Skip to main content

The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:

8 Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 212-231

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 212...
... Our conclusions are necessarily based on the far from satisfactory body of evidence on polygraph accuracy, as well as basic knowledge about the physiological responses the polygraph measures. We separately present our conclusions about scientific knowledge on the validity of polygraph and other techniques of detecting deception, about policy for employee security screening in the context of the U.S.
From page 213...
... Evidence of Polygraph Accuracy Source of Evidence The evidence for polygraph validity lies primarily in Theoretical, empirical studies showing associations between summary scores derived from polygraph measures and independent indicators of truth or deception, in short, in studies that estimate the accuracy of polygraph tests. Accuracy the ability to distinguish deceptive from truthful individuals or responses is an empirical property of a test procedure administered under specific conditions and with specific examiners.
From page 214...
... The evidence is insufficient to allow a quantitative estimate of the size of the overestimate. Estimate of Accuracy Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations of examiners such as those represented in the polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-incident polygraph testsfor event-specific investigations can discriminate lyingfrom truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection.
From page 215...
... Polygraph Screening Criterion of Truthfulness There are inherent difficulties in assessing the accuracy of polygraph testing in the screening situations of greatest concern to this study. Although the criterion of truthfulness is easy to establish in laboratory simulations, we have seen no indication of a clear and stable agreement on what criteria are used in practice for assessing the accuracy of security screening polygraph tests in any federal agency that uses the tests.
From page 216...
... Countermeasures Effectiveness Basic science and polygraph research give reason for concern that polygraph test accuracy may be degraded by countermeasures, particularly when used by major security threats who have a strong incentive and sufficient resources to use them effectively. If these measures are effective, they could seriously undermine any value of polygraph security screening.
From page 217...
... The difficulties that exist with computerized scoring of polygraph tests also exist, and may be multiplied, with possible expert systems for combining polygraph results with other forms of data. Combining Information Sources It may be possible to improve the ability to identify major security risks by combining polygraph information with information from other screening techniques, for example, in serial screening protocols such as those used in medical diagnosis.
From page 218...
... In populations with extremely low base rates of major security violations, such an application requires greater accuracy than polygraph testing achieves. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that the polygraph might be defeated with countermeasures, at least by the most serious security violators.
From page 219...
... Use in DOE Employee Security Screening Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for DOE employee security screening between too many loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left undetected. Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.
From page 220...
... Recent Policy Recommendations on Polygraph Screening Two recent reports that advocate continued use of polygraph tests for security screening in federal agencies are partly, but not completely, consistent with the scientific evidence on polygraph accuracy. The Hamre Commission report recommends more restricted use in DOE; the Webster Commission report (Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs, 2002)
From page 221...
... Acting on such a belief with the results of security screening polygraph tests could pose a danger to national security because a negative polygraph test result in a population with a low base rate, especially when the test protocol produces a very small percentage of positive test results, provides little information on deceptiveness beyond what was already known prior to the test, that the probability of true transgression is very low. FUTURE DIRECTIONS Although the scientific base for detecting deception remains weak, scientific analysis remains the best way for government agencies to assess techniques that are presented as useful for detecting and deterring criminals and national security threats and to develop improved methods.
From page 222...
... What do practitioners of the technique do to counteract or correct for such mechanisms? Is this response to the possibility of false positives reasonable considering the mechanisms involved?
From page 223...
... · How do the social context and the social interactions that constitute the examination procedure affect the reliability and validity of the recordings that are obtained? · Are there plausible alternative theoretical rationales regarding the underlying mechanisms that make competing empirical predictions about how the technique performs?
From page 224...
... · Analysis of Sensitivity and Specificity or Their Equivalents Data should be reported in a way that makes it possible to calculate both the sensitivity and specificity of the technique, preferably at multiple thresholds for diagnostic decision making or in a way that allows comparisons of the test results with the criterion on other than binary scales. A PROGRAM OF RESEARCH Our conclusions make clear that polygraph testing, though exhibiting accuracy considerably better than chance under a variety of conditions, has characteristics that leave it far short of what would be desirable for screening programs to distinguish individuals who pose threats to national security from innocent examinees.
From page 225...
... Expanded Research Effort We recommend an expanded research effort directed at methods for deterring and detecting major security threats, including efforts to improve techniques for security screening. Research offers one promising strategy for meeting the national need to deter and detect security threats.
From page 226...
... Thus, the research program might support research ranging from very basic work on fundamental psychological, physiological, social, and organizational processes related to deterring and detecting security threats, on one hand, to applied studies implementing scientifically sound methods in practical situations, on the other. We have investigated only a part of this large domain.
From page 227...
... The value of this research depends on the usefulness of the polygraph for detection in particular contexts, which could be made clearer with the other suggested research. · Careful documentation of polygraph examinations as they are being administered, combined with individual background information and reports on subsequent outcomes, would generate a valuable body of epidemiological data that could provide better estimates of the accuracy of field polygraph testing, both generally and with specific populations.
From page 228...
... · Systematic research on the bogus pipeline phenomenon can help with deterring and detecting security threats in more than one way. It can clarify the extent to which the practical value of the polygraph (or analogous techniques)
From page 229...
... Organization of a Research Program Organizational Emphasis A substantial portion of our recommended expanded research program should be administered by an organization or organizations with no operational responsibilityfor detecting deception and no institutional commitment to using or training practitioners of a particular technique. The research program should follow accepted standards for scientific research, use rules and procedures designed to eliminate biases that might influence the findings, and operate under normal rules of scientific freedom and openness to the extent possible while protecting national security.
From page 230...
... that the research activities are housed in an organization whose mission involves promoting and training personnel in a specific technique of detecting deception. These factors create real and perceived conflicts of interest with respect to research that might question polygraph validity or support an alternative method as superior.
From page 231...
... In addition, mission-oriented agencies should be encouraged and even mandated to cooperate with the broader research effort, for example, by providing archival data and cooperating in field research. Countenneasures and Classified Research The problem of countermeasures highlights some important questions about how future research on detecting deception should be structured.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.