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Testing and Evaluation of Standoff Chemical Agent Detectors (2003) / Chapter Skim
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7 Decision Making and Risk
Pages 28-30

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
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From page 28...
... A lack of confidence in the detector's performance, in turn, could reduce its value as a risk management tool for dealing with chemical threats to military operations. On the other hand, successful testing of a standoff detector with actual agents under a limited set of "open-air" or field conditions will not provide complete assurance that the detector would meet performance criteria under the myriad of weaponization and delivery modes as well as background conditions found on the battlefield.
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From page 29...
... The basic components of the risk management process include threat identification, threat/risk assessment, development and implementation of appropriate controls, and evaluation/revision of the risk management strategy. Implementing this methodology for a mission that faces chemical warfare threats might include such details as atmospheric dispersion modeling of possible CWA attacks, prediction of potential casualties, and development of controls for risk management (e.g., modifying troop deployment, placement of detectors)
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From page 30...
... The committee concluded that risk management science has to be an integral part of utilizing the "hard" technical output from any monitoring instrumentation. One of the committee's recommendations underscores the importance of this issue.
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Key Terms

  • standoff detector
  • military operations
  • false negative
  • detector performance
  • false positive

  • negative rates
  • management process
  • false positives
  • spectral features
  • chemical warfare

  • protective measures
  • standoff detectors
  • test protocols
  • false negatives
  • atmospheric dispersion

  • limited set
  • rigorous test
  • apparent false
  • actual field
  • addressed explicitly

  • performance criteria
  • unproductive protective
  • force base
  • cwa attacks
  • combat conditions

  • delivery mode
  • ambient environment
  • distinguished unequivocally
  • information analysis
  • ultimate proof


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