Evaluation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities (2002) / Chapter Skim
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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Pages 1-6
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The committee concluded that safe chemical weapons disposal operations are feasible at the new facilities scheduled to begin operating at Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, if their management is diligent in setting and enforcing rigorous operational procedures, in providing comprehensive training, in establishing a strong safety culture encompassing all plant personnel, and in absorbing programmatic lessons learned from the first two operational facilities, JACADS and TOCDF. The committee believes that many of the observations and recommendations made in this report are applicable to all demilitarization facilities, including those that may not use incineration.
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4 Other incidents that clearly involved chemical agent were not defined 4For example, Army Regulation 50-6, on chemical surety, provides specific examples of chemical events which the committee judges to be so broad as to invite widely divergent interpretations by local Army depot commanders, such as example number 7: "Any malfunction or other significant activity at a chemical demilitarization plant that could reasonably be expected to cause concern within the local community or the press, or that in the judgment of the local facility or installation management or leadership could cause embarrassment to the U.S.
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The Army should maintain conservative chemical demilitarization exhaust stack and in-plant airborne agent exposure thresholds. If current limits for exposure to stockpiled chemical agents are further reduced, the Army should not further reduce existing monitoring thresholds unless chemical agent monitors can be made both more sensitive and more specific so that lower thresholds can be instituted without significant increases in false positive alarm rates or unless health risk assessments demonstrate that lower thresholds are necessary to protect workers or the public.
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CHEMICAL EVENTS ANALYSES In analyzing past chemical events, the committee found that the basic design of the incineration-based demilitarization facilities and the processes used to disassemble and destroy chemical weapons and to dispose of residue and waste streams (see Appendix A) are fundamentally sound.
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The Army Emergency Operations Centers and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program should establish a stronger capability and capacity for the coordination of training, equipment, and plans necessary to respond effectively to an emergency incident, and the commitment to do so in a coordinated and cooperative fashion. Additionally, the Army should continue its program of outreach including listening to public concerns and responding to them, as well as engaging in more conventional public information efforts to both the public and the relevant government oversight agencies to enhance general understanding of the chemical demilitarization program.
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Recommendation 13. A generous allotment of time should be given to training and retraining chemical demilitarization plant operating personnel to ensure their total familiarity with the system and its engineering limitations.
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