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Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes (1988)

Chapter: Culture and Group Cohesion

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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Suggested Citation:"Culture and Group Cohesion." National Research Council. 1988. Enhancing Human Performance: Background Papers, Social Processes. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/786.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Culture and Group Cohesion Boaz Tamir and Gideon Runda Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Introduction What makes men risk their lives under fire? This is a question that has occupied many scholars over the years. Military life offers perhaps the most extreme manifestation of the dilemma that lies at the heart of manes social existence: the degree of willingness of - individuals to make personal sacrifices for perceived group interests. What made men "go over the top" at the Somme, stand under fire in "squarest at Waterloo, cross the Suez canal in the 1973 Middle East War, and live underground for years in The San? Why do some military units break while others hold their ground? Answers have varied from Freud~s (1936) suggestion that men are driven to war by an unconscious "death instinct," to Reegan~s (1975) speculation that it is the consequence of various combinations of rum (or other intoxicating agents), jingoism, and an untried, youthful machismo. While no conclusive answers have been given, the fact remains that military organizations vary quite dramatically, and apparently systematically, with regard to the group performance. For the military command, the same question assumes practical dimensions. To the extent that military decision-makers have degrees of freedom to influence a.,= ~~.'-,~.,-~ __ ~_.. _..__ (itself an open question), how to most effectively do so becomes a question of considerable significance for the outcome of military engagements. Whether articulated or not, this question has been addressed by military organizations in a variety of ways. Henderson (1983), for example, illustrates the very different practical theories of motivation that have guided military organization in countries as the performance of men under fire 1

diverse as the USSR, North Vietnam, Israel, and the United States. Perhaps the most common variable used to explain performance, with appeal to both students and practitioners of military organization, is "cohesion." Grounded in the literature on small- group behavior, cohesion refers to the quality of the relationships between members of the small group. Henderson (1983), for example, defines cohesion as: The bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, their mission....cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldier, of the small group with which he identifies, and of the unit leaders are congruent...with all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective. ~ However, to explain performance with "cohesion" thus defined, is to engage in tautology. Consequently, efforts to explain the existence of cohesion have been extensive, both in military and non-military contexts. Structural variables have been primarily used to explain cohesion. A sizeable literature on the structural underpinnings of small-group cohesion has emerged. Numerous studies have attempted to relate cohesion to group size, span of control, leadership style, length of tenure, recruitment and promotional practices, benefits packages, the nature of the task, the available technology, and so forth. While such structural and task variables no doubt have a significant impact on performance they are clearly insufficient, having long frustrated decision-makers eager to influence the nature of "cohesion." Since the unexplained variance remains considerable, more comprehensive explanatory variables are needed both for theoretical and practical

purposes. The cultural context of military performance has been offered as an important explanatory factor. Henderson, for example, suggests that the nature of beliefs and values held by soldiers, as well as the external ideologies contained in their social, ethnic, and national groups of origin, mediate the connection between military structure and cohesion. Cultural variables, however, remain vaguely defined, and are often offered as an afterthought or a commonsensical and often tautological retrospective explanation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of cultural variables in explaining cohesion more systematically, by applying Schein~s (1985) model of organizational culture to the question of cohesion. In the first section, Schein's model will be outlined. Following that, the use of the model will be illustrated at the societal, organizational, and group levels of analysis, using examples mainly from Israeli military history. The main thesis is that cultural variables have an independent role in mediating the relationship between structural variables and cohesion. Finally, specific hypotheses will be outlined with regard to experimental project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, Training) manning system.1 Appendix tA) briefly outline major methods for further exploration . i. The goal of the new personnel system is to keep the soldiers and their commanders together for a long period of time. Personnel, within this system, will be stabilized in their units for definitive time period. Movement in or out of units between those assignments periods will be constrained. The goal is to stabilize first term soldiers in their unit for their initial term of enlistment.

ORGANT ZAT I ONAL CULTURE ~ N THE MI L ~ TAR Y CONTEXT . According to Schein (1985), culture refers to a shared world-view developed by members of a social group. He suggests that: ...culture should be viewed as a property of an independently defined stable social unit. That is, if one can demonstrate that a given set of people have shared a significant number of important experiences in the process of solving external and internal problems, one can assume that such common experiences have led them, over time, to a shared view of the world around them and their place in it. Culture, in this sense, is a learned product of group experience and is, therefore, to be found only where there is a definable group with a significant history.2 This shared world-view is presumed to influence and constrain how members perceive, understand, and take action in the world. As a concept, it is applicable to different types of social groupings, including civilizations, national entities, ethnic groups, occupations, organizations, and small groups. To the extent that members share certain views of the world they live in, they may be said to have a culture. - A groups culture is manifested at three distinct levels (see Table 1: Levels of culture and their interactions): Artifacts, Values, and Basic Assumptions. Artifacts -- the constructed physical and social environment -- are . the most visible level of a culture. These include all external manifestations of it: language/ clothing' art r technology, 2. Edgar H. Schein Organizational Culture and Leadershio, Jossey-Bass Publication, 1945, p. 7 4

arrangement of physical space, and so forth. Taken together, artifacts are an expression of a shared world-view held by members of a group or an organization. However, as guides to a group's culture, artifacts require careful and knowledgeable interpretation. For example, in the Israeli army, the dress code of the elite paratrooper unit is very different from that of the tank corps. Members of the paratrooper unit wear loose, often intentionally shabby and informal clothing. They typically wear a variety of civilian caps and ignore military insignia, including formal signs of rank and status. In the tank corps, in contrast, the dress code reflects the "spit and polish" image of the British army (where its founders received their training): there is careful and detailed attention to formal appearance and status differences. The dress code is just one artifactual element out of many in the Israeli army, yet it immediately invites interpretation: Do members of these two groups perform differently during peacetime? In combat? Do they have different attitudes about the use of military technology? Will these units react in different ways to the loss of a commander in combat, or to the necessity of an individual to endanger himself to help an injured peer? And areithese artifacts consistent with others? To answer such questions we must examine a deeper, more systematic aspect of culture: its values. Schein suggests that artifacts reflect shared underlying values for the group members. They serve the normative and moral function of guiding group members in how to deal with key situations. Group members are often conscious of the values they claim to share and 5

adhere to, and they can usually articulate them. For example, a number of key values in Israeli combat units guide behavior. "Never leave a comrade behind" is an organizationally supported and widely shared value that has guided behavior under fire. This value is associated most closely with elite infantry units. "Report the truths is a value that is expected to guide officer behavior: Never offer misleading or distorted information, even if the truth is personally damaging. "Follow me" (the leader is first into combat) is a battlefield value which suggests that commanders always lead their troops into battle, are always at the front line, and often take great personal (even unnecessary) risks. Each of the above is a widely known, frequently articulated, shared value in the Israeli army that either guides behavior in combat in ways that might contradict concern for personal safety and advantage, or serves as a shared standard for evaluating behavior. As we will demonstrate there are myths, explanations, stories, and behaviors that illustrate these values; and despite the many documented examples of incongruent behavior (and even alternative values), they have a demonstrated effect -- at least in the authors' experience -- on combat performance and behavior. However, lists of values do not give the entire picture. In many cases such lists are not patterned, sometimes they are mutually contradictory, and sometimes they are incongruent with observed behavior or leave large areas of behavior unexplained. For example, the values of "personal example" and Volunteering" in the culture of the Israeli cohort units, that suggest the importance of individual responsibility to the collective or to his related group, have in the 6

past been a source of high status and a guide to the behavior of many conscripts. However, since the 1982 war in Lebanon, in many combat units the value of "own a little head", seems to have gained impetus. Similar to the Scottish "never volunteer and never refuse," the owner of the Little head" will do his duty and not Openly challenge the importance of the collective task, but will not assume any further responsibilities. In general, this attitude represents a newly introduced element of passive self-preservation that challenges the old values. Thus, the examination of values is often inconclusive. This is in part to the "ideal" nature of values, i.e., if values express- "espoused theories," then we must determine the variables of "theory in action."3 In addition, contrasting values often exist within a single group: Do they represent potential alternatives held in the collective mind of the group? Do they serve to differentiate sub- cultures within a single group? Or do they represent a weakness, strength, or some dynamic not strictly related to effectiveness of the group? To get at a deeper and more systematic level that would allow us to decipher behavioral patterns) and predict future behavior, a third level of group performance must be understood -- that which is guided by "basic assumptions." 3. In their analysis of theories of practice, Argyris and Schon suggest two kinds of theories: "espoused theories" are those that actors claim guide their actions, "theories in use" are those that are revealed in practice. There is often a gap between the two. Argyr~s C. and Schon Donald, Organizational Learning, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978. 7

Basic assumptions comprise the underlying, taken-for-granted understanding of the nature of the world that is shared by group members, often at an unconscious level. Since they are taken for granted and unarticulated, basic assumptions are often unconfrontable and therefore difficult to change. In stable cultures, these basic assumptions underlie the patterns of values and artifacts which are more easily observed. A culture often coma-ins inner contradictions at the basic assumption level, and contradictions often exist among its three levels of artifacts, values, and basic assumptions. For example, a shared basic assumption that characterizes the Israeli military combat unites t end Israeli society in general) is that there is an enemy with evil intent out to destroy the collective. Self preservation requires suspicion, vigilance and eternal conflict. "They [the enemies] don't understand any other language" is a frequently heard characterization of the enemy. The role of the individual in this struggle requires self-sacrifice and risk-taking that express a debt to the collective. This not only to his peers, but also to the overall society. This rhetoric of individual commitment to his peers also differentiates the Israeli from the presumed passivity attributed to Diaspora Jews. This basic assumption is expressed in the oft- repeated and now cliched words of a national poet [Alterman], who sees the "fallen" as the "silver platter that brought forth the state." These basic assumptions, perhaps less widely shared in Israel today, nevertheless serve as a basis for interpreting historical events, and explaining diverse aspects of Israeli political and military life. 8

of culture. Basic assumptions comprise the most crucial aspect of culture, the underlying paradigm governing a cultures more superficial manifestations. As Schein suggests, it is the nature of basic assumptions that distinguishes the concept of culture from its other variables. Unless we have searched for the pattern among the different underlying assumptions of a group and have attempted to identify the paradigm by which the members of a group perceive, think about, feel about, and judge situations and relationships, we cannot claim that we have described or understand the group's culture. At the minimum we should take each of the assumption areas [for a summery see Table 11... and attempt to answer systematically whether or not real consensus exists among group members in the area. We can then decide that there is no - culture or a weak culture or culture conflict be tween seve rat groups. But unless we push to this level of analysis, we should not make any statement about culture at all. Superficial statements run the risk of losing the very meaning of the concept of culture or trivializing it to the point where the concept becomes no more valuable than the concept of values or norms.5 Schein suggests a number of dimensions along which basic assumptions can be categorized. These are reproduced in Table i ~ Insert table 3 (Schein 1986, p. 86) here. ~ 5. Edgar H. Schein Organizational Culture and Leadership, Jossey-Bass Publishers, IBM, p. ~ 11. 10

In this paper we will illustrate the importance of introducing the concept of basic assumptions to the analysis of military organization. For this purpose, we will focus on the basic assumptions that address the question of man's social nature and the nature of human relationships, and the group's relationship to the environment. Assumptions about human relationships, asserts Schein, are the foundation of culture, and they "...directly reflect or are coordinated with assumptions about human nature, the nature of the external environment, and the nature of truth and reality." They may be seen as focusing on two dimensions: horizontal --peer relationship- - and vertical --authority relations. In the former, we can identify differences in assumptions concerning the way in which people relate to each other. Some cultures are "individual-competitive" and place more importance on the individual than the collective. Other cultures are "collaterals or regroup cooperatively and emphasize group cohesion; individual needs are secondary to the group and are identified with common interests. The vertical dimension of authority relationships reveals the way in which organizations, and specifically military units, perceive the uses of power and power differences between the ranks. The differences between the Cohesive Army" and the Noncohesive Army" that Darryl Henderson (1985) describes is a good example of this concept: The members of the Noncohesive Army perceive more inequality between superiors and subordinates than those in the Cohesive Army. The Noncohesive Army leader will believe that the only way to run an organization is to assign individual tasks, hold individuals 11

accountable for their performance, and minimize group cooperative work because military operations could not, and should not, be democratized. The nature of combat decisions, under the Noncohesive Army assumption, must be fast and accurate and could not tolerate the slow democratic process or the compromise of the "lowest common denominator" that so often marks group solutions. In contrast, the Cohesive Army unit leader might emphasize cooperation and communication among soldiers as the best means of solving problems and implementing solutions. In this case the leader's rationale is that time invested on decision-making process before action is time saved during implementation. In sum, analysis of the levels of culture allow us both to capture the richness of the external manifestations of culture as well as the organizing themes and patterns that underlie and explain it. This allows us to understand both its uniqueness as well as its universal features. So far, however, the analysis is static, based on a cross sectional view of a culture at a particular point in time. Cultures, however are constantly evolving and changing. In the following section we will briefly outline Schein~s view of the dynamics of cultural change. I Culture as a Dynamic Concept Culture, in Schein~s view, is a dynamic process. It evolves out of a complex social learning process, as the group struggles with questions of external adaptability and internal integration. Successful solutions to problems posed by the environment and internal group 12

dynamics, once implemented, become institutionalized, their rationale often drops out of the awareness of the group's members, and they become the basis for shared basic assumptions. The dynamics of cultural change are not well understood. Even less clear are the ways in which cultural change can be explicitly managed (if at all). Nevertheless, Schein suggests a number of mechanisms of social learning that underlie the dynamics of cultural evolution and change. Of primary importance is leadership --the impact of individuals in positions of formal authority (and occasionally of informal authority) on the nature of the culture.6 v. reran IS socialization --the process whereby new members are introduced to the culture. According to Van Maanen and Schein, socialization is not simply a deterministic factor rooted in the individual's childhood, but a dynamic process that is developed along an individual career. They define organizational socialization as: ...the process by which an individual acquires the social knowledge and skill necessary to assume an organizational role. Across the roles, the process may appear in many forms, ranging from a relatively quick, self-guided, trial-and-error process to a far more elaborate one requiring a lengthy preparation period of education and training, followed by an equally drawn-out period of official apprenticeship. In fact, if one takes seriously the notion that learning itself is a continuous and lifelong process, the entire organizational career of an individual can be characterized as a socialization process. The relationship-of-socialization processes to cultural evolution remains at a hypothetical stage. For example, in comparing-between MBA students at Harvard and MIT-Sloan, Van Maanen (1983) proposed a number of dimensions of socialization processes and offered hypotheses concerning their impact on role performance and on some of the underlying beliefs concerning the relationship of individuals to their tasks, to each other, and to their institute In the realm of military we can expect that a unit that is socialized within the system of individual replacement (which characterizes most of the Americans army's units) will be more conformist to the channels of command. This character could be 13

LEADERSHIP according to Schein, is probably the most essential variable in developing a culture. Since social learning is fundamentally an anxiety-reduction process, and military units, particularly in combat, are characterized by high levels of anxiety, the role of leadership in the military becomes all the more important. The leader's prescriptions for how to adapt to environmental stimuli help establish the basis for further reactions and thus he helps structure initially unstructured intragroup relationships. If the response works, it will be doubly reinforced in that it will both reduce anxiety and accomplish goals. Thus, actions that solve a group's problems repeatedly, and that reduce individual and collective anxiety, will survive and become a part of the culture. The success or failure of the leader in shaping group culture is determined by his demonstrated ability to respond to external environmental conditions. However, if the leader is surrounded by strong members who are not willing to accept his initial assumptions, the process of forging initial responses will involve conflict, negotiation, compromise, or in some cases, a fractionization of the group. The way in which the leader is accepted by the group and how he transmits his own assumptions is mutually dependent on the previous culture and world- view that members of the group bring from their collective or individual experience. changed after pursuing the COHORT MANNING system that emphasis a collective unit socialization. 14

The military gives its leaders an important starting point in their struggle against other strong members of the unit: their formal rank, and the legitimization of their orders. Furthermore, because of the nature of the army, subordinates expect their leaders to be more experienced and skilled in solving problems under extreme conditions. readers who can skillfully shape and articulate a vision for their group, and can enforce the military's hierarchical boundaries, have an important initial advantage in determining the group's responses. But this edge cannot last long. A "neurotic" leader, whose position is established solely on hierarchical boundaries, would probably increase group anxiety t reducing its capacity to operate under regular conditions, and preventing it from solving problems under the extreme circumstance of combat (Kets de Vries, and Miller 1984~. Thus, leadership interacts with other variables as well as with environmental contingencies. All this makes an analysis of the dynamic aspects of culture a complex task with results that are difficult to predict. In sum, culture should be seen as a dimension that is characterized by social continuity. But at different levels culture is changeable: while its artifacts and values are much easier to identify and are more malleable, its basic assumptions are much more difficult to change. It is more likely that the artifacts and values are shaped by its basic assumptions. Nevertheless, dramatic individual and social-historical experiences can change basic assumptions. For example, the contemporary American trauma of the 15

Vietnam war, or Israel's reaction to Egyptian President Sedates visit for peace, illustrate the way historical events have had a substantial impact on individual and societal basic assumptions toward war, peace, and a country's enemies. * * * Schein's model is applicable at all levels of analysis. Whatever the social grouping, the degree to which it is characterized by shared basic assumptions, i.e., the degree to which it might be said to have a culture --is an empirical question. In a complex society, members typically have multiple affiliations, and cultures may be seen as either nested within each other, or as intersecting. Thus a military field commander might be seen as a member of a national, ethnic, and class culture, as well as an occupational and organizational one. Consequently, the levels of analysis are not only methodological conveniences, but are conceptually and analytically linked. The culture of a small group is determined not only by small-group dynamics, but by the cultural dynamics of its social environment. In the following section, we will apply Schein's model to three levels of analysis: the army in a societal context, the regimental unit, and the small combat group. In each case we will offer comparative examples of basic assumptions characteristic of the group that influence cohesion under apparently similar structural conditions. Then, we will explore the case of project COHORT MANNING, and suggest some thoughts concerning the impact of culture at different levels of analysis, and how these hypothesis might be related. 16

CULTURE AT THE SOC I ETAL LEVEL: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL MILITARY FORCES The structure-functionalist theoretical framework (Parsons 1949, Merton 1949), suggests that there is a direct connection between structure and function: For each social function there is one appropriate structure, one best or "classic structure." This classic structure become one element among others in an overall social system that basically consists of political and economic realms, and a major "system-value" to which Parsons attributed the function of integrating all elements into the societal system (yet never fully elaborated). In this way every social institution is both an element [structure] carrying a defined role within its external societal environment, and also an environment to its internal sub- institutions. This analytical framework defines an organizational system in terms of its orientation to goals and assumes a consensus where members share the institutional goals (or overall social functions) defined by top administrators. This claim, however, can lead a student of military cohesion to partial, even false conclusions. For example, Gabriel and Savage, in Crisis in Command (1978), attribute the US military defeat in Vietnam to "forces internal to the military structure....n7 They insist that The strength or weakness of a 7. -It is beyond the extent of this paper to explain the US military's disintegration and its performance in Vietnam, or the historical influence of the civil opposition to the war and its results . However , since we assume that the new COHORT plan to reconstruct the US army is an implementation of a structural- functionalist theory, we believe that the emphasis on structure 17

3 military structure is, by and large, a function of conditions generated within the military, structure itself.n8 In Gabriel and Savage's perspective, the structural-functionalist view is sufficient for the understanding of military performance. Thus, the definition of the military function in its society dictate the most adequate structure. Gabriel and Savage reject, however, the cultural view, or in their words the "popular notion, n that associates the army with its external societal culture. They dismiss the view that was first introduced by Alexis de Tocquevile in the nineteenth century. As de Tocqueville put it: "The remedy of the vices of the army is not to be found in the army itself, but in the country."9 Thus, only a misinterpretation of what Parsons named the ~value- system", or an unawareness of the linkage among the three layers of a culture proposed by Schein can lead to the following conclusion: ...there is nothing in the nature of American social values or in the application of technology which, 'ate initio,' precludes the development of both a military structure in general and an officer corps constituted along traditional lines [i.e., cohortI. Further, one has only to examine the British, French, and Israeli systems to see that the doctrines accompanying social democracy need not hinder the development of a highly cohesive, traditionally based, disciplined, and effective fighting force.10 rather than culture in here perceived as a major factor in determining military cohesiveness. B. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command, Management-in the Army, McGraw-Hill, and Wang 1978, pp. 32-33. 9. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Boston: John Allyn, 1873, lI 331. 10. Gabriel and Savage Crisis in Command, p. 24. 18

By taking structural-functionalists assumption to their extreme, Gabriel and Savage found themselves bound to deal with culture as an external variable in an organizational analysis. In order to keep the culture external to their analysis, they assumed that all democratic countries have developed similar patterns of authority in their institutions. Such an assumption creates a significant problem of plausibility for their theory. In this context their argument -- that the US military "classic" cohesive structure and ideology were displaced by the "ethics of the entrepreneur" and were not linked to factors operant in the American society at large -- bears · ~ reexamination. To cluster British, French, Israeli and American patterns of organizational authority in the same category of a democratic society, as Gabriel and Savage do, ignores the reality of national cultural diversification, and the mutual relationship among basic assumptions, values, and artifacts. Democratic values, in our view, are related to one segment of a broader national and organizational culture. The army is, overall, an organization with characteristic purposes, attitudes, and behavior. All are a reflection of the basic assumptions, values, and artifacts that grow out of internal and external social interactions. The basic assumptions, values, and artifacts are, in this respect, the principles crucial to understanding the military, like any other organization that shares an interdependency with its external society. Culture differences between societies, in our view, can provide us with an explanation of the sources that led each army to develop 19

-or its unique organizational pattern of authority. To demonstrate the linkage between a particular national culture and military cohesion let us examine the way in which the roles of US and the Israeli armies are perceived in their respective societies.11 The US army is considered one among other government or administration actors in a pluralistic system, and frequently participates in the political decision-making-process.12 The professional soldier or officer in the US army serves the administration as part of a mutual agreement to pursue his individual career. Thus, the cohesiveness of the US army is embedded either by instrumental factors such as individual careers, or within a wide national political consensus when the individual's and the group/unit's philosophy are in harmony with their external society. The US army developed a pattern of authority characterized by the successful practices of the American economic institutions. A major impetus toward this pattern was given in the early 1960's by Robert McNamara. As secretary of defense in 1961, he attempted to expand the entrepreneurial economic tradition into the military. Using his industrial management experience, he developed a set of "good business practices for military management. Such an approach would ~ - ~ ~ 1 1 . - Mi l i ta ry cohesion is neither a consequence of one variable, such as structure or culture, nor one cultural dimension such as a particular basic assumption. Eventually it is a complex integration of all of these factors. Our point here is simply to show the importance-of culture at each level of analysis. 12. For this discussion we should bear in mind that as an exception to most of the Western democratic states, the US pluralistic system embraces the armed forces as integral administration actors. In many other cases the army is considered external to the political and civilian decision-making-realm. 20

not have taken hold had it not been congruent with the broad social and cultural patterns exemplified by Corporate America. Hence, structural changes in the US army, such as the COHORT initiative, are not sufficient to heal the Vietnam Syndrome" and replace disintegrated units with desired cohesive ones. This point is made in Moskos's discussion of the US military disintegration in Vietnam: It is suggested that the intense primary-group ties so often reported in combat units are best viewed as mandatory necessities arising from immediate life-and-death exigencies. Much like the Hobbesian description of primitive life, the combat situation also can be nasty, brutish, and short. To carry the Hobbesian analogy a step further, one can view primary-group processes in the combat situation as a kind of rudimentary.social contract which is - entered into because of advantages to individual self-interest. Rather than view soldiers, primary groups as some kind of semimystical bond of comradeship, they can be better understood as pragmatic and situational responses. Furthermore, the American soldiers essentially individualistic frame of reference in Vietnam was structurally reinforced by the operation of formal organizational assignment policies -- the rotation system -- which set a private termination date for each soldier's participation in the war.13 The values that determine the way American soldiers fought also guided the way they expressed discontent. Individualistic and anti authoritarian discontent was manifested in the widespread use of drugs, desertions, and more extremely, in the practice of fragging.14 13. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam, The Journal of Social Issues, Vol 31, #4, 1975, p. 37. _ . , 14. Fragging refers to the attempted killing of a peer or a commander by his counterparts or subordinates. It was used by the American soldiers in Vietnam and consider a major.sign of self destructive phenomena characterizing the US military disintegration in Vietnam war. 21

The Israeli army operates in a very different cultural environment. This army is traditionally considered apolitical, and is central to the national ideology of independence. The cohort culture of the Israeli unit is rooted in the history of the Israeli army before and after statehood. Before statehood, the major Jewish force in Israel was the Palmach. The Palmach was the military arm of the ~Haganan __ the political institution related to the Socialist Zionist political faction in the Zionist movement 15 and was closely related to the Kibbutz movement. Thus, the cohort structure has deep roots in a broader social philosophy; the military patterns of authority are not exceptional. The Palmach members, like the Israeli De fence Forces (IDF) soldiers, saw themselves as a leading national force. They were the young generation that claimed to overcome the psychological inferiority of the Jews in the Diaspora (non-sovereign Jews in exile, or out of Israel). Ma she Dayan and Yigael Allon become symbols of this generation; the "Sabra," the Hebrew name for the cactus fruit with a prickly exterior and a tender inside was used metaphorically to describe such an Israeli-born youth. The Palmach promoted the eliite values of the intellectual, self- controlled or "civilized" person that were also motivated by a deep universal socialist ideology. Hence, they enforced democracy and egalitarianism, not only among men but also between the sexes. Many women took an active role in combat within the Palmach forces. The 15. The Socialist faction was the leading force in the Zionist movement, and from the late 1930,s dominated its politics. 22

leaders were "first among equals: I Friendship and comradeship" were vital values. The Palmach, and the other small Jewish undergrounds before statehood (Etzel and Lehi) were the genesis of the IDF. The IDF is very different: the IDF is also a mixture of a~diverse pattern of sub-cultures. However, values and artifacts that were introduced earlier in the paper, such as "volunteering," and "never leave a comrade behind" are just few among many other examples. But above all, the major artifact that every Israeli citizen supports without considering social class, education, or even sex, is compulsory enlistment.16 A war in this case becomes a matter for the entire society, and not an affair of some professional military personnel. Such an artifact reflects strong values and basic assumptions. In a democratic state with open borders it is almost impossible to mobilize an entire society to war without an underlying basic assumption that war is an inevitable result of self-defense. Broad social values stand behind the rational supporting a n just warn that is generated by the necessity of defense or supporting a war that is engaged in preventing aggression from another country. Loss of consensus can produce a cultural crisis. In June 1982, for example, the value consensus in Israel was ignored by the government's controversial political decision to invade Lebanon. And as a result of this political decision the cohesiveness of the IDF was damaged. The Israeli soldiers, responded to this crisis in a 16. There are few exceptions due to religions affiliation: Jewish orthodox, and minorities like Muslims and Arab Christians. 23

&. complex way, manifested both in their pattern of following orders and in their method of protest.l7 The political decision to invade Lebanon, created tension among at least three basic assumptions: 1) Israel is in a perpetual adversarial relationship with its neighbors, and its because of its precarious existence, cannot tolerate extreme internal dissension. 2) the army is separate from, but recognizes the legitimacy of, the political system; and 3) Israelis will participate in war only when there is no other choice. Israeli soldiers protest in accordance with the way they fight. The same group that had previously fought together now showed their discontent together over the decision to invade Lebanon. Entire reserve units finished their tours of duties and as civilians - 17. The Israeli and American forms of dissent were different from the response of their French counterparts to the 'societal controversies over "Algeria. The French army's tradition of serving a civilian master faithfully and without protest had earned it the nickname the Great Mute army (la Grande Mutte): not one actor among others in an pluralistic adminstration. Despite a long tradition of the "Great Muted in May 195B, Ithe French army cast off its instrumental role in an unprecedented (by Western democratic standards ~ military intervention, after its humilia~cion in ache Algeria war. -The 1958 coup was an emotional eruption of a cohesive organization that thought to reflect the people Is discontent with its Fourth Republic politicians and government. And, in fact, the military success in establishing the Fifth Republic was due to the alienated French army that was at one with the civilians of France in a common desire deco bring an end to the immobilism of the Fourth Republic. The military success registered civilian disillusionment. The result of the Algeria war, - in contrast to the US war in Vietnam, was attributed to the government to setting explicit military goals, and not to a particular military structure. 24

demonstrated in front of the Prime Minister's house in Jerusalem.18 A letter addresed to Menachem Begin, Israel's prime minister, and signed by 35 soldiers of an elite unit, illustrates the tension among these three basic assumptions that was causing internal societal conflict: ~ Not for this purpose did I volunteer for an elite unit! It was always clear to me that should I ever go to war, it would be a just war --a war necessary for our survival as individuals and as a nation... Now it is clear to me that I was deceived and that I was called to a war, for the first time in our existence as a state, not solely for defense purposes. ...Be aware, that those voices [the civil demonstrations protesting against the war do not hurt my morale, but actually give me the strength to continue fighting with the conviction that our human values and sanity have not vanished. - Even now, I will continue to obey the order of my officers, but with the belief that I am endangering my life in a war in which I do not believe. I do not trust the defense minister [Ariel Sharon].19 The cohesiveness of the IDF was damaged, and it will take years before this social-political trauma will be cured. However, the fragmentation of the Israeli army was never as severe as that of the US army in Vietnam. In sum, cultural patterns are revealed both in combat and in dissent. While, the Americansiexpressed their discontent in an individualistic and anti authoritarian way, the Israeli's framed their protest as a collective attempt to change political decision- 18. Most of the IDF's human resources consist of reserve soldiers. -These soldiers were thus able to participate in a civil demonstration against the government after they finished their period of conscription. 19. The letter was sent on July 24, 1982 and ten days later was published along with the prime ministers reply. 25

making within the democratic political and ideological context that exists outside the realm of the army, and to which they continued to express commitment. The above brief comparison shows the importance of harmony between the military and the societal values and basic.assumptions: cultural disparity between the army and its social environment could be harmful to the army's cohesiveness. A detailed study of a military culture at the societal level can explain the interdependence of the various levels of culture that is essential for both a nation and its army in shaping and understanding military cohesiveness. A given artifact such as military patterns of authority cannot be understood without examining their underlying layers of values and basic assumptions. A good military planner would never develop a tactic that is not rooted in a larger strategy; in the same way an army's culture cannot be separated from its external society. Furthermore, if we accept basic assumptions as the centra' axis for the dissemination of cultural values and artifacts, then it follows that army cohesiveness can be achieved through harmony with broader social trends. In sum, soldiers express their values and basic assumptions during combat, or when they find themselves frustrated by their social and political external environment. An analysis of an army's structure does not provide a sufficient explanation for such expressions; cultural analysis, as opposed to structural-functional - analysis, has the potential to deliver a broader perspective for us to understand, and even predict, some of the responses of individuals 26

and groups to external and internal events. Thus, cultural factors should be viewed not only as important in determining organizational patterns of authority, but also the relationship between the cohesiveness of an army unit and its reaction to external stimulus. The next section will elaborate on this argument in the battlefield. we will do so by introducing a combat scenario in which two armies developed different offensive tactics, each rooted in an organizational culture. CULTURE AT THE ORGANI ZATIONAL LEVEL: LARGE UNIT CULTURE AD PERFOR~CE The examination of cultural patterns at the divisional level is crucial. It is at this level that culturally significant decisions are made and projects (such as COMORT) managed. In order to illustrate the weakness of the structural-functionalist explanation for the linkage among military structure, cohesiveness, and performance at the divisional level, we will compare the two competing combat offensive tactics applied during the Golan Heights combat between Syrian and Israeli armored divisions in the 1973 Middle East War. Despite the various similarities in structure that characterized the two armored divisions that clashed, shared the same geographical arena, and a common offensive strategy, cohesion and performance appeared to be different. In general, the Syrian offensive strategy in this combat was to surprise the Israeli forces before the latter could mobilize their 27

reserves. Syria's aim was to hurl a critical mass at the Israeli forces and to attain a military advantage in a particular theatre of operations. That is, Syria attempted to launch, in a very~short period of time, a massive armored offensive on the relatively small Israeli forces on the front line. The Syrian offensive tactic was developed in a dynamic way. The units were organized in straight lines and simply drove into the front. As the Syrian division approached the front line, it was segmented into brigades, and then into battalions. This tactic enabled commanders to exert relatively tight control and provided subordinates with a clear idea of their duties. Overall, such a strategic system required a high degree of order, with each individual performing a narrowly defined job; there was no room for exceptions. The Israeli counteroffensive was dramatically different. The tactic was to maneuver its forces much more flexibly: Units and individuals got assignments that could change frequently during the offensive, and frequently commanders at all levels as well as individual soldiers initiated activities that were in the Spirit of the mission" but were never planned. The freedom to react and adapt to a changing environment without getting a particular order to do so was an expected norm of Israeli combat tactics. Both of these military offensive tactics reflect a particular pattern of culture. The Syrian organizational approach is based on formal procedures that consist of a centralized decision-making process, where social cohesion is not necessary. Such tight control also coincides with the Syrian tradition of internal adversarial 28

relationship between ethnic groups, and a totalitarian regime controlled by a minority group (the Alawites) that is supported by a strong security police force. All these artifacts are rooted in an underlying assumption that individual loyalty cannot be trusted; individual innovation or local discretion by a commander could be a threat to the regime. This is a case in which the planner seeks to create a pattern of control that suppresses individual or group creativity and innovation, and that has strict hierarchical boundaries, high degrees of specialization, and a low potential for resistance. The pattern of the Israeli offensive tactics, in contrast, embodies decentralized and informal decision-making processes. Here social cohesion is necessary, and lack of individual innovation and local discretion will prevent the army from achieving its mission. The most prominent value in this culture is the "maintenance of the objective" by all means and at all levels. Hence, in this case the planner seeks to create a combat culture that induces cohesion and broad job definition, a collective sense of identity and loyalty ("not to follow but to initiates), reduced hierarchical boundaries, and greater innovative behavior). The way in which the Syrian and the Israeli divisions kept fighting after their first attack illustrates the role of culture in affecting military cohesion. The Syrian division, due to high casualties-sustained in the first wave of the armored offensive, was moved back to the rear for reorganization: The unit structure had to be completed in an attempt to implement the job required. The second 29

Syrian offensive was generated by another fresh, complete division. The new division not only consisted of a structure very similar to its preceding one, but also used the same armor and paths of attack. Despite the strategic surprise that the Israeli forces had experienced, together these Syrian offensive waves could not reach more then fifteen miles into the Israeli territory. For Syria a necessary condition for implementing the mission was to keep the fundamental cohort structure and reduce the gap between the basic plan and actual combat. When circumstances were changed -- either the shape of the unit, or the contingent-- the Syrian division lost its effectiveness. Hence, despite the fact that the Syrian units were structurally organized within the cohort pattern, they could not keep fighting after the initial structure was changed. The Israeli division kept up its attack without stopping for reorganization, or replacement; it always kept the front line, but the shape of the division changed. The casualties that it suffered were replaced mainly by consolidations of partial units, armor crews, and individuals that consolidated into crews. Thus, frequently large numbers of individuals in the consolidated units did not know each other. Many soldiers kept fighting with a commander they could not see and jeopardized their lives for peers they had not met before. Even units which had not been trained as a cohort could keep their cohesiveness. This fighting spirit was bound together by common values and basic assumptions that are rooted in individual commitment, broad skill definition, and a broad national consensus. 30

In sum, two divisions with similar structures and tasks, performed differently. The differences can be accounted for by a cultural explanation. In the next section we will focus on a basic nucleus unit -- a tank crew -- and identify the cultural elements that stand behind the artifacts of both Israeli- and Syrian tank crews. CULTURE IN THE NUCLEUS GROUP: THE T~K CREW . The structure of a tank crew is "cast in iron:" four member enclosed within an iron frame. However, cultural differences among tank crews are significant not only between two armies, but also within the same army and unit. In this section we will examine the differences between a Syrian and an Israeli tank crew, which characterizes those crews that participated in the 1973 Middle East War on the Golan Heights battlefield. A typical Syrian tank crew as part of an armored division offensive must follow the leading tank into the front line. The rule is that if the leading tank is destroyed, the remaining tanks must bypass it into the front and keep to the offensive. In many ways this approach resembles, with spme modification, the classic Roman Falanga tactic. The way in which a typical Israeli tank crew operates in the counteroffensive is distinct from its Syrian counterparts. The - ~sraeli crew must be flexible enough to react independently, even when it loses communication with its unit. Not only the commander, but the entire crew must understand the mission and be able to 31

implement it. Thus, the commander can be replaced if injured and the tank can keep to its mission. In contrast to the Syrian approach, the Israeli approach can be viewed as a modern interpretation of classic cavalry warfare.20 The cultural differences are manifested Inca number of revealing practices. First, the crew's attitude toward the position of its commander, i.e., whether he should stand with his head out of the tank, and expose himself to greater risk by not having armored protection, or whether he should remain closed within the turret. This artifact is rooted in leadership values. A Syrian commander who participate in the "line offensive" stays closed within the turret. Individual innovation is not required; his mission is strict and well-defined. Furthermore, an enclosed commander requires less commitment from his crew since he takes fewer personal risks. In this system of narrow job definitions, nobody in the tank crew can take over if the commander is injured, and his well-being is necessary for the crew to keep operating. When a commander is disabled the crew loses its ability to function and hence the commander must be protected to the same extent as the other crew members. Since the operatiion requires very simple actions, it is expected that the crew members will remain disconnected from their commander's stressful environment, and it is assumed that their access to accurate information would cause damage by increasing their anxiety and ability to function. 20. See a good description of such a cavalry warfare in John geesan The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, 1976. Chapter 2, Agincourt Battle. 32

There is no great room for maneuvers and changes; the division's success is determined by accurate strategic planning and the critical mass required to execute the tactic. A major unplanned environmental event can prevent the fulfillment of the mission. The artifacts of a Syrian tank crew would, among other things, consist of strict hierarchical bureaucracy to an inflexible response to changing combat conditions, and restricted predefined individual roles based on narrow job definitions. The tight Syrian hierarchical control is marked by a reluctance to be creative or innovative, and by a desire to follow the path of least resistance. In different, a common practice in the Israeli armor force is- that the upper part of the tank commander's body should be outside the turret. This position gives the tank commander immediate and direct knowledge of his environment, and enables him to make choices at his own discretion. Here the value of "follow me, n as well as the overall military values concerning the role of it commander corps, dictate the way in which the tank commander stands during combat (with his upper body out of the turret). In fact, frequently, in an attempt to improve his view, a tank commander will stand high in the turret, and even disobey his commander order to stand low. By standing with part of his body out of the turret, the tank commander exposes himself to higher risk only for the sake of active participation in and correct information about the battle. As a result of this typical artifact, during all combat in which Israeli armor participates, tank commanders are at highest risk and have the most casualties. 33

Second is the organization of communication in the tank. This artifact reflects deeper values is the fundamental disparity in the use of communication techniques. In a Syrian tank frequently there is no radio: the tank commanders simply follows their commander, or strict orders that have been given in advance.. In a higher ranking commanders' tank (platoon level), the only person who listens to regimental communication networks is the commander, while the other crew members have access only to the internal. The network is designed so that only from the commander position can an individual member access external networks. In contrast to the Syrians, a common practice by Israeli crew members is to listen to all radio channels of command. They do so despite the fact that it makes the tank radio channel more difficult to follow. In other words, within a culture of narrow job definition, the tank driver should listen only to the tank commander: The function of the driver is explicit and as such his radio system should be channeled only to his tank commander. In an Israeli tank, technically each crew member can listen to all channels to which the tank commander is listening.21 The assumption underlying the last two examples is that each Israeli individual in combat should have a large amount of accurate information about the combat, both before and during his unit's operation. For that matter the Israeli crew must develop informal 21. This is true even if the tank commander is also ~ division or battalion commander. In this case the tank crew are listening to the entire division's or battalion's radio channels. 34

hierarchical boundaries that consist of a common ability to innovate, contingent upon broad job definition and social cohesion. Hence, since the crew's values determine that every individual shares all information even when such information is not directly re levant for him. However, the common practice is to try to get a better view of the close environment and to keep a connection with the broad picture by listening to the radio. The artifact that indicates this pattern of sharing information, is rooted in values such as mutual commitment, and the basic assumption that all Israeli individuals and groups are in pursuit of a common goal. Values, rather then structures, are frequently used as a basis to define combat behavior. The importance and the emphasis~that is given to the necessity to share information among all ranks in the Israeli army is case in point. The functional consequences is twofold: First, it is instrumental in fulfilling an innovative job; and second, it sets the stage for internal replacement of any crew member, especially the commander, so that another member can lead the force. Namely, within the context of sharing information, every individual and even every unit is replaceable; sharing information is also the framework that enables a unit to adapt to rapid environmental and internal structural changes. In sum, we can confidently assume that further examination of a military unit's basic assumption that would reveal related behavioral and performance variables. Social cohesion, based on common values and basic assumptions, rather on a particular structure in such a unit is fundamental for implementing the mission. 35

CONCLUSION In this essay we used Schein's (1985) model of organizational culture to explore the relationship of cultural variables and military cohesion. The focus on culture should not be interpreted as an ignorance of other types of variables. In particular, we recognize the centrality of structural and task (or functional) variables in determining the relation of military cohesion and performance. These variables, however, have received more than their fair share of attention from scholars who have applied social theory to the analysis of the military organization. The purpose of this paper was to introduce and examine the contribution of the relatively neglected dimension of organizational culture to the analysis of military performance. The paper challenges some of the structural-functionalist assumptions that have guided much of the research on organizational performance. We assert that the overemphasis on linear relations between structure and function is an inadequate explanation of social action. The concern with expected consequences typical of structural-functional explanations, rather than with the causes of social action that lie in the riealm of culture, often leads to a distorted view of organizations. Thus, an organizational design based upon a strict functional and task analysis risks inadequacy by ignoring cultural variables that mediate, limit, constrain, or enhance performance. These variables are necessary to explain organizational diversity under similar conditions. Overconcern with the expected consequences or the organizational goals, at the expense 36

of the causes of a particular social action is analogous to designing a military unit for an environment characterized by a lack of ambiguity, "plain, n nclean" and specific combat. Such an approach suffers from an overdeterministic view of human behavior. In addition, this approach also manifests an assumption of social homogeneity, while not considering the diverse origins of the unit groups and individuals. To be fair, the structural-functionalist contains the seeds of Schein~s cultural perspective, manifested in Parsons attempt to understand the social origins of the organization by proposing the concept of a cultural value-system. In Parsons' view, an - organization is tied to society by the value-system which it shares and by its functional requirement which it can only meet through the society and which must be satisfied if it is to survive.22 However, the notion of a semi-independent cultural sub-system is the least explored one. Hence, by suggesting unidirectional culture diffusion --from the top down-- the structural-functionalist's approach does not explore the notion of sub-cultural development, and the reality of diverse organizations performing within the same "functional" realm. Hence, a major question remains open: how and why do diverse organizations arise and operate within the same functional boundaries.23 22. Parsons Talcott (1965) "an Outline of the Social System", In Parson ed. Theories of Societies, New York: Free Press, pp 30. 23. The counts r argument that each organ) Nation has some unique manifest or latent social function Chat explains its specific form (Merton, 1949) is at best tautological. 37

J9.r Parsons' underutilized notion of a "cultural system" served as the departure point for Schein's culture framework. Schein's model is in fact an additional but necessary development of the structural- functional model, in which cultural variables become endogenous to the analysis. Thus, the organizational culture framework should be considered as a theoretical extension which tries to connect the structural-functional relations among the three basic analytical levels -- societal, organizational, and group. Schein's culture model adds two significant dimensions to organizational analysis: first, a rigorous analysis of the internal dynamics that account for the uniqueness of a given organizational culture, rather then the external forces embodied in Parsons' value- system that mold organizations into a specific societal function. This enables us to examine sources and processes (rather then the structure and function) that lead to organizational diversity, and offers variables (such as leadership and socialization) that are controllable by decision makers. Second, Schein's model explains cultural constraints on organizational performance in situations where pure structural and functional considerations would! suggest successful outcomes. In Schein's view, basic assumptions --learned ways of viewing the world-- often constrain or enhance organizational performance independently of other variables. This perspective offers decision makers a way of understanding the limits of structural design 38

decisions, as well as those of organizational strategies and policies. For example, an analysis of the new COHORT MANNING system that considers Schein's culture framework will provide both the policy-maker and the military scholar with an important dimension that is missing from the structural-functionalist perspective. In sum, the organizational culture framework suggest that organizational structure is not only a result of external forces, or inherent in the nature of the organizational goals, function, task or technology, but a consequence as well as a symbol of the most fundamental cultural factors that develop within the organization. Namely, while the structuralist argument emphasizes top down causal links, and in fact presents a highly constrained and deterministic image of individual choice and behavior, the cultural argument adds perspective that is derived from the bottom up and thus emphasizes variables that are potentially controllable by individual decision makers as well as other participants. Overall, it adds sets of cultural variables that must be understood and taken into account by anyone who would influence the nature of military life, and the outcomes of military performance. SOME COMMENTS WITH REGARD TO PROJECT "COHORT MANNING" Our discussion of the relationship of culture~structure and cohesion in military setting has a number of implications for project COHORT MANNING. In essence we claimed that the impact of the structural arrangements on attitudinal and performance outcomes in meditated by culture variables that are at least partly independent and should be 39

taken into account in the planning stage. COHORT MANNING is primarily program that defines the structure and the shifts of units. What impact it will ultimately have on the performance of military units under various conditions is --if~we are right-- not a simple question. These outcomes might very quite dramatically under the same structural conditions as a result of culture variables. An analysis of these variables might help in designing the project and in practice its outcomes. AS an example of hypotheses that are derived from a cultural perspective, we offer the following: 1. T relations between structure and performance COHORT is necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining military horizontal-cohesion. Thus, cohesion might disrupted by contradictory basic assumptions. The racial tension among peers in the US army in Vietnam, as described by Moskos, is a point in case. 2. The Dynamics Factors: COHORT socialization can be destructive to vertical-cohesion, by producing a subculture that rejects external intervention. For example, John Van Maanen (1983) asserts that as a result of the cohort structure in the Harvard Business School, its graduates develop cooperative horizontal values, but are much less conformist as subordinates. In contrast, at the MIT Sloan School of Management the graduates are trained individually, and hence friendship among peers is rare, but graduates are much more conformist as subordinates. 40

socialization in a Cohort unit is designed in an attempt to "break" the individual as a private citizen, and remold him as a member of a cohesive unit. A conflict between the values of a person as a citizen and as a soldier could be developed. A COHORT scheme blocks the ambitious individuals from promotion: A soldier who desires to be an officer will find it much more difficult, not only because of the structural determination, but also as a consequence of the cohort culture that suppresses individualism and demands loyalty to the group. 3. Demographic Element - - A COHORT unit that consists of individuals who enlisted without any other economic choice will develop low self-esteem and internal distrust: instead of having an elite spirit, the second-class spirit will be in force. 4. Ideological Element The COHORT scheme can develop internal values that will contradict civilian legal principles such as the military subordination to the civil political regime, and the ethic and moral foundation of the society. 4

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