Monitoring International Labor Standards Techniques and Sources of Information (2004) / Chapter Skim
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3 Information from Nongovernmental Labor Monitoring Systems
3 Information from Nongovernmental Labor Monitoring Systems
Pages 69-103
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From page 69... ...
These initiatives involve new forms of collaboration, new roles for NGOs, new responsibilities of firms, new responses from local and national government authorities, and most important for this study, new types of information on the compliance of firms with international labor standards. These nongovernmental systems of labor monitoring and reporting are expanding extremely rapidly across industries and regulatory arenas-now covering garments, shoes, toys, forest products, oil and gas, mining, chemicals, coffee, electronics, and even tourism (Herrnstadt, 2001; Gereffi et al., 2001; Wick 2001; Cashore, 2002)
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From page 70... ...
This chapter seeks to describe and assesses the nature of these initiatives and, in particular, the information they are producing on compliance with international labor standards. Based on interviews with staff of each of the leading initiatives in the United States and Europe, interviews with multinational managers and advocacy organizations, a review of the existing literature and program documents, and direct evaluation of monitoring activities in China, Korea, Indonesia, and Mexico, the chapter details efforts at nongovernmental labor monitoring, explains how these systems function, describes the challenges they face, and evaluates their effectiveness in improving labor practices.
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From page 71... ...
While traditional regulation involves a national government establishing standards and policing performance, in contrast, outsourced monitoring involves NGOs and firms in standard setting and regulations, with the International Labour Organization (ILO) core standards and local laws as minimum standards.
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From page 72... ...
to advance codes and to define institutional procedures to monitor compliance. Increased pressure from labor and human rights groups has motivated a growing number of multinational corporations to adopt codes of conduct and to submit to some form of external monitoring.1 Codes related to labor standards were originally quite diverse (Varley, 1998; Diller, 1999; Compa and Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, 1995)
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From page 73... ...
These systems can either be extensions of existing supply-chain management programs -- simply adding labor, human rights, and environmental concerns to current systems for evaluating quality, timeliness, price, etc -- or they can involve entirely new systems for internal monitoring and evaluation.
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From page 75... ...
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From page 76... ...
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From page 77... ...
Reebok and Adidas, Nikes' main competitors, along with many other prominent footwear and apparel firms, have established similar programs that combine in-house assessment with audits by consulting firms. Reebok, for instance, has instituted a worldwide Human Rights Production Standards Factory Performance Assessment System, while Adidas has created "standards of engagement" for labor practices and health, safety, and the environment for all its subcontractors.5 Through these auditing tools, companies like Nike, Reebok, and Adidas now regularly rate their subcontractors for environmental and labor performance.
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From page 78... ...
Three such major initiatives have emerged in the United States: the Fair Labor Association (FLA) , Social Accountability International (SAI)
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From page 79... ...
Factories contract Companies commit and schedule to use independent Specially trained local selected external monitors audit teams will be independent accredited and briefed by local monitors to perform selected by the FLA NGOs and unions, on-site evaluations. to conduct periodic speak to managers Based on this inspections of at and workers, and evaluation, the least 30 percent of check the records of independent their facilities during the factories.
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From page 80... ...
All undergo the process monitoring must of becoming Factories self-select involve local NGOs. accredited SAI for certification.
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From page 81... ...
to determine if their facility complies with the WRAP Principles. Reporting All internal and Audit reports go to Audit reports are external monitoring the companies and provided to reports will be to SAI.
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From page 82... ...
Bean, Nicole Miller, Phillips Van-Heusen, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the International Labor Rights Fund, the RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights, and the National Consumers League. 8The FLA has to date accredited 11 organizations to carry out this "external" monitoring.
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From page 83... ...
The FLA worked closely with the companies and with the Worker Rights Consortium to pressure factory managers to respect worker rights, and in March 2003 the union and factory management signed a collective bargaining agreement (Maquila Solidarity Network, 2003a)
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From page 84... ...
The FLA responded to these new allegations by helping to bring unions and management to the bargaining table and by contracting with an FLA-accredited monitor to monitor the negotiations. On July 16, 2003, the local parties reached agreement on a contract -- the only collective bargaining agreement to date in the Guatemalan apparel and textile industry (Maquila Solidarity Network, 2003b; Fair Labor Association, 2003b)
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From page 85... ...
WRAP's board members include major apparel brands, such as Vanity Fair Corporation, Sara Lee, Kellwood, and Gerber Children wear. The WRAP certification board consists of individuals primarily from the private sector, with a nominal claim that the majority of its members are not directly affiliated with the apparel industry (Maquila Solidarity Network, 2001a)
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From page 86... ...
The WRAP certification board accredits firms to be external monitors of manufacturing facilities. WRAP has accredited six firms as monitors to date (Maquila Solidarity Network, 2001a)
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From page 87... ...
The FWF requires companies to monitor their supply chains, with independent verification and effective worker complaint procedures. The foundation plans to certify companies that have a system in place to gather evidence on factory conditions in their supply chains.
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From page 88... ...
, and local NGOs to correct problems that have been identified. The WRC's investigative efforts rely on collaboration with local NGOs and activists, personnel from either the WRC, its board, or affiliated university members, and labor and human rights experts.
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From page 89... ...
It utilizes the power of transparency and dialogue to identify and disseminate good practices based on universal principles."13 To this end, the Global Compact asks companies to commit to respecting nine principles, including respect for human rights, labor rights (basically the ILO core standards) , and the environment and to report annually on their progress on advancing these principles.
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From page 90... ...
Others are fully transparent, with full investigation reports made public. In general, most of the initiatives have now converged on codes of conduct that center around the ILO core labor standards, plus a number of other key issues: health and safety, wages and hours, and the treatment of women.
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From page 91... ...
The multistakeholder initiatives also vary in their content and levels of public disclosure. The WRAP certification program currently provides virtually no information to the public, even on factories audited or certified.
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From page 92... ...
Perhaps more problematic is the currently unsystematic nature of data that are available. Reports come from individual exposés and partial samples of supply chains, so it is difficult to reach general conclusions even from detailed reports that are available.
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From page 93... ...
Many of the initiatives described above are still too new to evaluate fully. The FLA has only recently begun its external monitoring program.
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From page 94... ...
Nongovernmental monitoring faces many of the same mundane challenges as traditional government monitoring and enforcement, including coverage, training and capacity of inspectors, incentives of monitors, corruption, etc. The long and mobile nature of apparel supply chains, which has strained traditional monitoring, also makes nongovernmental monitoring extremely challenging.
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From page 95... ...
. Having NGOs play the role of regulators may also ultimately undermine traditional regulatory processes (Nadvi and Wältring, 2001; International Labour Organization, 1998)
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From page 96... ...
CONCLUSIONS Despite a number of problems and challenges, new nongovernmental monitoring systems have the potential to generate valuable information for the evaluation of compliance with international labor standards. As these systems are focused primarily on factory- and brand-level evaluations, they offer potentially very detailed information on the context of manufacturing practices in a particular country, providing ground-level information to complement national-level data on labor standards performance.
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From page 97... ...
Can improved practices "spill over" into firms not directly tied to high-end global supply chains? Can southern stakeholders be brought into discussions and have a real say in the structure and implementation of these programs?
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From page 98... ...
Monitoring systems that are more transparent would receive higher ratings. In the United States, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights is working to develop a public comparison system for labor performance, modeled at least in part on the environmental comparison website.19 Both of these initiatives would advance transparency and comparability of codes and monitoring programs.
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From page 99... ...
If these experiments in nongovernmental monitoring can be made more transparent, accountable, and democratic, it may be possible to build them into an important complement to existing labor regulation. At a minimum, nongovernmental monitoring and reporting offers a glimpse of emerging strategies to monitor global supply chains and to begin the process of building new systems for a fast-changing world.
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From page 100... ...
. Models of international labor standards.
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From page 101... ...
. Fair Labor Association.
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From page 102... ...
. Corporate codes of conduct and product labeling schemes: The limits and possibilities of promoting international labor rights through private initiatives.
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From page 103... ...
Maquila Solidarity Network. Available: http://www.
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