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2. When and Why to Consider Bioconfinement
Pages 29-64

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From page 29...
... As most traditionally improved organisms pose few safety problems that require confinement, it is likely that most of the vast array of proposed genetically engineered organisms (GEOs) will pose little threat to public health or the environment, and they will require minimal confinement, if any.
From page 30...
... WHAT IS RISK? In many aspects of its deliberations, the Committee on the Biological Confinement of Genetically Engineered Organisms found it necessary to discuss "hazard," "harm," and "risk." The terminology used here is consistent with past reports of the National Research Council (NRC, 1983, 1996, 2002b)
From page 31...
... . Without cumulative risk analysis, it is impossible to assess the hazard associated with bioconfinement failure.
From page 32...
... . The committee recognizes those earlier discussions and suggests it would be useful to describe a systematic approach to risk assessment and management, without delving into the issue of risk characterization other than to note its relevance and importance, particularly with respect to transparency and public participation.
From page 33...
... How well established is the knowledge used to identify the hazard, estimate its risk, and predict harms? Risk reduction What can be done (including bioconfinement and other planning and confinement)
From page 34...
... . In September 2000, the Washington Post reported that traces from transgenes of StarLink corn had been detected in the human food supply by an independent laboratory for Genetically Engineered Food Alert, a coalition of environmental and food safety organizations (Kaufman, 2000)
From page 35...
... . "Concern" is used here to mean an "uneasy state of interest, uncertainty, and appre The potential sources of the widespread presence of StarLink material in the human food supply are many.
From page 36...
... Potential Effects Genetically engineered organisms are controversial. Dozens of scholarly reports have identified, reviewed, and evaluated the realized and potential effects of their use, particularly transgenic crops and fish (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001; Colwell et al., 1985; Cook et al., 2000; Dale et al., 2002; Hails, 2000; Kapuscinski and Hallerman, 1991, 1994; Keeler and Turner, 1990; Marvier, 2001; McHughen, 2000; NRC, 1989b, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2003; Rissler and Mellon, 1996; Scientists' Working Group on Biosafety, 1998; Snow and Moran-Palma, 1997; Tiedje et al., 1989; Traynor and Westwood, 1999; Winrock International, 2000; Wolfenbarger and Phifer, 2000)
From page 37...
... . The list of potential benefits attributable to transgenic plants, animals, and microorganisms is long and diverse, and it is difficult to name all of the beneficial phenotypes that have been proposed for transgenic organisms.
From page 38...
... . There is no data yet, however, to suggest that the rate of horizontal transfer would be any faster for transgenic organisms (Syvanen, 2002)
From page 39...
... Atlantic salmon Increased growth rate and food Aquaculture Method has conversion efficiency after for human been patented; insertion of Chinook salmon food seeking Food growth hormone gene that and Drug operates year-round, thereby Administration fostering steady growth through approval the year rather than summer growth (Cook et al., 2000; Hew and Fletcher, 1996) Red sea bream Increased growth rates after Aquaculture Research insertion of an "all fish" growth for human hormone consisting of ocean food pout antifreeze protein gene promoter and Chinook salmon growth hormone (Zhang et al., 1998)
From page 40...
... Carp Improved disease resistance after Aquaculture Research insertion of a human interferon for human gene (Zhu, 2001) food Goldfish Increased cold tolerance after Aquaculture Research insertion of ocean pout antifreeze for human protein gene (Wang et al., 1995)
From page 41...
... . Oysters Improved disease resistance by Aquaculture Research introduction of retroviral vectors.
From page 42...
... Kuruma prawns Potential improved growth rate Aquaculture Research through gene insertion. for human Researchers are currently food inserting marker genes to confirm most appropriate method (Preston et al., 2000)
From page 43...
... Plum Resistance to plum pox virus Fruit Release permit using capsid gene (Ravelonandro production issued et al., 1998) Bartlett pear Resistance to fireblight bacterial Fruit Field tested disease conferred by a synthetic production under APHIS antimicrobial gene (Puterka et notification al., 2002)
From page 44...
... (De Leij et al., indigenous 1995) microbial populations in wheat Fluorescent Chromosomal insertion of lacZ To monitor Field testing pseudomonads and Kanr (De Leij et al., 1995)
From page 45...
... plants Aspergillus niger Production of bovine chymosin Cheesemaking Commercial Colletotrichum Virulence to weeds Mycoherbicide Research and coccodes development Escherichia coli Production of human insulin by Treatment of Commercial cloned gene diabetes in production humans Insects Cochliomyia GFP in PiggyBac (transposon Improved Research hominovorax that inserts gene sequence of a pest control desired trait in the TTAA gene sequence of the insect) (Handler and Allen, unpublished)
From page 46...
... competence Pectinophora Fluorescent proteins in PiggyBac Improved Research and gossypiella (Peloquin et al., 2000) pest control, field trials heterologous protein expression in mass-reared insects Anastrepha Fluorescent proteins in PiggyBac Improved Research suspensa (Handler and Harrell, 2001)
From page 47...
... . Virtually all farmed fish and shellfish lines can breed readily with other captive lines and with wild relatives.
From page 48...
... A basic understanding of gene dispersal and the fitness effects of specific transgenes is essential for evaluating whether bioconfinement is needed and for developing effective bioconfinement methods. The committee intentionally did not hazard to guess what the fitness effects of classes of transgenes might be in recipient populations because it is already clear that generalizations might be difficult to obtain.
From page 49...
... The first is whether transgenes will confer a benefit to the transformed organism itself or to weedy or invasive relatives, resulting in the evolution of weeds that are difficult to control or in the evolution of new invasive lineages that overrun and disrupt natural ecosystems. The second issue is the question of whether the wild relatives of transgenic organisms will suffer an increased risk of extinction because of hybridization with or competition from those organisms.
From page 50...
... . If transgenes confer the ability to overcome factors that limit wild populations, the resultant genotype might be significantly more weedy or invasive than is its nontransgenic progenitor.
From page 51...
... . Crops that are engineered to produce pharmaceutical or other industrial compounds can cross-pollinate with the same species grown for human consumption, with the unanticipated result of new chemical components in the human food supply (Ellstrand, 2003b)
From page 52...
... . Nonetheless, if transgenes or transgenic organisms designed to be toxic to pests or pathogens move into locations or populations for which they were not intended, they could harm organisms other than the intended pest species.
From page 53...
... WHEN AND WHY TO CONSIDER BIOCONFINEMENT: THE NEED FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION It is essential to consider preventive action before a failure occurs and even before confinement techniques are chosen. Prevention typically is less expensive and more effective than is remedial action, and some consequences -- death of a human, extinction of a species, destruction of a large ecosystem -- cannot be reversed.
From page 54...
... In some cases, appropriate confinement might be obtained by conventional, non-biological, methods. For example, sufficient isolation might be achieved by growing a minor crop far from stands of the same variety and away from populations of wild relatives.
From page 55...
... The appropriate amount of confinement might be possible now, but the method could be so expensive as to preclude its use. Bioconfinement methods offer an opportunity to expand the number and diversity of tools available.
From page 56...
... In any case, regulatory agencies have seen that granting approval to genetically engineered plants that are intended solely for animal consumption is inadvisable if other varieties are used in human food production. PREDICTING THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE Failure of bioconfinement presents several challenges.
From page 57...
... The StarLink incident led to the realization that current systems do not provide for the segregation of genetic material. A flurry of attention from the popular media about a bioconfinement method that fails could result in similar public mistrust for methods that are designed to keep transgenes in their place, leading to a loss of public confidence in the food supply and damage to the viability of the biotechnology industry as a whole.
From page 58...
... that could be affected by an escape or by any resulting loss of public confidence; insurance companies; government regulators; and private citizens who might sue to enforce environmental laws. Decisions about private legal action arising from damage caused by GEOs might indirectly affect whether bioconfinement or other confinement measures are undertaken.
From page 59...
... food supply. After the Prodigene incident, the Grocery Manufacturers of America met with senior USDA officials and congressional staff members to call for stricter regulation of pharmaceutical crops (Fox, 2003)
From page 60...
... Determining which law applies to a GEO under the coordinated framework can entail a complicated analysis, involving such factors as the stage of development (Is the GEO contained in the laboratory? Is it being field tested?
From page 61...
... APHIS, for example, requires physical confinement where crops genetically engineered to produce industrial chemicals or pharmaceuticals are field tested. The confinement requirements include a 50-ft perimeter fallow zone around the field test site; restriction on the production of food and feed crops in the field test site and in the fallow zone the next season if volunteer plants could be inadvertently harvested with that season's crop; the use of dedication of mechanical planters and harvesters for the duration of the test, and cleaning of that equipment in accordance with protocols for tractors and tillage attachments; the use of dedicated facilities for storing equipment and the regulated GEO; and, for field tests of open-pollinated pharmaceutical corn, a prohibition against growing any other corn one mile of the field test site for the duration of the field test (Federal Register, 2003)
From page 62...
... . The regulatory system described above is obviously complex, leading to differing legal authorities and responsibilities, potentially overlapping jurisdictions, and differing statutory standards for regulating GEOs and determining confinement (including bioconfinement)
From page 63...
... Private Action for Damage An indirect decision maker about bioconfinement is found in private causes of action for compensation for damage that results from escape, which typically would be subject to state law. One example with respect to nonbiological confinement is a class action lawsuit brought by farmers who claimed they were harmed when StarLink corn was discovered in the human food supply in 2000.
From page 64...
... 64 BIOCONFINEMENT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS confinement (Monsanto Canada Inc. & Monsanto Co.


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