Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues (1985) / Chapter Skim
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5 Strategic Defensive Arms Control: The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
5 Strategic Defensive Arms Control: The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Pages 136-158
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From page 136... ...
interest in nationwide ballistic missile defense has raised serious questions about the future of the ABM Treaty. (See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the SALT and SALT IT limits on strategic offensive arms.)
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From page 137... ...
For that reason, President Dwight Eisenhower refused to approve production and deployment of the system. The Johnson Years Despite Eisenhower's decision against early deployment of an ABM system, research and development continued on ballistic missile defenses.
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From page 138... ...
The Soviet Union also continued its vigorous program of research and development, and in 1964 it paraded a large ABM interceptor missile in Moscow. By 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara began to argue that stability in the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union should rest on a capability of "assured destruction." That is, the United States should be able to destroy a large fraction of Soviet cities and industry after absorbing an all-out Soviet first strike.
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From page 139... ...
In his January 1967 budget message, President Johnson called for intensive development of the Nike-X system but stated that he would "take no action now" if the Soviet Union was willing to begin negotiations on mutual limitations on ABM systems. Soviet Premier ATexei Kosygin stated in response to a letter from President Johnson in March 1967 that he agreed to bilateral discussions, but that the discussions should be on "means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles." Shortly afterward, the two governments announced that they agreed in principle to begin discussions on both offensive and defensive systems, at an unspecified future date.
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From page 140... ...
The Nixon Years: ABM and SALT The approval ofthe Sentinel system, combined with the collapse ofthe scheduled arms talks, aroused unexpectedly intense public opposition to the deployment of ABM interceptor missiles armed with nuclear warheads outside major cities. In response to the growing criticism of the Sentinel system and another Soviet offer to begin arms control negotiations, the new Nixon Administration announced in February 1969 a temporary one-month halt to the deployment of Sentinel pending a review of U.S.
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From page 141... ...
In a period of about 10 to 20 minutes, computers would have to interpret the radar signals, identify potential targets, distinguish between warheads and decoys, eliminate false targets, track incoming objects, predict trajectories, allocate and guide interceptor missiles, and aim and detonate interceptor missiles when they got within range of a target. All of this would have to be accomplished in a very hostile environment involving radar blackout from offensive and defensive nuclear explosions as well as enemy countermeasures.
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From page 142... ...
The radars, missiles, and computers in the system were at the limits of existing technology, and extraordinary coordination would be required among those subsystems with a very short reaction time in the poorly understood environment induced by multiple nuclear explosions. Scientists also argued that Soviet ballistic missiles could easily penetrate the Safeguard system by a variety of tactics or overwhelm it by sheer numbers.
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From page 143... ...
On May 26, 1972, Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev signed the SALT ~ ABM Treaty of unlimited duration and the five-year Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. In the ABM Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to deploy ABM systems for national or regional defense.
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From page 144... ...
. serves the security interests of both parties, decreases the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, facilitates progress in the further limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, and requires no amendment at this time." The Strategic Defense Initiative In the early 1980s the issue of ballistic missile deployment and the future of the ABM Treaty once again became a major security issue.
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From page 145... ...
strategic offensive forces will continue at full speed and in a very specific direction that of acquiring the potential to deliver a nuclear first strike." The Soviet President went on to unveil a new arms control proposal to prevent an arms race in space. In testimony on the Strategic Defense Initiative program for fiscal year 1985 that was to implement the President's proposal, administration officials were less clear about whether the program was to be directed specifically at a nationwide defense effort.
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From page 146... ...
It recommended a Tong-term research and development program to develop options that could guide future decisions concerning ballistic missile defense. The Strategic Defense Initiative, which emerged from these studies, is designed to explore the feasibility of a multitiered system that could engage ballistic missiles and warheads along their entire trajectories, including the boost, post-boost, mid-course, reentry, and terminal phases.
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From page 147... ...
A significant new element of the 1980s debate is the impact of the Strategic Defense Initiative on the SALT ~ ABM Treaty, which is the cornerstone ofthe arms control process. Although the Reagan Administration has asserted that its immediate program is consistent with the ABM Treaty, critics point out that the program will inevitably collide with the treaty in only a few years if the administration pursues its stated goals.
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From page 148... ...
The treaty specifically prohibited development, testing, or deployment of sea-, air-, space-, or mobile land-based ABM systems and their components, since these systems could provide the base for a nationwide defense. Moreover, an agreed statement to the treaty made clear that if future technology produced ABM systems "based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars," specific limitations on such systems would be developed to fulfill the treaty's basic obligation not to deploy nationwide ABM systems.
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From page 149... ...
Both groups see the initiative as a timely response to several major developments that challenge the basic premises on which the SALT ABM Treaty was based. These developments include growing dissatisfaction with a strategic policy of deterrence based on the threat of retaTiation and mutually assured destruction, various scientific and technical developments that suggest the possibility of an effective ballistic missile defense, and evidence of a major Soviet effort to develop a ballistic missile defense system as part of a broader defensive military
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From page 150... ...
In today's strictly offense-dominated U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the continuing growth of the Soviet ballistic missile threat could force the United States to make ever more difficult improvements in its offensive forces to assure a survivable retaliation force. On the other hand, a new balance between offensive and defensive forces resulting from a ballistic missile defense could enhance deterrence against deliberate attack and provide greater safety against accidental use of nuclear weapons or unintended nuclear escalation.
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From page 151... ...
Emerging Technologies. The main reason for reconsidering ballistic missile defense at this time, according to most supporters of the Strategic Defense Initiative, is the emergence of technologies that may make an effective ballistic missile defense feasible.
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From page 152... ...
The Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Program. One of the main reasons for the Strategic Defense Initiative cited by its supporters is the advanced state of the Soviet ballistic missile defense program.
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From page 153... ...
Consequently, despite its promise of a more humane and moral approach to strategic policy, President Reagan's proposal will actually lead to a more dangerous relationship with the Soviet Union and an increase in the arms race. Furthermore, within a relatively short time, critics point out, the Strategic Defense Initiative will come into conflict with the provisions of the SALT ~ ABM Treaty and probably other arms control agreements as well.
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From page 154... ...
It should not be undertaken in the context of seeking a nationwide ballistic missile defense, which is clearly contrary to the underlying objective of the ABM Treaty. The Realities of Assured Destruction.
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From page 155... ...
The Destabilizing Effects of Nationwide and Intermediate Defenses. The most important danger of a major national effort to achieve an effective ballistic missile defense, according to critics, is that it will be an unprecedented stimulant to the arms race.
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From page 156... ...
Critics ofthe Strategic Defense Initiative state that its advocates have overstated the magnitude and significance of the Soviet ball istic missile defense effort. In any event, some critics continue, the magnitude of the Soviet effort is largely irrelevant to the U.S.
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From page 157... ...
Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative assert that it will actually accelerate the arms race and further undercut the arms control regime built over the past 20 years. In addition to the ABM Treaty, other arms
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From page 158... ...
Any hopes for negotiating a comprehensive test ban agreement or an anti-satellite accord would also be lost. In short, these critics argue, the Strategic Defense Initiative will lead to the destruction of the entire arms control framework developed over the past two decades.
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