Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues (1985) / Chapter Skim
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4 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations
4 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations
Pages 107-135
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From page 107... ...
The NATO action, which responded to the Soviet deployment of a new generation of intermediaterange weapons (SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers) , was described as a two-track decision, since in parallel with the deployment of groundlaunched cruise missiles and Pershing IT ballistic missiles the United States was to seek to negotiate equal limits on these missiles with the Soviet Union.
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From page 108... ...
In response to the Soviet medium-range missile deployment and the perceived Soviet advantages in intercontinental ballistic missiles, the United States in 1959 deployed Thor and Jupiter missiles, which had a range of 2,500 km, in Europe. This deployment was in fact intended to reassure the alliance that the United States was prepared to defend Europe.
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From page 109... ...
FIexi ble response, which is still NATO's basic strategy of deterrence, requires NATO to be able to respond to a Soviet attack with a range of options, from conventional defense alone to the use of either tactical or long-range theater nuclear forces to the ultimate use of intercontinental nuclear forces. To implement this strategy the United States announced that 400 warheads on Poseidon ballistic missile submarines were being committed to the European theater.
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From page 110... ...
Chancellor Schmidt called on NATO to respond to this growing disparity in the theater nuclear balance. NATO's Dual-Track Deployment Decision On December 12, 1979, after two years of extensive study and consultation, NATO unanimously decided to modernize its Tong-range theater nuclear forces by deploying 464 grouncI-launched cruise missiles (GECMs)
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From page 111... ...
NATO's deployment decision was called `'6ual track" because the alliance also pledged to pursue a parallel effort to obtain an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union to limit theater nuclear forces. The NATO communique stated that limitations on U.S.
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From page 112... ...
Widespread European fears that the United States was moving toward a nuclear war fighting capability which had been kindled by the deployment decision, the 1979 controversy over the neutron bomb, and the Carter Administration's 1980 announcement of a new flexible targeting strategy were further fueled by the Reagan Administration's hard-Tine rhetoric and its failure to resume arms controT negotiations promptly. At the end of February 1981, President Brezhnev in his report to the 26th Soviet Party Congress called on the United States to join in negotiations and proposed a U.S.-Soviet moratorium on deployment of new medium-range nuclear missile launchers in Europe and European parts of the Soviet Union.
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From page 113... ...
The NATO ministers responded by endorsing the arms control process, stating that they planned to go ahead with the deployment of the new weapons in Europe should the negotiations fail. President Reagan asserted that it was the deployment decision that had brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, and that the antinuclear demonstrations in Europe "were bought and paid for by the Soviet Union." President Brezhnev then proposed a two-thir(ls reduction in NATO
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From page 114... ...
Brezhnev also called for the "real zero option," which he defined as the removal of all tactical and medium-range nuclear arms, including British and French arms. He stated, however, that if the West was not ready for "radical decisions" the Soviet Union would settle for deep cuts.
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From page 115... ...
The NATO allies joined in dismissing Brezhnev's initiative and noted that existing deployments of SS-20s east of the Urals could also be targeted on Europe. President Brezhnev publicly responded to the NATO allies' concern in a nationally televised speech in May 1981, in which he pledged that missiles withdrawn from the European part of the Soviet Union would not be redeployed east of the Ural Mountains within range of the Western European nations.
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From page 116... ...
The U.S. press reported that after much debate within the administration, President Reagan had previously rejected further exploration of the walk-in-the-woods compromise, as a result of strong opposition from the Department of Defense.
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From page 117... ...
He also confirmed that "some rockets could be completely destroyed and some could be redeployed behind a line in Siberia where they could no longer hit targets in Western Europe." The Reagan Administration rejected Anc3ropov's proposal, saying that it would still leave a Soviet monopoly on intermediate-range missiles in Europe and deny the Uniter! States "the means to deter the threat." The NATO allies also quickly rejected Anciropov's offer, and the French Foreign Minister said that he was "shocked" that the Soviet Union would attempt to include the French nuclear arsenal in U.S.Soviet arms control talks since the French nuclear force was "independent." By the end of November 1982, when the third session of the formal negotiations ended, the two sides remained far from agreement.
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From page 118... ...
As the deployment date drew nearer without progress in the INF negotiations, President Reagan and the NATO allies reaffirmed several times during the summer of 1983 that the deployment was the only way
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From page 119... ...
proposal. At the United Nations on September 26, 1983, President Reagan announced that, within the context of an interim agreement providing the United States and the Soviet Union with the right to equal numbers of intermediate-range missile warheads globally, the United States was prepared to consider a commitment not to offset the entire worldwide Soviet INF missile deployment with U.S.
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From page 120... ...
The State Department initially held that there was little new in Andropov's latest proposal, but a few days later President Reagan commented that the United States would study the new Soviet proposal and address it in Geneva. On November 14, 1983, as U.S.
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From page 121... ...
Also, within the context of an agreement providing the right to equal global levels, the United States stated that it was prepared to consider a commitment not to offset the entire worIdwide Soviet missile deployments with U.S. missile deployments in Eu
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From page 122... ...
medium-range missiles in Europe and reductions of Soviet SS-20 missile launchers within range of Europe to approximately 140; or alternatively, elimination of all (U.S., Soviet, British, and French) "medium-range" and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, otherwise referred to as the "real zero option." · Dismantling or destruction as the primary means of reduction for excess systems.
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From page 123... ...
and Soviet Perspectives The underlying issue in the.INF negotiations is the different assessments of the balance of nuclear forces in Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union. These differing views determined each side's position on the scope of the negotiations.
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From page 124... ...
President Reagan countered the Soviet claim of approximate parity in the overall European balance, including missiles and aircraft, with the claim that the Soviet Union had an overwhelming six to one advantage. According to estimates provided by the U.S.
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From page 125... ...
Fighter-bombers (F-llls, F-4s, A-6s, A-7s, FB-llls) Pershing IA missiles British Polaris missiles Vulcan bombers French Land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles Submarine missiles Mirage 4 bombers SOVIET COUNT Soviet Land-based missiles (SS-20s, SS-4s, SS-5s)
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From page 126... ...
forward-based nuclear force (FB-l l l bombers, F-l l l and F-4 fighterbombers, A-6 and A-7 carrier-based aircraft, and the Pershing lA missiles) , together with the nuclear forces of Britain and France (ground-based French S-2 and S-3 missiles, British Polaris and French M-20 submarine-based ballistic missiles, and Vulcan, Buccaneer, and Mirage bombers)
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From page 127... ...
the geographic scope of the negotiations, and (3) the treatment of thirdcountry nuclear forces.
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From page 128... ...
zero option proposal would have been to ban any ground-launched nuclear missiles with ranges greater than that of the Soviet SS-12/22. The United States did not include limits on the shorter-range U.S.
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From page 129... ...
In response to the Soviet argument that British and French nuclear forces should be included, the United States maintained that these were independent forces of two sovereign nations that were not parties to the negotiations. The United States also argued that it does not determine or control the composition or employment of these forces, which are national minimum deterrents.
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From page 130... ...
Soviet advantages in intercontinental ballistic missiles and theater forces offset U.S. advantages in strategic bombers, forward-based systems threatening the Soviet Union, allied forces, and the overall quality of U.S.
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From page 131... ...
Although toward the end of the negotiations the United States agreed to consider aircraft, the Soviet Union argued that U.S. accounting of aircraft turned the NATO's real 50 percent advantage over Soviet medium-range aircraft into a fivefold advantage for the Soviet Union.
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From page 132... ...
proposals generally on the grounds that they called for inequitable and disproportionate reductions in Soviet forces. In the Soviet view, the zero option was, in effect, an attempt to impose unilateral disarmament on the Soviet Union, since it would have to scrap all of its medium-range missiles while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all of their nuclear weapons in this category.
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From page 133... ...
The U.S. ban on excess or reload missiles, which complements the ban on launchers and missiles in the zero option proposal and the reduction of missiles and launchers in the interim proposal, would appear to require intrusive on-site inspection of Soviet and U.S.
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From page 134... ...
For example, the Social Democrats in Germany, the Labour Party in Britain, and the Labor Party in Norway all supported the Soviet proposal to match British and French systems. Some European opposition leaders who originally supported the 1979 dual-track decision, believing that it would produce negotiated reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe, are now calling for a delay in the deployments and a return to the negotiating table.
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From page 135... ...
It is further argued that joining the two negotiations may complicate the arms control process to the point where no agreement is possible. Those who support integrating the two negotiations argue that the initial premise of NATO's 1979 decision was to conduct European intermediate-range negotiations within the context of the next round of strategic arms limitations talks.
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