Countering Bioterrorism The Role of Science and Technology (2002) / Chapter Skim
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2. Intelligence, Detection, Surveillance, and Diagnosis
2. Intelligence, Detection, Surveillance, and Diagnosis
Pages 15-26
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From page 15... ...
INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ~ncreasecl awareness in the S&T community could reduce the inadvertent spread of knowledge that may aid terrorists, although there is a fine balance that must be achieved so as to not quash legitimate exchange of scientific information. Voluntary international and national efforts to share biotechnology information could improve security and safety in the handling, storage, and transport of sensitive biological material and equipment.
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From page 16... ...
Nucleic acid sequence databases for pathogen strain types and advances in chemical-trace analysis and the use of taggants will help the process of attribution, thus discouraging terrorism, but they will by no means guarantee that perpetrators can be identified. The greatest potential benefit of a counterterrorism strategy might derive from preemptive efforts at earlier points in the bioterrorism-attack timeline that is, the evolution of a bioweapons program from inception through weapon deployment, before any biological agent is released.
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From page 17... ...
It is important to note, however, that even though cultivation is slow, limited in scope (by ignorance of appropriate growth conditions in the test tube and in human tissues for many pathogens) , and the least technologically sophisticated approach, it provides the most ready assessment of complex microbial phenotypes (behaviors)
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From page 18... ...
A further challenge is the need for highly sensitive systems, as some highly infectious pathogens require the inhalation of only 1 to 10 organisms to cause disease. In general, much greater attention is needed to translate basic laboratory research into field applications and clinical validation (standards will play an important role; see Recommendation 16 and surrounding discussion)
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From page 19... ...
. Sensitive and specific diagnostic tests are important adjuncts to clinical diagnosis; however, such tests cannot substitute for astute clinical recognition of symptoms to raise the suspicion of a particular diagnosis.
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From page 20... ...
Others include patterns of secreted proteins in host fluids, volatile compounds in breath (analyzed, for example, with mass spectroscopy) , and spectral features of host cells and fluids (studied using spectrometers and hyperspectral analysis)
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From page 21... ...
disease outbreaks, but it is not clear whether it will be useful for early detection of key threat agents such as smallpox, anthrax, and tularemia. Because infectious diseases do not respect national borders, international cooperation is vital in the sharing of epidemiological and clinical data, both on emerging infectious diseases and on outbreaks caused by potential bioterror agents.
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From page 22... ...
Because of the low likelihood of infections with BW agents compared to common, widely circulating agents like influenza viruses, routine application of rapid diagnostics for potential BW agents in a primary care setting in the absence of clinical suspicion will face problems with false-positive and false-negative results, for which rapid adjunctive standards do not exist. A triage system could be applied in which patients with relevant symptoms who test negative for a panel of expected pathogens would be sent to a referral laboratory for a second round of diagnostic tests, which could include suspected BW agents and broad-range methods.
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From page 23... ...
, as currently constituted, has proven adequate for naturally occurring disease, it would probably be unable to help eradicate intentional introduction, especially if this were done at multiple sites. There is a need for USDA to develop a research and surveillance capability for plant and animal diseases comparable to the one that CDC oversees for human diseases.
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From page 24... ...
the biological agents that could affect crops are more numerous than the pathogens that affect humans, making it more difficult to focus the research funding available for efforts to counter agricultural bioterrorism. Threats to crops intersect with threats to livestock in the case of animal feed, and there is a particular concern about the timing of ultimate effects.
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From page 25... ...
For animal disease, USDA operates several laboratories Plum Island and Ames among them that perform diagnoses, carry out research, and provide training for veterinarians. CDC is the central agency for the control and prevention of communicable human disease, but no center currently exists to serve the same function for plant disease.
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