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Chemical Terrorism: Assessing Threats and Responses
Pages 115-134

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From page 117...
... Terrorists intent on acquiring chemical weapons have two options: buying or stealing them from existing national stockpiles, or manufacturing them independently. Because the synthesis of military-grade agents entails significant technical hurdles and risks, the acquisition of toxic industrial chemicals is more likely.
From page 118...
... Nonpersistent agents dissipate within a few hours and pose mainly an inhalation threat, whereas persistent agents remain hazardous for as long as a month when deposited on terrain, vegetation, or objects, and pose primarily a skin contamination threat. Blister agents, such as sulfur mustard and lewisite, are liquids that cause chemical burns.
From page 119...
... In pursuit of this mad scheme, Aum aggressively recruited scientists and technicians from Japanese universities to work on the development and production of chemical weapons as part of a "chemical brigade" within the cult's "Ministry of Science and Technology."3 Aum chemists chose to manufacture sarin because of its relative ease of production compared with other nerve agents, its volatility, and the fact that the necessary ingredients could be obtained from commercial suppliers. The cult purchased a Swiss-made pilot plant with computerized process controls, normally used by industry to prototype chemicals.
From page 120...
... , shortness of breath, muscular twitching, and gastrointestinal problems; and 984 had miosis only.6 Had the sarin been purer and disseminated in aerosol form, the attack would have caused many more deaths. A few weeks later, on May 5, 1995, Aum staged another chemical attack in a Tokyo subway station, this time using a crude binary weapon.
From page 121...
... Synthesis of nerve agents requires the use of high temperatures and corrosive and dangerous chemicals, and would not be feasible for terrorists untrained in synthetic organic chemistry. Blister agents such as sulfur mustard could be produced more easily if the necessary ingredients were available, but ordering large quantities of a key precursor chemical such as thiodiglycol from a commercial supplier would arouse suspicion and might lead the requested company to notify law enforcement authorities.
From page 122...
... According to one estimate, the number of organophosphate compounds a category that includes nerve agents, pesticides, and fire retardants exceeds 50,000.~5 Thus, toxic industrial chemicals are widely accessible in a way that the materials needed to produce military-grade CW agents are not. The Monterey Institute database suggests that, historically, terrorists have tended to employ "off-the-shelf" chemicals that are readily available.
From page 123...
... Because the contamination was not discovered for months, dioxin was probably present in chicken meat and eggs sold in Europe in early 1999.~8 This experience suggests that other toxic chemicals could be used to poison the food supply, by way of either animal feed, a food-processing facility, or direct product tampering. A terrorist incident involving the deliberate poisoning of a beverage took place in Dushanbe, the capital of the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan, on December 31, 1994.
From page 124...
... PREVENTING CHEMICAL TERRORISM Government authorities can take a number of measures to reduce the risk of chemical terrorism. First, state and local emergency management officials should conduct vulnerability assessments of the chemical manufacturing plants within their jurisdictions and encourage the owners to improve security at sites that produce or store toxic chemicals.
From page 125...
... EMTs sought to triage the victims and offer some medical assistance, but they did not administer antidotes, intubate serious cases at the scene, or attempt to decontaminate the victims or even remove their sarin-saturated clothes.25 The Tokyo subway incident demonstrated that first responders to an incident of chemical terrorism who lack personal protective equipment (such as police, paramedics, and ordinary firefighters) are at considerable risk of becoming victims themselves.26 Indeed, some observers have called police officers "blue canaries" because they would probably succumb to the toxic agent shortly after arriving on the scene.
From page 126...
... National Laboratories are developing handheld detectors that first responders could use to identify about a dozen different CW agents.27 Until the toxic agent has been identified, medical practitioners should treat exposed persons according to the resulting clinical syndrome (cluster of symptoms) , such as chemical burns, pulmonary edema, cardiorespiratory failure, neurological damage, or shock.28 At the same time that first responders are treating the casualties of a chemical attack, law enforcement officials will have to conduct a criminal investigation in order to identify and arrest the perpetrators.
From page 127...
... Accordingly, decontamination is needed not only to prevent further absorption of the toxic agent through the skin or by inhalation of vapor, but also to prevent the victims from contaminating other people and the interior of cars and ambulances. During the Tokyo subway incident, police were slow in establishing a perimeter around the affected zone and did not decontaminate victims on-site.
From page 128...
... But no antidotes currently exist for exposure to choking or blister agents, which must be treated symptomatically. Inhalation of choking agents typically results in pulmonary edema, which can be managed by administering oxygen, cortisone, and a drug to widen the bronchial tubes.
From page 129...
... Psychosocial Impact Another problem that will inevitably arise during an incident of chemical terrorism is that a large number of people will experience psychogenic symptoms or extreme anxiety and self-report to hospitals and doctors' offices for treatment. During the 1995 Tokyo subway incident, roughly 80 percent of the casualties who arrived at hospitals (about 4000 people)
From page 130...
... But although Hazmat specialists deal routinely with spills and accidental releases of toxic industrial chemicals, they require additional training to safely contain military-grade agents and to decontaminate and treat large crowds of victims. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Domenici, tasked the Department of Defense (in conjunction with other federal agencies)
From page 131...
... Although such compounds are far less toxic than military-grade agents, the Bhopal disaster demonstrates the deadly potential that could result from the sabotage of a commercial chemical plant or a series of railroad tank cars. It therefore makes sense to devote more resources to addressing forms of chemical terrorism that would be less catastrophic but are more likely, such as industrial sabotage, rather than focusing exclusively on worst-case scenarios involving the large-scale release of a military nerve agent.
From page 132...
... 9. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, WMD Terrorism Database, data as of May 7, 2001.
From page 133...
... 2001. Feds prepare state, local governments for terrorist attacks.


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