Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues (1985) / Chapter Skim
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7 Nuclear Test Bans
7 Nuclear Test Bans
Pages 187-223
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From page 187... ...
, which provided for the special handling of peaceful explosions under the threshold. The Carter Administration renewed the effort to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty but failed to produce an agreement.
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From page 188... ...
Early proposals to stop testing were opposed within the U.S. government by both military and civilian officials on the grounds that the requirements for more advanced nuclear weapons were so urgent as to far outweigh any immediate health dangers that might be associated with nuclear tests.
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From page 189... ...
This moratorium was subsequer~tly extended to the end of 1959 and testing was not resumed until 1961. On October 31, 195S, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, then the only nuclear powers, opened the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests in Geneva, Switzerland.
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From page 190... ...
In response, the Soviet Union called for a ban on all space tests, a five-year moratorium on underground tests below magnitude 4.75 while the joint seismic research program was under way, and a political decision on a specific number of on-site inspections. After meeting with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, President Eisenhower agreed to the concept of a moratorium on tests below the magnitude 4.75 threshold, but only after a threshold treaty with an agreed quota of on-site inspections had been signed and a joint research program agreed upon.
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From page 191... ...
The negotiations were stalemated, and neither side was prepared to make further significant concessions. This phase of the test ban negotiations abruptly ended on August 30, 1961, when the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume nuclear testing, which began the next day.
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From page 192... ...
One was a treaty banning all nuclear tests without a threshold on underground tests. The provisions of this comprehensive test ban were essentially those of the previous threshold test ban, although it was suggested that the number of inspections would be reduced.
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The treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions was an issue that had not been resolved within the U.S. government and would eventually
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From page 194... ...
On June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced in his famous American University speech that agreement had been reached to hold high-level discussions in Moscow on the test ban. In the speech, which examined the issues of war and peace and U.S.-Soviet relations in a nuclear world, Kennedy also declared a unilateral moratorium on atmospheric nuclear tests for as Tong as other states did likewise.
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From page 195... ...
provision explicitly permitting withdrawal from the treaty. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was of unlimited duration, banned nuclear tests in all environments except for underground tests that contained the resulting radioactive debris so that it would not be present outside the territory of the country conducting the test.
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From page 196... ...
To balance the commitment of the non-nuclear weapon states not to obtain nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive device, the nuclear weapon states agreed to share the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race. Article VT ofthe NPT specifically committed all parties to the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Moreover, the preamble to the treaty recalled the determination expressed in the preamble of the Limited Test Ban Treaty "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end." In the eyes of most non-nuclear weapon states, nuclear testing, even though it was underground, remained the symbol of a continuing policy of active discrimination uncler the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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From page 197... ...
The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, or more simply the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (Appendix E) , prohibited any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kt.
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The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was directed specifically at weapon tests and did not deal with peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)
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When Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Moscow in March 1977 to establish the arms control agenda for the next four years, it was agreed to resume trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban agreement. The negotiations, which began in the fall of 1977 in Geneva, made significant early progress but slowed as the SALT IT negotiations began to dominate the bureaucratic and political processes in the United States.
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From page 200... ...
Using data from this system as well as the full resources of their respective National Technical Means, the countries could request inspections that would have to be granted unless NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
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Both sides considered this a matter of principle and refused to modify their positions. A potentially serious issue that remained to be addressed was the definition of a "nuclear weapons test explosion." This issue, which had always been postponed in earlier attempts at a comprehensive test ban,
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arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance." In March 1983, James George, acting director of ACDA, stated in a written response to questions at appropriation hearings that the United States requires continued nuclear testingfor "the development, modernization, and certification of warheads, the maintenance of stockpile reliability and the evaluation of nuclear weapons effects." Other spokesmen have emphasized the problems with verifying a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet Union has continued to advocate a comprehensive test
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From page 203... ...
In the absence of progress on a comprehensive test ban or other arms control treaties, the Reagan Administration came under strong pressure from Congress, particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to proceed with the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, which had been on the calendar of the Foreign Relations Committee since 1976. In July 1982 it was reported that President Reagan had decided that the two treaties would have to be renegotiated to seek unspecified improvements in their verification measures before they could be ratified.
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From page 204... ...
Both sides still maintain their intention to continue to observe the threshold in the unratified treaties. In the 1984 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale attacked the Reagan Administration's repudiation of a comprehensive test ban and called for prompt negotiation of a treaty as part of his proposed package of arms control measures.
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From page 205... ...
They also assert that new warheads are not necessary for future delivery systems and that a case has not been made for a new or third generation of nuclear weapons except as a component of an accelerated arms race. Similarly, nuclear tests to understand the effects of nuclear explosions are not necessary except as part of a program that would accelerate the arms race.
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From page 206... ...
Thus, a nuclear test would be required to confirm the performance of an existing weapon or to certify a modification or replacement to correct the problem. Moreover, these opponents point out that these defects, which are not random and may occur after a certain period of time in weapons of a particular design, could over a relatively short period render a significant fraction of one leg of the deterrent force inoperative, since the same type of nuclear weapon is often used on all delivery vehicles of a particular type.
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From page 207... ...
Supporters of a CTB argue that, while stockpile reliability is obviously a very important problem, nuclear testing is not required to deal with it satisfactorily. Weapons undergo frequent nondestructive tests to ensure proper operation of all components.
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Supporters also point out that the hypothetical problem of having all the warheads on one leg of the strategic triad become inoperable due to a common failure would be eliminated by having some mix of existing warheads on each major delivery system. Some supporters of a CTB would acknowledge that after a generation without any nuclear testing, political and military leaders might well have less personal confidence in the stockpile regardless of its intrinsic reliability.
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From page 209... ...
In this concept, the X-ray radiation from an exploding thermonuclear weapon would power an external laser device that could project a narrow cone of intense soft X-ray radiation to distances of thousands of kilometers in space. Other exotic applications that use nuclear explosions as a source of power in space are also under consideration as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
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From page 210... ...
Moreover, attempts to develop such systems, whether successful or not, would lead not only to the termination of the SALT ~ ABM Treaty but to the abrogation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty as well, since such applications would eventually require testing in space. In short, supporters of a CTB argue that it would preclude a range of weapons developments that could contribute to the acceleration of the nuclear arms race without precluding future weapons systems that might contribute to the survivability of the deterrent.
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From page 211... ...
They assert that this nonnuclear approach would provide sufficient information to assess the vulnerability of existing warheads and delivery systems to nuclear radiation and to ensure adequate communications to release retaliatory strategic forces. Supporters of a CTB argue that the limitations on high-altitude tests significantly constrain the development of ballistic missile defense systems, which they believe are essentially destabilizing and a major stimulant to the nuclear arms race.
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From page 212... ...
Safety Some opponents of a CTB argue that it would interfere with efforts to improve the safety of nuclear weapons in the event of an accident involving nuclear weapons. Although such an accident or terrorist attack would not produce a nuclear explosion, it could cause the high-explosive component of a nuclear weapon to go off, dispersing several kilograms of dangerously radioactive plutonium in the general vicinity.
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Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Some opponents of a CTB argue that such a ban would preclude the development and use of peaceful nuclear explosives, which they claim hold great economic promise. This was a major issue during the 1960s, when the U.S.
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From page 214... ...
With this history in mind, supporters of a CTB argue that continued efforts on the part of the nuclear powers to retain a PNE option will provide potential nuclear weapon states with a rationale for keeping open a nuclear explosives option on the grounds that it might be needed for a PNE program. The Weapons Laboratories Opponents of a CTB argue that such an agreement would seriously weaken U.S.
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From page 215... ...
In contrast, most CTB supporters have argued that there would be adequate verification to ensure that the Soviet Union or other countries were not conducting nuclear tests that could have any real military significance. Nuclear explosions are unique events.
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Nuclear explosions in space at vast distances can be monitored from satellites by their characteristic X-ray .
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If a nuclear test occurs in a sufficiently large cavity that does not collapse during the explosion, it is theoretically possible to reduce the coupling by a factor of as much as 100. In addition, there are regional biases in the coupling of seismic signals.
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From page 218... ...
Some opponents also argue that by firing shots in large underground cavities, the Soviet Union could clandestinely conduct tests with yields up to 100 kt. Supporters of a CTB argue that the system that the Soviet Union appeared to be prepared to accept would have an effective threshold of identification of around 1 kt.
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From page 219... ...
The only area of the Soviet Union that has such earthquakes with reasonable frequency is the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kurile Islands region, where seismic events can be carefully monitored by nearby seismic equipment in Japan and Alaska, by very sensitive underwater seismic arrays, and by any unmanned seismic stations located in the immediate area as part ofthe monitoring system in the Soviet Union. Since the test would have to be hidden in the signal from a distant earthquake, it would be very difficult to match the exact timing and magnitude of the test with the arriving earthquake signal.
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From page 220... ...
Supporters of a CTB argue that on-site inspections, even if they require an invitation after a challenge, are a useful deterrent to ciandestine testing. However, they disagree that an on-site inspection is needed to make the case that a nuclear test has in fact occurred since seismic criteria are capable of identifying most explosions as explosions above the threshold with high confidence.
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From page 221... ...
In this way, the Soviet Union could have an option to resume testing openly with an asymmetric advantage. Supporters of a CTB argue that clandestine testing below a kiloton or even several kilotons would not contribute to existing Soviet weapons capabilities.
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From page 222... ...
Impact on Nuclear Proliferation Opponents of a CTB argue that it would not be an important factor in non-proliferation. The potential nuclear weapon states of real concern would not sign such a treaty, they assert, since these states wish to maintain a nuclear weapons option.
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From page 223... ...
These states particularly object to the continuation of nuclear testing, which they see as a symbol both of the threat of nuclear war and of the inequitable nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Supporters argue that a CTB treaty would go a Tong way in the eyes of the non-nuclear weapon states to meeting the obligation that the United States and the Soviet Union undertook in Article VT of the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Many potential nuclear weapon states would sign a CTB treaty, according to supporters.
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