Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035 Becoming a 21st-Century Force : Vol. 7, Undersea Warfare (0) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 26-51
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From page 26... ...
Oceanographic models for the sea surface, internal waves, and bathymetry exist; however, they require further development to extrapolate their use down to acoustic wavelength scales and environmental data to constrain the parameters in the models. Signal Processing · Algorithms for wide-aperture, high-density arrays.
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From page 27... ...
The emphasis in signal processing is usually on the coherent front-end beam forming and matched filtering, yet the postprocessor that performs an incoherent combination of these outputs across frequency for a threat spectrum and over time for a track hypothesis provides a substantial fraction of the overall processing gain. In addition, the postprocessor provides the track parameters for target motion analysis solutions.
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From page 28... ...
The following technologies are unique to the Navy ASW mission and may require direct Navy support for their further development: . sensor spacing Array technology Low-cost horizontal, vertical, and multidimensional arrays with dense Reliable array deployment and handling Modular, fiber-optic data telemetry · Environmental data acquisition High-resolution environmental databases Assimilation of real-time oceanography Real-time satellite data · Processing hardware and software Modular, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
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From page 29... ...
Yet, addressing several of the imperatives for passive ASW that exploit fully coherent processing with large-aperture arrays requires a facility where these research issues can be addressed. Experiments with fixed arrays are necessary because towed arrays introduce both motion effects and positional variability, which complicate measurements and analysis.
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From page 30... ...
Nevertheless, passive detection ranges for these low-speed modern submarines have shrunk from hundreds of kilometers to only a few kilometers. These trends, illustrated in Figure 1.1, if continued into the next 35 years will lead to essentially undetectable submarines and will reduce ASW capabilities to close-proximity detections and transient or higher-speed situations.
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From page 31... ...
At the same time, relatively cheap but high-performance sensor and telemetry or connection concepts are maturing, based on fiber optics for both sensors and telemetry and MEMS or other miniaturized sensor concepts. These developments enable not only the processing of more signals with higher bandwidths from more sensor elements with ever more sophisticated algorithms, but also exploitation of the details of the local ocean environment through temporally and spatially coherent processing as well as spatial signal replica/adaptive beam forming the so-called matched-field processing.
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From page 32... ...
Concept A represents the more traditional monostatic configuration common to all tactical sonars as well as the SURTASS-LFA system using the research ship Cory Chouest, now assigned to the Pacific fleet. Concept B has proven to be quite valuable in certain environments where surface ships, submarines, buoys, and fixed systems with bistatic receivers can provide detection capability at greater distances from the transmitters.
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From page 33... ...
UAVs could also act as communications relays or weapon deliverers. Overall, active acoustics could confound an adversary without putting manned platforms at risk.
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From page 34... ...
Because of advances in submarine quieting and the use of off-board sensors, detection ranges in some scenarios are beginning to fall into those commonly associated with modern mine-hunting sonars. As detection ranges decrease, the role of high-frequency sonar for both passive and active systems may become more prominent.
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From page 35... ...
; and 3. In situ detection of the turbulent wake, contaminants contained in the turbulent wake, or the internal wave field using sensors mounted on or towed from surface ships or submarines.
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From page 36... ...
Little work, however, has been done on the vulnerability of acoustic communications networks to acoustic jamming or on covert underwater communication. UNDERSEA WEAPONS A FUTURE PERSPECTIVE The continuing evolution of the potential submarine threats facing U.S.
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From page 37... ...
In the near- to mid-term time frame, the focus will be on improving the performance of undersea weapons in complex, littoral environments and scenarios against an increasingly stealthy submarine target equipped with sophisticated countermeasure devices for thwarting a weapon attack. Insertion of new technology in signal processing, detection and classification, sensors, and guidance algorithms is planned.
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From page 38... ...
The proliferation of sophisticated undersea weapon systems available to potential adversaries will drive a concerted effort to achieve assured self-defense against incoming torpedoes for both surface ships and submarines. A major focus of this effort will be on counterweapons (i.e., hard-kill antitorpedo torpedo, capable of intercepting an incoming torpedo and destroying it)
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From page 39... ...
Technology advances in unmanned systems will allow the proliferation of sensors over the undersea battle space without exposing manned platforms to unacceptable risks. Unmanned air, surface, subsurface, drifting, and fixed platforms will act as force multipliers to provide a highly integrated network to address the ASW problem.
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From page 40... ...
Examples of these concepts with their requisite enabling technologies are presented in Table 1.2. It is evident that the TABLE 1.2 Possible Future ASW Concepts Concept Enabling Technologies Submarine detection, instant localization from space or air vehicles Hull Wake Surface effects Picobuoys (highly distributed floating sensors)
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From page 41... ...
· Incorporate engineering experience connected with the manufacture and deployment of large towed arrays gained by the offshore oil exploration industry.
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From page 42... ...
· Pursue robust enabling technology for protecting surface ships and submarines against threat torpedoes, such as antitorpedo weapons and advanced countermeasure devices.
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From page 43... ...
The panel foresees an increasing number of instances where the Navy and Marine Corps will be required to operate freely in near-shore waters, and the forces at their disposal, including MCM forces, should be configured such that they are able to operate effectively in these environments. At the same time, during the projection period of this study (2000-2035)
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From page 44... ...
activation or deactivation through acoustic or electromagnetic links. During the past 45 years, in spite of the very modest effort devoted to mine design the explosive charge carried by the typical mine has essentially doubled in energy output; its instrument section has been reduced from 20 percent of its volume to a space the size of a soda can through the adoption of modern electronics; its lethality range has increased from a few tens of feet athwart ship to a half mile through the use of mobile warheads; its logic systems have been made more resistant to countermeasures; and through the use of stealth technology, its ability to evade mine hunting sonars has increased.
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From page 45... ...
The panel also took account of the 1995 White Paper issued by the Chief of Naval Operations2 calling for a major sea change in the Navy's approach to MCM operations. Specifically, Admiral Boorda directed that the Navy's MCM force be transformed from a dedicated on-call force to an organic force capable of traveling at battle group speeds, and that MCM be mainstreamed into the fleet as a professional competency at all ranks and rates.
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From page 46... ...
Mines are cost-effective weapons that can serve as an important force multiplier, but humanitarian and political considerations mandate that they not be deployed without sufficient control to ensure the limitation of collateral damage and injuries to third parties. A VISION OF FUTURE MCM FORCES It is anticipated that future battle groups will have organic MCM capability in the form of air, surface, and underwater platforms.
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From page 47... ...
ISR enhances the efficiency of MCM operations by reducing the threat to a minimum prior to the initiation of sweeping, hunting, and neutralization activities. ISR was the highest-priority recommendation of the Naval Studies Board report Mine Countermeasures Technology.3 The importance and priority of that recommendation are reinforced and restated by the present study.
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From page 48... ...
Battle Group and Task Force Organic MCM In a future where conflicts are likely to arise suddenly and unexpectedly, it will be necessary for naval forces to be capable of reacting swiftly and independently. Since the geographical locales of possible conflict are so widely dispersed, it will be impractical to create forward-based MCM forces.
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From page 49... ...
Brute Force Mine and Obstacle Clearance There will be situations in which MCM operations that deal with one mine at a time cannot be conducted because of the density of the threat and lack of time or because normal MCM operations are slowed or ineffective due to the harshness of the environment, stealthiness of mines, or presence of buried mines. In these cases brute force methods of breaching will be required.
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From page 50... ...
the placement of a foam causeway over a mine field. The Naval Studies Board Mine Countermeasures Technology4 study recommended a concept in which precisely positioned (to GPS-level accuracy)
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From page 51... ...
Autonomous Networked Undersea Systems Advances in sensors, signal processing, and computational power will enable the development of autonomous and semiautonomous systems. In support of ISR, networked multiple undersea surveillance systems using small, autonomous undersea vehicles have significant potential for providing a covert mine surveillance, detection, and neutralization capability.
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