Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks Implications for National Security Emergency Preparedness (1989) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 9-15
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From page 9... ...
create a more fragmented (less unified) network of networks, and the National Communications System and other users of the public switched networks will have to factor this fragmentation into their planning for national security emergency preparedness.
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The committee also commends the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) for bringing together industry and government representatives to address NSEP issues.
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The Deputy Manager of NCS agreed that the committee should examine switching and control in the context of a broader review focused on what the public switched networks might look like in the year 2000 and what the NCS planners may be faced with in fulfi~ing the President's National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-97~. The committee heard presentations from industry network planners, systems architects, technologists, and engineers as well as regulators, manufacturers, academics, network management experts, and individuals from the research and development community.
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From page 12... ...
While a fiber route is not inherently more vulnerable than alternative methods of landline transmission, fewer fiber routes are needed to meet national capacity requirements. The power of optical fiber technology is diminishing the number of geographic transmission routes, increasing the concentration of traffic within those routes, reducing the use of other transmission technologies, and restricting spatial diversity.
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From page 13... ...
The third is the economic disruption that can occur as society increasingly relies on the public switched networks. The committee points to the Ninsdale event as an early warning for the need to broaden the scope of national security emergency preparedness in an information society.
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The public switched networks are increasingly controlle`d by and dependent on software that will offer open public access to executable code and `databases for user configuration of features, a situation that creates vulnerability to damage by ~hackers," Viruses, Worms, and Time bombs." *
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From page 15... ...
1984. Assignment of National Security arid Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions.
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