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2. Fundamental Crosscutting Issues
Pages 25-55

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From page 25...
... The importance of the mine threat is reinforced by the strategic orientation of the naval forces and U.S. joint forces generally to expeditionary warfare along the littorals, where battle groups, amphibious forces, and the seaborne logistic support for all U.S.
From page 26...
... 26 NAVAL MINE WARFARE: OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CHALLENGES FIGURE 2.1 Taiwan Strait. FIGURE 2.2 Sea of Japan and Korea Strait.
From page 27...
... FUNDAMENTAL CROSSCUTTING ISSUES 27 FIGURE 2.3 Persian Gulf. FIGURE 2.4 Indonesia.
From page 28...
... Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should take the steps needed to establish mine warfare as a major naval warfare area. Such an elevation in warfare status will require that the Department of the Navy (a)
From page 29...
... To date, some additional progress has been made in each of these areas. Navy staff beefed this committee on shortfalls in the Fleet Engagement Strategy and a draft implementation plan intended to both address the shortfalls and define the schedule and the hierarchy of responsibility and accountability for "mainstreaming" mine warfare.2 Mainstreaming mine warfare and adding organic MCM capabilities to the fleet is a significant and complex undertaking, critical to the ability of deployed carrier battle groups (CVBGs)
From page 30...
... Incorporating organic MCM capabilities into the fleet and mainstreaming mine warfare are integrally related. They succeed or fail together.
From page 31...
... Adequate CVBG and ARG Expertise Independent of the transition to new organic MCM capabilities, deploying CVBGs and ARGs need to prepare for the likely mine threat by leveraging existing countermine warfare capabilities. For example, the mission areas required for CVBG and ARG certification prior to deployment already formally include the mine warfare mission area.
From page 32...
... Similarly, readiness to conduct mine warfare must be reported as part of overall unit readiness, especially in view of the growing likelihood of mine encounters in littoral waters and in expeditionary operations. As the new organic MCM systems are introduced into the fleet, MCM readiness associated with those systems should become reportable in the ship's operational readiness training status (SORTS)
From page 33...
... Recommendation: Naval component and other operational commanders should enhance realism in Redeployment training, fleet maneuvers, and amphibious warfare exercises by routinely including mine threats, in addition to air and submarine threats, in such exercises and by assigning realistic consequences to poorly planned and executed countermine warfare operations. Recommendation: The CNO should have the MIREM program examined and upgraded, including increased emphasis on warship self-protection measures and emerging organic MCM systems.
From page 34...
... Also, to ensure adequate and appropriate attention to inshore countermine warfare, the Marine Corps would have to be a participant in battle laboratory activities, along with amphibious force commanders. Recommendation: The CNO and the CMC together should establish a mine warfare battle laboratory under the auspices of the numbered fleet commanders)
From page 35...
... Aviation MCM training relies on on-thejob training. The need to incorporate mine warfare into the mainstream of naval force training and education is noted above, and the current state of inadequate attention to the necessary personnel planning and training for integration of the organic MCM systems into the fleet is noted in Chapter 4 in connection with offshore countermine warfare.
From page 36...
... of the existing fleet of dedicated mine warfare forces, and another third is for ongoing development of the seven organic MCM systems described in Chapter 4 of this report. This leaves a little over $1.5 billion over the 5-year FYDP period to meet all the other needs for mine warfare described in detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this report.
From page 37...
... The Secretary of the Navy and the CNO should review the allocation of funds by warfare area in the future year defense program (FYDP) , with a view to finding ways to increase funding in the mine warfare area to meet the urgent mining and countermine warfare program needs identified in this report.
From page 38...
... Notwithstanding its importance, ISR for maritime mining and countermine warfare is not in good order, either in the fleet or elsewhere in the defense establishment. Improvement in ISR for mine warfare can have a greater impact on navalforces mine warfare capability than any other step that might be taken.
From page 39...
... MCM ships and fleet combat ships do not routinely have on board the environmental data needed for efficient MCM operations, from simple avoidance to active mine hunting and minesweeping. Knowledge of environmental conditions is essential both for mining and for countermine warfare.
From page 40...
... Recommendation: The CNO should plan to retain and modernize a capable, dedicated MCM warfare force that would be available for those situations in which the MCM requirements exceed the available organic MCM capabilities of the deployed battle groups. Such a cledicated force should include: · Upgraded surface MCM ships and their potential future replacements as discussed in Chapter 4; · Dedicated MCM helicopters, including retention of the MH-53E helicopter in the dedicated airborne MCM force until it can be replaced by equipment that provides comparable capability, perhaps as a variant of the Navy's next-generation heavy-lii~t logistic aircrailc;8 · Augmented EOD/VSW teams and systems designed to help or replace them; · Continued provision of support for deployed dedicated surface, airborne, and undersea MCM craft that is similar in concept to that provided by the :Inchon (MCS-12)
From page 41...
... If mine warfare is to become a warfare area comparable with air, surface, and undersea warfare, all the information collection discussed above must be considered part of the naval forces' expansion of their fundamental design and operational techniques into the network-centric warfare mode.6 Mine warfare cannot be treated as a merely collateral responsibility for the naval and joint forces' command, control, communication, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and 6Naval Studies Board, National Research Council.
From page 42...
... and the INTELINK contingency planning tool. Recommendation: The CNO and the CMC, through their senior planning staffs, the fleet and fleet Marine force commands, and in joint forums, should take steps to ensure that the ISR needed for mining and countermine warfare is planned and integrated into all naval warfare activities as part of a total system that starts with ISR and ends with successful mine interdiction, mine countermeasures (including avoidance)
From page 43...
... From another perspective, some of the new organic MCM systems (RMS and MH-60S capability) will add still another mission onto the DDG class of ships (together with antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, naval surface fire support, and potentially, theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD)
From page 44...
... planning and programming for follow-on dedicated MCM command and support capability and for follow-on dedicated surface, airborne, and undersea MCM capabilities. Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC should plan to retain and continually evolve the dedicated MCM force based on an integrated plan that is prepared, updated, and optimized as lessons from the combined dedicated and organic force operations are learned.
From page 45...
... For the longer term (i.e., beyond the lifetime of the above short-term Inchon replacement ships) , the anticipated continuing need for larger-scale MCM capabilities than those planned for the battle groups, as well as the need for better support to inshore MCM, indicates a prospective need for more capable forwarddeployed, dedicated MCM forces to avoid the long deployment times.
From page 46...
... Because of their additional role in logistic support closer to shore and in inshore MCM in support of amphibious landings and their relationship to current and planned capabilities of the MCS discussed above, their essential capabilities and shortcomings are summarized here, leading to the future of the dedicated mine warfare forces. Detailed recommendations regarding these force components individually are contained in Chapter 4.
From page 47...
... constitutes the current airborne MCM component of the dedicated mine warfare force. It is a multipurpose helicopter employed for both vertical replenishment and airborne MCM.
From page 48...
... Recommendation: The CNO should plan to retain and modernize a capable, dedicated MCM warfare force that would be available for those situations in which the MCM requirements exceed the available organic MCM capabilities of the deployed battle groups. Such a dedicated force should include: · Upgraded surface MCM ships and their potential future replacements as discussed in Chapter 4; · Dedicated MCM helicopters, including retention of the MH-53E helicopter in the dedicated airborne MCM force until it can be replaced by equipment that provides comparable capability, perhaps as a variant of the Navy's nextgeneration heavy-lift logistic aircraft;8 The decision between retiring the MH-53E force, extending its service life, or acquiring a followon dedicated helicopter may need to be made before all the new mine warfare components of the MH-60S host aircraft have been fielded and their overall capability fully measured, depending on the pace of any new heavy-lift helicopter program.
From page 49...
... In addition, the MCM ships and helicopters will be vulnerable to enemy action in the form of antiship and antiaircraft missiles as they perform their missions within range of such weapons. When deployed, MCM ships have no 9Schilt, Michael P., Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Bremerton Detachment, Bremerton, Wash., "SSRNM Fleet Status" (Slide 11)
From page 50...
... More generally, beyond the threat of enemy shore defenses discussed above, there seems to be a general inattention, in planning MCM and, more broadly, in developing overall countermine warfare systems, to potential obvious, low-cost enemy countermeasures to many ongoing U.S. MCM programs.
From page 51...
... ports. In the future, the new organic MCM systems that will become available on each coast later in the decade could reduce the initial response time now needed to move an airborne and surface MCM capability to the threatened area from Corpus Christi.
From page 52...
... and allied countermine warfare forces will have to be highly interoperable, requiring standardized countermine warfare data structures and data links. NATO channels and procedures offer major opportunities for such standardization.
From page 53...
... JOINT INTERESTS AND INTEGRATED CONCEPTS OF OPERATION Although the Navy has the responsibility for clearing mines from the sea lanes and the inshore areas that must be traversed by amphibious and logistic support shipping, much of mining and countermine warfare is of joint interest and involves joint forces. For examples, see below: .
From page 54...
... Joint concepts of operation for mine delivery in contingency areas, with families of sea mines that are compatible with both Navy and Air Force means of delivery. All of these concepts of operation must be developed as an essential element of the integration of mining, countermine warfare, and all the subordinate systems and activities into naval force and joint force activities.
From page 55...
... They should involve TRANSCOM in any aspects of logistic support operations that TRANSCOM must attend to in order to benefit from Navy countermine warfare support to protect logistics shipping and offloading.


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