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Pages 78-103

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From page 78...
... Along with the evolving Operational Maneuver From the Sea concept that calls for logistic support of land operations from the sea with a much smaller or, in some cases, nonexistent land base, these factors raise the risk that an opponent could seriously interfere with a U.S. naval force expeditionary warfare campa~gn.
From page 79...
... The combat ships, helicopters, carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft, and MPA are also able to deliver antisubmarine torpedoes. Submarine quieting degrades this vast array of capability to the point that the ASW force is capable of placing only small-diameter detection circles in the water, around sensors (fixed and mobile)
From page 80...
... Finally, networking technology like that used in creating the cooperative engagement capability defense of the surface fleet will permit connecting all the sources of sensing and signal processing in a cooperative system that combines passive, active, and nonacoustic ASW. Like its electromagnetic counterpart that helps in detection of low-observable missiles and aircraft attacking the fleet and shore targets, a networked ASW cooperative engagement system will greatly advance the ability to find and attack hostile submarines beyond the capability of the individual means listed above.
From page 81...
... Countermine Warfare The other potential undersea expeditionary warfare "showstopper" for naval forces is mine warfare. All opponents trying to protect a shore against amphibious landings, or trying to deny free passage of warships and logistic ships through waters approaching their coasts, will use mines.
From page 82...
... The capability thus derived will take time to build, but once available it should serve our naval forces well for an extended period. First and foremost, attention is needed to ensure availability of intelligence, surveillance, end reconnaissance: intelligence to know in detail what mine warfare capability any operation will face; surveillance using all available assets to track mining activity and to gain the options of mine interdiction and mine avoidance; and reconnaissance to provide ground truth confirming unmined areas or to concentrate MCM forces only on areas known from both surveillance and reconnaissance to be mined.
From page 83...
... being developed by the Navy and Marine Corps will find use on beaches having no obstacles, and in neutralizing minefields on land. Additional "brute force" methods would greatly strengthen the naval forces' capability for rapidly clearing the SZ and CLZ immediately in the path of an amphibious landing, and shortly before the landing.
From page 84...
... . The AMCM helicopters cannot operate at night because they lack artificial horizons and night vision equipment, and the surface ships do not operate out of concern for floating mines.
From page 85...
... The local knowledge required involves more than knowing the layouts of streets, facilities, and buildings, although those are required, even to specific construction details
From page 86...
... Although intelligence resources may be limited overall, the cost for building area expertise, even if some of the effort pertains to areas where it is ultimately not needed, is small relative to the payoff for having it or to the loss incurred if it is not available when it is needed. The task must be joint, because joint forces will inevitably be involved, so that the naval forces will not have to absorb the expenses all on their own.
From page 87...
... The naval forces will need all of these advanced information and technical capabilities, ranging from means of disabling infrastructure and obtaining deep local knowledge to ways of capturing hostile areas with minimal friendly and local casualties, as an essential part of their "kit of tools" for expeditionary warfare and operations other than war. REENGINEERING THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM Logistics is usually considered as an "annex" to military operational plans.
From page 88...
... (Logistic communications to and from forward forces in a "supply as needed" combat situation are tactical communications, not the pipeline-filling transmissions that have characterized logistic communications loads in the past.) 2{ For a detailed discussion of the impact of OMFTS on naval force expeditionary warfare logistics, see Naval Studies Board, 1996, The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp.
From page 89...
... The need for ships' fuel will gradually be reduced by incorporation of more efficient electric drive and hull drag reduction in the major platforms. Aviation fuel needs will gradually be reduced as engine efficiencies, reflected in reduced specific fuel consumption, increase in new and upgraded aircraft.
From page 90...
... Ammunition resupply requirements will also change as the means of land attack and fire support change. Shifting strike and fire support from "dumb" bombs and shells to greater use of guided weaponry, and using large numbers of tube-launched weapons for strike and naval surface fire support, will radically affect those requirements in currently unpredictable ways, leading to many changes in logistic support loads and how they are delivered.
From page 91...
... For example, the regional conflict study estimated that the logistic load to support a light battalion-sized force ashore would be reduced from 37 to 7 tons per day if all the battalion's fire support were delivered from the sea.24 Land combat units with less heavy equipment, as visualized under the evolving doctrine, will also require less fuel. Remaining logistic requirements for the ground forces in combat will have to be supplied routinely (for food and other consumables)
From page 92...
... Three basic kinds of simulation that are used by the military forces reinforce and interact with each other: (1) so-called constructive simulation of systems and combat performed wholly on computers; (2)
From page 93...
... They affect all aspects of naval force planning, acquisition, and operation: designing systems and optimizing their operation; choosing among systems and forces for specific military tasks; developing and testing operational concepts with real or postulated force designs; mission planning and rehearsal, and evaluating alternative courses of action in carrying out missions; evaluating mission outcomes and the results of operational test and evaluation; and training forces and commanders at all command levels. Such a pervasive technology requires a new "corporate" management approach if the naval forces are to capitalize fully on the benefits that modeling and simulation can offer.
From page 94...
... changing the technical basis of M&S to incorporate and capitalize on modern computing and M&S technology. The needs for these advances apply initially in the area of constructive simulation but also will have an important influence on the way virtual simulations and field exercises are planned and on the way their results are interpreted and used.
From page 95...
... Within the family of models and simulations, it will be necessary to provide the capability for easy and inexpensive exploratory analyses and tests with different scenarios, databases, and concepts of operation, to learn which approaches are most likely to give robust solutions before specific plans and force designs are "cast in concrete." These advances in the M&S field to support naval forces will not be made effectively without focused technical support. As in any other important technical area, an ongoing research effort is needed to provide that support.
From page 96...
... The environment in which future naval forces will exist and in which they will have to function effectively will be characterized by continuing budget stringency, barring the emergence of some future mortal threat to the United States and its allies. Regardless of the level of resources that will be allocated to support the creation of the entering wedges of capability that this study foresees as essential to future naval force viability, and however they are found, the R&D part of those resources will have to be spent as efficiently and effectively as possible, and in a timely manner.
From page 97...
... Some of the jointly agreed R&D will help the naval forces, just as some of the Navy Department R&D will help meet needs of the other Services. Within the Department of the Navy, the following areas of concentration for R&D application, associated with the entering wedges of capability and leading
From page 98...
... 3. Surface and air systems: Rocket-propelled missile system design: staging and advanced, insensitive propellants for range extension, tailored warheads, terminal guidance, cold launch, at-sea reload, and cost reduction; Target sensing, target recognition, and target location using unmanned platforms; Continued work in stealth and counterstealth for all platforms, with special emphasis on the IR regime for aircraft signature reduction; Continuation of ATBM systems development; Laser weapons for ship defense against missiles, in the cooperative engagement capability (CEC)
From page 99...
... 4. Undersea systems: Matched-field coherent processing technologies for extending passive ASW detection and tracking capability; Multistatic active ASW; Multispectrum active and passive nonacoustic sensors for both ASW and mine detection; Mobile underwater synoptic sensor networks; Ocean science and related technology developments; Secure tactical communications between undersea and surface, air, and space systems; Advanced explosives, undersea weapon warheads, and mine fusing and warheads; Ship defense against torpedoes; Advanced countermine warfare rapid location and tagging, parallel neutralization, defeating "smart" minefields, explosive blasting of channels to the beach from the air with precision bomb emplacement and timing.
From page 100...
... military aircraft engine performance we see today, and to significant advances in civilian aviation as well. The areas of surface ship and submarine design and construction, ASW, and oceanography listed above need a similar model of integrated, sustained R&D support, with clearly defined goals and schedules, industry-government collaboration, and stable funding, to achieve the potential seen for them in this study.
From page 101...
... It is appropriate, however, in recognition of the difficulty of the resource issue, to comment on the implications of resource management philosophy for the naval forces' evolution over the next 35 to 40 years, and for their ability to do what will be demanded of them in the security environment described earlier in this report. The greater demands that will be made of naval forces in the coming decades, together with the relative scarcity of resources, will require a new conceptual basis for the design of the 21st-century naval forces.
From page 102...
... In this approach, "affordability" must come to mean purchasing needed value for the money the Navy Department is willing and able to spend for a capability within its allocated budget, rather than simply spending the least amount of money in any area, as the term has come to be used in many parts of the Defense Department. PAYOFFS AND VULNERABILITIES The restructured naval forces that would emerge after such changes in thinking about naval force design, and after integration of the new capabilities described in the previous chapter, would be leaner and more powerful than today's forces, and able to do more within a given budget.
From page 103...
... The transformation of the forces would bring with it a revised, more flexible cost structure for the naval forces, making continual modernization easier to sustain in the face of the rapidly evolving and spreading world technology base. It is apparent that benefits in these directions would increase as the rate of evolution increases from today's naval forces to those visualized for future decades.


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