Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues (1985) / Chapter Skim
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8 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
8 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Pages 224-274
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From page 224... ...
Given sufficient political incentives, most states could in time produce a nuclear weapon, if they obtain the necessary technical talent, know-how, and materials. A peaceful nuclear power program can provide many of the technical assets that could contribute to a nuclear weapons program.
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From page 225... ...
The fourth part of this chapter addresses the role and future prospects of these treaties and identifies the principal issues that have arisen among the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states in defining and developing this international regime. International safeguards are the principal means of verifying compliance with the two major multinational non-proliferation treaties.
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From page 226... ...
Although several states appear to be seriously considering the development of nuclear weapons, a range of possible actions exists to deter this decision in each case. In 1964, when China joined the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France as the fifth nuclear weapons state, few observers would have predicted that in the next 20 years only one other state would test a nuclear device and that, after the test, India would emphasize its "peaceful" purpose and apparently discontinue an active weapons program.
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From page 227... ...
States without nuclear weapons generally see the danger of the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to their adversaries as outweighing the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons or even the future option to produce them. The adherence of more than 120 states to treaties designed to support non-proliferation and the willingness of these states to pay the price of forswearing the future option of acquiring nuclear explosives demonstrates the widespread recognition of the international security advantages of a non-proliferation regime.
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From page 228... ...
The critical and indispensable ingredient of a nuclear explosive device is either highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium. Highly enriched uranium is produced by separating the fissionable isotope uranium-235 from uranium-238 in enrichment plants by a variety of different processes.
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From page 229... ...
The resulting "plutonium economy" based on plutonium reprocessing and plutonium breeder reactors would have resulted in vast quantities of plutonium at power reactors, reprocessing plants, and fuel fabrication plants and in transit domestically and internationally between these facilities. For example, the plutonium fuel load for a single plutonium breeder could contain enough plutonium to make 50 nuclear weapons.
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From page 230... ...
The drastic slowdown in the growth of nuclear power in recent years has caused a glut of natural and enriched uranium on the international market, and the projected plutonium economy has receded into the future. Domestically, the changed prospects in this area are dramatically illustrated by the termination of the Barnwell reprocessing plant and the Clinch River breeder reactor and by the increasingly uncertain future of the large new centrifuge uranium separation plant at Portsmouth, Ohio.
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From page 231... ...
It could also be used to remove the isotope plutonium-240, which has an undesirably high spontaneous fission rate, from the plutonium in spent fuel from power reactors, improving the plutonium's utility for weapons purposes. If applied by non-nuclear weapon states to the accumulated spent fuel from their reactors, it could greatly enlarge the quantity and quality of weaponsusable material accessible to them.
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From page 232... ...
To date, non-proliferation efforts have primarily sought to build legal and political barriers against decisions to fabricate nuclear weapons. International agreements have drawn the line at the actual manufacture of a nuclear explosive, rather than at the acquisition of underlying technical capabilities that might make this possible.
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From page 233... ...
Since the mid-1970s, concern over nuclear weapon capabilities has focused on the most sensitive nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium) and on enrichment and reprocessing facilities for their production.
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From page 234... ...
Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons intensified not only in the United States and the Soviet Union but in many non-nuclear weapon states as well. One result was the negotiation in 1963 of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Appendix D)
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From page 235... ...
request, the principal nuclear supplier states met in 1975-76 to work out common guidelines for nuclear exports.* The resulting Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines, which do not constitute a formal international agreement, include a clarification of the safeguard requirements for exports to nonparties to the NET, the first multilateral attempts to deal with physical security against subnational threats, and constraints on the export of sensitive nuclear materials and facilities.
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From page 236... ...
These U.S. statutes were criticized abroad as discriminatory and inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the NPT to help non-nuclear weapon states develop peaceful nuclear energy.
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From page 237... ...
These safeguards and supply conditions were tightened up somewhat after the Indian nuclear explosion. As interest in commercial reprocessing and plutonium began to emerge in the mid-1970s, the policy of constructive engagement was qualified by selective denial of the most sensitive nuclear exports.
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From page 238... ...
Selective denial defines the effort to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from gaining direct access to weapons-usable material. It is based on the premises that these materials are the pacing items for the fabrication of nuclear weapons and that international safeguards would not provide "timely warning" of their diversion (safeguards are discussed later in this chapter)
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From page 239... ...
Uniform Versus Discriminatory Policies The Reagan Administration has declared that the policy of selective denial of sensitive nuclear exports will be applied less rigorously to Euratom countries and Japan. This decision highlights the issue of the extent to which it is desirable and feasible to establish uniform nonproliferation policies, applicable to all potential trading partners without discrimination.
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From page 240... ...
Critics of this approach point out that non-nuclear weapon states present a wide variety of very different situations. Some states (such as Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany)
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From page 241... ...
Some NPT parties have complained that those provisions of the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines and the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act that restrict the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of Article IV. In response to this criticism, it is argued that while this article was designed to ensure that the parties would not be deprived of the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, it did not remove all discretion as to how this was to be accomplished consistent with the treaty's underlying objective of preventing further proliferation.
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From page 242... ...
Nevertheless, there is no question that the Israeli attack set back the Iraqi nuclear program by several years and that the French and other suppliers will probably be considerably more circumspect in how they replace and fuel the damaged facility. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS A major focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to secure treaty commitments from non-nuclear weapon states not to develop or acquire nuclear explosives.
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From page 243... ...
and non-nuclear weapon states (all other countries) places on all signatories the following basic obligations: · Article I: "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." · Article II: "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." · Article Ill calls on all parties not to export nuclear materials or equipment to any non-nuclear weapon state without international safeguards designed to verify that such exports are not diverted to nuclear explosive programs.
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From page 244... ...
This was designed to prevent the nuclear weapon states from gaining special economic advantage from these developments, which they alone could pursue. During the 1960s the United States had promoted the potential of nuclear explosives for a variety of peaceful purposes.
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From page 245... ...
Many of the non-nuclear weapon states contend that the "basic bargain" consisted of a balance of obligations between the non-nuclear weapon states, who were forswearing nuclear weapons, and the undertakings of the suppliers and the superpowers under Articles IV and V1, and that the latter are not honoring their end of the bargain. The counterarguments are that there has been extensive cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and some progress in nuclear arms control, and that in any event the basic non-proliferation provisions of the treaty benefit the security interests of all its parties.
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From page 246... ...
. In this regard, it should be noted that the treaty was accompanied by parallel declarations by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom that each would "seek immediate Security Council Action to provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used." Thereafter, all five nuclear weapon states entered into a treaty commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American parties to the Treaty of TIateloIco (discussed below)
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From page 247... ...
Protocol IT has been ratified by all five nuclear weapon states, including China, which gives it the unique distinction of being the only nuclear arms control treaty joined by all five of these states. The treaty has been signed by several parties and signatories that have not joined the NPT (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile)
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From page 248... ...
The principal dispute among signatories of the treaty is whether it precludes the acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives by its parties. Most of its parties acknowledge that it has that effect unless and until a clear way of distinguishing peaceful explosives from weapons can be found, but Argentina and Brazil maintain that it does not foreclose their right to acquire such explosives.
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From page 249... ...
Moreover, any tests under the associated Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes could blunt the increasingly successful efforts to establish internationally that peaceful nuclear explosions are unpromising and cannot be excepted from non-proliferation constraints because they are indistinguishable from explosions of nuclear weapons. In contrast, a comprehensive test ban, which is not now being negotiated, is widely held to be important to non-proliferation.
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From page 250... ...
Proponents argue that even states that do not join a comprehensive test ban would be inhibited from conducting tests in an international environment in which most of the states in the world, including the nuclear weapon states, did observe such a ban. However, some critics of a comprehensive test ban argue that testing is not indispensable to the development of first generation nuclear weapons and that, in any event, the states of primary proliferation concern would not be likely to join such a treaty or be influenced by it.
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From page 251... ...
International safeguards provide an agreed mechanism for demonstrating and verifying compliance with commitments not to divert safeguarded material or equipment to any military or explosive use and not to transfer it to any non-nuclear weapon state without safeguards. They also provide detailed knowledge of the location, status, and use of safeguarded material or equipment.
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From page 252... ...
Israel has given no legal or political assurances not to use the plutonium from this reactor to make nuclear explosives. In the case of the safeguarded Soreq reactor, on the other hand, the IDEA has firsthand and continuing knowledge of how it has been operated, how much nuclear material has been supplied to it, and the form, location, and use of that material.
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From page 253... ...
Approximately 5 to 10 kg of separated plutonium or 15 to 20 kg of highly enriched uranium are needed to make a nuclear explosive. The TAEA considers 25 kg of the latter the significant benchmark with regard to Tosses in the fabrication process.
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From page 254... ...
Research reactors range from very small reactors, whose inventories and annual throughputs are insignificant in terms of the requirements for a nuclear weapon, to large reactors that use or produce significant quantities of weapons-usable material. There are a few research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium or capable of producing significant quantities of plutonium.
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From page 255... ...
In light of this potential risk, proponents of a strict interpretation of the timely warning test believe that weapons-usable materials should not be available to any non-nuclear weapon state. Those who disagree with this viewpoint do not deny the theoretical risk but believe that considerable weight should also be given to other factors, such as whether the state in question already has access to substantial quantities of weapons-usable material and whether there is any evidence that it might have decided to develop nuclear explosives.
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From page 256... ...
The 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act deals with this issue by requiring a formal judgment before the United States consents to the reprocessing abroad of nuclear materials originating in the United States or to international transfers of plutonium that the risk of proliferation would not significantly increase. "Foremost consideration" must be given to whether the reprocessing or retransfer would take place "under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the United States well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device." This legislative compromise did not dispose of the underlying issue as to what mix of capabilities and intentions constitutes proliferation.
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From page 257... ...
, and importing non-nuclear weapon states without full-scope safeguards. Even in the United States, debate continues as to whether the full-scope safeguards condition should be extended to cover exports of nonnuclear components of nuclear facilities and related materials such as heavy water.
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From page 258... ...
The NPT includes a commitment by its non-nuclear weapon parties to accept IAEA safeguards on all of their present and future peaceful nuclear activities. These are known as de jure full-scope safeguards.
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From page 259... ...
consent to the reprocessing of the spent fuel in Indian facilities) were tied to this guaranteed fuel supply, as was the clarification obtained by the United States in 1974 that India would not use this fuel in any nuclear explosive, even if labeled "peaceful." When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act forced the United States to terminate fuel deliveries to India, India took the position that since this was a material breach of the agreement, India was relieved of its reciprocal obligations.
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From page 260... ...
Safeguards on Exports to NucIcar Weapon States. The NPT does not obligate a nuclear weapon state to safeguard its own nuclear programs or to require safeguards on nuclear exports to other nuclear weapon states.
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From page 261... ...
The NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines both require safeguards against diversion to any nuclear explosive device, regardless of its intended use. This is to avoid a loophole by which a nation might develop nuclear explosives for purposes asserted to be "peaceful." There is general agreement that a nuclear explosive device suitable for peaceful applications, such as nuclear excavation or the stimulation of oil or gas wells, would be usable as a weapon and could not be developed without acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
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From page 262... ...
nuclear exports in the same way. The IAEA took the position that any nuclear explosive device inherently furthers a military purpose.
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From page 263... ...
. to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source or special nuclear materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose .
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From page 264... ...
Thus, if safeguards inspectors found declared and safeguarded highly enriched uranium or plutonium fabricated into shapes suitable for nuclear explosives, they would have no authority to object so Tong as the material remained accounted for and was not actually made into a weapon, although they would presumably report the finding. The proposed international plutonium storage system under discussion in the IAEA could partially remedy this defect.
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From page 265... ...
At the same time, it can be argued that, if the safeguards system discovered a serious violation, it would soon be widely known and the international community would be fully informed about the problem. HOLDOUTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME The most immediate and challenging problem in the field of nonproliferation is how to deal with the small number of states that have deliberately avoided international commitments and controls in order to preserve a nuclear weapons option that some of them appear to be pursuing.
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From page 266... ...
The principal non-proliferation objectives with respect to India are to head off the resumption of its nuclear explosive program and to persuade it to continue to maintain a prudent export policy that minimizes the risk of India's becoming a source of further proliferation. Since it is no longer possible to deprive India of the capability to manufacture some nuclear weapons, the practical problem is to persuade it that nuclear weapons are not in its overall interest and that it should refrain from further developments in this direction.
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From page 267... ...
It would probably also result in a cutoffof U.S. economic and military aid under the present five-year $3.2 billion program, since the authorizing legislation calls for such a cutoff if the recipient detonates a nuclear explosive device or transfers such a device to a non-nuclear weapon state.
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From page 268... ...
In addition, it may have acquired enough highly enriched uranium for a number of nuclear weapons from a U.S. facility that could not account for the Toss of the material under .
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From page 269... ...
and will require safeguards on all of its nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states. Argentina The proliferation concern in Argentina, which has indigenous uranium resources and is acquiring a large heavy water production plant, focuses on an unsafeguarded reprocessing plant, a large unsafeguarded research reactor that has Tong been planned, and a recently announced unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility that is under construction.
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From page 270... ...
and completion of the pending French ratification of Protocol I Thus, non-proliferation objectives in Brazil are to achieve full-scope safeguards coverage, to complete the preconditions so that the Treaty of TIateloico will come into force for Brazil, to persuade Brazil that a nuclear explosive program would not be in its security or economic interests, and to persuade Brazil to exercise prudence in its nuclear exports so as to minimize the risk of its becoming a source of further proliferation.
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From page 271... ...
While this completes the list of countries generally thought to be of near-term proliferation concern, it must be recognized that if the international security environment changed dramatically if, for example, the current non-proliferation regime or certain alliance relationships disintegrated some of the major industrial states, which clearly have the capabilities to make nuclear weapons on a large scale relatively quickly, might decide to do so. This would obviously have extremely serious implications for international security.
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From page 272... ...
Some of the supplier countries also disagree with the emphasis that has sometimes been placed on capabilities rather than intentions. This is understandable, since they also have the requisite capabilities for a nuclear weapons program and therefore wish to emphasize the importance of legal and political commitments to non-proliferation.
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From page 273... ...
interest in supporting Pakistani resistance to the Soviet threat in South Asia, encouraging the new Argentine government, and not precipitating default on international loans by Argentina or Brazil, also limit such action. Finally, the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to make progress in nuclear arms control, and the continued emphasis of the nuclear weapon states on the need for and utility of nuclear weapons in an ever-broadening military context, greatly complicate the task of persuading the problem countries not to acquire their own nuclear weapons.
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