Naval Mine Warfare Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces (2001) / Chapter Skim
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1. The Mine Warfare Problem
1. The Mine Warfare Problem
Pages 17-24
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From page 17... ...
In that battle Rear Admiral David Farragut, the Union commander, using techniques involving surveillance and reconnaissance followed by mine hunting and avoidance of the located minefield techniques that are similar in concept to those in use today1 penetrated the barrier losing only a single ship. This action perhaps helped establish an attitude that has persisted to this day: that mine warfare is principally for the use of weaker naval forces to defend against, and to be overcome by, stronger ones.
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From page 18... ...
life, this mining campaign continued to stop shipping into and out of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese harbors, thus interdicting 95 percent of the seaborne logistics resupply to North Vietnam. A limited attempt to employ mines during the Persian Gulf War proved less successful.
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From page 19... ...
Navy and Marine Corps contingency regions have significant mineable waters, including the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Taiwan Strait, the Red Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Yellow Sea, the Korea Strait, and the coastal margins of the Sea of Japan. (See Figures 2.1 through 2.4 in Chapter 2 for illustrative locations of potential minefields in water depths consistent with known mine characteristics.)
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From page 20... ...
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From page 21... ...
Strategically employed, remotely controlled, smart minefields incorporating a distributed sensor system could be a cost-effective counter to the feared proliferation of quiet nonnuclear submarines. International conventions signed by the United States forbid the laying of armed sea mines in international waters in peacetime unless they are continuously monitored and international shipping is warned of their location.
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From page 22... ...
· Dispersed force operations. In the future, surface warships and submarines may be dispersed throughout the theater doing key task unit operations (strike, fire support, theater air defense, and theater ballistic missile defense)
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From page 23... ...
The unified commands actually operate the mine warfare forces in-theater; the intelligence agencies provide vital ISR information; Marine Corps units must work closely with the Navy in any amphibious operations and interface with Army mine warfare (and other) operations ashore; Navy and Coast Guard units must work together closely in inshore mine warfare opera10Johnson, ADM Jay L., USN, Chief of Naval Operations.
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From page 24... ...
These recommendations provide the committee's best judgment on how current mine warfare programs can be strengthened to meet future naval force needs, how additional efforts should be developed to address future capability shortfalls, and how the naval forces can better leverage joint or national assets to meet their objectives. The most important of these recommendations are highlighted in the Executive Summary under seven overarching summary recommendations; the remainder are included in the relevant sections of Chapters 2 through 5.
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