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3. Prevention, Response, and Recovery
Pages 27-44

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From page 27...
... Part of that preparation should involve research and development on needed tools and approaches. These include modeling techniques, bioforensics, methods for defining threats, specific and broad-spectrum antibiotic and novel antiviral agents, and means for rapid vaccine fielding.
From page 28...
... Indeed, all of this argues for major development of modeling capabilities. UNCERTAIN UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Modeling the likely outcomes of different bioterrorism attacks is important for two reasons.
From page 29...
... For example, new antibiotic discovery is dependent on an understanding of fundamental cellular mechanisms that are held in common among bacterial pathogens and nonpathogens. Careful oversight of experiments with pathogenic organisms is essential to ensure that they are not in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.3 3From the Web site of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation: "The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, with advice from an international group of legal authorities, has prepared a draft convention that would make it a crime under international law for any person knowingly to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use biological or chemical weapons or knowingly to order, direct or render substantial assistance to those activities or to threaten to use biological or chemical weapons." More information is available online at .
From page 30...
... Biological trace evidence, microchemical analysis (analysis of information about the agent carried along with the biological weapon during manufacture, storage, handling, and release) , and the feasibility of using tagged organisms should be comprehensively investigated to determine their value in the characterization and comparison of the biological agents used in different weapons.
From page 31...
... The population is highly susceptible to such infectious agents, and the mortality rates among infected individuals can be high. Such agents in a bioterrorism attack could easily be spread to large numbers of individuals (Peters, 2002~.
From page 32...
... A genetically engineered pathogen could also have these characteristics and would need to be viewed as being among the most serious potential biological threats. The difficulty is that such genetically engineered pathogens could be created from virtually any biological pathogen or even vaccine strain; thus it will be challenging to develop vaccines or therapeutic antimicrobial agents in advance of a bioterrorism attack.
From page 33...
... DEVELOPING ANTIMICROBIALS AND ANTIVIRALS The diversity of existing biological weapons and the ever-increasing number of possibilities through use of genetic recombination preclude simple therapeutic countermeasures to bioterrorism. The Soviets are known to have developed at least 30 biological agents.
From page 34...
... Thus, new 4A Public Health Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance appeared in the Federal Register on June 22, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 121)
From page 35...
... should be more fully investigated for human application, as their use represents a potential quick path from determination of the genome sequence to the availability of a vaccine. Recombinant human antibody technologies should be explored, including novel delivery systems.
From page 36...
... . Similarly, continue to expand and deploy the capability to use genomics to rapidly identify engineered mutations or altered virulence factors, create a generic platform to develop a vaccine against recombinant pathogens, and employ streamlined testing and regulatory processes to assure adequate efficacy and safety while expediting delivery.
From page 37...
... Recommendation 10: Improve environmental and personal protective equipment. Agencies such as EPA, NIOSH, CDC, DOD, and DOE should perform and support research on new technologies that increase the protection factors of such equipment, and ensure uniform testing oversight to certify efficacy.
From page 38...
... A chemical attack might destroy multiple hospital emergency departments or contaminate them so completely that they could no longer be used; a biological attack could quickly spread to medical personnel, thereby effectively destroying their capacity to respond. · The attack is short-lived and can be handled within a short time frame (less than 24 hours)
From page 39...
... The federal government already has systems in place for responding to disasters. HHS coordinates Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams, Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, and other medical specialty teams located throughout the country.
From page 40...
... Maintaining high-quality clinical microbiology laboratories on site or near the institutions and communities that they serve is the best approach at present for managing infectious diseases and detecting resistance to antimicrobial agents. However, a public health reserve system, consisting of certified laboratory personnel with the ability to provide expertise when the health care system becomes overloaded, needs to be created.
From page 41...
... As part of a broader planning process, create a reserve system of veterinarians and plant pathologists (modeled on the military reserve system) , and prepare local and regional laboratories for deploying surge capacity to supplement and enhance disaster-response capabilities.
From page 42...
... Moreover, the correct means for identifying the presence of many biological agents are not known, nor is the significance of the presence of biological agents in the natural environment (e.g., anthrax spores are found in the soil in some parts of the United States)
From page 43...
... Eradication, especially of soil-borne spores of plant pathogens, is virtually impossible. Methyl bromide, one of the few standard chemicals used for fumigation of soil and containers, will be banned after 2005 in developed countries and 2010 in developing countries as the result of an international agreement made in response to evidence that the chemical depletes the ozone layer.
From page 44...
... Because cross-agency collaboration is often challenging, the Office of Homeland Security should designate a lead agency on these issues and ensure that collaborating agencies provide the necessary resources to identify and support research efforts in this area.


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