Naval Mine Warfare Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces (2001) / Chapter Skim
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A. Details of Amphibious and Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations
A. Details of Amphibious and Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations
Pages 133-158
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From page 133... ...
antagonists still use former Soviet military doctrine a defense consisting of perimeter, main, and very shallow water (VSW) mine barriers in the beach approaches, and tough obstacles interspersed with antitank (AT)
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From page 134... ...
expeditionary operations from a sea base, and (4) sustained operations ashore.
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From page 135... ...
STOM employs the principles of maneuver warfare on land to maneuver on the sea in littoral regions in order to project combined arms MAGTFs directly against objectives well inland from the sea base. Specifically, STOM will allow for tactical movement by air and surface means from over the horizon directly toward assigned objectives inland without the need for stopping to seize and build up beachheads before moving on.
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From page 136... ...
The tasked assets in the ISR plan should be able to detect the transportation of mines and obstacle materials from depots to coastal areas, develop accurate environmental data and bottom mapping, determine both mined and unmined areas from the SW zone to the beach, and detect mining and obstacle construction on and behind the beaches in potential landing areas. This effort involves tasking national, theater, and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance assets by the joint task force (JTF)
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From page 140... ...
UUVs that are affordable, clandestine, and include a variety of capabilities will occupy an important role in the future of mine countermeasures. The Navy must acquire a family of UUVs and appropriate sensors if it is to operate effectively in shallow water in support of amphibious power projection missions in the future.
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From page 141... ...
SOURCE: Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
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From page 142... ...
Information on mine stockpiles, mining activities, and early bottom mapping in regions of potential contingencies, as well as data on gradients, tides, and other environmental parameters that could be available through MEDAL, should also be made accessible through this developing planning tool. Access to INTELINK is through the SIPRNET or the joint world intelligence collection system.
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From page 143... ...
. While the organic MCM CONOPS currently under assessment in the fleet will assist the battle groups and amphibious ready groups as they approach the designated LPAs, it will not be a substitute for surveillance and clandestine reconnaissance systems required to support amphibious power projection missions from the SW zone to across designated LPPs.
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From page 144... ...
Near-Term CMCO Required Capabilities Transit Lane Neutralization and Clearance Transit lanes begin at the line of departure (LOD) and extend to the 40-ft contour, a distance of up to 25 nautical miles.
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From page 145... ...
Transit Lane Neutralization and Clearance With the introduction of the AAAV the LOD will move seaward to a distance of 25 nautical miles or greater. Required is the clearance of up to six 165-yd lanes within 24 hours, 48-hour threshold.
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From page 146... ...
. Marking Until all landing craft, to include assault follow-on echelon craft, have inherent C4ISR detection, reception, and navigational systems to avoid mines or navigate through electronically marked lanes, physical marking systems will remain a requirement.
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From page 147... ...
Current CMCO Capability Table A.1 summarizes current and developing U.S. CMCO capability, and Figure A.5 indicates the likely number of mines and obstacles to be encountered for each transit lane using the nominal threat lay-down as outlined in Box A.1.
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From page 148... ...
1. Penetration of the minefields and obstacles in the transit lanes to the beach depends on a complex interaction of systems used in various time phases of the operation.
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From page 149... ...
Surveillance assets employed in support of upcoming amphibious operations are assumed to be either clandestine or wide enough in area coverage to conceal landing site intentions. D-30 to D-27 The CJTF reviews available historical intelligence of enemy capabilities, including sea mines and coastal beach defenses.
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From page 150... ...
The CATF requests/tasks surveillance assets to further refine the common operational picture relative to amphibious operations within the selected LPA. This action would engage a wide spectrum of national and theater surveillance assets as well as tactical intelligence assets.
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From page 151... ...
Additionally, definition of at-sea assembly area~s) and transit lanes landward through the LPSs becomes clearer.
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From page 152... ...
However, due to the potential for fratricide, standoff breaching will not be possible once the assault has begun, thus adding to clearance time lines and requiring additional technologies. If logistics lanes are sufficiently separated from assault lanes to allow standoff breaching, this significantly increases the CMCO requirement since additional transit lanes will be required from the assembly area, each with its assault lanes, to and through the SZ and up the beach.
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From page 153... ...
in roughly 2014. As time allows, feedback from reacquisition, identification, and charge placement activities during this period is used to make final adjustments of transit lanes.
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From page 154... ...
Therefore the committee assumed an additional transit lane for each LPS. This separate set of transit lanes for logistic purposes prevents the fratricide of incoming assault traffic as assault logistics lanes are opened.
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From page 155... ...
Without this early detection and classification effort the capability to reacquire, identify, and place neutralization charges in all transit lanes between H-48 and H-1 will probably not be feasible. Although it is not the intent of this report to determine VSW force structure, it was considered worthwhile to estimate the capability of the currently constituted VSW detachment for clearing a single transit lane for landing a BLT.
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From page 156... ...
It must further reacquire, identify, and place neutralization charges on identified mines in a transit lane from 30 nautical miles offshore landward to the SZ, less the augmentation available from EOD MCM detachments. The SZ boundary extends approximately 1725 yd seaward from the high-water mark on the beach.
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From page 157... ...
Similarly, there is a reluctance to neutralize mines by high-order detonation in the more distant perimeter and main mine belts more than a few hours before assault for fear of giving away intended transit lanes. Explosives are cheap; why not set off charges in many locations while the mines are being detonated?
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From page 158... ...
However, if JLOTS areas are in a benign area, then dedicated MCM force assets can be used in water depths greater than 40 ft. The Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force together need to identify the requirements for logistics shipping and associated areas and lanes to be cleared of mines and obstacles in order that MCM asset requirements can be defined and resources furnished for the near-, mid-, and far-term support of forces ashore.
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