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The Drama of the Commons (2002) / Chapter Skim
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Part II: Privatization and Its Limitations
Pages 193-196

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From page 193...
... In theory, for private goods, markets efficiently determine what, how much, how, and for whom to produce in the current period and over time. Tietenberg and Rose argue that it is difficult to privatize common-pool resources in the real and messy world when property rights are not easily defined and enforced, a prerequisite for efficient market functioning.
From page 194...
... He suggests that if a society wishes to prevent a concentration of permits in the hands of some resource users, it may limit transferability of the quotas, of course at the cost of lowering economic effectiveness. Tietenberg examines cases in which a local, state, or national government assigns property rights and allocates them among common-pool resource users.
From page 195...
... Second, the allocation of rights is a difficult political process that has to be solved in any environmental regime. The allocation process, therefore, deserves special attention in the analysis of "implementation feasibility." Third, both chapters point out the crucial importance of monitoring and enforcement for any institutional arrangement governing common property resources.


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