Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

Assessment of the Current State of Technologies Involved in Naval Theater Missile Defense and an Evaluation of Current and Projected Department of the Navy Programs Designed to Meet the Evolving Threat
Pages 39-93

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 39...
... Various presentations indicated that aircraft would be operating to deliver and provide logistic support to Marine Corps units ashore and that fire missions would be executed by ships launching ERGMs and other land-attack weapons, as called for by the Marine Corps. The committee believes it is necessary to construct a concept of operations that uses whichever measures are necessary to ensure that the theater missile defense can be coordinated with the offensive operations in such a manner that both succeed without conflict or danger to friendly forces.
From page 40...
... At the same time, and in the same area, defensive measures must be taken to defeat ballistic missile, cruise missile, and aircraft threats to forces in the area, both afloat and ashore. The conduct of effective theater missile defense without disruption of and conflict with offensive measures is a very difficult task but a necessary one.
From page 41...
... However, the Department of the Navy has not come to grips with the rapidly approaching necessity for overland cruise missile defense. In the future, adversaries will employ land-attack cruise missiles to deny U.S.
From page 42...
... Self-defense systems on some ship classes lagged in capability, but robust area defense gave Navy battle groups a good overall AAW capability. Today, with typical ship formations, the ability of one ship to defend another against some of the most dangerous antiship cruise missiles is almost nil, because the threats fly too low and too fast.
From page 43...
... The Marine Corps operational strategies, OMFTS and STOM, will require the Navy to provide layers of air defense overland. Carrier-based manned aircraft can be counted on to keep enemy manned aircraft at bay, but in the future the enemy may use land attack cruise missiles to attack fixed objectives such as ports and airfields.
From page 44...
... The Department of the Navy is unprepared for a defense against land-attack cruise missiles and is not funding development to rectify the situation. 3.1.3 Theater Ballistic Missile Defense The NAD system will implement a TBMD capability on all Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
From page 45...
... with an X-band radar for horizon-search against cruise missiles and for long-range TBM discrimination. Because the severity of the near-term threat calls for fielding an NTW capability quickly, because many engineering challenges must be overcome to field even a limited NTW capability, and because the Navy will surely benefit considerably from experience gained in beginning to use the system as soon as possible, the Navy is considering fielding the so-called Block I NTW system.
From page 46...
... National sensors for TBMD, (3) sensors for overland cruise missile defense, (4)
From page 47...
... Since the radar energy can be concentrated in a smaller region, the detection range for these smaller targets can be much greater (often by a factor of 2 or more) than that with autonomous search.
From page 48...
... Analysis indicates that such a capability will require an improvement in detection range by at least a factor of 2, which translates into
From page 49...
... The radar detection range depends on the target RCS, and a radar that is adequate for one particular RCS level may be inadequate or overdesigned for a smaller or larger target. The development and acquisition of a new radar will take a number of years.
From page 50...
... o 50 ....... 100 __ -- 150 __ - - 200 -- -- -- - 250 FIGURE 3.1 Trade-offs between radar range and interceptor velocity in a terminalphase engagement.
From page 51...
... A final approach to fire control for NTW is to launch the SM-3 based on data from external sensors. These might include up-range Aegis ships, an uprange land-based radar such as a THAAD, or a space-based system such as SBIRS-low.
From page 52...
... launches and one in the Western Hemisphere to detect submarine-launched ballistic missiles) and one mobile/deployable ground station.
From page 53...
... 3.2.1.3 Sensors for Overland Cruise Missile Defense The concept of Navy platforms providing OCMD requires the ability to detect, track, and intercept cruise missiles that are beyond the line-of-sight horizon of ships at sea. Clearly, an elevated sensor node will be a critical part of any OCMD system.
From page 54...
... Given the critical importance of an airborne air surveillance node for the achievement of a credible littoral TMD capability, the committee believes that this is a major issue that must be addressed. If funding to support the E-2C RMP is not available, alternative approaches to providing an elevated sensor for OCMD should be considered.
From page 55...
... Although AWACS, JLENS, and the proposed new E-2C radar would all provide excellent AMTI capabilities against current overland cruise missile threats, their future performance might be degraded by two factors. The first of these would be the introduction of low-RCS cruise missiles.
From page 56...
... However, multistatic radars can detect target glints and can exploit the fact that low-observable cruise missiles are not low-observable from all viewing angles. Thus, multistatic radars offer the possibility of countering further reductions in the nose-on RCS values of cruise missiles.
From page 57...
... Although the committee acknowledges the limitations of a TPS-59 as an OCMD sensor, it points out that when used in a TBMD role, its performance should be quite credible. 3.2.1.4 Sensors for Antiship Cruise Missile Defense As discussed in Chapter 2, the arsenal of antiship cruise missiles in the hands of potential adversaries is a formidable one.
From page 58...
... The Navy is developing four systems that together will bring a dramatic improvement in detection performance against antiship cruise missiles. The first is MFR, which is planned to provide a horizon search capability greatly exceeding that of any other radar in the fleet today.
From page 59...
... and cues from CEC, Aegis ships are reduced to near pointdefense capability against some low-altitude threats. Therefore detection improvements planned for ship classes other than Aegis are important for their survivability in-theater.
From page 60...
... E-2C aircraft have for decades provided wide-area air surveillance for carrier battle groups. They continue to be reasonably effective in this role, but the aircraft is looked on to carry out new missions in the future, as discussed in Section 3.2.13, "Sensors for Overland Cruise Missile Defense." Vectored toward an enemy aircraft by the E-2C, an F-14 aircraft can detect (but not identify)
From page 61...
... The SM-2 Block IVA is designed to intercept both lower atmosphere air-breathing threats and shorter-range tactical ballistic missiles. It engages tactical ballistic missiles in a deep reentry regime and employs a mid-wavelength infrared (MWIR)
From page 62...
... If the seeker field of view can cover the handover volume, the detection range is limited only by the seeker sensitivity. If the field of view is smaller than the handover volume, the seeker must scan the volume (for example, using step-stare modes)
From page 63...
... Navy Area TBMD Weapon (SM-2 Block IVA) The Navy is modifying its standard missile 2 Block IV into SM-2 Block IVA to provide an improved capability to engage short- to medium-range TBMs.
From page 64...
... Therefore target maneuvers of any sort will complicate terminal guidance. SM-2 Block IVA will intercept its target well within the atmosphere, when aerodynamically induced target maneuvers are possible.
From page 65...
... The committee was not presented with detailed analysis of the NTW system except for ascent-phase engagements. Many if not most of the situations the naval forces will face in expeditionary operations will require defense of forces against threats in trajectory descent phase coming from inshore.
From page 66...
... In this example, it is assumed that a forward sensor like SBIRS-high detects the launch of the threat and tracks it through burnout of the main propulsion. As previously mentioned, the SBIRS frame rate allows determination of azimuth and velocity with sufficient accuracy to project a handover volume forward in time suitable to cue the shipboard radar into a very reduced search volume.
From page 67...
... However, the radar limits the battle space, allowing time for only a single shot or salvo against most threats. Second, if the smaller RV cross sections that can be expected in the future cause the detection range to be less than the arbitrary 300 km assumed here, substantial improvements in radar performance will be required just to provide self-protection let alone to project protection ashore.
From page 68...
... This information and the need for observation time place a high premium on the interceptor sensor acquisition range as well as the interceptor commit time. Both parameters become even more important when countermeasures such as chaff and decoys are introduced.
From page 69...
... The provision of an outer layer of area defense against overland cruise missiles will require in addition to a resolution of the issues related to sensors a sea-launched missile that can be directed by an airborne platform. The development of such a weapon
From page 70...
... Aircraft with AMRAAM missiles may have some capability against lowaltitude cruise missiles, but sustainability considerations dictate that most of the defensive coverage for the area be provided by missiles launched from surface ships operating offshore. Except against cruise missiles that can be tracked by those ships, the Navy has no such capability at present, and the committee was unable to identify a program of record to develop such a capability.
From page 71...
... to handle emerging cruise missile threats, especially fast and highly maneuverable ones. The ESSM is a greatly improved upgrade of the sea sparrow; it provides a more powerful rocket motor, better aerodynamic control, and a new guidance system.
From page 72...
... Weapon Control in ASCMD The speed of many antiship cruise missiles, their ability to delay detection, and the adversary's potential to coordinate attacks so that greater numbers of
From page 73...
... These systems are as applicable for TBMD as they are for area AAW and CMD. The Navy and Marine Corps BMC3 for theater missile defense is discussed in more detail in the next section.
From page 74...
... Block IVA's imaging IR seeker will not be used against cruise missile or aircraft threats. 3.3 BATTLE MANAGEMENT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS 3.3.1 Introduction BMC3 is the overall process and supporting capability for realizing the tactical direction and coordination of sensor and weapon assets.
From page 76...
... A further dimension is the need to adapt to the rapid evolution of technology. BMC3 for theater missile defense is currently prescribed in a rather rigid manner with no natural provisions for the operational flexibility and adaptability that are likely to be required, either in terms of operational concepts or the underlying technical capabilities.
From page 77...
... Realizing fully that there is a very broad range of potential scenarios, the committee has selected neither the simplest possible scenarios nor those that appear most often on briefing charts, but simply plausible ones that illustrate the points made in this section. The first scenario involves theater-wide defense against ballistic missiles.
From page 78...
... The enemy is postulated to have chosen to launch cruise missiles directly through the Navy's aircraft so that friendly planes, commercial aircraft, incoming cruise missiles, and interceptor missiles could all occupy the same airspace. This second scenario poses extremely complex and difficult challenges for BMC3.
From page 79...
... Second, this air picture must somehow be related to the ground picture so that the naval shooters know the current location of the Marine Corps. Third, the BMC3 system must help the commander decide in real time on the best locations for intercepting the cruise missiles so as to minimize collateral damage caused by their falling debris (chemical and biological)
From page 80...
... In the more stressing threat scenarios, however, the BMC3 component begins to move to the forefront and becomes relatively more and more important. Thus one can say broadly that plans for wide-area systems against both ballistic and cruise missiles place a higher premium on the BMC3 system than do plans for more local defense systems (the NAD system and ship self-defense)
From page 81...
... In summary, BMC3 is already critical for the Navy's more stressing threat scenarios (NTW and overland cruise missile defense)
From page 82...
... In particular, a more modern approach would move from the many special-purpose systems shown here to a configuration based on common standards and general-purpose communication and computing capabilities. The center block in Figure 3.9 represents real-time and near-real-time decisions to allocate and launch defensive ship-based missiles.
From page 83...
... ~ | Link11 | ~ 1 C2P/ CDLMS l ACDS BLK 1/ SSDS MK2 Aegis C&D/ADS 83 Tr3ntinr31 nr3tr3 1 inks | Link | FIGURE 3.9 BMC3 system architecture. DMS, defense message system; OTCIXS, officer in tactical command information exchange subsystem; TADIXS, tactical data information exchange system; CUDIXS, common user data information exchange system; NAVMACS, naval modular automated communications system; TACINTEL, tactical intelligence information exchange system; J1Y7, joint tactical terminal; C1Y7, commander's tactical terminal; TIES, tactical information broadcast service; TDDS, tactical receive applications (TRAP)
From page 84...
... In addition, the area air defense commander (AADC) module has been established to provide a display capability to help time-critical (but not real-time)
From page 85...
... Since the Link 16 message set was developed in the context of air defense, it covers the sort of information needed for cruise missile defense. Ballistic missile defense, however, required new messages to be added for example, messages referring to missile launch and predicted impact points, space tracks, and engagement status.
From page 86...
... Serious consideration needs to be given to a much more modern approach to tactical data links. Such an approach would use a well-defined layered structure, as in Internet technology, instead of mixing the distinct problems of radio frequency (RF)
From page 87...
... The SIAP system engineer has emphasized the importance of establishing 8Joint Theater and Air and Missile Defense/Combat Identification Division (J85)
From page 88...
... 3.3.6 Cooperative Engagement Capability 3.3.6.1 Planned Capability CEC combines measurement-level data from multiple radars and other available sensors in near real time to form a composite track picture. The Navy's intent is to deploy CEC widely on cruisers, carriers, some destroyers, amphibious ships, and surveillance aircraft.l2 Initial focus is on air defense (primarily ship self-defense against cruise missiles)
From page 89...
... CECis being planned for use in naval ballistic missile defense and is also being considered for joint theater ballistic missile defense. However, a ballistic missile track picture is much easier to obtain than a lowaltitude cruise missile picture.l4 The question is thus whether the exchange of 13For example, Underway 10, conducted in September 2000, involved six CEC-equipped ships (1 CVN, 4 CGs, and 1 LHD)
From page 90...
... When the coverage regions do not overlap significantly, it could suffice just to send track data, which could be done via a (possibly enhanced) tactical data link.l5 The committee believes CEC can provide a valuable capability for ship selfdefense and overland cruise missile defense if adequate overland sensors are available in the latter case.
From page 91...
... Similarly, further development of the operational concepts for joint ballistic missile defense also appears to be required. In execution, the AADC module's display and tools allow for the near-realtime tasking and redirection of defensive assets.
From page 92...
... For example, in wide-area mission overland cruise missile defense, naval forces lack effective surveillance capability and would need the capability provided by a platform such as the AWACS or, perhaps, a group of UAVs. Crossing Service lines like this means that the appropriate technical and procedural capabilities must be in place; the committee saw no evidence that these requirements were being addressed for overland cruise missile defense.
From page 93...
... However, while it does have a high bandwidth, it was not designed to be a multipurpose communication system easily accommodating the inclusion of nodes not designed to its specialized interface specifications. · Newly emerging commercial wireless technology can be leveraged to meet missile defense communications needs.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.