Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel The Continuing Societal and Technical Challenges (2001) / Chapter Skim
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1. Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: An Overview of the Societal and Technical Challenges
1. Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: An Overview of the Societal and Technical Challenges
Pages 7-19
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From page 7... ...
1 Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: An Overview of the Societal and Technical Challenges The development and use of nuclear technology, which began in the early 1940s, has produced a substantial inventory of radioactive wastematerial with no current or currently known future use. The most radioactive fraction of this waste must be isolated from humans and the environment, because it produces hazardous levels of ionizing radiation that may persist for a long period of time and because some components of this waste can be used to make nuclear weapons.
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From page 9... ...
Moreover, HLW in need of safe management is also located in nations that are part of the former Soviet Union, in countries having Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, and in other countries. Figure 1.1 illustrates the general concept of a geological repository.
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In Canada, a federally appointed panel has recommended that the government postpone the search for a repository site until broad public acceptance of the geological isolation approach has been achieved. In Germany, there has been intense public opposition to moving spent fuel to an interim storage facility at Gorleben, the site of the German candidate repository, and the decision on whether to proceed with development of a repository at Gorleben has been delayed.
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From page 11... ...
The low- and intermediate-level waste programs in Sweden and Finland have been successful, and the Swedish HLW program is advancing, although more slowly than originally planned. Repository programs have not moved ahead as they were expected to by the technical community and by the political leadership that has sought advice from the technical community on management of HLW.
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From page 13... ...
More than four decades later, many national programs have carried out extensive investigations of a variety of rock types and geological settings as candidates for geological repositories.3 Much is known about the potential performance of candidate geological settings and engineered barriers, but the situation is now widely recognized to be more complex than originally expected. An important approach developed to reduce the impact of this complexity and of the resulting uncertainties is to employ multiple barrier systems, with engineered and geological barriers workin~ together to Five a robust overall safety system.
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From page 14... ...
The committee uses the term "security" as a parallel term to safety to highlight the problem of human actions that could compromise safe HLW management in a different way, namely by the retrieval of fissionable components of HLW such as plutonium with the intent of making nuclear weapons, or by the dispersal of highly radioactive materials over populated areas as an act of terrorism. The risk of human intrusion, including both inadvertent intrusion and deliberate intrusion, is a concern for both waste storage and underground disposal.
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From page 15... ...
15 During the l990s, experience in many national programs that investigated geological disposal demonstrated the need for flexibility and for accommodating the inherent limitations in the information that scientific investigation can provide about the geological setting and the durability of engineered barriers. These important limitations in scientific understanding comprise "scientific uncertainty," which can be reduced but not entirely eliminated by further research.
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From page 16... ...
The status of national programs is summarized in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses public perceptions and attitudes toward radioactive waste, particularly HLW.
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From page 17... ...
PUT can reduce the amount of actinides and long-lived fission products, but its actual efficiency in practice is unknown, and inevitably some radioactive waste will remain. This waste will require management in a geological repository or in surface facilities.
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The argument is predicated on acceptance of the assumption that a sealed repository represents less of a future burden than stored wastes for which one is still free to choose a disposal option. Many parties within the international HLW community now are considering the merits of a strategy involving emplacement of HLW deep underground in a facility designed for permanent closure but with the intent to carry out monitoring for a considerable period of time with an ongoing possibility of retrieval, as opposed to a program that involves relatively prompt closure of a repository and the absence of planned activities thereafter.
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From page 19... ...
The United States and several European nations are far along in planning HLW repositories, but no country has approved a design and commenced construction, although the United States has started operation of a geological repository for long-lived transuranic intermediate-level waste (the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, see Sidebar 4.1~. The national HLW programs regularly share technical data and the results of ongoing scientific research, and many scientific experts participate in multiple national programs.
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