End Points for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in Russia and the United States (2003) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 88-107
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 88... ...
at present is being stored. At the same time, both countries chemically process liquid HLW in order to immobilize it for safer storage and disposal.
|
From page 89... ...
The time and effort expended in countries that have geologic disposal programs attest to the difficulties, and scientific understanding of the phenomena involved is still evolving. A recent report by an international committee of the National Research Council nonetheless concludes that geologic disposition is the only long-term end point that does not require continued management and resource expenditures (NRC 2001a)
|
From page 90... ...
. This approach applies not only to managing liquid HLW in corroding tanks and remediating contaminated ground water, but also to disposition of radioactive waste in geologic repositories.
|
From page 91... ...
Geologic repositories that are intended to isolate wastes from the biosphere for anywhere from centuries to hundreds of centuries are an unprece2A safety case is defined as ~ ... a collection of arguments, at a given stage of repository development, in support of the long-term safety of the repository.
|
From page 92... ...
In Russia, progress is being made as HLW at PA"Mayak" is immobilized in aluminophosphate glass logs and stored onsite; interim storage facilities are planned for SNF at several sites; efforts are underway at the Krasnoyarsk MCC to extend the capacity of the wet storage facility and to design and plan construction of a dry storage facility for VVER-1000 and RBMK SNF; and the rate of defueling of decommissioned nuclear-powered ships has increased. In the United States, DOE and other managers of SNF have made progress in achieving interim end points for SNF and HLW: nearly all SNF in the United States is in safe storage in cooling pools or in dry casks; HLW at West Valley has been vitrified and HLW at the Savannah River Site (SRS)
|
From page 93... ...
These wastes are located at many sites and, in some cases, are not sufficiently protected. The physical form of SNF makes it more difficult to dis3Consider, for example, the liquid wastes at PA"Mayak" stored in the Techa Ponds Cascade, held in place by earthen dams whose failure would threaten substantial contamination of the river.
|
From page 94... ...
To reduce the potential for terrorist attacks and vulnerabilities associated with stored liquid HLW, governments should deploy physical protection systems capable of preventing successful attacks and should accelerate programs to immobilize that waste. The potential theft of HEU and plutonium Because of the potentially horrible consequences of the theft of nuclear materials containing highly enriched uranium (HEW)
|
From page 95... ...
In order to reduce on-going contamination and to prevent accidents, the practice of dumping of liquid radioactive wastes into Lake Karachai should be discontinued in the future and appropriate actions should be taken to decrease the water level in the Techa ponds cascade. 4.1.2 Near-Term Problems in the United States Several problems in the United States require action over the next several years.
|
From page 96... ...
Efforts to stabilize, dry, and package this fuel should be expedited and a disposition path should be found for the corrosion products and sludge from this fuel. A disposition program for excess weapons plutonium that has an ambitious schedule and has not taken crucial steps As noted in Chapter 2, current DOE plans are to complete designs for the MOX fuel-fabrication facility in 2003, complete the licensing in 2005, to begin hot startup of the facility in 2007, and to load the first MOX fuel into a reactor in August 2008.
|
From page 97... ...
To this end, Russia should carry out a comparative analysis of the efficiency of two approaches to organization of the closed nuclear fuel cycle with fast reactors: (1) using fast neutron reactors with conversion ratios of approximately 1.05 to 1.1, which require plutonium generated in thermal reactors for their primary feed, and (2)
|
From page 98... ...
A Russian research and development program, drawing on and coordinating with international efforts in these areas, could dramatically reduce the risks and impacts of an expanded SNF processing program in Russia, and might improve the economic features of the program. Such studies of non-PUREX processes may become important also for the United States as the government pursues the recommendations of the national energy policy announced by the administration in 2001 (National Energy Policy Development Group 2001~.
|
From page 99... ...
develop dismantling technologies for NPSs with damaged reactor compartments; and · build a regional underground facility for radioactive waste storage and a centralized storage facility for long-term storage of unreprocessible SNF. 4.2.5 Managing Liquid HLW ~ .
|
From page 100... ...
There are no plans at this time to ship RBMK SNF from the sites, so additional storage capacity is needed. Adding dry storage for the older SNF would likely be less expensive than expanding the wet storage facilities and would free up space in the cooling pools for freshly discharged SNF, which requires wet storage.
|
From page 101... ...
Given such disagreements, international teams should continue to study the issue, conducting a comprehensive investigation of the isolation capabilities of the existing disposal wells for liquid radioactive wastes. Meanwhile, Russia should not dispose of high-activity, long-lived wastes as it exhausts the capacity of the existing wells, and Russia should conduct continuous environmental monitoring at these injection sites.
|
From page 102... ...
Without such a strategy, resources will be wasted and both safety and proliferation hazards will be left unaddressed. In both countries, an integrated strategy should be developed to incorporate, as noted above, all fuel cycle elements up to the final stages.
|
From page 103... ...
Conclusions and Recommendations 103 Ads' ........
|
From page 104... ...
Nuclear engineering and nuclear chemistry are not the only fields in which future workers on SNF and HEW problems are trained, but the committee has informally observed a similar pattern in relevant specialties in other fields, making the prospects for research in these areas discouraging. The situation is even more alarming when one looks at workers and technicians charged with carrying out the activities.
|
From page 105... ...
If the focus is put on nuclear energy systems rather than the separate parts of these systems, then the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste management activities are but an integral part of the total nuclear energy system. This might attract more students and future professionals to management of nuclear waste.
|
From page 106... ...
Russia and the United States can collaborate on several other important topics of mutual concern: · protecting materials useful in nuclear and radiological weapons; · consolidation of nuclear materials in a few reliably protected sites; counter-terrorism studies and methods; tion development and refinement of technologies for safe and efficient defueling, dismantling, and disposing of decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines; handling the legacy wastes from nuclear-weapons productransportation of spent nuclear fuel; development of standard, highly durable waste forms for immobilization of different types of HLW; . methods and techniques for extraction of HLW that has been stored in tanks for decades; .
|
From page 107... ...
107 In light of the terrorist attacks that have occurred in the last few years, it is worth reiterating one of the above areas for collaboration, for emphasis. Russia and the United States should prioritize working together to protect nuclear facilities from thefts of nuclear materials and from terrorist acts.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.