Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

Problems of Biological Security in Agriculture
Pages 207-218

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 209...
... In fact, we have already seen a case in which the religious sect Aum Shinrikyo carried out a terrorist act using chemical weapons and attempted to initiate production of biological weapons. In many countries, the public has been concerned about the possible consequences of terrorist acts in our high-tech society, and attempts are being made to develop effective methods of combating these phenomena.
From page 210...
... A sharp reduction in food resources is always accompanied by demoralization and the worsening of demographic indicators regarding the health of the population. The economic costs involved in fighting epizootic diseases are practically always enormous, not to mention the costs of protecting health and preventing financial damages associated with quarantine measures and reduced labor productivity.
From page 211...
... Today, the overwhelming majority of states and their leaders actively oppose the use of pathogens as a means for the mass destruction of people, plants, and animals. Thanks to the activism of many politicians advocating controls over work with especially dangerous pathogens, you will not hear any strategists of warfare or terrorist acts saying that biological weapons are not only the most economically accessible, but also the most humane of weapons from the standpoint of preserving material valuables or the environment.
From page 212...
... joint expert committee on veterinary sanitation.3 However, in certain cases this system is ignored for reasons of economic constraints, which usually follow after the issuance of official FAO notifications on the presence of quarantine infections in a country. This creates a precedent for the wide-scale spread of especially dangerous infections.
From page 213...
... We have seen dozens of examples in which agents from so-called natural foci infections appeared far beyond the borders of the areas in which they are traditionally found: African swine fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, Rift Valley fever, and others. The territorial rotation of pathogens always causes significant difficulties in the areas where the pathogens have newly arrived.
From page 214...
... Highly infectious material can be produced in quantities sufficient for the commission of terrorist acts even in the most primitive conditions barns, caves, or even animal pens. Doing this would require just 1-2 ml of a pathogen and a susceptible animal.
From page 215...
... First, legislative limits must be placed on the number of scientific institutes and biological enterprises that are authorized to work with especially dangerous pathogens and with infectious materials in general. The international community must develop methods for monitoring the safe operation of biological enterprises regardless of their ownership.
From page 216...
... It is also essential to strengthen the 1972 convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, first of all by creating an atmosphere of international trust. From the first years of its production activity, the Pokrov Biological Preparations Plant of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture operated on a self-financing basis, requiring no budget support from the government.
From page 217...
... These infections have really appeared on the horizon of the twenty-first century in connection with the growth of international trade, tourism, ethnic conflicts, natural and technological catastrophes, and an ever-increasing number of militarized conflicts. Given the real threat of biocatastrophes, efforts must be stepped up to create international institutions that will focus their activities on rendering practical assistance to states in eliminating even small foci of especially dangerous exotic diseases.
From page 218...
... 1968. Thermonuclear, chemical, and biological weapons: means of mass destruction.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.