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5. Inshore Countermine Warfare
Pages 99-130

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From page 99...
... Strategic Need Amphibious landings against significant opposition are a rare event. Few such landings have been needed since the heavily opposed landings during World War II.1 The Inchon landing in the Korean War was made without major oppo1Operation Overlord, the cross-channel invasion of June 6, 1944, was the largest opposed amphibious assault of the war, and by far the most difficult and costly MCM operation.
From page 100...
... opponents along the littoral. The Soviet defensive mine doctrine, which was followed only in part by Iraq in defending against a possible coalition landing in 1991, called for a succession of mine barriers starting with a perimeter minefield about 25 nautical miles off the beach, extending through a main mine barrier with several lines of mines about 7 to 9 nautical miles offshore and a VSW barrier, and ending with a heavy deployment of mines and obstacles from the surf zone through the beach exit zone.
From page 101...
... State of Navy Responsibility and Attention to the Need Although the Navy has moved smartly to increase capability for offshore countermine warfare in support of amphibious landings and subsequent logistic operations, the same cannot be said for inshore countermine warfare. Currently, the Navy has responsibility for mine clearance up to the high-water mark in support of Marine Corps amphibious landings, with the Marines being responsible for clearing the beach and the exit points.
From page 102...
... State of Current Capability and Efforts vis-a-vis Marine Corps Requirements Capability for inshore mine and obstacle clearance today is only slightly better, in effectiveness and speed, than it was in preparation for the Normandy landing during World War II. Essentially all of the nation's inshore/surf zone countermine warfare capability currently resides in the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
From page 103...
... The Physical Environment Modern sensors and their projected improvements are becoming increasingly sensitive to environmental parameters. Foreknowledge of these parameters is, therefore, becoming more critical to the operational effectiveness of countermine warfare (CMW)
From page 104...
... Above all, the intent is to define a countermine warfare sequence of systems, and not an uncoordinated set of CMW assets. The exemplar problem set for this section is the one described in Appendix A clearance of six 165-yd-wide transit lanes from the 40- to 10-ft contour, and for each, the breaching of two 50-yd assault lanes through the SZ and CLZ, and the clearance of an 80 x 80 yd offloading zone on the beach, the initial craft landing zone (ICLZ)
From page 105...
... The threat environment is outlined in Appendix A Intelligence In a 1994 report,6 and again in its 1997 report on undersea warfare,7 the Naval Studies Board (NSB)
From page 106...
... There is little evidence, however, that all-source surveillance has been addressed as a unified program, that tasking priorities have been addressed, or that the required architecture for converting all-source data into an evolving tactical picture for commanders has been considered. Joint Littoral Awareness Network (,ILAN)
From page 107...
... However, it is understood that the system, designed to be deployed in the littoral and capable of detecting minelaying activity and quiet diesel electric submarines, has successfully passed its milestone reviews and is set for procurement in FY05. ADS appears to be better 9Evans, CAPT Kirk, USN, Comanding Officer, Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, Research Development Testing and Evaluation Division, Naval Research and Development Command, San Diego, Calif., "Joint Littoral Awareness Network Advanced Technology Demonstration (JLAN-ACTD)
From page 108...
... Reconnaissance Surveillance can detect the existence of mine laying and the rough boundaries of the resulting minefield, but reconnaissance is needed to provide ground truth and to begin filling in the details of inshore minefield boundariesii and mine and minelike object density, and ultimately to focus detection and classification efforts on likely mine locations. Fortunately, the effort to achieve a minefield reconnaissance capability has been more aggressively pursued over the past 10 years than has the effort to fully utilize surveillance assets.
From page 109...
... Therefore, although the committee supports the ongoing R&D effort in UUVs, it cautions against any attempt to replace swimmers and marine mammals until UUVs have proved to be a more cost-effective solution, the naval community has learned to place equal confidence in them, they have demonstrated the ability to overcome countermeasures such as fishing nets (including mist nets, which can be strung in lengths of up to 40 miles) , and they can successfully replicate the mammals' unique ability to detect buried mines.
From page 110...
... Buried Mine Detection by Electrical Resistivity. The VSW detachment and, later, UUVs need an ability to detect buried mines; this is especially important in Maritime Technology Sector, ``Clandestine Mine Reconnaissance and countermeasures system, briefing to the Panel on Undersea Warfare, Technology for Future Naval Forces, on February 12, 1997, science Applications International corporation, McLean, vat
From page 111...
... The top surface of the rectangular device can be insulated to prevent interference from surface wave effects, and it is "flown" over the bottom a distance allowing the electrical field to penetrate to the desired depth (say, 12 ink. Given sufficient distance above the bottom, the device can detect the anchor and cable of moored mines, bottom mines, and buried mines.
From page 112...
... The objective, in addition to that noted above, is to eliminate the burdensome task of lane marking by systems that may be obscured at critical times during an assault.l8 The Mine Clearance Task The section "Amphibious Operations" in Appendix A stipulates that the VSW detachment, aided by CMR/CS, would use the 48 hours of D-2 to D-Day to 3730:(1) :89-100, AeroSense 1999 Symposium, held at Orlando, Fla., April 5-9; Goldfine, Neil J., Andrew P
From page 113...
... However, with the eventual introduction of large well-deck/flight-deck amphibious ships, the perfection of airborne MCM, and demonstration of the stability characteristics of the SWATH hull form, all of the flaws in the original idea can be remedied. Such a dedicated MCM support ship with both well deck and flight deck capable of deploying with the battle groups and amphibious ready groups, and carrying enough airborne MCM and surface MCM assets, could be able to handle the littoral mine threat.~9 An MHS-l-like craft to supplant the MSL would be able to perform the functions originally intended for the MSL, in addition to the swimmer and mammal support tasks described above.
From page 114...
... 11-13 (see also Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 7.
From page 115...
... , and joined Kernel Blitz 99 under its own power from Coronado. In these exercises the MHS-1 performed above expectations, operated for 48 continuous hours with only crew changes, continued operation when other MCM craft had to return to port due to heavy weather, accurately identified 10 out of 11 contacts, duplicated the performance of MH-15 helicopters equipped with the AN/AQS-14 sonar, and demonstrated the ability to return to a mine contact four times in four tnes.22 When a small SWATH mine hunter/neutralizer is designed with the MHS-1 as the baseline, the mine avoidance sonar should be upgraded to m~ne-hunting status and should be equipped with an expendable mine neutralization vehicle.
From page 116...
... The MHS-1 has demonstrated its ability to do the work, in the littoral environment, of the MCM-1, MHC-51, and MH-53. A support ship designed or modified with the above capacity would transport, deploy, support, and recover the MCM equivalent of roughly the combined MCM capability of the coalition forces of Desert Storm (26 surface MCM hunter/neutralizers and 6 airborne MCM helicopters)
From page 117...
... Attachment of a neutralization charge to a mine such that it remains in place under current conditions is a problem yet to be solved. The bungee cord works with moored mines and with proud mines but is less applicable with partially and completely buried mines.
From page 118...
... And creating and projecting a wave onto the beach through which the energy is focused appears problematic. The committee understands that a research effort is ongoing to produce a small mine neutralization charge using aluminum powder and water.
From page 119...
... For calculation purposes, the committee stipulates that instead of focusing on the two 80 x 80 yd areas (the ICLZ) at the end of each 50-yd assault lane, clearance will focus on the 65 x 100 yd area between the two assault lanes projecting through the SZ and CLZ from each 165-yd transit lane.
From page 120...
... respectively. The standoff range is 15 nautical m~les.27 The committee considered the number of missile dispensers and the number of 5-in.-/155-mm rounds required to clear the SZ and ICLZ area for six transit lanes (12 assault lanes)
From page 121...
... Harvest Hammer. In both its 1994 MCM study29 and its 1997 TFNF study,30 the Naval Studies Board concluded that air-delivered bombs used to create a line charge analogue were the only effective means of clearing both mines and obstacles from the assault lanes through the SZ and ICLZ within the time limit desired by the Marine Corps.
From page 122...
... . After reviewing the many ideas proposed over the past decade for clearing assault lanes through the SZ and CLZ within the desired time limits and ICLZ dimensions, the committee believes that the Harvest Hammer approach holds the greatest promise.
From page 123...
... Harvest Hammer is intended for use only in cases where both mines and obstacles are present, where there is no alternative to breaching, and where breaching time is cntical. In such cases, IA3 could include antiaircraft guns and missiles.
From page 124...
... and extending through the SZ and ICLZ (20 x 4 x 2025 divided by 20) would require 8100 cubic ft of chemicals, or 16,200 cubic ft for two assault lanes.
From page 125...
... Assuming that Harvest Hammer has been used to clear the assault lanes, the water cannon would be used to rearrange the slope of the terminal lip (if required) to cut the longitudinal berm on the interior side of the channel,34 and to 34During the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptians used high-pressure water jets to breach the sar-Lev Line.
From page 126...
... Once the 22 AP mines have been swept to a known location, combat engineers can place neutralization charges on the 11 AT mines, and on the two concrete blocks and two tetrahedrons. Since the triple roll of concertina wire will already have been cut by the two assault channels, this vehicle could simply drag the rolls inland for disposal.
From page 127...
... Behind, and towed by the strong-back, is a chain "blanket" used to hold the strong-back on the ground under tow and to sift disturbed earth through the blanket while leaving buried mines proud of the ground. Disturbed earth and mines flow over the strong-back in a kind of standing wave.
From page 128...
... The key issue is that a satisfactory lane-marking and assault vehicle navigation system is needed to safely guide assault and logistics vehicles along relatively narrow transit and assault lanes under varying conditions of visibility. A system that does not depend on pre-emplaced navigational aids would appear to be the preferred methodology, such as one that relies on the GPS coordinates in conjunction with autopilot controls on the AAAV and LCAC, should be developed for this purpose.
From page 129...
... · The CNO and the CMC should agree on, and the CNO should ensure that the Navy funds, the programs needed to fulfill the Navy's responsibility to clear minefields from the VSW zone through the SZ that the Marines may have to traverse to make amphibious landings of up to two Marine expeditionary brigades in size against levels of opposition and on the time lines that have been jointly determined and agreed to be reasonable. These programs should include: Expansion of the MCM capability supported by the dedicated MCM support ships)
From page 130...
... The airborne MCM helicopters were sitting on the pier in Abu Dhabi waiting for a ship, and the surface MCM platforms were just arriving in the Gulf. Lacking any clear intelligence picture, command estimates of the amount of time requires!


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