Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues (1985) / Chapter Skim
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6 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Arms Control
6 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Arms Control
Pages 159-186
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From page 159... ...
In 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear tests in space. In 1967 the Outer Space Treaty prohibited stationing -weapons of mass destruction in space.
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From page 160... ...
An agreement was not reached, and there have been no further negotiations since 1979. The Soviet Union has continued to advocate such an agreement and in 1983 presented to the United Nations a detailed draft treaty banning weapons in space, ASAT systems, and the use of force against satellites.
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From page 161... ...
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons and other "weapons of mass destruction" in space. The 1972 SALT ~ ABM Treaty bans the development, testing, or deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in space.
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From page 162... ...
In June 197S, a year after the United States declared the Soviet ASAT operational, President Carter summarized his Presidential Directive on National Space Policy, stating that "while the United States seeks verifiable, comprehensive limits on anti-satellite capabilities and use, in the absence of such agreement, the United States will vigorously
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From page 163... ...
The Reagan Years The policy agenda of the new Reagan Administration called for a complete review of arms control policy and objectives and consequently put any further movement on these issues, including the ASAT negotiations, on the back burner. In March 1981 the Soviet Union, which had never previously destroyed a target with an ASAT system, successfully performed a complete operational test of its ASAT system using a radar homing device.
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From page 164... ...
The UN General Assembly, however, approved the draft treaty and referred it to the First Committee. The Committee on Disarmament was instructed to include on its agenda for negotiations the Soviet draft treaty as well as the question of negotiating agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.
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From page 165... ...
Soviet President Yuri Andropov quickly followed the Reagan Administration's announcements with further calls for arms control negotiations on these issues. In response to a petition from a group of American scientists to ban weapons in space, Andropov stated that the United States and the Soviet Union were approaching a crucial time when failure to negotiate a ban on weapons in outer space would make an extension of the arms race into outer space inevitable.
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From page 166... ...
In addition to these proposals, Andropov stated that the Soviet Union "assumes the commitment not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon." Shortly
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From page 167... ...
At the United Nations the new Soviet draft treaty was referred to the First Committee. The United States was the only member of that committee to vote against a compromise resolution that would have established an ad hoc working group on outer space with a view toward undertaking negotiations.
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From page 168... ...
In his official ASAT report to Congress on March 31, 1984, President Reagan formally rejected the comprehensive ban proposed by the Soviet Union. President Reagan stated in the transmittal letter that "no arrangements beyond those already governing military activities in outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall interest of the United States and its allies." The report stated that the factors that impede the identification of effective ASAT arms control measures include significant difficulties of verification, diverse sources of threats to U.S.
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From page 169... ...
commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty; a temporary moratorium on the testing and deployment of all weapons in space; and, following that, negotiation of a "verifiable treaty blocking weaponry in the heavens." Other critics of the administration's report argued that it was simply a laundry list of problems facing ASAT arms control and failed to compare the advantages to U.S. national security of an ASAT ban with an unconstrained ASAT race.
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From page 170... ...
Following the President's press conference, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin presented a note to Secretary of State George Shultz on June 29, 1984, proposing formal negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Vienna in September on an agreement to prevent "the militarization of outer space," including a ban on space weapons and the mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems. President Reagan responded almost immediately, stating that the United States was prepared to hold wide-ranging arms control talks with the Soviet Union, including discussions seeking agreement on "feasible negotiating approaches" to limits on anti-satellite systems, but would not allow the agenda to be restricted to the militarization of outer space.
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From page 171... ...
S Position President Reagan reported to Congress on March 31, 1984, that no arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military activities in outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall interest of the United States and its allies.
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From page 172... ...
There is no indication as to which of these positions the United States will advance if the Vienna meeting takes place. The Soviet Position The Soviet offer of a unilateral testing moratorium, announced by Andropov in August 1983, states, as reported by Tass, that the Soviet Union "assumes the commitment not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon, that is, imposes a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for the entire period during which other countries, including the U.S.A., will refrain from stationing in outer space anti-satellite weapons of any type." The Soviet 1983 draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space Against the Earth is comprehensive in scope and of unlimited duration.
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From page 173... ...
According to the administration, the problems facing ASAT arms control, which more than offset the potential benefits, include the lack of effective verification, the Soviet potential for breakout, the problem of defining ASAT systems, and the risks of disclosing sensitive information. The administration also argues that a U.S.
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From page 174... ...
As further examples of the verification problems of ASAT arms control, the government asserts that ground tests of a ground-based laser ASAT weapon would be easy to conceal and that space tests of such systems could be difficult to detect. Moreover, although circumstances might be suspicious, it would be extremely difficult as a practical matter to determine whether an orbiting satellite contained a weapon.
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From page 175... ...
The administration has also pointed out that while the establishment of cooperative measures might diminish the difficult verification problems associated with ASAT arms control, these measures could cause additional problems. Cooperative measures meant to enhance verification of an ASAT arms control agreement might require access to U.S.
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From page 176... ...
ASAT could be operational. With regard to the draft treaty itself, the Reagan Administration argues that it lacks effective verification provisions since it provides for nothing beyond National Technical Means of verification, which are deemed inadequate.
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From page 177... ...
The Soviet Union has called on the United States to declare a similar moratorium on its activities before the opening of official arms control negotiations on space. The 1983 Soviet draft is broader in scope and more precise in definition and terms than the 1981 draft, which Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko referred to as simply an extension of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
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From page 178... ...
Given real interest in finding effective solutions, he said, any questions relating to the militarization of outer space could be successfully resolved during negotiations. Soviet analysts point out the impossibility of trying to solve the problem of verification without even discussing it within a negotiating framework.
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From page 179... ...
Domestic supporters of ASAT arms control emphasize that satellites are vital to U.S. national security and strategic stability and that their survival can best be protected by strict ASAT arms control limitations.
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From page 180... ...
These domestic supporters also argue that ASAT arms control is in the U.S. interest because the United States will be less able to adapt to the costs of an unrestrained ASAT competition.
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From page 181... ...
Domestic supporters of ASAT arms control emphasize that there is now a unique opportunity for agreement since the tested but rudimentary technology of the Soviet ASAT system and the untested but more advanced technology of the U.S. F-15 ASAT system do not provide either side with a really threatening ASAT capability.
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From page 182... ...
Verification. Supporters of ASAT arms control do not accept the administration's conclusion that a comprehensive ASAT agreement poses impossible verification problems.
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From page 183... ...
This threat could be contained by including in the agreement "rules of the road" that prohibit such trailing activities. Finally, supporters argue that various indirect ASAT capabilities that are inherent in other military and civil space activities are not in fact serious threats at present.
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From page 184... ...
ASAT Link with ABM. Another reason for ASAT arms control, according to some supporters, is to assure that the SAI,T ~ ABM Treaty limitir~g anti-ballistic missile systems is not undermined.
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From page 185... ...
Some supporters of ASAT arms control disagree with the administration's negative assessment of the Soviet 1983 draft treaty. They argue that it is a significant improvement over the much less comprehensive 1981 Soviet draft and a sign that the Soviets mar have a serious interest in negotiating a ban on space weapons, including ASAT systems.
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From page 186... ...
186 acbvibes and systems that are limited than the 1981 drain. For the first bme the Soviet Union teas indicated ~ ~iHingness to Thee to dismantle As existing ASK system.
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