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Pages 1-12

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From page 1...
... in Russia and the United States and describes inventories, compares the approaches taken in the two countries, and assesses the end-point options for interim and long-term storage of materials and wastes and for permanent disposal of wastes. An end point for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste is a stable, safe, and secure disposition of the material that can be sustained.
From page 2...
... in the United States is an operating geologic repository for long-lived transuranic waste. These interim and final end points are necessary parts of any nuclear fuel cycle.
From page 3...
... has made efforts to address the most serious environmental and waste-management problems within its nuclear complex, and has made progress on some of them. But the resources available for these activities in Russia have been much smaller, and some of the problems, particularly the environmental contamination, are more difficult and urgent than their counterparts in the United States.
From page 4...
... Stabilize Unretrievable Fuel Stored in Floating Technical Bases and Unload Retrievable Fuel from Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines The state of the Russian nuclear fleet's floating technical bases with stored SNF is generally poor, meaning that the ships are disabled and, therefore, it is sometimes acutely dangerous to continue to store SNF in them. The condition of the fuel in these ships should be stabilized, and plans should be made to remove it.
From page 5...
... According to previous investigations, injection of such wastes into deep, hydraulically isolated aquifers is likely to be safe. Many in the United States and Europe, however, remain skeptical about the practice of deep injection and believe that it should not continue.
From page 6...
... At the same time, MOX fuel based on both weapon-grade and regenerated from VVER-440 SNF plutonium types has been already tested successfully in fast breeder reactors (BN-600 and BOR-60~. Design Chemical Processes for VVER-1000 SNF .
From page 7...
... 7 Prevent Use of Nuclear Materials for Terrorist Acts While Russia has been aware of terrorist threats, the events of September 11, 2001, forced the United States focus on preventing terrorist acts. This has led to many reviews of vulnerabilities at nuclear power stations and at all facilities where radioactive materials are stored and used.
From page 8...
... Russia and the United States have been \/vorking on finding disposition paths that are technically sound and that satisfy demands driven by domestic policy and international relations. From the outset, Russia has expressed its desire to fabricate plutonium-uranium mixed-oxide (MOX)
From page 9...
... ASSESSMENT OF LONGER-TERM ACTIONS NEEDED IN BOTH COUNTRIES Finally, pursuing some end points for SNF and HLW requires research, development, and implementation beyond the near term. Work is needed on aspects of every stage of the nuclear fuel cycles that Russia and the United States have as their goals: fuel fabrication, irradiation in reactors, storage in at-reactor facilities, short-term and long-term storage away from reactors, transportation, reprocessing of SNF, processing of HLW, immobilization, and disposal.
From page 10...
... Work is needed to develop processes for solidification and incorporation of HLW, other than that planned as feed for the Defense Waste Processing Facility, into durable glass-like and crystalline waste forms. This research would seek, select, and develop fabrication technologies for highly durable glass-like, glasscrystalline, and crystalline matrices for immobilization of different types of HLW, radioisotopes with similar characteristics, and individual radionuclides.
From page 11...
... . Russia and the United States can collaborate on several important topics of mutual concern: · assuring the availability of both the current and future supply of expert scientists, engineers, and technicians needed to work on SNF and HLW management; · protecting materials useful in nuclear and radiological weapons; 6
From page 12...
... Russia and the United States should prioritize working together to protect nuclear facilities from thefts of nuclear materials and from terrorist acts. The threats are present and the dangers are significant, so action should be taken without delay.


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