Nuclear Arms Control Background and Issues (1985) / Chapter Skim
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3 The Nuclear Freeze
3 The Nuclear Freeze
Pages 81-106
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From page 81... ...
The freeze concept has increasingly become a political symbol of commitment to arms control and opposition to the Reagan Administration's approach to arms control. The Reagan Administration opposes a comprehensive freeze at current levels as being contrary to U.S.
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From page 82... ...
In 1980 Forsberg prepared a public memorandum entitled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," which challenged the United States and the Soviet Union to stop the nuclear arms race by adopting a comprehensive freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. In the memorandum, Forsberg argued that ending the nuclear arms race with a comprehensive freeze was the crucial first step that the superpowers needed to take at this time, because the next generation of more dangerous counterforce nuclear weapons would disrupt the present balance of forces and increase the likelihood of nuclear .
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From page 83... ...
military relations, the administration's early statements about fighting and surviving nuclear war, the administration's calls for a vastly increased defense budget, the administration's delay in initiating nuclear arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and its failure to achieve progress once it did so, and the simple, direct language of the proposal. The Congress and Freeze Resolutions The nuclear freeze movement was raised to a national level on March 10, 1982, when identical nuclear freeze resolutions were introduced in the U.S.
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From page 84... ...
As Congress continued to consider the freeze resolutions and the Democratic party began to assess the issue, the freeze movement emerged as a political symbol of commitment to arms control and opposition to the administration's approach to the problem. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected a resolution that called for a freeze and commended the administration's START proposal.
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From page 85... ...
Several weeks after the election the struggle between the administration's approach to arms control and the grass-roots freeze movement took on a new dimension when President Reagan stated that he believed that a number of "sincere" Americans who were supporting the freeze were being manipulated by foreign interests who wanted to weaken America, and that "foreign agents" had helped "instigate" the freeze movement. The leaders ofthe freeze campaign were outraged and reaffirmed that one of the their projected goals for the 9Sth Congress was to send a joint freeze resolution to the President.
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From page 86... ...
not been permitted to land in New York, that the Soviet Union proposed to cease, under effective verification, the buildup of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons; to renounce the deployment of new-kinds and types of such arms; to establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and new kinds and types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles; and to stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating arms. Gromyko added that the freeze could initially apply to the Soviet Union and the United States on a bilateral basis, by way of example to other nuclear states.
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From page 87... ...
This approach differed from that of the earlier freeze resolutions, which expressed the sense of Congress without carrying the force of law. The new tactic was to press Congress to implement a limited freeze by suspending funds for the testing of nuclear warheads and the testing and deployment of new ballistic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, provided the Soviet Union halted the same activities.
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From page 88... ...
Since the original nuclear freeze resolutions appeared on state and local referendums in November 1980, there have been many general formulations of the proposal that differ in scope and detail. The leadership of the nuclear freeze campaign has consistently maintained, however, that their objective is to stop the arms race by an immediate, mutual, verifiable, comprehensive freeze that would prevent further testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
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From page 89... ...
pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race; (b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems; and (c)
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From page 90... ...
Whereas the Soviet Union has more strategic missiles and more and larger lanc3-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that This discussion assumes a comprehensive freeze ~ long the lines outlined in the November 1982 Scientific American article by Randall Forsberg and generally supported by the leadership of the freeze movement.
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From page 91... ...
than comparisons of numbers of weapons is the fact that both countries have acquired enormous "overkill," that is, each has many times the number of weapons necessary to destroy the other's urban population and society. Critics of the Comprehensive Freeze Administration of ficials and many other critics of the freeze reject the assessment that parity exists between the superpowers.
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From page 92... ...
By banning the testing of nuclear weapons and new delivery systems, the comprehensive freeze would effectively stop their development, since significant advances could not be made without testing. This would essentially eliminate the qualitative nuclear arms race.
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From page 93... ...
The ban on the fabrication of nuclear weapons would prevent stockpiled fissionable materials or old nuclear warheads from being used to make newer models. Freeze supporters also assert that the comprehensive freeze would not undercut European security because the freeze would preserve the present overall U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, which is the real determinant of European security.
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From page 94... ...
Freeze supporters argue that it is not necessary to complicate the comprehensive nuclear freeze by including nonnuclear air defense and antisubmarine warfare systems, since these systems do not pose a serious threat to existing retaliatory strategic forces. They point out that ballistic missile defenses are adequately constrained by the SALT ~ ABM Treaty.
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From page 95... ...
The comprehensive nuclear freeze proposal has been criticized both by supporters of the START approach, which seeks to improve the strategic balance by deep reductions without qualitative restraints, and by supporters of the incremental approach, which permits modernization within specified limits, as characterized by the SALT process. Supporters of the START approach argue that the comprehensive freeze at existing levels would be extremely dangerous to U.S.
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From page 96... ...
strategic triad in the foreseeable future, contend the critics. The comprehensive freeze would limit the United States to its present strategic systems and capabilities while not constraining either Soviet nonnuclear air defense systems or nonnuclear antisubmarine warfare systems, thus making the U.S.
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From page 97... ...
Some critics of the freeze inside and outside the administration argue that, despite its apparently radical approach to nuclear arms control, the freeze does not go nearly far enough. According to these critics, it neither requires immediate reductions nor creates a framework that would encourage reductions in the future.
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From page 98... ...
They argue that the negotiations would inevitably be a long, drawn-out undertaking that would not produce concrete results for several years, during which time the arms race would continue. They point out that the experience of the SALT, START, and Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations demonstrates conclusively that developing the detailed language of a comprehensive freeze agreement would prove to be extremely complex and time-consuming.
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From page 99... ...
Those critics who support the incremental approach of the SALT process argue that a prolonged and possibly unsuccessful freeze negotiation is a poor alternative to the early ratification of SALT or or an updated version ofthat agreement. Moreover, they express concern that the freeze movement, by raising unrealistic expectations about the prospects of an early freeze agreement, will divert arms control efforts into a controversial and unproductive path while undercutting a public consensus in support of more limited arms control agreements that might be negotiated relatively quickly.
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From page 100... ...
Any indication of deployment or production would signal a possible violation, so details of definition or complex quotas on production would not arise. The synergistic effect of various mutually reinforcing aspects of the comprehensive freeze would make it easier to verify than the total of its individual components.
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From page 101... ...
The halt in production of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems under a comprehensive freeze would assist this monitoring process. As long as tactical and battlefield systems and associated nuclear warheads continue to be manufactured, the entire production chain for nuclear weapons will remain operational, making verification much more difficult.
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From page 102... ...
Thus, it is highly unlikely, according to freeze supporters, that either party would see any real military advantage in trying to build a small number of additional nuclear weapons or delivery systems clandestinely. Critics of the Comprehensive Freeze The verifiability of a comprehensive nuclear freeze has been challenged not only by the Reagan Administration but also by many arms control analysts who supported the verifiability of the SALT ~ and SALT II agreements.
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From page 103... ...
In light of this experience, according to the administration, the United States simply cannot base its national security on trust in the Soviet Union. Some arms control analysts who supported the verifiability of the SALT agreements and a comprehensive test ban share some of the technical concerns about verifying a ban on the production of nuclear delivery systems, particularly those involving the fabrication of nuclear weapons and the production of small and dual-capable systems.
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From page 104... ...
Shortly after the Soviet Union formally presented its freeze proposal, several Soviet arms control experts, in unofficial conferences on arms control, stated that a freeze on the maximum spectrum of systems
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From page 105... ...
But they argued that, with political will, leaders could resolve these issues. The introduction of the Soviet freeze proposal at the United Nations was the first official Soviet endorsement of the comprehensive freeze approach, although the Soviet press, in its extensive coverage of the U.S.
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From page 106... ...
Soviet of ficials have stated that the call for a freeze is consistent with their positions in the INF and START negotiations and does not preclude other approaches to arms control. In the United States there has been relatively little reaction to the Soviet proposal in the United Nations.
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