Making the Nation Safer The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (2002) / Chapter Skim
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6. Energy Systems
6. Energy Systems
Pages 177-209
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From page 177... ...
energy systems are extensive networks of electric generating facilities and transmission lines, natural gas pipelines, oil refineries and pipelines, and coal mines and transport. These systems, and their operators' emergency-response plans, have been tested by natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes; in general, the affected industries have returned disrupted systems to operation relatively quickly.
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From page 178... ...
Another important difference is that the refineries for converting crude oil into its large family of products are generally very large and complex facilities, located in just a few areas of the country, while the electric generating facilities come in a great range of sizes and are widely distributed throughout the nation. While some oil and gas operations generate their own power, most are highly dependent on electricity for their operations.
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From page 179... ...
Controls, cost competition, and regulatory uncertainty could each, in one way or another, limit the willingness of companies to invest in security upgrades that might seem desirable from a societal point of view. It is readily apparent that any prolonged interruption of the supply of basic energy be it electricity, natural gas, or oil products would be a devastating blow to the nation and its people.
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From page 180... ...
The nation's electric power systems must clearly be made more resilient to terrorist attack. The electric power system consists of four major components: generation plants, transmission lines and substations, distribution lines and substations, and system operations (the last mentioned may be located within a utility's service area or may serve a larger set of service territories)
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From page 181... ...
. All four main transmission lines to the central business district failed, leaving the center of the city largely without power for about 2 months.
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From page 182... ...
Such outages could be serious, but they are unlikely to require the replacement of much equipment. The most insidious and economically harmful attack would be one that exploits the vulnerabilities of an integrated electric power grid.
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From page 183... ...
Tools for Identifying System Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Attacks For a utility or independent power producer, one of the most significant challenges will be to direct its often limited resources to protecting its most important elements. This prioritization must take into account possible threats, probability of threat, consequences of attack, and response capability.
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From page 184... ...
Recommendation 6.2: The electric power industry (as well as the oil and natural gas industries, discussed later in this chapter) should undertake near-term studies to identify vulnerabilities to physical attack on equipment and controls.
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From page 185... ...
Recommendation 6.5: An immediate review of electric transmission lines should be initiated, through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the regional reliability councils, to identify opportunities for
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From page 186... ...
Allowable actions could include simulation-model development and deployment, increasing surveillance, hardening of sites, retrofitting transmission lines against cascading failure, increasing operating margins, decentralizing control systems, and increasing the availability and numbers of critical equipment spares.
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From page 187... ...
, (5) involvement of the regulatory community, through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
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From page 188... ...
The national security and defense communities in this country have developed, over the decades, many design philosophies for achieving reduced vulnerability. These ideas should be studied and aggressively adapted to the power grid.
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From page 189... ...
As noted in the discussion of the oil and gas sectors, this issue is relevant to all three energy sectors. Recommendation 6.11: Surveillance technologies developed for defense and intelligence agencies should be investigated for their usefulness in defending against terrorist attacks on widely distributed oil, gas, and electric transmission assets.
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From page 190... ...
To counter such threats, lower-cost electronic shielding needs to be developed and employed to protect critical components. Defensive Systems Protecting facilities and systems deemed to be most critical from air attacks is a significant challenge.
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From page 191... ...
Regional models of the power grid such as the Texas grid model for the Houston area, which has been used for analysis of outages must be expanded and interdependency modeling accelerated (Patton et al., 1999~. In that spirit, a federally funded center for interdependency modeling has recently been established (the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center)
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From page 192... ...
Change in the electric power infrastructure will, of necessity, be evolutionary, not revolutionary. As such, implementing new technology for intelligent, adaptive power grids will take time and resources.
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From page 193... ...
If fully developed and implemented, some of these technologies such as distributed generators based on fuel cells or microturbines could play a role in making energy systems more resilient in the face of terrorist attacks. Although DOE responded quickly to the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection it recently established the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, as noted above infrastructure per se has not received a high level of budgetary support.
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From page 194... ...
Research and development to achieve an intelligent, adaptive power grid will require the participation of experts in fields such as microelectronic systems, sensors, distributed intelligence, and communication. The research already under way in these areas for military applications should be brought to bear on counterterrorism as well.
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From page 195... ...
Recommendation 6.17: A coordinating council should be formed to ensure that the necessary research on electric power systems is carried out, that the resulting technologies have a route to market, that implementation is done expeditiously, and that the costs are recovered through appropriate incentives, fees, rate adjustments, or other funding mechanisms. The council should include, but not be limited to, representation from the North American Electric Reliability Council, DOE, the Office of Homeland Security, NARUC, EPRI and other utility industry groups, manufacturers, and ISOs and RTOs.
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From page 196... ...
Vandalism was taken into consideration, but the facilities were not designed and built to withstand terrorist attack. Several components of the natural gas infrastructure could be considered attractive targets for terrorists (see Figure 6.1~: · Transmission pipelines, including those from offshore collecting sites;
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From page 197... ...
; · Compressor stations (where gas compressors, driven by large electric motors or gas-fired engines, pressurize the gas to facilitate its movement through the pipelines) ; · City Gates (stations where high-pressure gas from the transmission line is transferred to delivery pipelines at lower pressures for distribution to cities)
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From page 198... ...
The loss of an individual interconnection may not be very serious, but interconnections become critical components with the loss of transmission lines or when they are associated, say, with a major gas storage facility. Interconnections are aboveground and protected by nothing more than chain-link fences unless they are part of a larger facility.
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From page 199... ...
Compressor Stations. Natural gas pipelines typically have compressor stations placed about every 60 miles along the route to maintain high pressure (typically 700-800 psi, although pressures can be as high as 1,400 psi)
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From page 200... ...
Today City Gates are often easily identified and poorly protected. Again, the only protection, typically, is a chain-link fence, and repair and restoration of a lost City Gate could take months.
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From page 201... ...
Offshore oil platforms are also inherently vulnerable to a number of attack scenarios; however the loss of a platform, while likely a spectacular event and a costly one for the crew and the owners, would not rise to the level of being catastrophic for the nation as a whole. Coordinated attacks on multiple key targets could have serious regional impact including, under some conditions, many fatalities, but the probability of catastrophic impact is much less than in the electric and gas sectors because of the ability to store and import oil products and crude oil.
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From page 202... ...
For example, California could face a fuel shortage following a coordinated attack on its refineries because there is limited ability to supply its uniquely specified fuels from other regions. This impact could be mitigated if the state and federal governments relaxed their location-specific fuel requirements in case of a catastrophic event.
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From page 203... ...
The loss of a pump or other single component at a pumping station can usually be handled routinely with existing spares. However, the outage following a terrorist attack that destroys a large amount of equipment could last at least 4 months if replacement pumps and drivers are available, and perhaps 8 months to a year if they are not.
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From page 204... ...
Such tools have been used extensively in the national security and defense communities, and it is recommended that they be aggressively directed to energy infrastructures as well (see Recommendation 6.2~. Create Incentives for the Deployment of Terrorist-Resistant Cybersystems The oil and gas industries are dependent on cybersystems.
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From page 205... ...
The oil and gas industries must now consider applying technologies as well. For example, pipeline systems nodes, junction points, compressor stations, and control centers could be hardened by applying known technology not normally employed by oil and gas operators before September 11.
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From page 206... ...
Holistic Simulation and Operating Models Oil and gas operations models need improvements to handle the threat of terrorist attacks. Holistic models should be developed that incorporate the complexity of interdependent systems (water and electricity, for example)
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From page 207... ...
Pipeline operators need new surveillance techniques capable of highly reliable detection of unwanted activity. Surveillance technologies developed for defense and intelligence agencies may be useful in defending against terrorist attacks, as well as against simple right-of-way encroachments, on widely distributed oil and gas assets.
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From page 208... ...
As in other such endeavors, industry involvement could be coordinated through a body like the National Petroleum Council, with federal management through DOE. The oil and gas industries are each made up of a few very large companies and many smaller companies.
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From page 209... ...
2001. Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies: Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, Washington, D.C., November.
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