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Present and Projected Theater Missile Threats
Pages 25-38

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From page 25...
... China's growing missile technology capability and apparent willingness to export that expertise, along with the marketing efforts of European weapon suppliers, make it likely that the United States will encounter significant numbers of these weapons in any future operations.
From page 26...
... Cruise missiles that are configured to carry and dispense submunitions constitute a particularly severe threat to troops in the field and to nonarmored vehicles such as trucks. When the submunitions that are dispensed by a cruise missile are high-performance, self-propelled devices that are equipped with terminal engagement sensors, they can even constitute a significant threat to armored vehicles.
From page 27...
... Such a missile need not always be totally destroyed degraded performance in the form of diminished accuracy for the guidance sensors or a partial loss of aerodynamic control authority may be enough to cause it to miss its intended target. Cruise missiles can attack both stationary and mobile targets.
From page 28...
... Aside from the threat that improved cruise missile seekers pose to Navy ECM techniques, there are many trends in cruise missile design that the committee found to be a source of concern, including the following: · Greater missile speeds, which limits the engagement time; · Lower RCSs, which limits the range within which a missile may be detected once it has crossed the horizon of defensive radars; · High maneuverability, which limits the ability of a defensive system to track and engage the missiles; · Trajectories that make maximum use of terrain obscuration and clutter masking in littoral situations; and · Sea-skimming flight paths, which keep incoming missiles below the horizon of defensive radars for as long as possible. Worldwide, cruise missile designs abound.
From page 29...
... However, unless elevated sensors are used, or unless significant improvements in defensive capabilities are achieved, missiles with the attributes in the third column of Table 2.1 will generally fall into the no-shot region of Figure 2.1. In such a situation, the defense will have to depend entirely on the Navy' s ECM capabilities to defeat the terminal guidance system.
From page 30...
... multistatic operation that allows the missile to be viewed from orientations where its RCS value has significant peaks. 2.3 THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS 2.3.1 Characteristics of Theater Ballistic Missiles On September 26, 1997, agreements were signed between representatives of the United States and the Russian Federation that established the permissible characteristics of TMD systems.
From page 31...
... With this delineation, one can define theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) as one- to three-stage liquid- or solid-propelled rocket vehicles that have launch-to-impact ranges of 100 to 3500 km.
From page 32...
... Unitary warheads are likely to contain a high explosive including the nuclear alternative to damage or destroy the target, although a precisely guided inert penetrator could be considered for attacking a deeply buried asset. Multiple warheads, including independently targeted RVs or unguided submunitions, could carry explosives for damaging one or more targets or chemical or biological agents to attack personnel over a wide target area; for this reason, their effectiveness is less dependent on impact-point accuracy.
From page 33...
... 2.3.2 Current Theater Ballistic Missile Threats For the present, it is sufficient to consider the TBMs discussed in NAIC1031-0985-98 (4) as representative of current threats.1 While many of these missiles embody old and relatively rudimentary technology, the more sophisticated missiles that are replacing them in the inventories of supplier nations today 1National Air Intelligence Center.
From page 34...
... Control forces for midcourse guidance correction can be provided by thrust during exo-atmospheric flight, while terminal guidance corrections can be effected by aerodynamic lift and drag control during endo-atmospheric flight. Sources for measuring guidance error a necessary input to the guidance logic include inertial measurement units, GPS or GLONASS, and terminal homing sensors, such as laser designation, optical or radar imaging and distance measurement, and radio stations or beacons.
From page 35...
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From page 36...
... The committee takes note of the vigorous debate that rages about exo-atmosphenc discnm~nation and the ease of creating effective countermeasures. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," U.S.
From page 37...
... The committee wishes to emphasize that once deployed, a TBMD system must be upgraded periodically in response to observed threat indicators. Therefore, programs for future defense against TBM missiles must take into account not only the characteristics of known threats, but also the technologies that an adversary can employ in response to its perception of our defensive capabilities.
From page 38...
... 38 NAVALFORCES' CAPABILITY FOR THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE ible with the accuracy needed for conventional IBM unitary warhead target damage objectives. With penalties in payload complexity and displacement of warhead volume and weight, terminal guidance and maneuver capability could be added to maintain acceptable impact-point dispersion.


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