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Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy (2004) / Chapter Skim
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3 Origins of U.S. Space Policy
Pages 14-18

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From page 14...
... Logsclon referred to a report of the Defense Science Board macle public in September 2003, which incticatect that the national security space enterprise is broken in terms of the ability to be on schedule, deliver technical performance, and meet national objectives.2 How much are these problems caused by the lack of any clear goals for the space program? Logsclon said that the workshop participants would have to answer that question.
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From page 15...
... Eisenhower's approach to a "space race," according to Logsclon, was to do as quickly as possible, before the Soviet Union, those things that the nation would be cloing in space anyway basest on their intrinsic military, scientific, or technological value, as technological capabilities clevelopecl. This approach changed with President Kennedy who, after the successful launch of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, felt more compelled to engage the Soviet Union in a more conspicuous space race.
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From page 16...
... Workshop participant Ec~warct Stone pointed out that in 1983 then NASA Administrator James Beggs came to the Space Studies Board asking for a scientific rationale for the station. The Boarcl's reply was to indicate that if there was a station, scientific uses could be found for it, but a station wasn't needled for good science.9 Logsclon noted that decisions to proceed with Project Apollo, the space shuttle program, and the space station have been the defining events for the U.S.
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From page 17...
... Therefore when NASA was discussing the space station program it ctict so without discussing configurations or cletailect technical icleas. NASA won support for the idea of the space station, but once this idea was approved, choosing a technical design to match all the clesirect capabilities proved to be more difficult than anticipated.
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From page 18...
... McCurdy replied by recalling an interview he had with former NASA Administrator James Fletcher, who indicated that perhaps the greatest mistake he, Fletcher, had ever made was not going to the White House, after the decision was made to build the space shuttle, and confess that in fact NASA could not build such a vehicle for the available funding. Logsdon followed up on this point by stating his belief that the space program has for so long been on such shaky political footing, that its leaders have refused to take the risk of being honest and saying, "We can't really do that." They do not want to test the hypothesis, according to Logsdon, that they can be honest about what could be done and risk losing political support.
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Key Terms

  • space station
  • human spaceflight
  • nasa administrator
  • national space
  • space shuttle

  • administrator james
  • security space
  • space science
  • human exploration
  • space policy

  • international space
  • howard mccurcly
  • von braun
  • national power
  • civil space

  • project apollo
  • shuttle program
  • mccurcly argued
  • former nasa
  • public opinion

  • national strength
  • successful human
  • defense science
  • opinion polls
  • spaceflight program

  • earth orbit
  • braun paradigm
  • space programs
  • logsclon incticatect
  • columbia accident


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