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Collected Reports of the Panel on Technical Evaluation of NASA's Redesign of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (1988) / Chapter Skim
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1 Interim Report #1: August 1, 1996
Pages 1-6

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From page 1...
... We have had more detailed briefings from and discussions with personnel of Rockwell International, Thioko1, and NASA/MSFC on the structural loads and dynamics of the total assembler shuttle and the resultant loads on the SRM, as well as briefings from personnel of United Technologies Chemical Systems Division, Aerojet Strategic Propulsion Company, and Hercules Aerospace Company on alternative solid rocket designs and alternative joint and seal designs. We have toured the Thiokol manufacturing and test facilities and engaged in many detailed technical discussions with Thiokol personnel on design and testing of proposed future SRB designs.
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From page 2...
... Joints between Motor Segments While the Panel agrees with the Presidential Commission that faulty design of the pressure seal, compounded by the cold temperature at launch and dynamic joint rotation, is the most probable cause of a blow-by of the two O-ring seals in the aft field joint of one SRB, the ensuing events which resulted ultimately in the loss of the shuttle (almost 60 seconds later) are much less clear.
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From page 3...
... The tests should be designed to investigate alternative modes of failure and to duplicate the failure of the 51-L joint. Based on its work to date, the Panel recommends that each of the following be addressed in the new design: joint rotation from all sources; O-ring materials; O-ring and groove design; verification of O-ring seating; insulation at the joint, considering the potential for gas flow in the gaps; asymmetries in gas circulation in the bore, gaps between segments, and nozzle from various causes; the bond between the metal case and insulation, and the role and properties of putty or alternative means for protecting the O-rings from exposure to hot gases.
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From page 4...
... Designs are being considered that do not Results of the investigation of the Titan accident suggests a new materials problem, a potentially erosive interaction between molten alumina and the steel case, that accentuates the need to avoid exposing steel casing to prope1lant gases. We recommend that this phenomenon be researched vigorously because of its potential importance for the safe design of future solid rocket motors.
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From page 5...
... We recommend that NASA review the experience of the military with control and surveillance of materials for its solid rocket motors and where applicable adapt that experience to the SRM program. Testing The fact that a solid fuel rocket can never truly be tested except in flight places unusual emphasis on adequate subsca~e and full scale testing with appropriate simulations and statistical analysis.
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Key Terms

  • honorable james
  • joint rotation
  • redesign program
  • redesign effort
  • space shuttle

  • rocket motor
  • reduce rotation
  • rocket motors
  • alternative designs
  • nasa consider

  • technical evaluation
  • rocket booster
  • shuttle solid
  • technical discussions
  • detailed tests

  • dynamic conditions
  • consider developing
  • panel intends
  • resulted ultimately
  • alternative solid

  • dynamic pressure
  • titan solid
  • nrc panel
  • pressure seal
  • inherently safer

  • alternative means
  • wind shear
  • nasa scientific
  • existing srm
  • current test


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