Naval Forces' Defense Capabilities Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Threats (2004) / Chapter Skim
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1 The Chemical and Biological Threat to Naval Forces
1 The Chemical and Biological Threat to Naval Forces
Pages 15-29
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From page 15... ...
FRAMING THE PROBLEM A Clear and Present Threat To set the context for the findings, conclusions, and recommendations presented in Chapters 2 through 5, the committee first evaluates the present and projected threat of chemical and biological weapons to naval force operations in littoral and open-ocean regions.
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From page 16... ...
As key technologies become more mature and widely available, adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons can be expected to gain increased technical sophistication and operational capability. Taking into account the types of events listed in the prologue, this assessment of the chemical and biological threat to naval forces derives from the following principal factors: 1.
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From page 17... ...
Among these taking the initiative to improve capabilities, however, some have tended to focus on the better-known approaches to countering chemical weapons, such as the Marine Corps' Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) , sometimes mislabeling their efforts as constituting both a chemical and a biological defense.
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From page 18... ...
National leadership appears to be assuming that the United States faces no such peer competitor in the foreseeable security environment because it has framed a defense strategy that describes instead a world in which a handful of regional powers and transnational terrorist organizations are acquiring weapons of mass destruction to gain regional dominance and to confound U.S. power projection strategies.
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From page 19... ...
Their potential high utility and the relative ease of acquiring a biological weapons capability as opposed to a nuclear weapons capability were primary motivators of the Nixon administration's decision to renounce biological weapons. The hope was that creating a norm and treaty regime against biological weapons would inhibit their proliferation to additional states and persuade states with existing programs to disarm.8 Lethal chemical weapons, with their more rapid lethal effects and limited area coverage (for individual bombs or artillery shells)
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From page 20... ...
. Thus, the United States did retain offensive chemical weapons until chemical arms control agreements could be negotiated.9 In addition, the United States committed a significant level of effort to fashioning an ability to fight and survive against Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons in spite of most other NATO members' recalcitrance about doing the same.
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From page 21... ...
The difficulty of accurately characterizing adversary capabilities is well illustrated by the revelations of the last decade about undetected weapons development in South Africa and elsewhere.10 The intelligence community has been harshly criticized for not doing well enough with the information that is available.11 The standard approach of the intelligence community characterizes the CW or BW threat in technical as opposed to operational terms. For example, threat agents and their technical characteristics are described and countries of concern are listed, but trends in the proliferation of delivery systems are not generally linked with weapon configurations to provide insight into overall capabilities.
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From page 22... ...
2001. Report of the Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force on Biological Defense, Washington, D.C., June, pp.
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From page 23... ...
Chemical and biological warfare agents have different technical characteristics that require appropriate operational responses. Chemical weapons are poisons whose direct physiological effects are generally well characterized.
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From page 24... ...
Their strategic value would come largely from inducing fear or by degrading the overall effectiveness of naval forces by placing them in a continuous protective posture. (Appendix B lists various chemical agents and their effects, including effective doses and rates of action.)
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From page 25... ...
Although terrorist success in mastering these capabilities has been limited, it was reported in the late 1990s that both Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda had made significant investments and were at work assembling potentially effective capabilities.17 In the CW realm, those states that have dabbled in entry-level capabilities with first- and secondgeneration chemical warfare agents appear to be moving on to third- and fourthgeneration agents.18 In the BW realm, there is sharply rising concern about the impact of the biotechnology revolution on the BW threat. As the recent DSB/ TRAC study emphasizes, the likely impact of this revolution on the threat over the coming decade could be a dramatic transformation in the threat: "Time is short.
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From page 26... ...
This fundamental understanding is not, however, reflected in the current Joint CBD Program, which is crafted on a philosophy of contamination avoidance in all situations, in spite of Joint Staff guidance to the contrary.22 More realistic and practical is a risk management approach which assumes that contamination will happen and balances avoidance with managing the response. With an understanding of the threat as described above, it is possible to take the next step, to characterize risk.
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From page 27... ...
In summary, the tables are provided as an illustration of the type of analyses that the Navy ought to conduct in each command with a view to particularizing the risk management plan. With this perspective on the risk of chemical or biological attacks to naval forces, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the Navy's present focus.
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From page 28... ...
Protective garments (suits and masks) were required to withstand a liquid chemical challenge of 10 g/m2 and a chemical vapor challenge of 5,000 to 10,000 mg-min/m3 -- conditions typical of the center of a chemical munitions detonation, especially if delivered by artillery in a standard firing pattern.23 Biological weapons challenge parameters were not defined; rather, it was assumed that protective measures effective against chemical weapons would be effective against biological weapons.
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From page 29... ...
It focuses more on how an adversary might fight than on who the adversary might be and where a war might occur. The shift is intended to refocus planners on the growing range of capabilities that adversaries might possess or could develop.24 Although addressing military capabilities in general, these statements regarding capabilities-based planning are particularly relevant to the approach and solutions for chemical and biological weapons defense -- and should provide the basis for the path forward for the Navy.
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