National Academies Press: OpenBook
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Network-Centric Naval Forces

A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities

Committee on Network-Centric Naval Forces

Naval Studies Board

Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications

National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
×

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

This work was performed under Department of the Navy Contract N00014-96-D-0169/ 0001 issued by the Office of Naval Research under contract authority NR 201-124. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the government, and no official endorsement should be inferred.

The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license throughout the world for government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, and dispose of all or any of this work, and to authorize others so to do.

International Standard Book Number 0-309-06925-4

Copies available from:

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National Research Council

2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20418

Copyright 2000 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

National Academy of Sciences

National Academy of Engineering

Institute of Medicine

National Research Council

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.

The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering.

The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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COMMITTEE ON NETWORK-CENTRIC NAVAL FORCES

VINCENT VITTO,

Charles S. Draper Laboratory, Inc.,

Chair

ALAN BERMAN,

Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University

GREGORY R. BLACKBURN,

Science Applications International Corporation

NORVAL L. BROOME,

Mitre Corporation

JOHN D. CHRISTIE,

Logistics Management Institute

JOHN A. CORDER,

Colleyville, Texas

JOHN R. DAVIS,

Center for Naval Analyses

PAUL K. DAVIS,

RAND and RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies

JOHN F. EGAN,

Nashua, New Hampshire

BRIG B. ELLIOTT,

GTE Internetworking

EDWARD A. FEIGENBAUM,

Stanford University

DAVID E. FROST,

Frost and Associates

ROBERT H. GORMLEY,

Oceanus Company

FRANK A. HORRIGAN,

Raytheon Systems Company

RICHARD J. IVANETICH,

Institute for Defense Analyses

WESLEY E. JORDAN, JR.,

Bolt, Beranek and Newman Co.

DAVID V. KALBAUGH,

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University

ANNETTE J. KRYGIEL,

National Defense University

TERESA F. LUNT,

Xerox Palo Alto Research Center

DOUGLAS R. MOOK,

Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company

DONALD L. NIELSON,

Menlo Park, California

STEWART D. PERSONICK,

Drexel University

JOSEPH B. REAGAN,

Saratoga, California

CHARLES R. SAFFELL, JR.,

Titan Technologies and Information Systems Corporation

NILS R. SANDELL, JR.,

ALPHATECH, Inc.

WILLIAM D. SMITH,

Fayetteville, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL G. SOVEREIGN,

Monterey, California

H. GREGORY TORNATORE,

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University

PAUL K. VAN RIPER,

Williamsburg, Virginia

BRUCE WALD,

Center for Naval Analyses

RAYMOND M. WALSH,

Basic Commerce and Industries, Inc.

MITZI M. WERTHEIM,

Center for Naval Analyses

GEOFFREY A. WHITING,

Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company

DELL P. WILLIAMS III,

Teledesic Corporation

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Naval Studies Board Liaison

SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN,

Chevy Chase, Maryland

Staff

RONALD D. TAYLOR, Director,

Naval Studies Board

CHARLES F. DRAPER, Study Director

MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer

SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant

JAMES E. MACIEJEWSKI, Senior Project Assistant

SIDNEY G. REED, JR., Consultant

JAMES G. WILSON, Consultant

Navy Liaison Representatives

ROBERT LeFANDE, Associate Director, Systems Directorate,

Naval Research Laboratory

CDR DAVID L. SPAIN, USN,

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N513J (through July 1999)

CAPT(S) MARK TEMPESTILLI, USN,

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N6C3

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
×

NAVAL STUDIES BOARD

VINCENT VITTO,

Charles S. Draper Laboratory, Inc.,

Chair

JOSEPH B. REAGAN,

Saratoga, California,

Vice Chair

DAVID R. HEEBNER,

McLean, Virginia,

Past Chair

ALBERT J. BACIOCCO, JR.,

The Baciocco Group, Inc.

ARTHUR B. BAGGEROER,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ALAN BERMAN,

Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University

NORMAN E. BETAQUE,

Logistics Management Institute

JAMES P. BROOKS,

Litton/Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.

NORVAL L. BROOME,

Mitre Corporation

JOHN D. CHRISTIE,

Logistics Management Institute

RUTH A. DAVID,

Analytic Services, Inc.

PAUL K. DAVIS,

RAND and RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies

SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN,

Chevy Chase, Maryland,

Special Advisor

DANIEL E. HASTINGS,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

FRANK A. HORRIGAN,

Raytheon Systems Company

RICHARD J. IVANETICH,

Institute for Defense Analyses

MIRIAM E. JOHN,

Sandia National Laboratories

ANNETTE J. KRYGIEL,

National Defense University

ROBERT B. OAKLEY,

National Defense University

HARRISON SHULL,

Monterey, California

JAMES M. SINNETT,

The Boeing Company

WILLIAM D. SMITH,

Fayetteville, Pennsylvania

PAUL K. VAN RIPER,

Williamsburg, Virginia

VERENA S. VOMASTIC,

The Aerospace Corporation

BRUCE WALD,

Center for Naval Analyses

MITZI M. WERTHEIM,

Center for Naval Analyses

Navy Liaison Representatives

RADM RAYMOND C. SMITH, USN,

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N81

RADM PAUL G. GAFFNEY II, USN,

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, N91

Marine Corps Liaison Representative

LTGEN JOHN E. RHODES, USMC, Commanding General,

Marine Corps

Combat Development Command

RONALD D. TAYLOR, Director

CHARLES F. DRAPER, Senior Program Officer

MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer

SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Assistant

JAMES E. MACIEJEWSKI, Senior Project Assistant

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COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS

PETER M. BANKS,

Veridian ERIM International, Inc.,

Co-Chair

W. CARL LINEBERGER,

University of Colorado,

Co-Chair

WILLIAM F. BALLHAUS, JR.,

Lockheed Martin Corporation

SHIRLEY CHIANG,

University of California at Davis

MARSHALL H. COHEN,

California Institute of Technology

RONALD G. DOUGLAS,

Texas A&M University

SAMUEL H. FULLER,

Analog Devices, Inc.

JERRY P. GOLLUB,

Haverford College

MICHAEL F. GOODCHILD,

University of California at Santa Barbara

MARTHA P. HAYNES,

Cornell University

WESLEY T. HUNTRESS, JR.,

Carnegie Institution

CAROL M. JANTZEN,

Westinghouse Savannah River Company

PAUL G. KAMINSKI,

Technovation, Inc.

KENNETH H. KELLER,

University of Minnesota

JOHN R. KREICK,

Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company (retired)

MARSHA I. LESTER,

University of Pennsylvania

DUSA M. McDUFF,

State University of New York at Stony Brook

JANET L. NORWOOD,

Former U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics

M. ELISABETH PATÉ-CORNELL,

Stanford University

NICHOLAS P. SAMIOS,

Brookhaven National Laboratory

ROBERT J. SPINRAD,

Xerox PARC (retired)

NORMAN METZGER, Executive Director (through July 1999)

MYRON F. UMAN, Acting Executive Director

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Preface

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) recently declared that the Navy would be shifting its operational concept from one based on platform-centric warfare concepts to one based on network-centric warfare concepts. This new operational concept can be described as a model of warfare, called network-centric warfare, that derives its power from a geographically dispersed naval force embedded within an information network that links sensors, shooters, and command and control nodes to provide enhanced speed of decision making, rapid synchronization of the force as a whole to meet its desired objectives, and great economy of force.

Realization of a network-centric warfighting capability will depend on a number of factors: development of warfare concepts (and supporting doctrine) that determine how weapons, sensors, and information systems will interact to carry out specific missions; experimentation to test the viability of the new concepts; application of both military and commercial technology, particularly information technology, with essential attention to information and communications security and robustness; timely and effective acquisition of information technology assets; and education, training, and utilization of naval personnel to meet the demands of a network-centric force. This change of operational concept is also part of the Department of Defense (DOD) thrust toward Joint Vision 2010,1 which encompasses efforts by the four Services to achieve similar objectives DOD-wide.

1  

Shalikashvili, GEN John M., USA. 1997. Joint Vision 2010. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Several initial steps have been taken by the Navy and Marine Corps toward achieving network-centric warfare capabilities. These include (1) promulgating the Navy Information Technology 21 (IT-21) initiative, which aims to bring the fleet up to date in information technology and related skills; (2) developing the Navy-Marine Corps intranet, to do the same for the shore establishment; (3) setting up the Navy Warfare Development Command and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, to develop concepts and doctrine; (4) testing these concepts and doctrines in fleet battle experiments and the Marine Corps “Warrior Series” experiments; and (5) making efforts toward interoperability of battle-group air defense and related command and control systems.

In a larger perspective, network-centric-type concepts have been applied by the Navy in the past, in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) since World War II, in approaches to air defense in the outer air battle in the 1980s, and more recently in the cooperative engagement capability (CEC) now under evaluation.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

At the request of Admiral Jay L. Johnson, USN, CNO (see Appendix A), the National Research Council (NRC), under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board (NSB), conducted a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. The terms of reference for the study call for an evaluation of the following:

  • What are the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to network-centric forces and capabilities? Particular emphasis should be placed on assessing the means, the systems, and the feasibility of achieving and delivering data via links with the necessary bandwidth, capacity, and timeliness capabilities. Emphasis also should be placed on establishing and maintaining network security, emissions control when needed, and links with submarines, and on integrating information which may arrive intermittently and with different timescales.

  • What near-term program actions need to be taken to begin the transition? What impact will these program actions have on the present platform-centric acquisition strategy? What impact will these program actions have on maintaining a robust industrial base to support the naval forces?

  • Recognizing that many areas of technology are evolving faster than the naval forces can develop concepts for their use: What experimental programs need to be put in place to help the forces select needed technologies and systems, develop doctrine, and develop operational concepts that together can support the transition to a network-centric naval force? What organizational adaptations might facilitate rapid progress?

  • What are the implications for both the business practices of the Department of the Navy and naval operations of moving away from a platform-centric

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
×

naval force to network-centric warfare? Implications for the following should be considered especially: resource priorities; force structure; personnel, education, career systems; warfighting doctrine; and coalition building and training with allies.

  • Over what period of time can a transition strategy be implemented and in what details will the naval forces be different from today’s forces when the strategy is finally implemented?

  • What trends, if any, suggest that potential adversaries might move toward a network-centric military capability or exploit its vulnerabilities? What are the implications for U.S. naval forces?

  • How will the move toward network-centric forces, if embraced by the Department of the Navy, be accomplished within the joint environment and subject to the likelihood of constrained future budgets?

  • What are the implications of network-centric warfare for naval doctrine and for joint operations?

COMMITTEE’S APPROACH

In responding to the CNO’s request, the committee organized itself into four ad hoc panels: (1) Panel 1—Concepts, Doctrine, Missions, and Operations; (2) Panel 2—System Architecture, Information Management, Dissemination, Protection, Assurance, and Command and Control; (3) Panel 3—Tactical Networks, Sensor-to-Shooter, Security, Protection, Targeting, Sensor Coordination, and Emission Control; and (4) Panel 4—Resources, Policy, Acquisition, Industrial Base, Career Issues, Education, and Training. In an effort to integrate the work of these four panels, an integration panel was formed with a lead representative from each panel, as well as the committee chair and NSB liaison.

The committee considered network-centric warfare, or better, network-centric operations (NCO), in the context of the Navy’s principal missions—strategic deterrence, sea and air control, forward presence, and power projection. Because of its unique characteristics, strategic deterrence was not included in the study. Further, taking a mission-specific approach, the committee decided to focus on NCO in the power projection mission, since power projection must also encompass sea and air control (as well as a degree of forward presence), and, in anticipated littoral operations, the land-attack aspect of power projection was considered to be less developed with respect to NCO than sea and air control, with which the Navy has considerable experience.

The following report attempts to treat in as much detail as was feasible the issues raised in the terms of reference listed above. As often happens, once the study’s directions of inquiry developed and results began to emerge, the committee found that its discussions of the issues raised in the terms of reference tended to group in a contextual and logical order different from the order initially antici-

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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pated. The next few paragraphs therefore sketch briefly where in the report discussions of the issues may be found.

The technical underpinnings needed for the transition to network-centric forces, capabilities, and operations are treated in detail throughout the report. Implications for naval force doctrine and joint operations are reviewed, directly and indirectly, in Chapters 1 and 2, while implications for joint operations in designing and creating NCO systems, in designing and creating a common information infrastructure (i.e., the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure, the NCII), and in undertaking network-centric combat operations are treated in detail at many points in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 in connection with the overall topics of those chapters.

Presented in the Executive Summary is a short list of recommended near-term program, management process, and organizational actions that must be undertaken to begin the transition from platform-centric to network-centric naval forces. The list was developed from the more detailed sets of recommendations given in Chapter 1, which were, in turn, taken from the fully developed findings and recommendations in the body of the report.

The implications for Department of the Navy business practices and organizational responsibilities needed to better transition to network-centric operations are considered in detail in Chapter 7. Management and technical aspects of some business practices and acquisition strategy are covered further in parts of Chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6 in discussions of the need for a new approach to thinking about the naval forces under the NCO concept and in descriptions of the many aspects of NCII design, operation, and information assurance. Needed experimental programs are described as part of these discussions, in Chapter 2 and also in Chapter 3, in connection with the technical details of subsystems and components needed to complete the NCO orientation of the naval force systems.

The committee believes that NCO will rely on a dual industrial base. The purely military aspects of such systems will draw on the base that currently furnishes the platforms and the specialized sensors and weapons that will enter NCO subsystems and components. Much commercial off-the-shelf technology will also support these subsystems and components. The NCII will draw largely from the huge commercial technology base that is developing to support civilian communication and computer-based information networks (e.g., the Internet) and the exponentially increasing commercial activity that their presence is fostering. This commercial base is as much a driver of the U.S. military’s movement to network-centric forces and warfare as it is an enabler for that movement.

The committee did not fully examine the capability of allies and potential coalition partners in the information and networking technology and systems areas relevant to network-centric operations. Similarly, it was not possible to investigate in depth, from the intelligence viewpoint, the possibility that potential adversaries could engage in network-centric conflict as defined in this report. The United States is so rapidly outpacing every other significant power in the

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world in the area of linking military forces in large, computer-based information networks that it is difficult for intelligence to estimate where the rest of the world stands relative to the United States in this area.

This does not mean that U.S. network-centric operations capability is now or will in the future be safe from attack or interference. As detailed in Chapter 5, U.S. information and combat networks and the NCII have, because of their inherent design and by virtue of their reliance on the commercial technology base, many vulnerabilities. Anyone with modern computing and communications capability can wage information war or cyber war against the United States, often in ways that have no easy counter. Approaches to mitigating this risk are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Overall, the committee believes that it has assembled a relatively complete picture of the significance of the movement toward NCO for the naval forces in the joint environment. The menu of needed actions to achieve the capability is large and will require a dedicated and extended effort throughout the Department of the Navy, building on and greatly extending actions currently under way.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS

The committee first convened early in 1999 and met for approximately 8 months. During that time, it held the following committee and panel meetings:

  • January 26-28, 1999, in Washington, D.C (Plenary). Organizational meeting. Navy, Marine Corps, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) briefings on network-centric warfare.

  • February 16-17, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1 and 3). Office of the Chief of Naval Operations concepts of operations and tactical data links briefings.

  • February 18, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • March 4-5, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 2). Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), DARPA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense information infrastructure and interoperability briefings.

  • March 9 and 11, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 4). Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Navy, and Marine Corps assessment and requirements briefings.

  • March 23, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Plenary). Air Force Battlespace Infosphere, Army Digital Battlefield, Defense Science Board Integrated Information Infrastructure, and DARPA Discover II briefings.

  • March 24, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1 through 4). DARPA, DISA, Military Satellite Communications Joint Program Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency information dissemination and management briefings. Naval Air Systems Command weapons, Navy Warfare Devel-

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
×

opment Command concepts of operations, and Office of the Secretary of Defense acquisition and technology briefings.

  • March 25, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • April 15-16, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 2). CitiGroup, DARPA, Naval Research Laboratory, and Office of Naval Research information assurance and security briefings.

  • April 19, 1999, in Alexandria, Virginia (Representatives, Panels 2 and 3). National Reconnaissance Office briefings.

  • April 20-21, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1, 3, and 4). Office of the Secretary of Defense and Marine Corps C4ISR requirements briefings. Air Force Rivet Joint and U2 briefings.

  • April 27-29, 1999, in San Diego, California (Panel 2). Site visit to Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. Briefings on information assurance and infrastructure programs, as well as related network-centric topics.

  • May 19-20, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Representatives, Panels 1 through 4). Air Force Expeditionary Force Experiment, DARPA information assurance, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization single integrated air picture, naval intelligence threat, and Naval Sea Systems Command battle force interoperability requirements briefings.

  • May 21, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • June 8-9, 1999, in Crystal City, Virginia (Panel 4). Navy and Air Force briefings on DD-21 and Joint Strike Fighter, respectively.

  • June 16-17, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 2).

  • June 21, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 4).

  • June 23, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 1).

  • June 22-23, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 3).

  • June 24, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Plenary). Status from panels.

  • June 25, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • July 13-14, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Panel 4).

  • July 19-23, 1999, in Woods Hole, Massachusetts (Plenary).

  • August 31 to September 1, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • September 29 to October 1, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • November 8-10, 1999, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

  • January 11-12, 2000, in Washington, D.C. (Integration Panel).

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Acknowledgments

The Committee on Network-Centric Naval Forces extends its gratitude to the many individuals who provided valuable information and support during the course of this study. Special acknowledgment goes to VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, president, Naval War College, who formulated the concept of network-centric warfare. His knowledge and insights made an invaluable contribution to the success of the study.

The committee extends a special thanks to the Navy liaisons to the committee, CAPT(S) Mark Tempestilli, USN, CDR David Spain, USN, and Dr. Robert LeFande, who responded to the committee’s numerous requests for information throughout the stages of the study.

The committee also thanks Mr. Kin Searcy, who helped arrange a visit to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. He and his staff were gracious in hosting members of the committee on its 4-day site visit to learn more about ongoing Navy information technology investments.

In addition, the committee wishes to thank Mr. Paul Blatch, who serves as the Navy’s action officer for Naval Studies Board activities and assisted with this study from its inception to completion.

The committee is grateful to the staff of the Naval Studies Board for its assistance, support, and guidance throughout the course of the study and to the CPSMA editorial office for help in editing the manuscript.

Finally, the committee thanks the many men and women throughout the Armed Services, as well as government, academic, and industry leaders who provided the committee with insightful discussions throughout the course of this study. Without their combined efforts, the committee’s report would not have been possible.

Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Research Council. 2000. Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9864.
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Acknowledgment of Reviewers

This report has been reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the authors and the NRC in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The contents of the review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. The committee wishes to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report:

William F. Ballhaus, Jr., Lockheed Martin Corporation,

Ruth M. Davis, Pymatuning Group, Incorporated,

John S. Foster, Jr., TRW, Incorporated,

Robert A. Frosch, Harvard University,

Charles M. Herzfeld, Silver Spring, Maryland,

Anita K. Jones, University of Virginia,

David A. Richwine, Fairfax, Virginia,

John P. Stenbit, TRW, Incorporated,

Jerry O. Tuttle, ManTech Systems Engineering Corporation,

Andrew J. Viterbi, QUALCOMM, Incorporated, and

Larry Welch, Institute for Defense Analyses.

Although the individuals listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, responsibility for the final content of this report rests solely with the authoring committee and the NRC.

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Network-Centric Naval Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities is a study to advise the Department of the Navy regarding its transition strategy to achieve a network-centric naval force through technology application. This report discusses the technical underpinnings needed for a transition to networkcentric forces and capabilities.

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