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7 Process for Evaluation of Options for Distribution of Potassium Iodide
Pages 137-154

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From page 137...
... Depending on local conditions surrounding nuclear power plants, there will be some very rare scenarios in which vulnerable members of the general public could inhale radioactive iodine. We assume that 137
From page 138...
... Yes, taking stable iodine (in the form of KI) within a few hours before or after exposure to radioactive iodine through inhalation or ingestion of fallout will protect the thyroid from thyroid cancer caused by such exposure in vulnerable populations.
From page 139...
... In summary, KI is effective and generally safe. Nuclear power plants in the United States contain a source of radioactive iodine that, in the event of a very rare severe incident, might impose risks of exposure to radioactive iodine via inhalation and ingestion in the vulnerable population, which could lead to thyroid cancers.
From page 140...
... have issued guidelines regarding KI, as discussed in Chapter 6. Potassium iodide Distribution Before Incident As described in Chapter 6, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission made a one-time offer to provide a supply of KI tablets to states to be made available to populations near NPPs.
From page 141...
... KI could be added to all SNS push packages, which are prepackaged with a set of supplies useful for a variety of disaster incidents. The push packages will reach the incident area first, by air to the nearest safe airport or ground transport within 1 2 h of the incident.
From page 142...
... Local Area Potassium Iodide Distribution Options For optimal benefit, KI should be administered to the potentially affected populace just before, concurrently with, or within a few hours after exposure to radioiodine. (Note that we are focusing on the threat posed by inhalation, not ingestion.
From page 143...
... Voluntary programs have rarely exceeded 50°/O participation by the potentially affected population. Where will it be distributed?
From page 144...
... Sample Plan Options There are tremendous regional differences in geography, population density, meteorological conditions and other characteristics related to NPPs. Thus, it is preferable for each local area to develop specific plan options and evaluate them on the basis of how well they meet their objectives in light of the area's characteristics (such as population size, ability to evacuate the entire affected population, and risk of radioactive iodine exposure)
From page 145...
... tablets inserted in mass mailing to households in KI planning zone (KIPZ) ; additional stockpiles at reception centers VP: Predistribute to individuals in KIPZ via Voluntary Pickup; additional stockpiles at evacuation reception centers outside KIPZ RC: Stockpile at evacuation reception centers outside KIPZ ND: No distribution of K]
From page 146...
... For example, Keeney, Renn, and von WinterfelUt (1987) constructed an objectives hierarchy for the former West Germany's energy supply by combining objectives of multiple stakeholders with divergent views.
From page 147...
... minimized (in healthy people, thyroid patients, and those with iodine allergies)
From page 148...
... The evaluation template in Table 7.3 shows the format for such an evaluation. This multiple-objective evaluation approach has been used widely, for example, in evaluating Los Angeles Unified Schools desegregation plans (Edwards, 1979, 1980)
From page 149...
... Simplify Kl procedures before and during I incident l | b.6. Educate public to respond to nuclear incident OVERALL VALUE (SUMPRODUCT OF WEIGHTS IMES RATINGS)
From page 150...
... When considering different geographical areas for predistribution of KI, plume dispersion models could be used to examine how far and how fast the radioactive iodine fallout might spread, as discussed in Chapter 4. When considering predistribution of KI compared with stockpiling at reception centers, as the distance from a plant increases, decisive factors will likely be I)
From page 151...
... , in particular Chapter 6, "Problems of Risk Communication", and Chapter 7, "Recommendations for Risk Communication": "Risk communication requires its own specialized expertise and deliberate planning and evaluation. Senior managers need to devote attention and time to managing risk communication efforts per se.
From page 152...
... It might be that predistribution of KI will raise fears of nuclear incidents, even though it is intended to decrease risks. Conversely, it is possible that KI might be erroneously seen as a "magic bullet" against all radiation risks, making all other riskreduction steps wrongly perceived as unnecessary.
From page 153...
... Institutions with the most vulnerable populations (children and pregnant and lactating women) should consider having stockpiles of KI onsite with distribution permission slips from parents of children.
From page 154...
... National Registry A national registry should be developed to be activated in the event of an incident for tracking radioactive iodine exposures (including airborne release concentrations, contamination levels in food and drink and measured thyroid radioiodine levels in individuals) and the extent of use of KI as a preventive measure (including date and time taken and dosage vs.


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