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Pages 13-18

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From page 13...
... augmentation by national technical means and by instrumentation in use for scientific purposes, and taking into account the possibilities for decoupling nuclear explosions from surrounding geologic media) ; and the additions to their nuclear-weapon capabilities that other countries could achieve through nuclear testing at yield levels that might escape detection as well as the additions they could achieve without nuclear testing at all—and the potential effect of such additions on the security of the United States.
From page 14...
... nuclear weapons unless effectively counteracted by programs of surveillance, repair, and remanufacture as needed. A further set of negative impacts that has been asserted concerning a constraint on new designs is the resulting inability to extend certain safety improvements to weapons not now so equipped and the inability to optimize nuclear weapons for additional specialized missions.
From page 15...
... The treaty does not prohibit research or development of nuclear weapons provided no tests are conducted involving a nuclear yield. The non-binding preamble, however, recognizes that the treaty "by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects." The treaty is of unlimited duration (Article ~X)
From page 16...
... The treaty was returned to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it will remain until it is brought up for another vote or is returned to the Executive by a majority vote of the Senate. Secretary of State Powell indicated in his confirmation hearing in January 2001 that the Bush Administration would not ask the Senate to approve ratification of the CTBT in the current Congressional session, noting that the issue would be examined in the context of the Adminiskation's overall strategic review and that President Bush has indicated that he has no intention of resuming testing since "we do not see any need for such testing in the foreseeable future."2 While there has been some dispute as to the constitutional status of the issue in the past, it is now generally accepted that a President can announce without any further Congressional action that he will not ratify a treaty and is therefore no longer bound by the Vienna Convention rules.
From page 17...
... E) The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

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