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2. Nuclear and Radiological Threats
Pages 39-64

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From page 39...
... Other countries have had weapons development programs in the past, and 1 Special nuclear material includes fissile isotopes such as uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium239 that can be used to make nuclear weapons. 2HEU contains 220 percent by weight of uranium-235.
From page 40...
... Theft or diversion of Russian nuclear weapons for terrorist use may represent a significant near-term threat to the United States, especially the theft or diversion of smaller, manportable weapons. Table 2.1 and the classified annex provide additional details on these threats.3 Improvised Nuclear Devices Improvised nuclear devices are nuclear weapons fabricated by terrorists, with or without state assistance, using stolen or diverted SNM.
From page 41...
... Clandestine production of SNM by states or terrorist groups for use against the United States represents a significant near-term threat to homeland security. Nuclear Reactors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, or Radiological Dispersion Devices The threats considered here include attacks on nuclear power plants (both commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs)
From page 42...
... Potential targets for aircraft or ground attacks against an NPP are described in the classified annex. The USNRC is supporting work at the Sandia National Laboratories, and the nuclear industry's trade association, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
From page 43...
... Additional details are provided in the classified annex. The potential vulnerabilities of NPPs to terrorist attack seem to have captured the imagination of the public and the media, perhaps because of a perception that a successful attack could harm large populations and have severe economic and environmental consequences.
From page 44...
... Research Reactors Research reactors are used primarily to produce neutrons and gamma rays for research and development, and they provide a testbed for education on reactor physics and operations. AS of April 2002 there were 36 operating research reactors in 23 states, an additional 12 reactors were being decommissioned, and 7 had licenses only to possess radioactive material.5 Most research reactors are 5Much of the factual information used in this section is taken from the USNRC Web site.
From page 45...
... than do power reactors, whose thermal output is commonly 2,000-3,000 megawatts. Research reactors also generally have fail-safe shutdown systems, and most do not generate sufficient heat to be vulnerable to core accidents, even in the event of a coolant loss.
From page 46...
... At some NPP sites spent nuclear fuel also is being stored outside the powerplant buildings in dry casks on concrete pads. At present, about 3,000 metric tons of spent fuel are being stored in this fashion.
From page 47...
... This facility, if licensed and constructed, could house up to 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel contained in up to 4,000 above-ground storage casks on thick reinforced-concrete pads (Private Fuel Storage, 2002~. The threat of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage facilities, like reactors, is highly dependent on design characteristics.
From page 48...
... This waste includes high-level spent nuclear fuel and high-level defense waste stored at government or commercial sites; transuranic waste stored at government sites; and low-level industrial, research, and medical waste stored at commercial sites, universities, and hospitals. Low-level waste may be a particularly attractive terrorist target: It is produced by many companies, universities, and hospitals, it is not always stored or shipped under tight security, and it is routinely shipped across the country.
From page 49...
... Several potential vulnerabilities are described in this section. State-Owned Nuclear Weapons and Improvised Nuclear Devices At present, the United States has no evidence that a terrorist organization or nonnuclear state possesses stolen nuclear weapons or INDs.
From page 50...
... Nuclear Reactors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, and Radiological Dispersion Devices Nuclear power plants may present a tempting high-visibility target for terrorist attack, and the potential for a September 11-type surprise attack in the near term using U.S. assets such as airplanes appears to be high.
From page 51...
... Stolen Nuclear Weapons and Improvised Nuclear Devices There are no obvious technological silver bullets to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorist use of stolen nuclear weapons or INDs. Nevertheless, science and technology can play a central role in an enduring, multilayered homeland-defense system that provides for the following capabilities: · Indications and warnings of terrorist group membership, structure, intentions, and transformational activities; · Accounting of and security for weapons and SNM inventories at their sources;
From page 52...
... Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Weapons and Special Nuclear Material Nuclear weapons and SNM can be most effectively protected, controlled, and accounted for at their sources, which are relatively few in number compared with the many potential points of transit across national borders and are protected by state-run security infrastructures. Therefore, the first line of homeland defense against nuclear and radiological terrorism is a robust system for protecting, controlling, and accounting for nuclear weapons and SNM at their sources.
From page 53...
... government, working through the Department of Energy and Department of Defense, should undertake an internal evaluation of its bilateral Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program in Russia and consider ways to accelerate progress in safeguarding nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, especially to counter potential insider threats.
From page 54...
... government, working through the Department of State, Department of Energy, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, should provide encouragement as well as technical and financial assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency to raise the levels of 9This effort could involve scientists and engineers from both countries, and one of its explicit goals could be to improve protection, control, and accounting technologies and practices and to share these improvements with other countries and organizations, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency.
From page 55...
... The United States also should encourage other nuclear states to provide support for this effort. Detection and Interdiction of Illicit Weapons and Special Nuclear Material An important line of defense in a layered system of homeland protection is the detection and interdiction of illicit nuclear weapons and SNM as well as the detection and disruption of illicit weapons development programs.
From page 56...
... A national detection network could consist of several types of sensors: large numbers of simple counters that indicate the presence of radiation, backed up by smaller numbers of spectroscopic instruments to identify specific isotopic signatures. The technical challenge for the deployment of both types of sensors is the differentiation of signals of interest from the background of naturally occurring radioactivity and medical and industrial radioisotopes.
From page 57...
... The following actions should be taken to improve the nation's capabilities to detect the illicit movement of weapons and SNM: Recommendation 2.6: A focused and coordinated near-term effort should be made by the Department of Energy, through its National Nuclear Security Administration, and by the Department of Defense, through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to evaluate and improve the efficacy of special nuclear material detection systems that could be deployed at strategic choke points for homeland defense. The objectives of these evaluations should be to provide (1)
From page 58...
... The current plan does not appear to provide the guidance needed to ensure this type of response in the case of nuclear terrorist attack. 12Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan—Operational Plan, published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the Federal Register on May 1, 1996, with a correction published on June 5, 1996.
From page 59...
... This past success suggests that the United States may be able to deter some future state-supported or state-sponsored nuclear and radiological terrorist acts by announcing in advance that it will retaliate by whatever means deemed appropriate, including the use of nuclear weapons, against states and terrorist groups responsible for nuclear or radiological attacks against U.S. citizens or assets.~3 To be a useful deterrent, however, this doctrine would have to be formulated and announced in advance, and its credibility would depend in large part on the ability of the United States to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it has the technical means to attribute such attacks to states or terrorist groups.
From page 60...
... Recommendation 2.10: The ongoing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Electric Power Research Institute assessments of nuclear power plant vulnerabilities to airliner attacks should be completed as soon as possible, and follow-on work to identify vulnerabilities on a plant-by-plant basis, including vulnerabilities to air attacks by small craft loaded with high explosives or to ground attacks by high-explosive projectiles, should be undertaken as soon as these initial studies are completed.
From page 61...
... This list is by no means exhaustive, and an effective remedy can be applied at a particular reactor only after a careful analysis of risks and benefits, taking into account the comparative risk reduction that could be achieved by devoting resources to hardening nuclear plants versus other large industrial facilities. Radiological Dispersion Devices Although the damage potential of RDDs is far less than that of stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear explosives, or successful attacks on reactors, the terror/panic potential of RDDs warrants increased attention to the control and use of radiological sources by regulatory agencies and materials licensees.
From page 62...
... As part of this training, responders should be provided with simple but effective radiation-monitor~ng devices, trained in their use, and told whom to contact for expert assistance, if needed. The Office of Homeland Security should take the lead for this effort in cooperation with the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
From page 63...
... The USNRC also sponsors R&D on NPP safety and vulnerabilities, and some of this work is carried out at NNSA national laboratories. Given its large budget and broad scope of current work, it appears that DOENNSA is best positioned to take a lead role for R&D on nuclear and radiological terrorism.
From page 64...
... 1998. Commercial Nuclear Fuel from U.S.


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