorized $5 million for fiscal 1963 and $10 million for each ensuing year. Although the House report on the bill recounted the latest figures on the numbers of working women with children in its explanation of the day care provision, the promise of lower welfare costs appears more relevant to its passage. After all, women with children had been entering the labor force in significant numbers for well over a decade--a fact of which the Women's Bureau consistently reminded Congress. Even under the welfare reform rubric, the day care program managed only to extract $800,000 of its $5 million authorization from the conservative appropriations committees in fiscal 1963. From its inception within HEW, the welfare reform legislation contained one specific regulatory provision regarding day care. Federal funding was made conditional on a facility's obtaining a state license. This provision left primary regulatory responsibility to the states, where it had traditionally resided. The promise of fed- eral money encouraged states to modernize their licensing procedures, and 40 percent of that money went in the first years of programs to fund this modernization. The results, however, were less than heartening. Still plagued by the social worker and enforcer, state licensing

159 authorities also suffered from a lack of technical know- ledge and funds. confronted by the choice of closing substandard centers with no prospect of a replacement or allowing them to continue, the regulators chose the latter. To compensate for this bending of the code they intensified their scrutiny of new applications. Thus expansion of day care facilities was curtailed, while older, less satisfactory centers continued to operate. This problem was compounded by the succession of new antipoverty programs, which provided funds for day care to allow mothers on welfare to receive vocational educa- tion or other job training. The proliferation of federal programs operated by various agencies and departments precluded any easy centralization of day care regulation, had one been attempted. _ By default, the states retained regulatory power over the expanding day care industry. The developmental tradition of child care also had its heyday. In 1964, Congress passed the mainstay of the war on poverty, the Economic Opportunity Act. Head Start, touching on practically every aspect of poverty, became the showpiece of the act and of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Following in the tradition of middle- class nursery schools, Head Start was designed to enhance the psychological development of poor children. The research of psychologists J. McVicker Hunt and Benjamin Bloom and various local preschool education projects in universities had indicated the positive impact of instruc- tion and a salutary environment on a child's cognitive development. Head Start was more firmly rooted in empiri- cal psychology than its antecedent nursery schools. Although its stated purpose--social uplift--was very similar to the moral uplift sought by the reformers of the early 20th century, there was a significant differ- ence. The poor welcomed Head Start; it was not the kind of hegemonic imposition that the infant schools were. It was also more of an effort to reach the rural than the urban poor. Yet, there was a motif of getting the ghetto out of the child. The prospect of derailing multigenera- tional poverty had great political appeal. Sargent Shriver, director of OEO, wisely chose to capitalize on it. Planned as a pilot project involving 100,000 children, Shriver allowed over half a million to enroll. OEO found Congress very willing to increase its budget to fund such a potentially revolutionary approach to poverty. Since employment and the cost of care were less relevant to Head Start's purpose, the issues of smaller groups, more

160 attention to education, health care, and nutrition became paramount. Head Start's stress on direct community par- ticipation circumvented the traditional federal-state- local funding chain and escaped the extant licensing morass. Its priorities were different from employment- oriented day care, and this difference in priorities was no better reflected than in their child-staff ratios of 4 and 5 to 1 for preschool children. Based on their own experience with preschool education and consultations with outside experts, Head Start's organizers reduced the traditional day care ratios by one half to two thirds. Costs, of course, were tripled. As the federal government expanded its day care fund- ing, a schism in purpose surfaced and slowly widened. In the developmental area, comprehensive child care grew with OEO's increase of Head Start. In the employment area, every new program proposed to replace welfare with "work- fare" carried a day care provision. Such provisions became more integral as the welfare explosion was recog- nized among unmarried mothers. Work would take them off the dole and occupy their time with pursuits other than procreation. Meanwhile the children required care so that their mothers could find jobs. Ultimately, both kinds of day care shared the commmon purpose of reducing poverty and welfare dependency. Nonetheless, their means were in most respects antithetical. Where minimum costs were essential to making employment practical, comprehen- sive services and education were integral to breaking the poverty cycle. There would obviously be a crisis if the two were ever compelled to integrate their programs; in 1967 that integration was mandated by law. The year 1967 was a watershed year for day care. OEO was coming under heavy criticism from conservatives. Accused of waste and mismanagement, its programs ran into the backlash against the urban riots and the economic pressures of the war in Vietnam. Essentially a creation of the Johnson administration, few in Congress felt responsible to defend it. The task fell to Shriver. To defuse his critics, Shriver formulated a revision to the Equal Opportunity Act, which promised tighter administra- tive procedures, expanded OEO's support services for welfare recipients seeking work, and proposed employing welfare mothers in child care centers. His revisions first encountered opposition within the administration. The Bureau of the Budget feared the administrative provisions were too constraining and probably unworkable. Their very complexity ensured that they would not be

161 followed and would merely invite more congressional criticism. HEW resented the further erosion of its policy purview. In particular, they fought OEO' s proposal to administer the day care program. At HEW's behest, the language was broadened to include HEW. The change was portentous, since Congress expanded the day care subsection to include the mandate for the FIDCR. The legislation encountered more problems in the 90th Congress. Republicans worked to divest OEO of its more established programs, such as Head Start, and to restore more program control to traditional departments. Budget authorizations were cut and appropriations were reduced. Finally, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee sought to bring some administrative order to the plethora of social welfare initiatives by mandating a set of inter- agency regulations to govern the numerous federal day care programs. From the perspective of OEO, HEW, and the Bureau of the Budget, however, day care regulations were not the issue. They worried about the potential cost of the day care programs that were greatly expanded in the OEO legislation and in the new Work Incentives Program. Over $1 billion would be needed to care for all children under six of the working poor affected by these programs. The new employment thrust of OEO's legislation did not reduce funds for Head Start nor did it eliminate the smaller Follow Through Program designed to preserve the child's early gains. But OEO's suggestion for employment of welfare mothers echoed loudly in the House Ways and Means Committee. Confronted by an unanticipated and politically frightening expansion in the nation's welfare rolls, the committee and the Congress enacted the AFDC- Work Incentives Program. The incentive for working was simplified: get a job or lose all benefits. For the first time, Congress imposed this requirement on women with young children. - Day care became a necessary support service and was included in the program. This legislation as well as the OEO revision complicated the day care programs further; they required the use of welfare recipi- ents to staff centers. Obviously, employment-oriented ~ ~ A; A_ ~ 1 care was overwhelming aevelopmencax care `~ ~v~y`~.v..~^ enactments. The only catch was that those who would write the regulations governing these day care programs were from the developmentalist tradition.

162 The 1968 FIDCR . Although some staff members within the Children's Bureau and OEO pondered the day care requirements mandate in the early months of 1968, such interagency coordination could be achieved only by someone on high. In April, HEW secretary Wilbur Cohen created the Federal Panel on Early Childhood to write the requirements. Jule Sugarman, former director of Head Start, chaired the panel. Cohen had brought Sugarman to the Children's Bureau as associate director as part of an overall strategy to ensure Head Start's transfer into the bureau. Both Cohen and Sugarman wanted to keep the program out of the Office of Education, where state school administrators would dominate it. Cohen also thought it appropriate to include on the panel representatives from other departments involved in pro- viding day care services. His inclusion created a some- what diverse group representing OEO, HEW, the U.S. Depart- ment of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Labor (DOL). Even the Defense Department participated in very early panel deliberations. Nonetheless, representatives of the Children's Bureau and Head Start predominated. From the outset, panel members divided into two groups: one favoring comprehensive developmental day care, the other advocating minimum cost day care to ease the employ- ment of welfare mothers. The former group included the Children's Bureau, Head Start, and the Women's Bureau of the DOL. The employment-minimum cost group was cham- pioned by DOL's Manpower Administration and, always in the background, the Bureau of the Budget. An agency whose program was designed principally to employ the poor sought day care requirements that minimized costs. An agency that operated a child development and care program pushed for more comprehensive requirements. Two factors miti- gated potential conflict. First, the working committee consisted of panel and staff members sympathetic to the developmental comprehensive approach, and it was they who drafted the requirements. Second, the open-ended entitle- ment of many of the day care programs made costs of tertiary concern. Neither group had a monopoly on the historic function of day care nor on good intentions. The employment- oriented group argued that the extent of employment programs was limited by the availability and cost of day care. Raising that cost beyond the bare minimum resulted in fewer jobs for the poor and a less effective employment

163 program. The developmentalists believed day care to be the chief means of providing necessary nutrition and medical services to deprived children. Staff attention and education would enhance the child's future prospects. They believed that costs should be secondary to the needs of deprived children. In a world of limited resources these two positions were not easily reconciled--if they could be reconciled at all. Yet 1968 was not a time when policy makers, at least those drafting the FIDCR, worried over such limitations. Sugarman's position was complicated by his administra- tive post. Coming from the Head Start tradition of com- prehensive developmental care, he had just assumed the number two position in the Children's Bureau. Had he leaned against the developmentalists, he might have alienated the personnel in the bureau. His responsi- bilities to the panel would end with the FIDCR draft; his relationship to bureau personnel would continue throughout his tenure there. His solution to these problems was to draft a set of requirements that, while formally affirming comprehensive developmental child care, were sufficiently ambiguous in content and intention to comprehend the interests of all panel members. The final version of requirements specified child-staff ratios and group and family day care. They stated that the location of facilities must consider the relative need of the population for federally funded day care, travel time for users, accessibility to "other resources which enhance the day care program," and opportunities for parent and neighborhood involvement. Facilities must conform to "appropriate" safety and sanitation codes. "Educational opportunities must be provided every child . . . under the supervision and direction of a staff member trained or experienced in child growth and develop- ment. Toys, games, and daily activities for each child "must be designed to influence a positive concept o~ ~` and motivation to enhance his social, cognitive, and communication skills." Counseling for child and family must be available to enable them to choose the best child care arrangements. Health and dental care must be pro- vided to the child. Facilities must provide "nutritious" meals and daily checks for any indications of illness in the child. ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ The requirements also ordered a periodic assessment of the "physical and mental competence to care for children" of staff members. They mandated "continuous in-service training" and "career progression opportunities" for

164 staff members. "Parents must have the opportunity to become involved themselves in the making of decisions" concerning center operations. In centers of 40 or more children, parents must be included in a "policy advisory committee" and constitute no less than 50 percent of its membership. Such a committee "must perform productive functions" in program development, funding application, selection of administrators and staff, and channeling complaints. Employment and administration policies must be written out and available to parents and employees. Finally, the facilities "must be periodically evaluated in terms of the Federal Interagency Day Care Standards." The agent for evaluation was left unstated.9 Despite their scope and detail, the 1968 FIDCR actually represented a series of rather subtle compromises. The developmentalist group wanted child-staff ratios akin to those of Head Start, which were lower than those suggested for day care by the Child Welfare League. The employment- oriented group objected to the costs these ratios entailed. Sugarman's answer was to allow clerical and housekeeping personnel as well as unpaid volunteers to count as staff for the purposes of the requirement. Such volunteers could include "older children." Moreover, the requirements specified the ratios not "normally" be exceeded. This sort of qualifier was replete throughout the 1968 requirements. Space must be "adequate"; safe- guards must be "adequate"; ventilation "adequate"; educational materials "appropriate" to the facility's "type"; and meals "adequate." What constituted adequacy or appropriateness was never specified--and this was crucial. "The basic responsibility," the FIDCR stated, "for enforcement of the requirements lies with the admini- stering agency." By prefacing the FIDCR with this state- ment, Sugarman mollified disagreeing panel members. Each agency governed the compliance with the requirements of its funding recipients. The one oversight agency that might have blocked the requirements--the Bureau of the Budget--had no authority to review agency regulations at that time. The developmentalist groups could enforce the requirements according to a strict interpretation; the employment-oriented group could enforce a loose inter- pretation. To ensure this flexibility, the FIDCR preface also noted that "Noncompliance may be grounds for suspension or termination of federal funds." The funding agency, then, had final determination over the only effective enforcement procedure, a funding suspension.

165 In her history of the FIDCR, Sara Pope Cooper observes that "discussions were seldom strident and that a strong consensus was reached on most points with remarkable ease."~° The reason for this ease toward consensus was the tacit recognition among panel members that they were agreeing on an ambiguous, nonbinding set of requirements. In other words, consensus ensued from the common premise that the 1968 FIDCR were a set of goals and, as goals, everyone agreed that they were fine. The panel conducted no cost studies; costs were irrelevant to ideal standards. They relied on their experience with Head Start and their knowledge of child development. Moreover, soon after the promulgation of FIDCR, informal assurances were passed by the Social and Rehabilitation Service through HEW's regional offices to the states that the requirements would not be enforced. In 1968 a possibility arose that the Children's Bureau would enforce the FIDCR in stages. Although it had no authority over the other day care programs scattered among the bureaucracy, the bureau did control the Title IVA (of the Social Security Act) day care program. Since funding was the only effective means of enforcement, the strongest supporter of the FIDCR--the Children's Bureau-- was in a position to implement them. Moreover, at that time, Title IVA had an open-ended entitlement; money was indeed no object. The bureau's position, however, soon changed. When the Nixon administration reorganized HEW, the Children's Bureau was divided among the Community Services Administration, the Health Services and Mental Health Administration, and the newly created Office of Child Development (OCD). OCD received the enforcement mandate for the FIDCR, but the Community Services Administration received the Title IVA program. Without control of day care funding, OCD was an unarmed police. In the larger policy conflict of 1967-1968 the FIDCR and its legislative mandate played a symbolic role. Among the slowly shrinking Great Society supporters in Congress, the conservative push to reduce welfare costs through the Work Incentives Program (WIN) portended in the minds of many children's advocates the sacrifice of the children of welfare recipients to shoddy care. On one level, the overriding stress on employment and administration of the WIN program by the DOL indicated that these children could expect the cheapest care supervised by an agency with no interest in them per se. On another level, insofar as Sheila Rothman is correct in arguing that the WIN program's "more fundamental purpose

166 [than employment] was to frighten welfare recipients from applying for relief," the poorer the day care, the more effective the deterrent. 2 Liberals on the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee hoped that federal interagency day care requirements might prevent a serious decline in the quality of day care. If it raised the costs of that care, then the requirements might well serve to make welfare payments to mothers at home cheaper than the day care that would allow them to work. Either contingency was more palatable than the WIN program and its day care provisions. The committee vested the FIDCR mandate in OEO/HEW to ensure that the requirements were comprehensive and developmental in orientation. Events in 1969 recast the political context of the FIDCR. The Westinghouse Study of Head Start questioned the long-term benefits of early invention--a serious setback for developmentalists. In that same year the newly elected Nixon administration advanced a sweeping proposal for welfare reform, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). Apart from its innovative guaranteed annual income provision, FAP entailed a massive federal day care program as an adjunct to a modified WIN program. HEW estimated that the program would require 400 new day care centers each year for 5 years. Also, HEW Secretary Robert Finch created tne ou~ ana Drought In an eminent psychologist from Yale, Edward Zigler, to administer it. Due to their ambiguity and vague criteria for compliance, Zigler believed the FIDCR unworkable in their present form. In light of the proposed FAP day care program, which OCD would administer, he received authorization to revise them. zigler aimed for a set of day care requirements that could be enforced and that provided a minimum level of care consistent with the child's health development. Faced with more stringent limitations on social welfare spending under the Republican administration, he worked to strike a compromise between the comprehensive develop- mentalists and the employment-oriented advocates. Zigler sought the best care for the most children with the fewest dollars. To commence the process of revision, he held a major day care conference in 1970. Over 1,000 parents, child care providers, social scientists, and advocates met to discuss the requirements. The conference Produced a manual to guide the revisions. In 1971, OCD began writing a new set of day care requirements.t 3 After the FAP proposal, Congress evinced continued interest in out-of-home child care. Among the employment -

167 oriented group, Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, requested a HEW report on state licensing procedures. Mills was troubled by reports that inadequate day care facilities limited the expansion of the WIN program. Cumbersome licensing processes delayed the opening of new centers. Moreover, state codes were inconsistent and often inappropriate to child care. Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, also sought to deal with the problems of state licensing. He proposed minimum federal standards to supersede those of the states and accelerate the expansion of day care facilities. Under pressure from these committee chairmen the Nixon administration through OCD initiated a study of state licensing codes. The administration, however, opposed super sedence of any state with federal authority in this matter. OCD did disseminate a guide for day care licensing in 1973 and encouraged states to revise their codes accordingly. Since it was only a guide, its contents reflected Zigler's position that standards must be enforceable and guarantee the minimum needs of the child. He was also sufficiently politic to seek advice during its preparation from all interested parties." 4 In 1971, congressional advocates of comprehensive developmental child care added a $2-billion program in this area to an OEO extension bill. Sponsored chiefly by Senator Walter Mondale and Representative John Brademas, S 2007 proposed comprehensive services for children in day care. Services would be free of charge for the poor and available on a graduated fee schedule for middle- income families. The bill also provided for new day care requirements to be developed through a complex interaction of government, caretakers, and parents. The innovation in the Mondale-Brademus bill was the extension of federal assistance to day care for nonpoor families. There was no precedent for a categorical federal program to sub- sidize the day care of middle-class children. The bill bore a large price tag without being linked directly to the employment of welfare clients or other traditional justifications. Among conservatives the program smacked of "sovietizing our [i.e., the nonpoor] children" and undermining the family. Many forgot that the tax law had for 20 years subsidized the nonparental care of middle- class children. The OEO extension, including the Mondale-Brademus child care program, passed the Congress in December 1971. President Nixon vetoed it, and the Senate sustained the veto. From the administration's perspective, the

168 legislation contained too many objectionable features, not the least of which was its cost. The child care program contained complex administrative procedures involving hundreds of sponsors working directly with federal agencies; the administration and several state governors believed these procedures to be unworkable. It impinged on the day care provision of the FAP and extended day care subsidies to the nonpoor. The OEO extension included an independent governing body for its legal aid funds. Since cabinet members had complained repeatedly about OEO-funded litigation against the government, the lack of presidential discretion regarding the board controlling these funds became a significant objection to the bill. Finally, a veto helped to mitigate conservative criticism of Nixon's foreign policy. No single considera- tion can explain the veto. In the wake of the veto, the House Education and Labor Committee reported another OEO extension bill, H.R. 12350, without the child care program. (The Mondale child care program also resurfaced in another bill, which passed the Senate but died in the House.) To ensure that the admini- stration, which advocates of comprehensive developmental- ist child care now clearly perceived as antichild, did not weaken the 1968 FIDCR, H.R. 12350 included a provision for comparability, which required any new day care requirements be "no less comprehensive" than the 1968 set. The legislation cost $1 billion less than the earlier vetoed version and modified the objectionable provisions regarding legal services. There was also an expansion of Head Start, which the administration opposed, intended to offset the loss of the comprehensive child care program. As the bill made its way through Congress in summer 1972, the comparability provision raised problems for HEW's completed but unapproved revision of the FIDCR. Secretary Richardson wrote Representative Albert Quie requesting a clarification of the provision. He explained the weaknesses of the 1968 FIDCR: ambiguous, and difficult to enforce. corrected these problems. Although it increased the ostensible child-adult ratios, the actual number of children per care giver was unaffected. Richardson requested a colloquy between Quie and Education and Labor Committee chairman Carl Perkins to clarify that the comparability provision entailed only overall quality, not "stringent . . . quantative measurement." Quie and Perkins had the colloquy along the lines Richardson had requested. 6 In September the legislation, compar They were vague, _. . The revised version .

169 ability provision included, went to the President for approval. The alignment of the executive agencies on this bill is significant to the fate of the 1972 revisions to the FIDCR. Both HEW and OEO recommended that Nixon sign the bill. Congress had dropped most of the objectionable provisions of the earlier extension bill. Perkins and Quie had clarified the comparability mandate to allow HEW's revisions. Despite these changes and the other agencies' recommendations, the OMB suggested a presiden- tial veto. The bill in general and the comparability provision in particular "would limit to some extent administrative flexibility in carrying out the program." OMB had always considered the 1968 FIDCR an "unattainable level" of care. Consideration of day care standards, they argued, was relevant only to the still-pending FAP legislation. Despite their recommendation for disap- proval, Nixon signed the OEO extension under the probably correct impression that it was the best that he could expect from Congress. Nonetheless, OMB's linkage of any day care requirements to the passage of the FAP would become significant for Zigler's revision of the FIDCR.t 7 In spring 1972, Zigler and his staff completed the new day care requirements. These requirements were much more specific on every aspect of a center's operation. They expanded the regulatory scope to in-home care, detailed sac arouninaS, meals Her hour ~ _,_ ~ of care, provider responsi- bilities, and a minimum wage requirement for center employees. In the crucial area of child-staff ratios the requirements increased the child-adult ratios but speci- fied that only care givers, not clerical or janitorial staff, could count in the ratios. Although the 1968 FIDCR mandated lower ratios, it allowed any adult volunteer or older child present in the center to count in that overall ratio. Zigler's revision counted only paid, qualified care givers. Moreover, his revisions included ratios for children under 3 years old: 0-18 months, 3:1 and 19-38 months, 4:1. The 1968 FIDCR had neither requirements for care of children under 3 years old nor any ratios set this low. Zigler had written not only a rigorous set of day care requirements but an enforceable one as well. Due to their content, they encountered OMB's opposition; due to the political context, the advocacy groups opposed them as well. Secretary Richardson approved the new requirements by June 1972. He proposed to hold a series of congressional and press briefings that summer to describe the admini

170 stration's day care policy. The centerpiece would be the new requirements, their relationship to the FAP, and modifications in Head Start. Richardson and zigler believed the revised FIDCR would affirm the administra- tion's commitment to good-quality day care and to children in the wake of the child care veto. OMB, however, had other plans. In a confidential white paper its staff assessed the HEW proposals. The OMB paper concluded that the proposed policy would (1) commit the federal govern- ment to determining directly the nature of child care, (2) raise care in the centers to "approximately" the same quality as that of Head Start, (3) increase FAP's day care allocation from $750 million to $1.2 billion, (4) establish a prime sponsor system "similar" to the proposed system of Mondale and Brademus but with fewer allowable sponsors, and (5) make an overall policy declaration in support of developmentalist day care. The staff assess- ment, in characteristic understatement, concluded that a policy statement of this sort "would be undesirable." In their analysis OMB questioned almost every fact of Richardson's policy proposals. Not only were the staff ratios challenged, but the very issue of "whether or not the administration wants to endorse the 'Federal presence' that these standards and the accompanying enforcement effort implies [sic]." They questioned the wisdom of the requirements' application to in-home care, to volunteer participants in federal programs, and to centers serving only those persons receiving federal cash subsidies. OMB pointed out that HEW's proposed child care credit allow- ance would double FAP outlays and "eliminate parental incentive to get a 'good bargain,' thus resulting in an upward cost push." Presumably, the potential cost of the minimum wage requirement also bothered OMB. In sum, their central argument was that HEW's proposals "cloud the difference between child care--a federal responsibility as part of the workfare provisions of H.R. 1 [FAP]--and compensatory education, which is primarily a state and local function." Their alternative was to "leave quality control to parental discretion under a pure income strategy or support more limited standards. . . ."~9 During the first half of 1972 the OMB and HEW were at loggerheads over a proper day care policy for the admini- stration. OMB wanted a minimum cost employment-oriented policy; HEW advocated a more comprehensive developmental- ist approach. Zigler's revision of the FIDCR was the linchpin of HEW's approach. Neither Richardson nor Undersecretary John Veneman would act without OMB's

171 approbation. As Veneman wrote the secretary in a confidential memorandum, "I indicated to [OMB] your desire to reach an agreement on day care [and that] it would not be your intention to release our position unless it was mutually determined to be appropriate." Unable to budge OMB or induce White House intervention, such a determination never came. The revisions were quietly buried with the death of the FAP. frustrated Zigler returned to New Haven.ZU ~ A Soon after, a Ironically, the most vocal opponents of Zigler's revision outside the executive branch were the staunchest advocates of comprehensive day care. From the viewpoint of the Child Welfare League, the Children's Defense Fund, and others, HEW and the administration had entered an insidious conspiracy to undermine the quality of federally funded day care. The revised FIDCR, they believed, eviscerated the impeccable standards of 1968. Caught in the middle, Zigler's revisions were soundly condemned by both sides. Politically the administration had nothing to gain from promulgating requirements already proscribed Fir Who `7-r~ n-mnl ~ they were designed to pacify. To the advocates of comprehensive day care, loyalty to the 1968 FIDCR had become the test of commitment to the proper care of children. In their minds an ambiguous, unenforceable icon was preferable to a practical but supposedly weaker set of Nixon administration requirements. As long as worship was voluntary, OMB, too, agreed to allow the 1968 idol to stand.2i MY Alec v ~ ~ ~ ~_~ ~ ~ THE FIDCR AND TITLE XX Two years of relative calm concerning day care regulations followed the failure of Zigler's revisions. The admini- stration abandoned its FAP proposal and worked toward keeping down social welfare expenditures; Congress worked toward increasing them. Not until the passage of the Title XX amendment to the Social Security Act did the issue of day care standards arise. Title XX incorporated an innovation in federal social welfare aid to the states. In place of categorical programs it broached a less rlgla formula grant approach with fewer restrictions on state allocations of federal funds. Among the areas to be funded in this fashion was day care. The administration's move toward revenue sharing and block grants did not sit well with many members of Congress and other advocates of categorical spending. They believed that, uncontrolled,

172 states and municipalities might spend the grant money in ways unintended by Congress. Day care advocates also feared the inevitable competition for funds with more powerful social service interests. A major issue was the continued assurance of adequate services to target popula- tions. In other words, the extent to which service program grants were earmarked and regulated was central to the Title XX enactment. In one respect, the history of Title XX began in 1972. At that time federal welfare funds were distributed in categorical fashion to states under an 80 percent matching formula. Outlays had grown by 450 percent between 1968 and 1972: $350 million to $1.6 billion. To impose some degree of restraint on this rapid growth, Congress placed a ceiling of $2.5 billion on federal outlays. This ceiling, however, would still have allowed a $1-billion increase in spending--something the administration strongly opposed. To keep spending well below the con- gressional ceiling, HEW issued new regulations governing federal funding in May 1973. Their main purpose was to tighten eligibility requirements and reduce allowance for services. Congressional opposition to these regulations resulted in a postponement of their enforcement until January 1, 1975. Congress and the administration had reached an impasse over social services spending. In meetings with organized labor, state social service administrators, and other interested parties, HEW assistant secretary of planning and evaluation William Morrill devised a strategy to break the impasse. In return for administration support of the $2.5-billion ceiling, Congress would enact new legislation to replace categorical specification of service programs with block grants. Federal review of the states' disposition of the funds would cease and only an independent audit would ensure that the states conform to the general strictures of the stature. In support of this approach OMB director Ray Ash explained to the President that the federal government could not distinguish as well as state and local authori- ties the useful from the useless programs. The new approach promised to reduce federal involvement and fructify the administration's long-term policy thrust toward a New Federalism. Ash envisioned no way of holding outlays below the $2.5-billion ceiling in the future. Congress's repeated deferrals of HEW's regula- tions and the various alternative bills boded only more spending in the traditional categorical vein. He believed

173 that the administration could at least extract a block grant approach in the process.2 2 With approval from the Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW's hierarchy, and OMB, Morrill commenced a prolonged series of meetings with all interested parties on the structure and content of what was to become Title XX. Through their meetings he built a consensus for Title XX. Regarding the 1968 FIDCR, the AFL-CIO was particularly insistent that the requirements be retained and enforced. ASPE's draft of Title XX thus included a provision for enforcement of the FIDCR, but, at HEW i no i~tence . the Provision also mandated a study of the appropriateness of federal day care regulation. For in-home care they proposed to leave the decision to the states, provided each state granted "all interested individuals and organizations the opportunity to submit recommended standards." Out-of-home care would have to conform to the 1968 FIDCR, except for the requirement mandating educational opportunities for children. Their draft bill gave the secretary authority to prescribe maximum permissible child-staff ratios for children over 5 provided that those ratios did not exceed 13:1 for children ages 5-9 and 20:1 for children over 9. The bill also included a request to the secretary to prepare a report on the overall appropriateness of the day care requirements. major change: - Regarding the requirements, OMB made one the clause requiring states to consult "all interested individuals" when setting standards for in-home care became standards set "reasonable in accord with recommended standards of national standard-setting organizations concerned with the home care of children." Popular input was scotched.2 3 The House Ways and Means Committee and Long's Finance Committee dominated congressional action on the bill and other welfare proposals. The Ways and Means Committee concurred in the central thrust of Title XX. They were pleased to be rid of the stalemate over social services mh ~ -^mm i ~ ~ "" ~ new r "a the overall recommended slatting ratios and imposed a 2:1 ratio for children under 3. They took this latter step to raise the cost of infant center-based care in hopes of discouraging it. It was, they argued, bad for the young child. The committee also reinstated the educational requirement of the 1968 FIDCR. Finally, as a gesture to those seeking to restrain costs, their report instructed the secretary to consider the cost implications of requirements in an appropriateness report.2 4 spending. 1..= ~..~..~

174 On the Senate side, the Finance Committee retained the principal features of HEW'S draft: the higher staff ratios and the waiver of the educational requirement. In place of specific staff ratios for children under 3 the committee gave the secretary discretion in the matter. Walter Mondale of the Senate and Patricia Schroeder of the House opposed the relaxation of the FIDCR's staff ratios as a move toward "warehousing" children. Despite this opposition, the House conferees acceded to all the Senate's provisions regarding standards. The conference report passed both chambers by voice vote.25 HEW approved of the enrolled bill. HEW Secretary Casper Weinberger wrote Ash that the higher child-staff ratios were "an improvement over our proposal in this ~ Apparently they had overestimated the political regard." _ muscle of the comprehensive care advocates. The Treasury Department, however, objected strenuously to the parent locater provision of the bill. The Internal Revenue Service, they believed, would be placed in the business of enforcing child support laws. For the same reason, OMB joined Treasury in recommending a presidential veto.2 6 President Ford's decision was not made that easily. As a member of Congress. he had supported precisely such a parent locater porated a much-desired revision ~, ~ ~ law. The bill incor to existing categorical programs. Republicans had taken a beating in the fall elections and the 94th Congress ~ ~ generous than its predecessor in promised to be more social welfare spending. Disregarding OMB's and Treasury's advice, Ford signed the legislation on January 4, 1975. Title XX did more than change the child-staff ratios; it altered enforcement procedures for the FIDCR. Before 1975 enforcement rested on a compliance procedure in which an administrative hearing occurred prior to any federal suspension of funds. The new method was a "federal financial participation" procedure in which the government could suspend funds at the time of the violation and require the state to reimburse any previously allocated money. Moreover, Title XX's penalty for noncompliance to the FIDCR was not the standard 3 percent reduction in overall funding but a total cutoff of day care payments. This new procedure was included at the behest of the AFL-CIO and Child Welfare League as part of the price of their concurrence in Title XX. Morrill, too, thought a rigorous enforcement of the 1968 FIDCR could clear up the question of their practicality. Indeed it would. The Social and Rehabilitation Service, which administered its

175 day care programs, estimated that "well in excess of half of the child day care provided under Title XX will not meet the FIDCR." Over $300 million, half of all day care funds, could be withheld for noncompliance. The contrast _ . between the old and new procedures was more striking. Neither the Social and Rehabilitation Service nor any other federal agency had ever held a compliance hearing to enforce the FIDCR within a state.27 The first rumbling of the political eruption to follow came in April 1975. That month HEW published for public comment preliminary day care requirements based on Title XX provisions. In the one staffing area in which they had discretion, children under 3, the department based the ratio on Zigler's unenacted revision. Centers were required to have a child-staff ratio of 1:1 for infants under 6 weeks old, 3:1 for children 6 weeks to 18 months, and 4:1 for children 18 to 36 months. All the other ratios, including the most controversial 5:1 and 7:1 for children ages 3-S, were fixed by Title XX or the 1968 FIDCR. Enforcement would begin October 1, 1975. It would include Title XX and the day care authorized under Title IV. As the implications of these requirements became clearer and state enforcement more likely, protest mounted from care givers, state administrators, and members of Congress. The reasons for the protest were ObVlOUS. A 1974 HEW audit of day care centers in nine states indicated that three fourths of them were not in compliance with one or more health or safety requirement. problem was staff ratios. A center's typical child-staff ratio for preschool children was 8:1. To lower that ratio to 5:1 or 4:1 could increase costs by up to 50 percent. In response to this protest, Weinberger changed the final regulations to allow a 4:1 ratio for children between 6 weeks and 3 years old. He recognized, however, that, despite these changes, the FIDCR's enforcement "would Ian if icantlv reduce the availability of child care in The more serious cost _ _ ~ ~ many states." The fracas over the requirements intensi fied as the October deadline approach. Congressional protest against the requirements did not divide along ideological lines. Such otherwise diverse politicians as Henry 8ellmon, Ronald Dellums, Carl Albert, Peter Rodino, William Brock, and George McGovern petitioned for a postponement Supporters of the requirements were more of a kind ideologically: Bella Abzug, Walter Mondale, Charles Rangel, and John Brademas, but James Buckley also supported the requirements.

176 Undoubtedly overwhelmed by ambivalence, Representative Joshua Eliberg signed letters of protest and of support. Opponents and supporters argued in surprisingly similar fashion. The opponents thought that enforcement of the requirements would price day care centers out of the market and endanger the well-being of the children. Supporters felt that failure to enforce the requirements would allow shoddy, inadequate day care centers to continue and endanger the well-being of the children. All were righteous; few were holy.29 As the deadline neared, enormous pressures were brought to bear on HEW. Members of Congress continued to threaten and cajole. Over 20 bills were introduced to suspend the requirements. Frantic over the possible loss of $300 million in day care funds, states warned day care oper- ators within their jurisdiction of an impending crackdown. They responded with calls and letters to Congress. The AFL-CIO and Child Welfare League threatened to sue HEW if the requirements were not enforced. In the South, day care operators did bring suit against HEW to block enforcement of the requirements. Finally on September 26, four days before they were to have taken effect, a federal district court judge issued a temporary injunction against their enforcement pending a hearing October 20. Within HEW strategies for dealing with the enforcement problem abounded. No one within the department seriously considered enforcing the requirements to the extent of closing down day care centers through a wholesale suspen- sion of federal funding. The Social and Rehabilitation Services, the administering agency, proposed an imagina- tive, though probably illegal, extension of Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, the demonstration provision. Under their plan, HEW would "allow the states to experi- ment with alternate requirements" and waive the FIDCR for these "experiments." That these demonstration projects might include over half the federally funded centers throughout the nation apparently presented no difficulty for the agency. The general counsel's office rejected their approach as unworkable and of dubious legality. An alternative, simply ignoring the law, was also rejected.30 The court injunction and the congressional push for suspension allowed HEW to adopt a less radical approach. On October 1, Secretary F. David Matthews sent draft legislation to the House and Senate. The legislation would amend the compliance features of Title XX. In place of total cutoff of funds the secretary would only reduce funding by 3 percent--the penalty for other Title

177 XX violations. No penalty would be imposed if the state were "making a good faith effort to upgrade day care facilities" to accord with the FIDCR. If a center was not in compliance with ~licensure, health, or safety standards," the secretary could suspend all funding. HEW's proposal dealt with the crux of the issue for all concerned: the staffing requirement for children under 6.3 t A good-faith effort or, at worst, a 3 percent penalty would assuage the fears of the states and their day care centers. Congress, however, chose another route. The ways and Means Committee repot ted out H.R. 9803 on September 29. The bill suspended staffing requirements for 6 months. In deference to supporters of the lower ratios it provided that starring ratios muse ~' w' `~ ~- state law and be no higher than those in effect prior to September 15, 1975. Overall the bill's manager, James Corman, justified the suspension as a necessary hiatus to allow congressional review of the requirements. The measure easily passed the House and went into Long's Finance Committee. 3 2 Long had difficulty with the House suspension. Six months, he argued, would not enlighten congressional decision making. Instead, he envisioned using the requirements to encourage operators to hire welfare mothers for their day care centers. Congress would provide additional funds to enable centers to meet staffing ratios and offer tax credits for employing welfare recipients. Long and Mondale introduced a bill containing these provisions and a $500-million authoriza- tion to defray the cost of additional staff. Centers could then meet the requirements without raising fees. Their strategy was simple. Using the threat of FIDCR's immediate enforcement without federal assistance, they hoped to compel members of Congress into passing the aid bill with its welfare provision. Federal funding would assuage the fears of day care operators and states over added costs. The lower child-staff ratios would enlist support from advocates of comprehensive day care. The welfare provisions would attract conservative votes. Finally, anticipating the administration's opposition, they were confident that these combined political forces could ensure presidential acquiescence or, at worst, over- ride his veto. The key was still the impending enforce- ment of the FIDCR. With this strategy, Long, a dogged opponent of strict day care regulation, became an advocate of quick imple- mentation, provided his welfare provisions were adopted.

178 He bottled up the House's 6-month suspension, H.R. 9803, in his committee. Instead he offered a 1-month suspension as an amendment to a pending tariff bill. Such a brief suspension would keep the pressure on Congress and the administration. In the first week of October the Senate passed the amended tariff bill and entered into conference with the House. Still concerned over impending enforce- ment, the House conferees insisted on a lengthier delay. Long compromised on 4 months. The report passed the House by a 383-to-10 vote and the Senate by voice. Since neither Congress nor the administration was prepared to enforce the staffing requirement at this time, Ford signed the suspension pending a more permanent resolution of the problem. The hiatus allowed Long to incorporate into H.R. 9803 his and Mondale's provisions for aid to the states in meeting the requirements and for the employment of welfare mothers in day care. By a 9-to-9 vote the Finance Committee defeated a Republican amendment to delete the staffing requirements entirely. The committee did reduce the aid authorization from $500 million to $250 million based on a new estimate of the states' compliance costs. They waived compliance for centers with fewer than 20 percent of their children receiving federal subsidies. However, the bill also made the employment tax credit refundable to encourage nonprofit centers to hire welfare recipients. This credit, in conjunction with direct federal funding, would have defrayed up to $5,000 of the cost of employing a welfare recipient in a day care center. Finally, implementation of the FIDCR ratios would be delayed until July 1, 1976. Under these provisions the employment-oriented advocates and the comprehensive developmentalists found a common cause in enforcing the FIDCR. Thus did Mondale and Long stand on the same ground. Their bill encountered opposition from both the admini stration and Senate Republicans. The administration had decided that the best solution to the staffing problem was to allow each state to determine its own day care standards. This accorded with its general block grant, defederalization approach. Moreover, it would eliminate the need to augment federal spending to enforce compli- ance. The administration wanted no new federal "workfare" programs through the FIDCR. On the floor the issue became one of federal vs. state regulatory authority. Senate opponents lost successive amendments to delete the staffing requirements, to delay them until completion of -

179 HEW' s appropriateness study, and to allow states to exempt more centers from the requirements. At the end of January 1976 the Senate approved the bill 65 to 24. The confer- ence committee made some minor alterations, but the Senate's provisions effectively remained intact. The final version passed the House 316 to 72 and the Senate 59 to 30-3 3 A piece of legislation stration's position could more antithetical to the admini- not be easily had. HEW summar- ized the objectionable provisions to the President. First, it provided an annualized $250-million increase to Title XX funds. Second, it imposed the FIDCR without the appropriateness study or any other evidence that children needed the services mandated. Third, it earmarked Title XX funds for day care--a violation of the block grant intent of the law. Finally, the welfare hiring incentives disregarded the children's interests by encouraging employment of unqualified care givers. HEW recommended a veto and suggested the administration submit legislation simply to extend the moratorium on FIDCR's enforce- ment. 3 4 OMB concurred for many of the same reasons, but with a significant twist. HEW's central strategy on the FIDCR was to promote a prolonged suspension of the ratios pending the appro- priateness study. In large part the hierarchy of HEW believed this approach to be the only politically viable one in light of Congress's determination to continue federal enforcement of the day care requirements. It was not that HEW opposed the administration's position that requirements were a state responsibility, but that they recognized the political difficulty of effecting that position. OMB, on the other hand, wholeheartedly, even recklessly pursued the state regulatory approach to avoid additional appropriations. Their cudgel in this matter was enforcement of the FIDCR without federal funding to ease compliance. At the very least, OMB believed, the administration could trade suspension for a further weakening of federal controls over Title XX funds. OMB and HEW could agree to veto H.R. 9803 because it would implement the FIDCR, provide compliance funds, and enact a new workfare program. Ford, in fact, vetoed the bill and, in a furious lobbying effort, was sustained in the Senate by three votes. The post-veto situation, however, was ripe for the OMB-HEW disagreement to surface. OMB sought to use the threats of the FIDCR's enforcement as a stick to force congressional acquiescence in loosening the strings attached to Title XX money or,

180 perhaps, the retrocession of regulatory authority over day care to the states. In Congress, Long and Mondale sought to use the promise of increased federal aid as a carrot to marshal! state and congressional support for federal enforcement of the FIDCR. The requirements became hostage in this contest. HEW believed OMB's approach would only push Congress into passing another bill like H.R. 9803 and overriding any subsequent veto. While Congress readied new legislation in spring 1976, the OMB-HEW disagreement festered. In May, Senator Mondale and Senator Robert Packwood, the principal antagonists over H.R. 9803, worked out a compromise on the enforcement of the FIDCR's staff ratios. Enforcement would be suspended until October 1, 1977, when HEW should have completed the appropriateness study. The bill provided $312.5 million over a 15-month period to aid states in complying with the FIDCR's unremitted health and safety requirements. Otherwise the bill mirrored the major features of H.R. 9803. Suspending the staff ratios for 17 months while retaining the additional day care funds, the bill allowed the states and centers to have their carrot while standing more or less still. Although some of those opposing H.R.~9803 had done so to block additional federal spending, the rest had done so to prevent the imposition of federally mandated requirements. In the absence of the FIDCR enforcement provision, the 3-vote margin that had sustained Ford's veto evaporated. Without a genuine threat of veto the administration's stick became a twig.35 At the same time whatever leverage the administration had over the revised bill was dissipating, OMB insisted on using the threat of enforcing the staff ratios to prod Congress into amendments more amenable to its position. HEW, however, could clearly see the fatuity of such tactics. William Morrill, assistant secretary for planning and evaluation, bore the brunt of HEW's negotia- tions with OMB and Congress. In a handwritten memo to Secretary Matthews, Morrill explained that OMB was resisting any prolonged moratorium on the FIDCR. COMB (O'Neill)," he wrote, "took a strong position that we should extend only to July 1, to keep the pressure on the Congress about the Title XX proposals. With great difficulty, we talked them into October 1." Morrill concluded that OMB his unlikely to budge. ~3 6 At OMB' S insistence HEW sent letters to House and Senate Republican leaders opposing the additional Title XX funds as illogical in the face of the staff ratio

181 suspension. The required health and safety changes simply did not cost that much money. The letter also objected to earmarking Title XX grants for day care. Despite these objections the bill passed both houses in June and went to conference. In a final attempt to salvage something from the legislation HEW offered to allow a S200-million increase in Title XX funds every year for 4 years in return for incorporating some of the block grant provi- sions into the bill. Supporters, however, knew when _^~m; =~ t.~= An rv any when it was not. This time they had the votes to override a veto. The conference committee rejected HEW's offer. With a reduction in funding from $312 to $240 million and a waiver of matching requirements for some of the day care money, the revised legislation passed the House 281 to 71 and the Senate 72 to 15. Congress did not enroll the measure until Ford's nomination as the Republican presidential candidate. With Ronald Reagan's right-wing pressure removed, they assumed a veto to be less likely. Their caution, though, was probably unnecessary; the override votes were there. HEW recommended approval. The bill, they observed, suspended staff ratios and was backed by a veto-proof majority. OMB, too, acquiesced in the undeniable proba- bility of a veto override and recommended approval. Both agencies agreed a veto would be highly impolitic in an election year. Only the Council of Economic Advisers suggested Ford disapprove the measure. Apparently Chairman Alan Greenspan either had little cognizance of the situation's political realities or had made other career plans for 1977. The President signed the bill into law on September 7, 1976.3 7 Postponed until October 1977, the FIDCR would become Jimmy Carter's problem. ~V1~+ L V111~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ & - ~ ~ ~ ~ TO THE APPROPRIATENESS STUDY Placing the FIDCR debate subsequent to 1976 in its political and economic context is a useful starting point for analysis. In large part the debate over the FIDCR was a contest among different perceptions of the reality of day care. Data that were statistically indisputable were ambiguous policy-wise, while data that clearly mandated a policy course were disputed. Among the relevant data available in 1976 are the following: one half of women with children under 18 work; 40 percent of

182 women with preschool children work; and over 5 million chidren under 13 (12 percent of the age cohort) spend 30 or more hours per week in the care of someone other than their parents or their teachers. Of these 5.2 million children, 1.3 million are cared for by relatives in the relative's home, 960,000 by relatives in the child's home, 620,000 by nonrelatives in the child's home, 1.2 million by nonrelatives in "family" day care facilities, and a little over 1.1 million in centers including day care centers, nurseries, cooperatives, and Head Start.38 Approximately $10 billion is spent on child care annually. Individual payments account for roughly 60 percent, direct federal payments 18 percent, federal tax credit 8 percent, and state and local payments the remaining 14 percent. The FIDCR applies to 56 percent of direct federal payments, mostly through Title XX's $800-million outlay for child care. If federally funded in-home care and family day care are discounted from the FIDCR's purview, the dollar amounts decline by 40 percent and leave approximately $600 million in center-based care covering fewer than 500,000 children. The FIDCR, then, governs less than 10 percent of the nonparental, out-of-school, full-time child care. Significantly, however, this total constitutes nearly half of all center based day care. Insofar as it might affect state regula- tions, the FIDCR could have an impact on all day care centers.39 Forty-one percent of all centers are proprietary, that is operated for profit; the remainder are nonprofit. Of the approximately 8,100 federal financial participation (FFP) centers, 23 percent are proprietary. Compared to the nonprofit centers, the proprietary centers generally spend fewer dollars per child and have higher child-staff ratios. Among FFP centers, 79 percent of the nonprofit centers meet the FIDCR's staffing requirements, while only 45 percent of the proprietary ones do. Among the non-FFP centers (those not governed by the FIDCR), 38 percent meet the staffing requirements. The upshot is that just under half of all day care centers do not meet the FIDCR's staffing requirements. More important, one quarter of the centers subject to FFP sanctions fail to meet the requirements; whence came the protest over the FIDCR's enforcement .4 0 Day care is a labor-intensive industry: 75 percent of all expenses involve staff salaries and benefits. The National Association for Child Development and Education, the trade association of the proprietary centers, -

183 estimates that lowering child-staff ratios to the FIDCR's level from existing state regulations would double the average staffing cost per child. For the proprietary centers a lower staff ratio would increase costs and compel them either to lower profits, raise fees, or drop children receiving federal subsidies. A boost in fees, insofar as it is not offset by larger state and federal subsidies, would reduce demand for their services, lower center utilization rates, and, ultimately, cut their profits. If subsidies for FFP proprietary centers were -^ "=c" mmmnl ions - to the FIDCR~ fees still increased .~ ~_~ __... might rise. Centers with less than 100 percent of their children receiving federal subsidies would have to conform to the lower staff ratios or drop their subsidized children. Moreover, states might not raise their subsidy share or, worse, they might revise licensing codes to require staff ratios consistent with those of the FIDCR. The latter move was a more disconcerting possibility to non-FFP proprietary centers for it would increase costs without providing any offset through subsidies.4i The staff ratios, however, do not have the same import for nonprofit centers. These centers serve a higher percentage of children completely covered by government funding. Thus, they are much more directly dependent on federal and state subsidies. Since the size of government staff ratios subsidies per child are roughly based on the mandated in the FIDCR, the nonprofit centers generally adjust their staff size to conform with the requirements. Their interest lies in having large staffs, not in maxi- mizing profits. Any increase in the allowable child-to- staff ratios could entail a decrease in government sub- sidies per child and consequently, reduce staff size. Unlike their proprietary cousins, the nonprofit FFP centers generally support low staff ratios. Although the staffing requirements of the FIDCR are very important to both proprietary and nonprofit centers, the reasons for their importance are antithetical.4 2 Among center-based providers, the proprietary centers comprise 20-41 percent of the total market. A multi- million dollar industry, they are expanding rapidly, particularly in the form of chain centers. As in most service industries, wages are low, $6,000 to $7,500 for care givers. Though they point to a "nickel on a dollar" profit, their rate of return on equity ranges between 13 and 20 percent--not quite that of IBM, but not quite that of a saving bond, either. They have a lobby in Washington and stress their "taxpaying not tax consuming" character.

184 The proprietary centers are strongly opposed to any federal enforcement of child-staff ratios lower than current state requirements. Their central argument is that in an age of fiscal austerity, government aid cannot be counted on to pay for "absurd" staff ratios. The continued availability of day care depends on keeping costs down. The employment-oriented advocates, as well as feminist organizations seeking to ease the entry of women into the labor force, join them in this position. On the other side of the staffing issue stand the many nonprofit centers, the comprehensive developmentalist advocates, such as the Child Welfare League and the Children's Defense Fund, and the American Federation of Teachers of the AFL-CIO. For reasons already mentioned, many nonprofit centers prefer lower child-staff ratios. Among the developmentalists, the 1968 FIDCR as amended are an article of faith. The Child Welfare League perceives any attempt to increase staff ratios to be an abrogation of the child's interest. Fiscal austerity and profit-making centers are their betes noires--precursors of "Kentucky Fried Children" and "Wee Willie Warehouses. The American Federation of Teachers has joined the advocates of comprehensive day care and presses for more requirements: stringent licensing requirements as well as low child-staff ratios. Its President Albert Shanker has called for "a system of universal day care [and] early childhood education" under public school sponsor- ship. It is no secret that the American Federation of Teachers has been struggling for several years to find a new market for unemployed teachers to offset declining school enrollments.4 3 On the issue of teacher certification, groups within the pro-1968 FIDCR coalition diverge. The teacher's union argues that the education of preschool children requires professional educators, i.e., their members. Many nonprofit centers with their roots in the community action programs of the 1960s feel threatened by any legally mandated infusion of teachers. Like a feudal baron fearing for his fiefdom if he relied too much on the king's troops to defend his castle, the community- based providers are wary of Shanker's legions protecting their government subsidies and low staff ratios. "Perhaps they were afraid,!' Barry Bruce-Briggs observes, "that they could not stand up to a tough-minded operation like the AFT. . . ."4 4 The defenders of the 1968 FIDCR greet the support of the American Federation of Teachers with one hand extended; the other they keep on their purses.

185 The array of the FIDCR's interest groups is matched in many respects by the differing concerns of agencies within HEW. The Office of Human Development Services (HDS) administers most day care funds within HEW. Within HDS the Administration for Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF) is the primary standard-setting body for children, a legacy from the Children's Bureau. Like its prede- cessor, OCD, ACYF does not administer day care funds other than those for Head Start. Direct administrative responsibility for Title XX belongs to the successor to the Social and Rehabilitation Service within HDS, the Administration for Public Services (APS). The schism between OCD's charge of enforcing the FIDCR and the Social and Rehabilitation Service's charge of funding day care oroarams persists in their descendants, ACYF and APS. ~ _ _ ~ _ _ ~ _ _ _ APS's chief concern is to avoid way care requirements that exact a level of care undesired by the states. The states are their clients and they do not want to impose punitive sanctions on them. ACYF, on the other hand, stands in the tradition of Head Start and the Children's Bureau and its strong concern for the child's development over other considerations. They support rigorous require- ments, effectively enforced. No better example of the different perspectives of these two offices can be found than ACYF's (at that time still OCD) response to an APS prepared "decision memorandum" for the undersecretary. APS had written: "the decision to modify or refine the HEW role as defined by the Title XX FIDCR is a political decision." ACYF replied that "we disagree with the statement. . . . We strongly believe it is a numan value decision. "4 5 These are positions not easily reconciled. Overall, this is the array of actors within and outside HEW in the years after the 1976 suspension of the FIDCR's staffing ratios. In this context HEW began to prepare the congressionally mandated appropriateness report and determine the fate of FIDCR. The preparation commenced in March 1975 with formation of the FIDCR Appropriateness Committee under the assistant secretary for planning and evaluation (ASPE). Chaired by career civil servant William R. Prosser of ASPE, the committee included representatives from HDS, ACYF, and APS. In addition, OCD and APS had commissioned several major studies of day care: three by Abt Associates (the National Day Care Infant Day Care Study, and the Family Day Care rem - = rip ~ i "- .~ t" r.i~n~ ina Studv: and APS'S Study, the Study); the __ ¢~ own effort to assess compliance with the Title XX FIDCR. By far the largest, most expensive, and most significant

186 study was Abt's National Day Care Study. It dealt with the primary issue of center-based, child-staff ratios. At the outset, Prosser's committee faced several problems. Congress had provided little or nothing in the way of direction for the study beyond its basic mandate. The committee members had as yet no hard data from these studies on the effects of day care regulation on children nor did they have any criteria for evaluating appropriate- ness. Merely arriving at a set of such criteria absorbed a year of their time. To aid them in identifying the issues and bringing extant knowledge to bear on the problem the committee commissioned 21 state-of-the-art papers from specialists in different facets of day care. Still, little progress had been made by the time the presidential election and change of administrations threw HEW's hierarchy into flux. Carter chose Joseph A. Califano to be secretary of HEW. Califano chose Peter Schuck as deputy assistant secretary in ASPE and gave him oversight responsibility for the appropriateness report. Over the first year of the new administration an approach to the FIDCR's revisions and appropriateness report was agreed on. In a meeting with Califano the principals (Schtick, Prosser, and other rele- vant staff) briefed him on the report's format and the key issues, such as staff ratios and cost-effectiveness. Califano stressed the need for continued public involve- ment and a published set of regulations by January 1979. Within the executive secretariat of the secretary's staff, there was some sentiment for detailed regulations. Although they were receptive to changes in staff ratios, the executive staff worried about "mere custodial ware- housing of children" and "franchise operations . mak[ing] profits from cheap, low quality centers." Despite the administration's policy opposing complex, lengthy regulations, Califano was prepared to make an exception for the FIDCR. Finally, he instructed Schuck, through ASPE's assistant secretary, Henry Aaron, to keep all options open in the appropriateness report.4 6 HEW contacted the appropriate congressional committees to obtain a postponement of the June 30 deadline for the report and the revisions. Not wanting to reenact the enforcement crisis of 1976, Congress suspended the FIDCR staffing requirement again, continued the basic Title XX provisions, and postponed to April 1978 the submission date for the report. Their only caveat, given informally, was that the various interest groups and advocates be consulted throughout the revision process.4 7 · -

187 To aid in drafting the report, Schuck recruited an advisory panel of specialists in various fields relating to child care. This move raised a larger question con- cerning Califano's overall include-the-public approach to the report and the regulation-writing process. The secretarY's approach can be interpreted as an effort to ~ _ , _ ~ ~ , _ ~ restrain potential critics through their inclusion at various stages in the process. ~ A social scientist or advocate who was asked for advice or commissioned to write a paper might be less inclined to attack the final product. With such a strategy, the product might reflect the adviser's point ot view; oy the same CoKen ~ a ~= of loyalty, participation, or obligation could act to inhibit criticism. An ancillary effect is that criticism made of a draft is often criticism not made of a final document. Merely by acknowledging the early criticism in the final report authors could avoid its repetition. By then, the critic is either frustrated at having had no impact or satisfied at having had the opportunity to voice misgivings. Public involvement may be democratic, but in the case of FIDCR, Califano conceived of it as a good tactic to dissipate future criticisms of the regula- tions. Whatever larger political and economic considera- tions might mold the FIDCR, the advocates would have had their moment of protest. The appropriateness report began with an introductory overview of American day care and the FIDCR. It then discussed the various provisions of the requirements, their costs. and their administration. The report ended with a set of inconclusive findings and innocuous recom- mendations. In February 1978, HEW held three large public conferences on the draft report. Conference participants severely criticized it for its failure to make policy recommendations, to take a stand on significant issues, and to present a clear, accurate exposition of the data. Some of the criticisms were comprehended in the final document, but the report still avoided any clear policy statement. This avoidance was consonant with Califano's wishes. As his staff explained, the criticisms were "probably an inescapable cost to be incurred for the benefit of keeping all major policy choices open to debate in the course of developing the new regulations. "4 Ill feelings toward the appropriateness report were not limited to the child care community. In Congress, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan excoriated HEW Undersecretary Hale Champion for the report's writing style. After reading aloud one particularly obtuse passage, Moynihan

188 bellowed, "What illiteracy. Would you dare consign a child to the care of someone who would write something like this? . . . It is appalling. And you have a man from Brookings [Aaron] who put this out, right? . . . this junk, this disgrace. . . ."4 9 Moynihan's histri- onics notwithstanding, the report was not without its problems. Califano's staff admitted that "given its bulky format, and technical, wordy style the FIDCR report is unlikely to have much immediate impact on its prescribed audience--Congress and congressional staff."50 Audience expectations, too, contributed to the report's reception. The interest groups and advocates anticipated a document that would make definitive policy statements. Califano, however, had decided against this approach; Prosser and his fellow authors were left to face the gales of criticism that ensued. Congress, on the other hand, looked at the report as an instrument for postponing the enforcement of the staff ratios. The report's prepa- ration justified subsequent suspensions. Regardless of intrinsic quality, any report would have encountered harsh criticisms within this political milieu. Many of the criticisms were well founded. Due in part to the political constraints placed on the report writers, their final product had flaws. Its attempt to include all points of view resulted in its having none. Its recommendations expressed the need for the requirements to "reflect current research and expert judgment" on child care, to "clarify roles and responsibilities of providers and state and local administrations," to "educate as well as regulate," to "accommodate the rich diversity in child-care needs and arrangements," and to "include participation of all interested individuals" in writing them. In other words, the report recommended that the revised FIDCR be appropriate to child care in Americas Whether it successfully fulfilled its stated purpose of informing the public debate remains to a great extent in the eye of the beholder. TOWARD THE FINAL REGULATIONS Once ASPE had issued the appropriateness report the task of drafting new regulations on day care fell to the Office of Human Development Services, the administering agency. Califano, however, had misgivings about leaving the FIDCR in the hands of HDS, which was permeated with client interests. The Administration for Public Services

189 was very much attuned to the states' concerns on regula- tions issues. The ACYF was composed of many child advocates opposed to custodial care for children; strict federal regulation was their chief method of ensuring a high quality of care. They were closely aligned with advocacy groups such as the Children's Defense Fund and the Child Welfare League. Regardless of which administra- tive unit had its way on the requirements, the whole decision-making process would be skewed. The secretary did not rely on the senior administrators in HDS to check the predispositions of its constituent units. Neither Assistant Secretary Arabella Martinez nor her deputy, T. M. Jim Parham, were among those Califano entrusted with decision-making authority over these delicate issues. Since Califano felt that HDS could not be trusted with the policy decisions on the FIDCR, he restructured the responsibility for revision writing within HEW. In October 1978 he took overall responsibility from HDS and vested it in the Office of the General Counsel under F. Peter Libassi. Libassi was the point man for HEW's most controversial regulatory decisions and worked closely with Califano and members of the executive secretariat. He brought a broader political perspective to the FIDCR and, more important, he had Califano's confidence.5 2 In the large context the conflict between Califano and HEW's bureaucracy reflected a basic division between career civil servants and political appointees. The career people were, among other things, individuals with many years of government service. In HDS, many senior civil servants were child advocates with established ties to advocacy groups, the states, and congressional com- mittees. Often jealous of their prerogatives, they resented what they perceived as the intervention of outsiders, usually political appointees of brief tenure, in the administration and regulation of their programs. While they might disagree among themselves, they could agree that intervention such as Califano's was unwarranted and insulting. In the midst of the revision process, Abt Associates completed its National Day Care Study. Abt's four-year study involved 1,800 preschool children, 1,100 parents, and 120 classroom groups from 57 day care centers in Atlanta, Detroit, and Seattle. The study dealt with three basic questions: (1) How is a preschool child's development affected by variations in regulatable center characteristics; (2) How is cost per child affected by variations in regulatable center characteristics; and (3) _ _ _ ~ ~

190 How does the cost-effectiveness of center day care change with regulatory variations? In essence they studied the impact of child-staff ratios, group size, and care-giver qualifications on the preschool child and the cost of care. Abt used a combination of test scores and obser- vations to assess the effects of different staff ratios, group sizes, and care giver qualifications on the child. These measurements included reflection/innovation, cooperation, noninvolvement, aimless wandering, and performance on the Preschool Inventory Peabody Vocabulary tests.s 3 The potential relevance of the Abt study to the FIDCR policy debate was as much a matter of coincidence as deliberation. The basic idea of examining these aspects of day care originated in the research and planning unit in OEO years before. When the Nixon administration dismantled OEO, its research staff was dispersed into OCD, ASPE, and elsewhere. One of these people, Allen N. Smith, resurfaced in OCD and in 1974 contracted with a research organization. Ant A~soci~t-~. Lo rent ~ =~' of day care. The study was commissioned prior to the Title XX-FIDCR controversy and the appropriateness report. Its relevance to these matters, however, soon became evident. By 1977, Abt had spent its entire $7-million Sudan an gathering data for the study. They went to their project Director at oCD, Allen Smith, and asked for an additional $1 million to analv~e the data and prepare their report. _ _ _, Having little choice, Smith agreed and began building support within OCD (now ACYF) and HEW for the additional money. There was, of course, opposition within HEW and among the research community to serving Abt so large a share of the funding pie for with an unsatiable appetite. ASPE he found one. what seemed like a study Smith needed allies, and in Prosser and his FIDCR appropriateness committee were still mired in their report when Smith came to him with an offer of help. If Prosser would support the $1-million extension of the Abt study, Smith would share Abt's early findings with him to assist in completing the report. After some hesitation, assuaged by a quick trip to Abt's headquarters in Cambridge, Prosser agreed. With his support Abt received the additional funds. Both sides were pleased. Prosser anticipated decisive help in what was becoming his own Vietnam, and Abt rejoiced in the hope that their study would be completed and sail in the appropriateness report to the sea of policy relevance.

191 Smith was among the first to realize that the appro- priateness report was headed toward serious difficulties. Any strong link between the Abt study and the report meant only problems for his project. Critics at the early stages of reviewing the draft had already begun to con- fuse Abt's study with the report. Wary of Prosser's attempts to infuse portions of Abt's preliminary findings into the text of the report, Smith prevailed on him to publish the findings, delivered as part of the research funding deal, as a separate appendix to the report. All Prosser reaped from his early support of Abt's funding was a further delay in his report's completion and another appendix. Abt's study did survive the appropriateness report, and during 1978 and 1979 Abt publicly disseminated its findings. Group size, Abt concluded in its briefing for HEW, was the "most powerful and pervasive factor related to NDCS [National Day Care Study] measures of quality." Children in groups of 12 with two care givers performed in a consistently superior manner to children in groups of 24 with 4 care givers. More desirable care giver behavior was also "associated with smaller groups." Then Abt turned to the crux of the FIDCR controversy, "For children, staff/child ratio is ambiguously related to child behavior [and] not related to test score gains." Only infants benefited from the low child-staff ratios. In one social scientific stab, Abt had killed the intui- tive, experiential assumption of decades of preschool education. Low child-staff ratios in themselves did not matter for the child's cognitive or social development. Staff ratios, however, were not unimportant. The Abt study concluded that they were "the most important determinant of difference in costs." In cost-benefit terms the ultimate conclusion became obvious. As long as group size was controlled, the center could reduce costs and increase the benefits of care to the child. As Keynes had once told governments, not only should they spend money they did not have, but also by spending it they would receive more; now Abt was telling HEW that not only could it spend less money per child on day care, but also that while spending less the children would benefit more.s4 Their identification of group size as the most signifi- cant factor related to outcome was somewhat surprising. Group size had consistently been included in standards for day care, but in a manner clearly subordinate to

192 staff ratios. Abt's researchers admit it was a "sleeper. Indeed, group size emerged in the wake of the study's early findings that staff ratios had no significant effect on outcome. Within ACYF project director Smith strongly suggested that Abt's results needed to establish more than the insignificance of regulatable center char- acteristics. Subsequent analysis of the data revealed group size as a significant regulatable characteristic; soon it was made a major finding of the study. In their recommendations Abt also suggested that regulators set less stringent staff ratios than the 1968 FIDCR had required. "The staff/child ratio requirement for three, four and five year old children should be no more stringent than 1:7." That ratio was for actual attendance; the enrollment ratio (the one generally used in calculating staff ratios) should be no lower than 8:1. Abt offered three policy options ranging from 8:1 to 10:1 for enrollment, and 7:1 to 9:1 for attendance.55 These policy options traded cost reduction for program quality. The minimum-quality policy promised that all centers would attain current average program quality at a cost savings of 10-12 percent from current average expenditures. The middle policy option offered a 5-10 percent increase in program quality and a 6-8 percent savings from current costs. The high-quality option offered a 10-20 percent improvement in program quality at a 1-2 percent savings from current expenditures. These three options involved enrolled child-staff ratios of 10:1, 9:1, and 8:1, respectively. "All three of the policy options," Abt observed, "have the potential of reducing costs." More important, "none of the three policy options would severely disrupt current subsidized center practices, Policy C [the minimum-quality option] would require the smallest changes."5 6 Politically, Abt's policy recommendations were signifi- cant. In shifting the emphasis to group size, Abt change the de facto compliance of FFP centers. If HEW chose the high-quality option, 72 percent of FFP centers would be in compliance with the recommended staff ratios and 77 percent with the recommended group size. If HEW chose the minimum-quality option (i.e., all centers reaching the average quality of current care) 83 percent would be in compliance with the recommended staff ratios and 89 percent with the recommended group size. The minimum- quality option would increase the number of centers complying with the FIDCR's staff ratios from 60 to 83 percent. Moreover, since 79 percent of the nonprofit ~, . ~ -

193 centers were already in compliance with the current FIDCR, this increase in compliance would be almost entirely among the 5S percent of proprietary centers that were not in compliance.5 7 The study's results offered something for everyone involved in the revision of the FIDCR. It confirmed ACYF's long-standing belief that federal regulation of day care could indeed affect a child's development in measurable ways. It also sat well with APS. Since the study recommended staff ratios higher than those in the 1968 and 1972 requirements, APS's clients--the states and their day care centers--would be relatively unaffected by requirements based on these recommendations. For the cost-benefit people in ASPE the study provided quantita- tive data on which the decisions could be based. Finally, at the secretary's level, the results placed a social scientific seal of approval on a relaxation in staffing requirements. Such approval would buttress Califano against attacks by those advocating either higher or lower staff ratios. The results would depoliticize an essentially political decision. Abt's study pleased most decision makers in HEW, and its impact soon became apparent through the Office of the General Counsel. There were some critics of the study's data gathering and the strength of the evidence supporting its conclu- sions. Nonetheless, Abt's careful presentations and efforts to incorporate the criticisms in their findings or the critics on their consulting staff mitigated much of the outcry that might have otherwise engulfed it. Moreover, Abt's finding of a positive correlation between center characteristics and child performance helped to preclude vehement opposition. Whatever else the study concluded about costs and staff ratios, that one finding pleased actors throughout the child advocacy establish- ment. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this finding, however, was that though the correlations between center characteristics and performance were real and statisti- cally significant, they were weak. Indeed, in assessing the study one social scientist observed that had federal regulation of day care never been attempted and had this study been the sole basis for determining whether or not to regulate, the results would not have justified the costs and the complexities of regulation. In the face of political reality that particular policy recommendation was simply untenable. Abt Associates' official briefing of HEW on their findings came in January 1979. Although their final

194 report was not released until spring, HEW's hierarchy had known of its general results for over a year. In the first public statement on the post-study "present thinking" of HEW, General Counsel Peter Libassi spoke to a group of advocates, center operators, and state and local administrators at a seminar in Washington on March 2, 1979. Although carefully qualifying his pronouncements with "we are leaning," "we are inclined" and "we want to hear from all of you on this issue," Libassi indicated in unambiguous terms that HEW was taking Abt's findings and recommendations very seriously. "The [FIDCR] task force," Libassi began, "leans toward accepting the conclusion that group composition should be used in the new regulations. . . . We believe that group composition strongly affects the benefits which children receive from day care." In the ensuing sentence he recounted Abt's recommended child-staff ratios. Though he made no explicit affirmation of these ratios, he clearly implied in the context of his remarks that these ratios were in the forefront of HEW's policy mind. Indeed, the leitmotif of Libassi's statement was that "sensible requirements are enforceable requirements." It would not be sensible to create a set of requirements beyond the reach of a large number of centers. Sensible, enforceable requirements were those eas~lv Tin hv the centers. Regulation, like law, had to be in large part a recognition of fact--something Libassi understood. Many of the doubts he might have had concerning the Abt ratios were assuaged by the responses of participants. William Pierce of the Child Welfare League rose to condemn HEW's "inclination." Significantly, however, he was alone in this proscription. The local center operators and administrators greeted Libassi's statement with approba- tion. They opposed the Title XX FIDCR and "excessive" regulation of their centers. Besides Pierce, no one assailed the higher child-staff ratios or any further relaxation in the requirements. Indeed, at the conclusion of his appearance a sanguine Libassi noted the absence of any widespread acrimony over the staffing issue. After the conference, the Abt ratios were, if anything, more firmly rooted in the FIDCR's policy soil at HEW. The preliminary publication of the new revised FIDCR took place in June 1979. Generally, the new FIDCR proposed the staff ratios recommended by the Abt study, though a range of options was offered. Neither the states nor the FFP centers desired requirements that might result in punitive sanctions against them. HEW's

195 hierarchy and, presumably, OMB also wanted to avoid raising the costs of child care or penalizing the states' Title XX funds. More than once the states and day care centers had demonstrated their political muscle in inducing congressional suspensions of child-staff ratios that they could not attain. Although the 1976 offer of additional Title XX funds for compliance did dampen state opposition, a fiscally austere Congress was unlikely to sweeten compliance with more money. Since the alternative to funding additional staff was more "sensible" require- ments, most members of Congress were not inclined to oppose HEW's relaxation of staff ratios. Moreover, the Abt study provided all parties interested in less strict child-staff ratios with a scientific justification. After preliminary publication, HEW sponsored a series of meetings across the country on the requirements. Participants generally approved the requirements, though there was some dissent over the exact child-staff ratios. While these meetings progressed, decision makers within HEW were replaced by new people. While Patricia Harris, who replaced Califano, and Jody Bernstein, who replaced Libassi, learned anew about the issues, the FIDCR revision process came virtually to a halt in fall 1979. In the face of this hiatus the advocacy groups split In one came were the proprietary day into three camps. care centers. They believed that the changes in HEW accorded them an excellent opportunity to delay the FIDCR's promulgation and relax the staffing ratios. To this end they distributed anti-FIDCR postcards to parents who used their child care facilities, newspapers, members of Congress, and HEW. The message was simple: the new FIDCR will close the day care centers or raise costs or both and we oppose them. At the other extreme was William Pierce and the Child Welfare League. Pierce refused to accept the staff ratios that the Abt study had recommended. He, too, wanted the new FIDCR blocked and replaced by the 1968 requirements. Pierce, however, was respectfully ignored. Somewhere in the middle was a colon or advocacy groups led by the Children's Defense Fund. They had accepted Abt'S recommendations and strove to have the new FIDCR promulgated with the strictest staff ratios within those recommendations. To this end they organized their own campaign to compel HEW Secretary Harris to promulgate the new FIDCR. In response to this coalition and the personal lobbying effort of the Children's Defense Fund's leader Marion

196 Wright Edelman, Harris agreed to a March 1980 deadline for the new FIDCR. Although the deadline was a small victory for the Children's Defense Fund, the exact staff ratios remained unresolved. Here the proprietary centers made some headway. Joan Bernstein, HEW's general counsel, had a reputation for being somewhat antiregulatory from a previous stint at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Bernstein and her staff produced a memorandum on the new FIDCR for Harris that essentially argued for less stringent staffing ratios. In conjunction with the proprietary centers' campaign, Bernstein's memo began to sway Harris toward less strict requirements--particularly staffing ratios. Bernstein's memo, however, was leaked to the Children' Defense Fund and to their allies within HEW--specifically ACYF. Proponents of the stricter FIDCR realized that only a strong response could salvage their course. In desperation they turned to White House domestic adviser Stuart Eizenstat. Access to Eizenstat depended on the personal relationship of one of the proponents with Eizenstat's wife. They presented their case for the stricter FIDCR to Eizenstat at his home one night and convinced him to send a memo--drafted by the Children's Defense Fund--to Harris expressing strong White House support for the stricter FIDCR. Armed now with White House support, proponents of the stricter FIDCR managed to overcome their opponents' objections based on costs and promote staff ratios as strict as (or stricter than) those recommended in Abt's Policy A option. The final regulations were issued in March 1980. Although the staff ratios for the key preschool age cohort--3-5-year olds--were in the range of Abt's Policy A option, they were still less stringent than those in the other revisions of the FIDCR. The new requirements are ~enforced" because 80 percent of the day care centers are already in compliance with all or most of the new requirements. Moreover, the requirements allow, upon application to HEW, a two-year phase-in period. Thus enforcement means affirmation of continuity in existing conditions, not disruption and proscription. Indeed, one of the general survey findings of the Abt study was that centers, regardless of regulations, tend to gravitate to certain staff and group patterns that quite simply work better than others. In the final analysis, effective regulation may be no more (and no less) than an authorita- tive imprimatur on situations ordered by forces more profound than any policy maker's decision. s

197 NOTES 1 Sara Pope Cooper, A History of the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements" (HEW, 1976); Sheila Rothman, "Other People's Children: The Day Care Experience in America," Public Interest, #30 (Winter 1973), 15-19; and Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Harvard University Press, 1960), passim. 2 Rothman, "Other People's Children," 18-19; Planning Services for Children of Employed Mothers Department of Labor Publication, 1953), 7-11, 14-15. 3 Gilbert Y. Steiner, The Children's Cause (Washington, D.C.: 1976), 16-18; Planning Services, 7-10, 14-15; Rothman, "Other People's Children," 20-21. 4 Planning Services, 10; Bureau of the Budget, Legislative Reference File: G-1-2154.1, [hereafter cited as BOB-LRF:] (1954), Record Group 51, National Archives [hereafter cited as NA]. 5 Standards for the Day Care of Children of Working Mothers (Children's Bureau Publication No. 284, 1942), - passim. 6 Planning Services, passim. 7Child Welfare League, Standards for Day Care Service (New York, 1960), passim. 8BOB:LRF:R1-4/67.4 (1967), KG 51, NA; Congressional Quarterly Almanac: 1967 (Washington, D.C.: 1968), 1058-1086 [cited henceforth as CQA:]. 9 Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (HEW Publication #(OHDS)78-31081, 1978 [1968]), passim. Scooper, "History of FIDCR," 19. Gwen Morgan, "Legal Aspects of Federal Day Care Standards" (HEW, 1976), 39. \2 Rothman, "Other People's Children," 22. ~3 Edward Zigler and David Cohen, "Federal Day Care Standards: Rationale and Recommendations" (HEW, 1976), 6-8. id Zigler to R. P. Nathan, April 18, 1972, File CY-1-3, HEW: Office of the Secretary [cited henceforth as OS]. ~5OMB:LRF R1-4/71.2 (1971), RG 51, Federal Records Center [cited hereafter as FRC]. In The Children's Cause Steiner apparently overstates the conservative appeasement motivation for the veto. ~ 6 Richardson to Quie, August 31, 1972, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. i70MB:LRF R1-4/7112 (1971), RG 51, FRC.

198 t8 Note for Mr. O'Neill, June 21, 1972, OMB File A7, RG 51. New Executive Office Building [cited hereafter as NEOB]. 19Ibid. 2 °Veneman to Richardson, July 10, 1972, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 2\ Zigler, "Federal Day Care Standards," 8-11; Morgan, "Legal Aspects," 39. 220MB:LRF R1-4/74.6 (1974), RG 51, FRC. 2 3 Ibid. 24 House Report 93-1490. 2 5 Senate Report 93-1356; House Report 93-1543; CQA: 1974, 505-508. 260MB:LRF R1-4/74.6 (1974), RG 51, FRC. 2 7Memorandum to the Secretary, September 16, 1975, File FIDCR-Title XX,~HEW:ACYF. 2 ~ Memoranda to the Secretary, August 27 and September 16, 1975, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS; Weinberger to Mondale, June 12, 1975, CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 29 See the letters in File CY-1-3 (1975), HEW:OS. 3 ° These responses are attached to the Social and Rehabilitation Service's draft memorandum, September, 1975, ibid. 3 Matthews to Carl Albert, October 1, 1975, ibid. 3 2 See CQA: 1975, 691-692, and CQA: 1976, 620-625, for the details of these legislative actions. 3 3 CQA: 1976, 621-625. 34Matthews to Lynn, October 16, 1975, OMB:LRF 73-1(G)/75.2 (1976), RG 51, NEOB. 3sCQA, 1976, 625-628. 36Morrill to Secretary, May 6, 1976, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 370MB:LRF R3-1/76.4 (1976), RG 51, NEOB. 38 These statistics are drawn from UNCO's, National Child Care Consumer Study: 1975 (HE W-OCD, 1975) and ASPE documents. 39Abt Associates, Inc., National Day Care Study: Preliminary Findings. . . (MEW: OCDS, 1978), passim. 4 °Ibid., 23-25; Abt Associates, Inc., Day Care Centers in the U.S.: A National Profile, 1976-1977 (Cambridge, 1978), 63; Abt Associates, Inc., Children at the Center: Summary Findings and Their Implications (Cambridge, Mass.: 1979), 194-195. 4~This information is derived from statements and handouts by participants in the Day Care and Child Development Reports' Conference, Washington, D.C., March 2, 1979.

199 42 Ibid. 4 3 Quoted in Barry Bruce-Briggs, Child Care: The Fiscal Time Bomb," Public Interest (Fall 1977), 100. 44 Ibid. 4 SS. R. Rosoff, OCD, to Margaret Watson, HDS, March 22, 1977, File FIDCR, HEW: ACYF. 4 6 Aaron Memorandum on his meeting with Califano, April 13, 1977, File FIDCR, HEW: ACYF; CQA: 95-59 and P.L. 95-171. 47 Memorandum for the Record, September 28, 1977, File FIDCR, HEW: ACYF; Cotton to the Secretary, September 15, 1977, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 48 Note for the Secretary (Bohen), June 21, 1978, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS; Note to the Secretary (Schtick), March 13, 1978, ibid. The latter note contains handwritten comments on the report and ASPE by a staff member of the executive secretariat. 49 From an unedited transcript of Moynihan's comment before the Senate Subcommittee on Welfare Reform in July, 1978. 50Note for the Secretary (Bohen), June 21, 1978, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. Tithe Appropriateness of The Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR): Report of Findings and . Recommendations (HEW:ASPE, 1978), XXXV. 5 2 Califano to Libassi, October 2, 1978, File CY-1-3, HEW:OS. 5 3 Abt Associates, Inc., National Day Care Study: HEW Briefing (Cambridge, Mass.: January 19, 1979), 1-4. 5 4 Ibid., 4-15, 21. 5sIbid., 22-25. 5 6 Ibid-, 25-30. 57Abt Associates, Inc., Final Report of the National Day Care Study: Children at the Center (5 vole., Cambridge, Mass.: 1979), I, 159. restatement by F. Peter Libassi, General Counsel, HEW (March 2, 1979).

Appendix A Proposed Child-Staff Ratios, 1942-1978 Source Year 0-6 Weeks 7 weeks- 19 mot 25 mot 3 yr. 18 mot 24 mot 36 mot old 4 5 Children's Bureau 1942 NR NR 10 10 10 10 Child Welfare League 1960 NR NR NR 6-7 .5 7. 5-10 7. 5-10 10-12 .5 Head Start 1965 -- -- ~~ 4 5 5 ~~ FIDCR 1968 NR NR NR NR 5 7 7 Child Welfare League 1969 NR NR NR NR 6 - 7 .5 7. 5 - 10 7. 5-10 Amer ican Academy of Pediatrics 1971 4 4 4 4 -- -- - FI DCR ( Zigler 's Revision) 1972 3 3 4 4 4 10* 10 HEW guides f or s tate 1 icenses 1973 4 4 4 5 10 10 12 Title XX legislation 1975 X x X X 5 7 7 Title XX FIDCR 1975 1 4 4 4 5 7 7 State licens ing average 1977 -- 6 8 10* 11.4 13.7 16.5 Abt study r ecommenda t ions 1978 1 5 5 5 8-10 8-10 8-10 NOTE: Figures given in table are numbers of children per staff member. NR: Center-based care not recommended for this age group. (-): No ratios specified/not applicable X-: To be set by the Secretary of HEW. S.: ~ standards G: "goals. R: Requirements n *over 54 months **over 30 months 200

6 7-8 9 10 11 12 13-14 Objective 10-12.15 10-12 .5 10-12 .5 10-12.5 10-12 .5 10-12 .5 10 10 10 10 10-12.15 10-12.5 10-12.5 10-12.5 10-12.5 10-12.5 __ __ __ 12 13 __ G __ R 10 10 R __ G S 13 16 16 20 20 R 12 16 16 16 16 20 20 S 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 R 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 R 18.8 18.8 18. 8 18.8 19.6 19.6 8-10 17 17 17 23 23 23 R 201

A o Ail Ail - r~ al m c' X ,1 s ~C) P4 o U] a) x ~5 a) ~ ma a, O Cal to ~ .Q ~ 0 of ~ ~ ao up 0 a, lo ~rem ao ~ ~ u, a: o A, Cal s a, :r: o U) - ~5 en a) CR a) ca  .,, Q. Y4 c o C,) - . 1 ~ 1 C) In ~ ~ a) Cal - - ,, ~ a, X In U) .,, .,1 0 8 ~ ~ U] 1 c, X ~ ~ ~ X H H JO U] I ~ ~ Z ~ .,' ~ ~ a, ~3, 4., ma A' A ~ - - ~: u ' ~ ~o l ~ 1 0 4 m ~ 1 JJ a H O _ 5E ~ U] E~ ~ U) :e 202 o o ~C~ ~ E E O JJ ,,, cn a) ~a a' p3 eq :: S ~n o :~: c7 C~ o  m IJ a, Q. o a a es ~C y, 0 ~, 8 ~ c-) v .,' s~ o c Q U] C~ ,' ~ O U] C~ Q C} ~ ~ a a c-) .,' s c-) 8 ~ r~ U~ tD ~ CD U' W U] C~ m~ E~ E~ ~ H Z 1 U) E~ H z X E~

u] ~5 u] o - ~4 a) Q4 ~o z x ~: ~l ·,1 c) o ~: o .-l :s Q ·_t S~ U) .,' X  E~ C) .,. s s O · - 54 s n, oP C) ~ X U) a~ Q~ ~ e-- ~ ~ E~ E~ s: ~ a' :~ ~ ~ ._, E~ 1 p. C  0 s ~ ~ 3 - y a' 3 ~n 3: O ,, O dP £ ~ o U. ~ ~ a, O ~ a, I c: O :D d~ ~ ~ o ~ U] Y s ~ ~ E~ ~ a, o 3 a~ =: o o £ ~ P4 ~r r~ ~D ~O O o ~D ~O ~r ~oP opoo U ~o~ · · ·· dP o ~o o C ~o 0 ~ a ~kD oo ·. · . · .· . a) ( ~ ~0 0 0 0 C ~O ~D ~er ~,- U~ ~U~  o | ~4 O CO ~(D ~ a, ~a a~ tD Q 4 o a, s C) C ~ 4 ~ 4,, 0, ~ 4 Q, V _1 0 ~ =-t ~ P4-V 4 ~ : ~> ~ /t' 4 4 >' ~ V 05 t ~.,~ _~ ~ ~G~ ~ 4 U) 4J ~ a' 0 ~ a, O c) c' a' ~ 0 1t 4 ~10 4 ~U) 04 ~ 4J -l c n 4 ~ 4 0 · (U 0 ~-I 0) 0 ~ 0' ~ ~ 0 aJ ~4 o: Z u' .^ ~r: z co ~a z ~ 3: v, s ° ~C) O E~ 203 s c o .,, IJ z s E" U] n E~ U? m U~ JJ U]  4 4 · ·~4 ~S 4 U ~O , ~·_ ~Z S ~ ~ E~ o _ 4 -~ C ~- U] a,, · ~q C) ~ C o U) a, ~: U' q~ O ~ U) ' 4 U] >~·~ 4 U' 4 C ·^ o C U) ~q~ 4 ' O · - S 4 . ua a, ~ ~ · - C ~-^ O ~n ~^ O - S a) U) U, O ~ S C a' O S C Q. ~ /~ 4 _1 4 aJ ~ 4 O C~ s- - ~ s  cq ~ ~n Q, . - 4 ·,4 o ~n X 4 ·,' a) S 4~ ~ C C ._. ·~ ~ C ._. 4 ~ a, nO o 4 0 a, C ~ -0 ,[' JJ C O C C, (U 4 · - w 3 ._' U) 41 3 4 0) .,' ~n ~ 4 a, V C C O ·- U) ~a o U~ S o W4 4 JJ ~0 a' w O O tO tD ' n ~ c o .~. U) W .~t 0 - -- ~ 0 0 U) 4~ t)

Append ix D Care Modes: A Consumer Survey Age and Numbers of Children _ 0-2 3-6 Care 10-29 Hours 30+ Hours 10-29 Hours 30+ Hours Mode per Week per Week per Week per Week Center (group) No. 106,000 180,000 494,000 708,000 Care % 8 15 26 40 Family Day Care No. 402,500 287,300 471,300 346,700 (Relative) % 32 24 25 20 Family Day Care No. 286,000 364,600 302,800 394,100 (Nonrelative) % 22 30 15 22 In-Home Care (Relative and No. 485,000 371,000 642,000 328,000 Nonrelative) % 38 31 34 18 TOTAL No. 1,279,500 1,202,900 1,910,100 1,776,800 IN CARE % 100 100 100 100 Number and Percentages of Children in Care Typo of Care 0-2 3-6 % No. % No. In Own Home by Relative 10-29 hours per week3 245,900 30+ hours per week3 239,900 In Own Home by Nonrelative 20-29 hours per week3 30+ hours per week Relative's Home 10-29 hours per week4 30+ hours per week3 Nonrelative's Home (Family Day Care) 10-29 hours per week3 30+ hours per week4 Nursery and Day Care Center 10-29 hours per week<2 106,300 30+ hours per week2 179,700 2 204 3 2 238,500 1 130,500 402,500 287,300 13  34 286,000 3 364,600 302,100 178,200 340,400 138,600 471,300 346,700 302,800 4 394,100 5 493,800 6 708,700

Appendix E Households Using Various Types of Care, Classified by Youngest Child's Age Main Method Over 30 Hours Youngest Youngest Youngest Youngest Service Child Child Child Child Used 0-2 3-5 0-2 3-5 - Relat ive (In Child's Own Home) 20.3 11.1 5.0 2.7 Nonr e let ive (In Child's Own Home) 16.8 17.0 3.1 3.2 In Relative' s Home 22.1 17.0 5.3 6.5 Nonrelat ive Home (Family Day Care) 10.7 10.8 6.2 5.6 Nursery School 4.4 8.2 2.1 4 .3 Day Care Center 1. 5 5.0 1.2 4 .2 Cooperative Center 1. 2 0.7 0.3 0.2 Before and After School Program 0.4 0.6 -- 0.3 Head Start 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.4 No Extramural Care 22.4 28.7 22 .4 28.7 Source: Sheila B. Kamerman and Alf red J. Kahn, Child Care, Family Benef its and Working Parents (1980). l 205