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Appendix E: An Economic Model of Supply and Demand for Teachers
Pages 287-297

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From page 287...
... No Licensure Testing A simple model of occupational choice is adopted here in which an individual chooses among occupations according to which provides the greater compensation (wage) .1 The wage offered to teachers in a given labor market is Allowing for other forms of monetary compensation, for forms of nonmonetary compensation such as working conditions, as well as for psychic aspects of employment, although important components of the overall value attached to working in an occupation, would not change the conclusions of the analysis.
From page 288...
... is given by ED / To Licensure Testing Assume now that all potential teachers must take a licensure test. The purpose and design of the test are to distinguish between the two groups, which it 2The assumption that competency cannot be determined absent a test and that, even if it could be, school districts would not use competency as a necessary condition of employment, is a crucial rationale for adopting a state licensure test.
From page 289...
... . It is reasonable to assume that mI exceeds mc for current licensing tests, although the extent to which this is true is unknown and may differ among both the type of skills that are tested (basic skills, subject matter knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge)
From page 290...
... As in the market payoff outside teaching than would alternative courses the individual might have completed had the teaching occupation not been chosen, an opportunity cost is incurred. Individuals who fail licensure tests, and thus do not get a teaching job, will receive lower wages in an alternative job compared to the wage they would have received had they taken courses in pursuit of an alternative occupation.
From page 291...
... NOTES: S0 = supply of teachers when there is no licensure tests; S1 = supply of teachers when tests are not costly; S2 = supply of teachers when tests are costly; To = number of individuals who would choose the teaching occupation at wage W0; Eo = number of individuals in group C who would choose the teaching occupation at wage W0; E2 = number of individuals in group C who would choose the teaching occupation at wage W0 when tests are costly. no-licensure case, it is assumed that [Ic is independent of the wage.
From page 292...
... FIGURE E-3 The supply of teachers: imperfect licensure test. NOTES: S0 = supply of teachers when there is no licensure test; S1 = supply of teachers when tests are not costly; S2 = supply of teachers when tests are costly; To = number of individuals who would choose the teaching occupation at wage W0; T1 = number of individuals who would choose the teaching occupation at wage W0 when tests are not costly, and who pass the test; T2 = number of individuals who choose the teaching occupation at wage W0 when tests are costly and who pass the test; Ed = number of individuals in group C who choose the teaching occupation at wage W0 when tests are not costly and who pass the test; E2 = number of individuals in group C who choose the teaching occupation at wage W0 when tests are costly and who pass the test.
From page 293...
... If nothing else changes when licensure tests are used or passing scores are raised, in particular, if the wage to teachers is not affected by the reduction in supply, class size will rise. Whether overall student learning increases or decreases would depend on whether students are better off with competent teachers in larger classes or with a mix of competent and incompetent teachers in smaller classes.
From page 294...
... Given the proportion of teachers 7In a more complete model, one would not take as given the level of tax revenues collected by the municipality. 8Again, this is in keeping with the intended purpose of licensure tests, which are not designed to determine teacher quality beyond competency.
From page 295...
... NOTES: S0 = supply of teachers when there is no licensure test; S1= supply of teachers when tests are not costly; S2 = supply of teachers when tests are costly; Do = market demand for teachers when there is no licensure test; Do = market demand for teachers when all individuals who pass the test are competent Case I; D2 = market demand for teachers when all individuals who pass the test are competent Case 2; To = Number of individuals who choose the teaching occupation at wage W0; Eo = Number of individuals who choose the teaching occupation at wage W0; Ed = Number of individuals in group C employed as teachers when tests are not costly and when demand is given by Do; E2 = Number of individuals in group C employed as teachers when tests are not costly and when demand is given by D2; EN = Number of individuals in group C employed as teachers when tests are costly and when demand is given by Do.
From page 296...
... The model tells us only that the demand will not shift down so much that the number of competent teachers falls below what it was in the baseline no-licensure case. Regardless of the direction in which demand shifts, the wage paid to teachers will rise, but this new wage simply reflects the appropriate scarcity of competent teachers.
From page 297...
... As the prior discussion makes clear, quantitatively assessing the efficacy of licensure testing requires a great deal of information, about not only the accuracy of the test but also the perceived costs to the test takers, alternative market opportunities of potential teachers, and constraints on the tax revenues of municipalities.


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