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Bioterrorism: A View from the Side
Pages 106-114

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From page 106...
... I have a Ph.D. in molecular biology and a doctor of science degree in virology, and my dissertation focused on the antigen structure of the glycoproteins of the Aujeszky's disease (pseudorabies)
From page 107...
... How can we reduce the probability that terrorists will use biological weapons? It seems that bioterrorism is an evil we will have to encounter in the near future, and the entire world community will have to fight it with united efforts.
From page 108...
... If bioterrorists were to develop their own strain using current molecular biological methods, it would require substantial expenditures, and at present I believe this to be unlikely, although possible.
From page 109...
... Terrorist acts involving the widespread release of dangerous human pathogens (smallpox, anthrax) in crowded areas could potentially lead to huge numbers of human casualties and enormous economic costs involved in dealing with the consequences, which could destabilize the situation in a country.
From page 110...
... Take, for example, a recently published study by Australian researchers that attracted worldwide notice. These researchers cloned the interleukin-4 gene in mouse pox virus and, as a result, unexpectedly obtained a virus substantially more virulent than the initial strain.
From page 111...
... Given Russia's economic weakness and its poor technical preparedness for dealing with the consequences of bioterrorism, a wide-scale bioterrorist attack carried out on Russian soil would in high likelihood produce an unfavorable scenario that might lead to a large number of casualties, social tension, and a destabilization of the situation. Thus, Russia finds itself in a situation characterized on the one hand by favorable conditions for terrorist groups to make or even develop bioweapons and on the other hand by a lack of preparedness to counter a bioterrorist act if it is committed.
From page 112...
... I would like to stress that serious attention needs to be paid to support not only for military science, but also for peaceful biological science not associated with bioweapons. From the standpoint of potential involvement in the manufacture or development of bioweapons, civilian virologists or molecular biologists are even more attractive to bioterrorists than are military specialists, given the weak control and monitoring research work carried out in civilian biological institutes in comparison with military organizations.
From page 113...
... In this regard, Russia could potentially become one of the top sites for the manufacture of biological weapons by terrorists. Active targeted support for Russian biological science by the world community, and primarily by the United States of America, would undoubtedly promote the elimination of these negative tendencies.


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